Memorandum by the Department for Constitutional
Affairs and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (VOT 01)
1. The Government welcomes this opportunity
to submit a memorandum to the Committees on the issue of voter
registration and looks forward to the Committees' report.
2. This memorandum has been produced jointly
by the Department for Constitutional Affairs and the Office of
the Deputy Prime Minister. It includes a statement of current
Government policy on the issue of individual registration and
addresses each of the other issues identified by the Committees.
THE GOVERNMENT'S
POSITION ON
INDIVIDUAL REGISTRATION
The Electoral Commission's recommendation
3. Voter registration in England, Scotland
and Wales is currently run as a combination of annual household
registration and individual "rolling" registration.
A person in each household is required to complete a form once
a year listing all those eligible to vote at that address. In
addition, individual "rolling" registration is available,
mainly used by those who move house part way through the year.
4. The Electoral Commission has recommended
that electoral registration should move to a system based entirely
on individual registration. This change envisages that, once a
year, an individual form would be used for each person in a household,
making everyone responsible for their own registration and meaning
that one individual in each household would no longer have this
role. The "rolling" individual registration to take
account of changes of address would continue.
5. The Commission further recommended that
along with individual registration, new requirements for individual
voter identifiers should be introduced, in addition to those that
currently apply. These identifiers, the Commission suggested,
should be a signature and date of birth. The Commission additionally
suggested the use of a unique registration number for database
management purposes.
6. The Commission argued that the effect
of these changes would be a more accurate register and a firmer
foundation on which to base remote voting methods.
The experience in Northern Ireland
7. Individual registration was introduced
in Northern Ireland under the Electoral Fraud (Northern Ireland)
Act 2002. The Act was intended to address the widespread perception
of electoral fraud in Northern Ireland and has been widely judged
as successful in achieving this. [1]
8. A consequence of the Act, however, has
been a significant drop in levels of registration. Although some
reduction in registration levels was expected as a result of increased
accuracy, the entire drop cannot be attributed to this. The numbers
of people registered to vote in Northern Ireland dropped from
1,192,136 entries on the August 2002 register (95.5% of the population
identified by the census) to 1,072,425 entries following the December
2002 canvass (86% of the population). Although the number of people
on the register increased over the year as rolling registration
was utilised, the fall in numbers of voters registered remained
at around 100,000 entries. At the following canvass, the total
number of entries fell slightly further, to 1,069,160. [2]This
drop in the number of people registered came despite the use of
extensive advertising and outreach campaigns, in addition to door
to door canvassing.
9. On 30 November 2004, John Spellar MP,
Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office, made a statement
to Parliament announcing that, in the light of a downward drift
in registration rates, the Government intends to bring to an end
the annual canvass in Northern Ireland. This will reduce the burden
on individuals and allow resources to be better targeted towards
those with the lowest levels of registration. As this will require
primary legislation, in the meantime the "carry-forward"
of electors' names, which allows people to remain on the register
for one year if they do not return a canvass form and which was
halted in 2002, will be reinstated. In this way, Government hopes
to maintain the high levels of accuracy and confidence that the
new system benefits from, whilst also ensuring registers are comprehensive.
The Government's position in the rest of the UK
10. The Government is sympathetic to the
principles of individual registration and appreciates the benefits
that it might bring to the rest of the UK, but is concerned about
maintaining a simple and clear system and comprehensive registers.
11. The introduction of individual registration
in Northern Ireland was a successful response to an issue specific
to Northern Ireland. However, given the experience of a reduction
in levels of registration, and while the work to reform Northern
Ireland's registration system further to ensure that registers
are complete as well as accurate is not concluded, the Government
does not believe that it would be appropriate to introduce the
system in place in Northern Ireland to the rest of the UK at this
time.
12. We are, however, considering any changes
that may be necessary to ensure that future remote voting methods
are made secure. The Electoral Commission had recommended that
individual registration was a prerequisite for any future roll-out
of remote voting methods, including all-postal voting or its proposed
"foundation model".[3]
We agree that as with all methods of voting, it is vital that
remote voting mechanisms are secure and are seen to be so and,
as such, we will continue to work with the Commission on the modernisation
of voting methods and will consider any changes to the registration
system that may be beneficial in achieving this.
(a) Advantages of individual registration
compared with the existing system of household registration
13. The Government recognises the potential
benefits of individual registration, particularly in terms of
supporting electoral modernisation, as seen in Northern Ireland
and as set out by the Electoral Commission and in the ODPM Select
Committee's report on postal voting.
14. However, the Government is also aware
of the concerns of others, such as the Northern Ireland Affairs
Committee, whose recent report on individual registration in Northern
Ireland stated that:
The Electoral Commission recommended that
individual registration as well as the abolition of the carry-forward
mechanism should be extended to Great Britain. In view of the
problems identified in this report, we strongly recommend that
the Government follows this advice only once satisfactory strategies
have been put in place in Northern Ireland for alleviating the
problems of under-registration among particular population groups.
[4]
15. As stated above, we are therefore engaged
with the Commission and others in the process of looking at the
various options available to support electoral modernisation and
remote voting—including the Commission's "foundation
model", which is currently in development—whilst ensuring
that electoral registers are not only accurate, but also complete.
(b) Strategies for encouraging registration,
in particular among young voters, and tackling resistance to registration;
and examination of the advantages and disadvantages of compulsory
registration
16. Promoting participation in the electoral
process, which includes electoral registration, was a function
given to the Electoral Commission under the Political Parties,
Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The Commission has been active
in this area, conducting research, producing policy reports, providing
voter education and running advertising campaigns. We await with
particular interest research commenced by the Commission to assess
the extent and nature of non-registration in Britain, expected
in Summer 2005.
17. The Government has also been active
in developing ways to encourage registration. For example, the
Representation of the People Act (RPA) 2000 introduced a number
of changes to voter registration procedures designed to make registration
easier and more convenient as well as to improve the accuracy
of the register.
18. The changes included the introduction
of what is known as "rolling registration". Rolling
registration enables people to register at any time of the year.
Prior to this, electors were only able to register each autumn
through the annual canvass. If a person missed this opportunity,
they had to wait until the next year before they could register.
Rolling registration has been particularly helpful for persons
who move during the course of the year, such as students, who
may now apply to register at their new address as soon as they
take up residence there. Rolling registration makes it easier
for individuals to register to vote and to participate in elections
in their new location, and for electoral registration officers
to achieve more accurate and up to date registers.
19. The changes made by the RPA 2000 also,
for the first time, enabled persons without a permanent address
to register to vote by making a declaration of local connection.
In this way, homeless people can now register to vote. There are
also provisions enabling registration by voluntary patients in
mental hospitals and prisoners on remand.
20. The Government is also currently engaged
in a project aimed at gaining a greater understanding of the attitudes
and motivations of the electorate in order to develop effective
policies to encourage engagement and participation. The project
involves research into understanding why certain groups of people,
particularly those who are currently least likely to register
or vote such as young people and some BMEs, may fail to register
to vote, and is aimed at generating possible solutions. We expect
the results to be available later this year.
21. On the issue of compulsory registration,
it should be noted that it is already an offence to fail to supply
information to a registration officer when requested. This includes
requests for information on an annual canvass form, and is provided
for under regulation 23 of the Representation of the People (England
and Wales) Regulations 2001. The offence is punishable by a fine
of up to £1,000. The result is that registration is, in effect,
compulsory at the time of a canvass.
(c) Issues of geographic and ethnic variations
in levels of voter registration
22. The Government is aware of some evidence—such
as that contained in the Electoral Commission's report on the
Electoral Fraud (Northern Ireland) Act 2002—that suggests
geographic and ethnic variations in levels of voter registration.
It is envisaged that the two pieces of research discussed in the
previous section will provide additional evidence on this issue,
as well as suggesting possible solutions where registration levels
are low.
(d) Advantages or disadvantages of electronic
rather than paper-based registration systems
23. Voter registration has traditionally
been a paper-based system. However, over the last three or so
years, an increasing number of local authorities have begun to
allow households which wish to report "no change" to
the information given during the previous annual canvass to do
this via automated telephone systems or through the Internet.
The local authorities involved in this report that up to one third
of households now choose to respond by these methods. They also
report positive elector feedback and state that the new systems
cut down considerably on the administration involved in running
the annual canvass.
24. For those electors wishing to make use
of "rolling registration" arrangements, the Electoral
Commission's website provides a form which can be completed online
but which must then be printed, signed and posted to the local
elections office. This system allows voter registration information
to be provided at a central point and is useful in facilitating
registration where an individual has moved. Many local authorities
offer a similar service at a local level.
25. In The Electoral Registration Process,
the Electoral Commission recommended that online and telephone
registration should be extended to accommodate full, online changes
of details and address, once individual registration had been
implemented. The Government shares this goal, but, in the absence
of a system that gathers unique voter identifiers, believes that
it is more difficult to extend these forms of registration while
maintaining a proper balance between increased convenience and
a high level of security.
26. We will continue to take these issues
forward through an existing working group made up of electoral
administrators and officials from Government and the Electoral
Commission. As part of this process we will also continue to consult
groups representing people with disabilities, for whom online
and telephone registration systems may prove particularly beneficial.
(e) Difficulties for the disabled and others
unable to complete forms
27. As with all aspects of the electoral
system, the Government is keen to ensure that voter registration
is as accessible as possible and notes the work done by the Commission
in this area, particularly through their issuing of best practice
guidance.
28. In considering changes to the registration
system, the Government has invited several organisations to comment,
including SCOPE, SENSE and the RNIB. It is the Government's intention
to continue to involve such groups in all aspects of electoral
modernisation.
(f) Availability and confidentiality of
the register
29. The electoral register has since its
introduction in the nineteenth century been a public document.
A public register of electors is an important safeguard against
the potential for abuse of the electoral system. The primary purpose
behind its public accessibility is to allow members of the public
and political parties to check the register to ensure that all
eligible names have been included, and that names of ineligible
people have not.
30. Formerly, the register could be made
available for a variety of other purposes. However, the Representation
of the People (England and Wales)(Amendment) Regulations 2002,
[5]amended
the existing Regulations[6]
that deal with registration ("the amended 2001 Regulations"),
and tightened up access to the register by establishing a new
framework governing access to, and supply and sale of electoral
registers. The 2002 Regulations addressed privacy and security
concerns expressed by the public arising from the possible misuse
of data on the electoral register, and took into account the ramifications
of the case of R v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council
ex parte Robertson[7]
("Robertson").
31. As a result of the amended 2001 Regulations,
each registration officer now keeps two versions of the electoral
register: a full version and an edited version. The full register
contains details of all registered electors. It is available for
inspection by members of the public, under supervision. It may
be sold and supplied to certain specified persons and organisations
for specified purposes: to political parties, MPs, certain office
holders and candidates for electoral purposes; to law enforcement
agencies and government departments for the prevention and detection
of crime, and criminal law enforcement purposes; to credit reference
agencies for checking a person's identity when they apply for
credit and the prevention of money laundering fraud; and to certain
other bodies, eg the British Library and the Office for National
Statistics for specified purposes.
32. Members of the public may choose to
have their details omitted from the edited register, which is
available for sale to anyone for any purpose.
33. The amended 2001 Regulations secure
compliance with data protection and human rights law. There have
been two court cases concerning the operation and interpretation
of these amended Regulations, [8]and
in each case the Court has upheld them and found them to be compliant
with data protection and human rights legislation.
34. The new framework governing access to
and supply of electoral registers has now been in operation for
over two years. The Government proposes to consult in the near
future on a limited package of proposed changes to address particular
issues that have arisen following the bringing into force of the
amended 2001 Regulations. For example, it is proposed to clarify
that certain agencies and organisations, in addition to those
already provided for, may have access to the full register for
specified purposes, and to provide for storage of old electoral
registers in public libraries and local authority archives offices.
35. The Government considers that the policy
surrounding access to and supply of electoral registers—as
embodied in the amended 2001 Regulations—is settled. The
proposed changes are therefore being brought forward within the
framework established by those Regulations. They will address
issues that have been raised following their introduction, and
in some cases ensure that the Regulations achieve what it was
originally intended they would achieve. They preserve the balance
between individual privacy and rights of access by public authorities
that was endorsed by the Robertson judgments.
36. Separate to this, the Government is
moving forward with proposals for a system of "anonymous"
registration in order to protect people whose appearance on the
electoral register may be the source of a threat to their safety.
The proposals follow an Electoral Commission recommendation and
are supported by groups including Rights of Women, Network for
Surviving Stalking and Victim Support. The proposals are being
developed with recognition of the importance of the public nature
of the electoral register, there will be stringent criteria and
we expect the number of "anonymous" registrations to
be very low
(g) Basis for individual registration, eg
address-based or on personal criteria such as NI number or birth
date
37. In considering our position on individual
registration we have looked at the issues around the use of addresses,
NI numbers and birth dates, and will continue to do so as part
of our continuing work on the registration system.
(h) The desirability of a national electoral
register
38. The Electoral Commission's May 2003
report The Electoral Registration Process recommended that:
(a) "electoral registers should be
universally electronically maintained according to mandatory national
standards"; and
(b) "electoral registers should continue
to be compiled and managed locally, but should form part of a
national register." The Government broadly accepts these
recommendations.
39. Electoral registration officers are
free to choose which electoral registration software to use in
discharging their functions. There are currently six main private
sector companies that each supply the UK market with different
software, plus around 20 electoral registration officers who use
a bespoke "in-house" system. This variation can create
obstacles to the efficient conduct of both "rolling registration"
and e-voting pilot schemes: in both cases registration data is
passed between electoral IT systems potentially provided by different
software suppliers. Standardisation of the way data is held and
transmitted by different software packages should help make those
electoral processes more efficient.
40. Additionally, there are a number of
"national" bodies who need to obtain copies of the electoral
register from every electoral registration officer for the conduct
of their commercial or statutory business. Examples include: The
Electoral Commission; Government bodies (eg the Court Service);
the Police; registered political parties; and registered credit
reference agencies. Again, due to the local nature of electoral
registration, these bodies are currently obliged to separately
approach over 400 individual registration officers to obtain copies
of their local register. Accordingly, whilst we accept that there
should in future be access to locally compiled electoral registration
data through a central point for authorised "national"
users, we have not yet decided what precise form those arrangements
should take (nor, indeed, whether there needs to be an actual
database at the centre rather than a portal providing access to
all the local data).
41. We are also investigating the extent
to which other benefits to the electoral process might be realised
through a system of national access. For example, whether the
national access arrangements might also provide more efficient
cross-referencing between registers, improving detection of erroneous
duplication.
42. On 15 January 2004, the Government announced
in the House of Commons the launch of the Co-ordinated Online
Register of Electors (CORE) project to deliver the standardisation
and national access referred to above. In the summer and autumn
of 2004 we undertook a public consultation and we are continuing
to work with stakeholders to move the project forward in tandem
with the wider Electoral Modernisation Programme.
(i) Means of ensuring the security of the
register: PIN numbers, electoral voting cards, signatures
43. Electoral registration officers have
a range of powers to help them compile and maintain accurate and
secure registers. They include the power to seek more information
from an elector and to remove persons from the register who do
not meet the conditions for registration. It is an offence punishable
by a fine of up to £1,000 to fail to comply with a request
for information from an electoral registration officer, or to
give false information. As stated above, the full electoral register
is also open to public inspection, under supervision, which means
that it can be checked to make sure that only eligible persons
are on it.
44. Electoral registration officers also
have the power to inspect records kept by the local council which
appointed them, and those kept by a registrar of births, deaths
and marriages to enable them to maintain accurate details on the
register. This means that where, for example, an electoral registration
officer suspects that a person should be registered but he has
not received a canvass form, he can confirm that person's residence
by reference to other data.
45. For the future, as stated above, we
are currently considering the various options available for utilising
the registration system to underpin our programme of electoral
modernisation. In approaching this issue, the Government believes
that all methods of voting must be secure and seen to be secure,
but recognises also that levels of electoral fraud are widely
considered to be very low and that there is a balance to be struck
between security and accessibility.
1 See the Electoral Commission report: The Electoral
Fraud (Northern Ireland) Act 2002: An assessment of its first
year in operation. Back
2
Source: the Electoral Office for Northern Ireland. Back
3
The Electoral Commission Delivering Democracy?, p 72. Back
4
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee: Electoral Registration in
Northern Ireland, para 82. Back
5
S.I. 2002/1971. Back
6
The Representation of the People (England & Wales) Regulations
2001, S.I. 2001/341. Back
7
R v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council ex parte Robertson
[2002] QB 1052 "(Robertson No 1)". Back
8
I-CD Publishing Ltd v Secretary of State [2003] EWHC 1761,
The Times, 11 August 2003 and R v Secretary of State
for the Home Department ex parte Robertson [2003] EWHC 1760
"(Robertson No 2)". Back
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