Select Committee on Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: Housing, Planning, Local Government and the Regions Written Evidence


APPENDIX B

REVENUE INCENTIVES FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING

SUMMARY

  Local authorities, particularly those in "high demand" areas, could be encouraged to support housing association (RSL) development of more affordable housing if they were to be offered revenue funding on usable capital receipts.

KEYPOINTS

  1.  The output of social rented dwellings from the Housing Corporation funded programme in London has not increased to fully replace the supply (over 1,000 homes pa) of new RSL dwellings formerly funded by London boroughs.

  2.  There are no specific financial incentives for local authorities to use their capital resources such as usable capital receipts to fund development by registered social landlords (RSLs).

  3.  The consequent anticipated future shortfall in investment due to the absence of revenue incentives wouldwill reduce rehousing of homeless from temporary accommodation. This will increase the (housing benefit) cost to Government.

  4.  The cost of temporary accommodation will exceed the revenue incentive needed to encourage the use of capital receipts to support housing investment.

  5.  It therefore makes financial sense for the Government to provide a revenue financial incentive for local authorities to apply capital resources (such as usable capital receipts) to fund RSLs in "high demand" areas where are substantial temporary accommodation costs.

1.  INTRODUCTION

  1.1  This report considers incentives for local authorities to fund the development of social rented housing by RSLs and so reduce usage of high-cost temporary accommodation.

2.  BACKGROUND

  2.1  With-debt local authorities wishing to support new additional RSL development from 2004-05 through use of their own capital resources will incur revenue costs, either as a result of debt charges or foregone interest. Exceptions were made for some schemes in London starting in 2003-04 which operated under previous financial arrangements.

  2.2  Previously local authorities were incentivised to use their own capital investment resources to fund RSL developments through the Local Authority Social Housing Grant (LASHG) arrangements.

3.  IMPLICATIONS

  3.1  From 2004-05 there is no revenue support to local authorities considering funding RSL schemes. Inevitably local authorities will be unlikely to use their capital resources such as usable capital receipts to fund RSLs if there is no financial incentive for them to do so.

  3.2  In the late 1990s the output of rented housing by RSLs in London was slightly over 6,000 per annum. This included over 1,000 per annum funded through Local Authority Social Housing Grant.

  3.3  The London Housing Board redirected £68.4 million of BCA funding to the ADP for 2004-06 to make up for the loss of the facility to use BCA funding to fund RSLs in London. However, this has not addressed the threatened redirection of other funding sources, mainly capital receipts, away from funding RSLs.

  3.4  The output from the London ADP allocations in 2004-05 and 2005-06 will only average just under 5,000 per annum.

  3.5  There are over 60,000 London households in temporary accommodation, rising by 5,000 each year. Most London social housing lettings rehouse the homeless. Hence losing access to the investment resource of usable capital receipts will reduce rehousing of homeless from temporary accommodation.

  3.6  Higher numbers in temporary accommodation will increase the Housing Benefit cost to Government. This increase would exceed the revenue incentive needed to encourage the use of capital receipts to support housing investment.

  3.7  Every £100 million of capital resources directed away from housing investment in London through RSLs means about 800 fewer dwellings. An analysis by London Housing shows that the long term net public expenditure cost would exceed £30 million.

  3.8  The potential saving to central Government through a revenue incentive scheme occurs in London largely as a result of the high cost of temporary accommodation, and the large (and growing) backlog of households in temporary accommodation. The fact that the great bulk of existing available family-sized lettings go to the priority homeless means that additional supply is needed to reduce the numbers in temporary accommodation.

  3.9  In addition, investment in RSL development by local authorities traditionally brought added value to housing association funding mechanisms by meeting local opportunities and objectives that would not be otherwise supported through the regional Approved Development programme ADP. For example:

    —  Estate regeneration schemes which help meet Decent Homes targets but which do not produce a net increase in social housing.

    —  Temporary to permanent accommodation schemes.

    —  Support for BME RSLs (ensuring that targets for local BME RSLs are met).

    —  Empty property initiatives.

    —  Bilateral cross borough initiatives.

    —  Investment in larger dwellings to meet demand for larger units of social housing. Only 26% of the social rented element of the 2004-06 ADP programme in London was directed at three-bed plus units.

4.  PROPOSALS

  4.1  It makes financial sense for Government to have a revenue financial incentive for "high demand" local authorities to apply capital resources (such as usable capital receipts) to fund RSLs where there is a clear saving in temporary accommodation costs.

  4.2  An alternative use for the capital receipts would be to repay debt. The revenue saving here would be set by the consolidated loans fund (CLF) rate of the authority. It would therefore be reasonable for the revenue incentive to be set at the CLF rate for the authority.

  4.3  To secure the temporary accommodation savings this incentive could only be for areas of "high demand" ie a large temporary accommodation backlog and a high proportion of net lettings going to the priority homeless. ODPM has already used a definition of "high demand" areas for its recent (February 2003) regulation on Right to Buy discounts. It covers 31 out of 33 London boroughs.

  4.4  It is proposed that this revenue incentive could apply to usable capital receipts from the disposal of local authority assets. This would enable local authorities to commit usable capital receipts and provide RSLs with some certainty when planning affordable housing.

5.  EQUALITIES IMPLICATIONS

  5.1  Socially excluded groups or local groups or communities in need of particular types of accommodation would benefit from additional social rented housing.


 
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