CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The background
1. This report was originally intended
to improve the draft legislation which is now unlikely to proceed
through Parliament in the near future. It now aims to put down
some markers should the Government in future decide to return
to the question of introducing elected regional assemblies, and
to point to areas where future legislation would need to be more
ambitious than the draft Regional Assemblies Bill in order to
create regional bodies that are fit for purpose. (Paragraph 7)
2. It is unfortunate
that a complete draft of the Bill was not published and that the
missing Clauses were not to be provided until the Bill was to
be introduced to Parliament. Some of the omissions relate to areas
which could have a significant impact on how elected regional
assemblies would operate and how effective they would be in practice.
We recommend that the Government should, in future, demonstrate
its commitment to pre-legislative scrutiny and facilitate the
scrutiny process by publishing complete Bills in draft. (Paragraph
13)
3. Some of the statutory
guidance and delegated legislation proposed under the draft Bill
would have significantly affected the shape of elected regional
government. We, therefore, recommend that drafts of these key
documents should have been published for consultation with stakeholders.
This would also have given members of Parliament and voters a
complete picture of the legal framework that would have regulated
elected regional assemblies. (Paragraph 17)
Elected regional assemblies - powers and resources
4. We believe that how elected regional
assemblies reconcile and integrate their economic, social and
environmental goals would be determined by the balance of resources
available to them rather than how their purposes are defined in
the legislation. The assemblies would need to be clear which agencies
would deliver each of their objectives. (Paragraph 21)
5. The requirement
on assemblies to promote sustainable development should be backed
up by a requirement to undertake sustainability appraisals on
key strategy statements and corporate plans or to identify sustainable
development targets. (Paragraph 24)
6. It is important
that the assemblies attract a new group of politicians. This would
only be achieved if the assemblies have enough powers and were
seen as worthwhile. We also recommend that a suitable statutory
commitment to promoting equality and diversity should be included
in any future Bill. (Paragraph 26)
7. With the general
powers proposed in the draft Bill there would have been little
chance of persuading the electorate or potential assembly members
that the elected regional assemblies would be worth establishing.
The assemblies must have specific powers and responsibilities
not only to convince the electorate that they are worth voting
in favour of but also to persuade serious politicians at local
and national level, that they are worth getting involved in.
(Paragraph 33)
8. Regional assemblies
would need to have a clearly defined set of functions and the
resources to perform them effectively. In light of this evidence
we are not convinced that a simple statement of open-ended powers
is the most appropriate way forward, and recommend that the general
power be supplemented by a clearer definition of a core set of
specific functions that elected regional assemblies would perform.
(Paragraph 34)
Managing three tiers of elected government
9. It is important that legislation
setting up regional assemblies should circumscribe their activities
to avoid any confusion or overlap with the role of existing local
government. Ministerial assurances before the Committee and in
other public statements should have been supplemented by a formal
statement on the face of the bill of a general presumption that
local functions should not be absorbed by the regional level (Paragraph
42)
10. The elected regional
assemblies would offer an opportunity to coordinate services across
regions. The assemblies would need to work closely with local
authorities to provide services. Any new legislation proposing
elected regional assemblies should include a requirement that
they have a formal structure for involving local authorities in
their work. (Paragraph 49)
11. Guidance to elected
regional assemblies and the Government Offices in the Regions
should emphasise the assemblies' role in overseeing the work of
Government Offices in the Regions. Rather than overseeing the
assemblies' work and ensuring they pursue national priorities,
the Offices should support the assemblies in developing regionally
specific policies which could then be fed into national policy.
(Paragraph 55)
12. Any proposals
to develop effective elected regional assemblies would require
the full involvement of all Government departments that fund or
deliver services at a local or regional level. The fact that limited
powers and resources that were to be devolved under the draft
legislation were mainly to come from the ODPM suggested that the
other departments were not signed up to the proposals. (Paragraph
59)
13. The successful
development and implementation of some policies, for example the
maintenance and development of cross-country railway networks,
obviously requires coordination across regions. An over-emphasis
on the importance of central government in coordinating inter-regional
policies and externalities could act as a brake on devolution,
as it has in the context of transport. The fact that an issue
cannot be addressed adequately by an individual region working
in isolation does not necessarily mean that it is most appropriate
to resolve the issue within Whitehall. Further thought should
be given to ways of addressing inter-regional issues within the
context of devolution. It might, for example, be possible to devolve
transport responsibilities to the regions on the condition that
all regions affected by a major development are required to work
together to design, approve and implement the policy. Central
government could usefully retain a role in facilitating such an
inter-regional approach, but need not necessarily retain overall
control. (Paragraph 63)
Policy Areas
14. Elected regional assemblies could
be effective in improving regional economic performance. It is
important that should the Government propose elected regional
assemblies in the future, sufficient resources and clout are devolved
to them to make a difference in terms of funding from Government
departments. (Paragraph 67)
15. The weight of
evidence in this case was unambiguous. We note that the Department
of Transport has shown a fuller openness to the regionalisation
of some of its functions than some other Government departments.
However, there is a strong case for pushing regionalisation further.
(Paragraph 70)
16. We recommend that
elected regional assemblies - as is broadly the case in London
- act as regional transport authorities with responsibility for
deciding on the distribution of funding currently allocated by
Whitehall for local transport plans. We also recommend that agencies
quite rightly focused on nationwide priorities such as the Highways
Agency and national railways authorities are required more explicitly
to take account of Assemblies' regional priorities and consult
on the regional dimensions of their policy programmes.
(Paragraph 71)
17. The effectiveness
of any future elected regional assemblies in developing regional
training and skills development policies and programmes would
need to be kept under review with a view to further devolution
within what is currently a national budget. This process could
usefully be attempted in two stages, with adult training budgets
being devolved to elected regional assemblies as a test case in
the first instance with a second, more thoroughgoing devolution
of resources to follow if the first stage proved successful when
measured against mutually agreed criteria. As with the Regional
Development Agencies, regional assemblies should appoint the Chair
and members of the LSC, issue policy guidance and ratify development
plans. (Paragraph 74)
18. The potential
dual funding of housing associations by the elected regional assemblies
and the Housing Corporation as proposed in the draft Bill would
have been unsatisfactory. Regional assemblies should appoint the
Chair and members of the Regional Housing Boards, issue policy
guidance and ratify development plans. (Paragraph 77)
19. Because of concerns
that they could lose their community focus and scales for operation
we remain unconvinced of the rationale for establishing regional
fire and rescue services as functional bodies of elected regional
assemblies. There is a need however to develop the wider role
foreseen in the White Paper in which elected regional assemblies
would lead the planning process for civil contingencies, involving
all the blue light services, but across a narrower part of their
fields of responsibility. (Paragraph 83)
Funding
20. Should the Government revisit
the idea of elected regional assemblies in the future it should
adhere to the idea of 'single pot' block funding and avoid the
temptation to be overly prescriptive on how elected regional assemblies
draw up their budgets. As far as possible the assemblies should
be empowered to set their own targets, and to deploy resources
to meet them. They would be accountable to regional electorates,
and need not be subject to the heavy hand of central Government.
(Paragraph 87)
21. To be effective
elected regional assemblies should have precepting powers and
they should also be fiscally accountable so that the electorate
can see how public funds are spent. At the very least separate
council tax bills would be required to highlight the contribution
towards the Assemblies. (Paragraph 91)
22. In making the
case for any future assemblies, the Government needs to estimate
the likely costs. Otherwise it will be too easy for stakeholders
to express a lack of confidence in the Government's financial
planning. We find it odd that the Government had done so little
detailed planning of the costs and benefits of setting up, and
urge it to produce fuller estimates in the name of transparency
should it at some point revive the elected regional assemblies
proposals. (Paragraph 97)
23. The electorate
in the North East were not convinced about the 'cost-benefit'
calculation in regard to elected assemblies, unable to see in
the modest powers of assemblies and their limited autonomy from
central government sufficient prospect of concrete improvements
in their daily lives to vote for their introduction. When the
policy on elected regional assemblies is revived, the Government
- and departments across Government - will need to invest real
powers and resources in elected regional assemblies. (Paragraph
98)
Constitutional and electoral issues
24. We are not convinced that there
is wide public support for the use of the additional member system
to elect members to regional assemblies. We are also concerned
that the experience of AMS in Wales and other devolved bodies
has shown it to have a number of significant disadvantages. These
most notably include: the creation of two types of assembly member;
the ability for candidates to stand as both constituency and regional
members (meaning that those who fail to win a constituency seat
can still win a seat as a regional member); and the fact that
the electorate are unfamiliar with the electoral system. (Paragraph
109)
25. When legislation
is considered for elected regional assemblies, we recommend that
the additional member system should not be used to return members.
The Government should use the more established and straightforward
first past the post system, that is used to return members to
the House of Commons. At the very least the Government should
remove as many of the difficulties with AMS as possible, for example
by prohibiting candidates from standing for both constituency
and regional seats. (Paragraph 110)
26. If the additional
member system is used to return members to elected regional assemblies,
the proportion of constituency to regional members could significantly
affect the political composition of the assembly and how it operates.
This detail should be included in a draft Bill and not left to
the discretion of the Secretary of State. (Paragraph 115)
27. The Government
expressed its intention that elected regional assemblies would
comprise one-third regional members and two-thirds constituency
members. This expression of intent is not, however, satisfactory
as a Regional Assemblies Act could remain on the statute book
for many years and many different Parliaments. We, therefore,
recommend that the Government's current intention should be stated
clearly in a draft Bill and it should require this proportion
to be maintained, regardless of the size of an assembly. (Paragraph
116)
28. We recognise the
Government's wish to ensure that elected regional assemblies were
streamlined, strategic bodies, with a size appropriate to the
functions they would perform. We would not want elected regional
assemblies to become large and cumbersome and agree that a significant
advantage of a relatively small assembly would be greater use
of unelected stakeholders. (Paragraph 126)
29. We are, however,
concerned that a maximum of 35 elected regional assembly members
could lead to a democratic deficit in some regions, with just
over 20 constituency members struggling to represent constituencies
significantly larger than parliamentary ones. In particular, this
proposed size limit could disadvantage rural areas in favour of
urban ones and would disproportionately affect regions with larger
populations. We are also worried that an assembly within the size-range
currently proposed might struggle to perform its proposed functions,
especially in the context of scrutiny. (Paragraph 127)
30. Rejecting the
additional member system and regional seats, in favour of the
first past the post system would make room for more constituency
members and accordingly go some way to addressing the risk of
democratic deficits. Regardless of its decision with respect to
the appropriate electoral system, any new Bill setting up elected
regional assemblies should allow for the number of constituency
members to be linked to the size of the region's population. A
maximum number of members should be imposed, perhaps in the region
of 45 to 50. (Paragraph 128)
31. We agree with
the Government's proposal to establish a cabinet structure for
elected regional assemblies. This would provide a prominent focal
point within regional government and facilitate more efficient
decision-making. If the proposed division between the executive
and scrutiny committees is to be maintained the effective separation
of the staff of the executive and that of review and monitoring
committees would, however, be vital. We recommend that the Government
should reflect on the experiences of other devolved bodies in
this regard when producing the statutory guidance on the operation
of the cabinet structures. (Paragraph 134)
32. We agree with
the Government's proposals to give elected regional assemblies
a significant degree of flexibility regarding the size of its
executive. (Paragraph 138)
33. We are concerned
about the scope of the proposed powers which could be exercised
by an executive on behalf of an elected regional assembly. We
would expect the entire assembly to be involved in agreeing key
strategy documents such as the assembly scheme and the assembly
report. We would also recommend that the entire assembly should
make key decisions relating to functional bodies, such as agreeing
amendments to the regional economic strategy. This would reduce
the likelihood of regional government interfering in the day-to-day
running of its functional bodies and maintain an arm's-length
relationship. (Paragraph 143)
34. We agree that
any legislation setting up elected regional assemblies should
not impose a pre-determined scrutiny structure on elected regional
assemblies. Assemblies should be able to determine for themselves
what committee structure would most effectively hold the executive
to account. Elected regional assemblies would, however, be able
to draw upon the wealth of experience of scrutiny within Parliament,
the devolved bodies and local government. (Paragraph 150)
35. The main Review
and Monitoring Committee of an elected regional assembly could
consist of as many as 32 elected members, as well as co-opted
members. Our experience of the select committee structure within
the House of Commons would suggest that a committee this large
might struggle to operate effectively. We would expect the main
job of scrutiny to be performed instead by smaller sub-committees,
which would be able to develop expertise in specific policy or
geographic areas. An assembly could, for example, establish three
sub-committees, one for each of the three purposes of elected
regional assemblies. This would enable backbench members and other
stakeholders to ensure that the executive is not neglecting any
one of the assembly's purposes. (Paragraph 151)
36. The proposed limits
on the size of elected regional assemblies would have placed significant
pressure on backbench members. If an assembly had adopted a sub-committee
structure, it is likely that individual members would be required
to sit on several committees. This would have made it difficult
for members to do justice to their scrutiny role. Increasing the
number of elected regional assembly members, as we have recommended,
could, therefore, have a knock-on effect on the quality of
the scrutiny performed. (Paragraph 152)
37. The membership
of scrutiny committees in Parliament, the devolved bodies and
local government, reflect the political composition of the entire
elected membership. This approach works well and prevents scrutiny
of the executive becoming a tool of the opposition. This, in turn,
improves the quality of the scrutiny undertaken and ensures that
committee work is taken more seriously by the executive. (Paragraph
158)
38. Despite the advantages
of the approach taken elsewhere in the British constitution, the
draft Bill proposed that the political composition of review and
monitoring committees should reflect the composition of the backbench
membership, i.e. excluding the executive, rather than that of
the entire elected regional assembly. This would create the risk
that these committees could be controlled by the opposition which
would be detrimental to both the quality and perception of the
vital scrutiny role of review and monitoring committees. (Paragraph
159)
39. The powers that
the review and monitoring committees would have are inadequate
and inconsistent with the arguments made by the Government in
favour of elected regional assemblies. If their powers are not
extended, review and monitoring committees would be unable to
hold to account unelected quangos operating within the region,
even if they have received funding from the assembly. They may
also be unable to investigate whether a coordinated and effective
approach to sustainable development is being taken within the
region. Review and monitoring committees should not be expected
to rely on the voluntary cooperation of those outside bodies which
are key to delivery of the assembly's underlying purposes. The
power to compel witnesses to attend and to provide evidence, though
rarely used, would give an important impetus for key stakeholders
to cooperate in the process of scrutiny. (Paragraph 164)
40. It would be unfortunate
if backbench members were paid only a part-time salary as this
could lead to review and monitoring committees being dominated
by dual-mandate holders, the retired and the unemployed. While
such groups should be represented, other groups which are more
likely to need a full-time salary, such as younger people and
those with families, should not be dissuaded from standing for
election. In addition, we are concerned that part-time backbench
members could struggle to perform their role effectively. Non-executive
members may, for example, be required to sit on more than one
review and monitoring committee. If they are to do justice to
their committee work, the three days per week suggested by the
Government would be insufficient. (Paragraph 167)
Stakeholders
41. The quality and reception of assembly
policies, strategies and scrutiny would depend to a large extent
on their success in encouraging stakeholders from a wide variety
of sectors to participate in their work. We, therefore, welcome
the requirement for assemblies to make arrangements to encourage
stakeholder participation and to assess the effectiveness of these
arrangements in their assembly annual report, which could then
be questioned by the public in the report meeting. Any Bill setting
up elected regional assembles should not prescribe the manner
in which elected regional assemblies promote participation. Statutory
guidance would, however, be useful in ensuring that elected regional
assemblies do not neglect this duty and in illustrating ways in
which this could be achieved. Allowing stakeholders voting rights
in policy sub-committees would encourage participation and should
be encouraged, providing that decisions of policy sub-groups are
subject to ratification or amendment by the full Assembly. (Paragraph
176)
42. The voluntary
sector has an important role in providing specialist expertise.
elected regional assemblies would need guidance on how this input
should be facilitated. (Paragraph 180)
43. The co-option
of non-elected members to the Review and Monitoring Committees
of elected regional assemblies should be encouraged as a way of
securing specialist knowledge. Giving these members voting rights,
however should be treated with extreme caution as it can undermine
the role of the elected representatives. (Paragraph 183)
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