Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, UKVISAS, AND THE HOME OFFICE

21 JUNE 2004

  Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon and welcome to the Committee of Public Accounts, where today we are looking at the subject of visa entry to the United Kingdom. We are delighted to be joined by Sir Michael Jay, who, of course, is the Permanent Under-Secretary of State and Accounting Officer for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I think it is your first visit to the Committee of Public Accounts.

  Sir Michael Jay: It is, Chairman.

  Q2 Chairman: I hope it will be very enjoyable for you. We welcome Mr Robin Barnett, who is Director of UKvisas, and Mr Bill Jeffrey, who is Director General of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the Home Office. I do not know whether it is your first visit or not, but thank you for coming this afternoon. Sir Michael, could I please ask you a general question to start with? The reference for this is contained in the Comptroller General & Auditor's Report paragraph 1.6-1.10, pages 13-15. Without having to plough through all those paragraphs, I can put it to you very simply: I accept that your new system is more efficient; that comes out quite clearly from the Report, but does it mean that you are not giving enough time to scrutinise applications?

  Sir Michael Jay: I do not think it does, Chairman. I think at the heart of the visa operation is finding the right balance between service delivery and control. Neither is more important than the other. They are both essential, and there is no alternative to doing both. That is the short answer to the question. Strong control is essential on immigration and on counter-terrorism grounds, and I think UKvisas are putting some important new measures in place to achieve that. Maintaining a good service to visa applicants is crucial as well, not least because if the service declines, the pressure on staff rises; they spend more time dealing with complaints, they become stressed, and the decisions tend to get worse rather than better. It is in that context that the sorts of measures which are being introduced, such as out-sourcing, streamlining, getting rid of queues, help ensure a good service to our customers and a better balanced visa operation all round.

  Q3 Chairman: That sounds fine as far as it goes. What I am going to be putting to you over the next few minutes is that all the pressure on your officers out in the field is to achieve this efficiency and streamlining, avoiding queues and the rest of it. Let us look, for example, at paragraph 2.8 on page 22: "UKvisas has established a benchmark that entry clearance officers should process 8,000 applications per year." That is 40 applications a day, Sir Michael, which equates to one every 11 minutes. Do you really think that, on average, you can properly consider an application for a visa in just 11 minutes?

  Sir Michael Jay: I think it entirely depends on how straightforward the visa application is, Chairman. The 40 cases that you mention is a productivity guideline, which refers to 40 straightforward applications per ECO per day, and I think that is a reasonable guideline, but of course, that is always subject to local circumstances. I have to say that in the 60 or so visa sections that I have visited over the last couple of years or so, I have often sat beside ECOs and seen them process straightforward visa applications sometimes in a matter of seconds. I have also seen them have real difficulties over the complicated cases. What we need to try to do is to sort out the procedure so the straightforward ones can be handled straightforwardly, and leave time for the more complicated ones, including those that should not be granted, to be handled properly.

  Q4 Chairman: That is obviously true, but what information can you give us as to the procedures you have to actually sort out these more difficult applications from the easier ones? What sort of evaluation is going on?

  Sir Michael Jay: Could I ask Mr Barnett to answer that one, Chairman?

  Mr Barnett: Chairman, we begin the visa application process by getting locally engaged staff to do basic checks. So even in the most straightforward of cases, initial information and checks will have been carried out and the ECOs will be able to check the information that is before them. Secondly, we are doing a great deal in the area of well managed risk assessment. In high-risk posts we have begun to introduce new risk assessment units with full-time UK-based officers in charge of them. In many posts we have already been operating a risk assessment system based around ECOs spending some of their time leading a risk assessment effort, therefore what we are doing when we select straightforward from non-straightforward applications is operating on a risk assessment and intelligence-led basis.

  Q5 Chairman: Mr Barnett, I wanted to ask you to look at page 11, paragraph 1.2, where you will see the overall demand: "UKvisas received 1.94 million visa applications in 2002-03, which represents an increase of 33% over five years." I just wonder whether this increase in demand—which is not your fault in any shape or form; we all accept that your staff are under tremendous pressure and do a very good job, and we congratulate them on a very difficult job they do—is overwhelming your resources?

  Sir Michael Jay: Could I take that? I do think the question of demand in the longer term is one of the key issues, clearly, for UKvisas, and they are doing quite a lot of thinking about the longer term. There is a lot more that needs to be done. I do not think that there is a risk of the service being completely overwhelmed, but I do think it is important to look ahead quite imaginatively at different ways of doing this. There are proposals such as the e-Borders programme, which is referred to in the Report, which does offer a real chance to change quite radically the shape of visa issuing in the future and cope with a rising upward trend. Meanwhile, there are ways of increasing productivity, better processes, better training of our entry clearance staff, making better and more effective use of IT, alternative methods of helping hard-pressed posts trying to look at applications being handled by hubs overseas, not always in individual countries, in which we can hope to meet at least some of the increased demand. But I do think that these are issues which we and Ministers are going to have to look at hard.

  Q6 Chairman: What is absolutely essential is that you have adequate evaluation and feedback of what is going on. Can you please turn to page 28 and look at paragraph 2.33? You will see there that there is virtually no evaluation of these people who are given visas once they get into this country. "The Home Office does not collect this information." How can your entry clearance officers be confident that they are making the right decisions when apparently there is no feedback which is sent back to them?

  Mr Barnett: It is true that since October 2000, when visas became leave to enter, there are fewer checks carried out on arrival, but what we have sought to do is to put in place a series of alternative measures. As the Report points out, we carry out follow-up exercises, we carry out checks on visa issuing, and we work very closely with IND to monitor what is happening to assess trends. The solution to monitoring and control is not solely a specific control target.

  Q7 Chairman: Rather than deal with trends, why not just check when people leave the country? That is how most people understand what a visa is about. Your passport is stamped when you come in and it is stamped when you go out, and then you have a rough idea of what is happening. Can I please put one example to you, Sir Michael, a case example in Accra? If you look at page 23, paragraph 2.12, you will see one example there. "For example, a tracking exercise carried out in Accra found that 37% of a sample of students who had been issued with a visa could not subsequently be traced." I put it to you that that is quite possibly, although only a single tracking exercise, something which may go on in other areas with other groups of students but, as we simply do not know what is happening to these people—most of them seem to vanish once they get into this country—there is no proper evaluation and we do not know what is going on, do we?

  Sir Michael Jay: As far as students are concerned, it will be easier to track students when we have a proper registration scheme, which is due to be in place shortly.

  Mr Jeffrey: It is certainly the case, Chairman, that we no longer check people's departure from the country, as was done a number of years ago. There was an embarkation check system, which was overwhelmed by numbers and was essentially paper-based and did not enable us in the early Nineties to make these sorts of connections and establish whether people had left the country or not. These checks were withdrawn gradually, initially in 1994 at ferry ports and small airports, and then completely in 1997. I think, short of the kind of electronic system that the e-Borders programme will bring us, there is no point in doing this partially.

  Q8 Chairman: It is better to do something partially than not at all, I would have thought.

  Mr Jeffrey: It is certainly the case that, as we work up to the e-Borders programme, we will be looking at whether there are some routes that we can pilot the approach on, but the intention is certainly in the next few years—

  Q9 Chairman: Mr Jeffrey, now that you have taken the floor, perhaps we can deal with the scam that was going on in Romania and Bulgaria. If you look at page 29, paragraph 2.37, you will see it deals with that. 26,500 applicants were granted entry to the United Kingdom. Entry clearance officers out in the field in Romania and Bulgaria estimated that they would have approved only 10% of these. So it is not surprising that morale is poor in Mr Barnett's operation if you are overturning nine out of 10 of his decisions.

  Mr Jeffrey: You will be aware, Chairman, that Mr Ken Sutton has done an investigation of that sequence of events.[1] What essentially happened was that over a period we operated on an unduly restricted view of the scope for refusing applications of that sort. It is worth remembering that the agreements are unusual in that they confer entitlements on people from accession countries to be allowed to establish themselves here on the same basis as a British citizen.

  Q10 Chairman: I thought you might say that because that, of course, is in the Report, that you, the Home Office, considered that they could not treat Bulgarian or Romanian nationals differently from United Kingdom nationals. I think Mr Sutton said that actually that is not entirely true, is it? You could have done a different process if you had wanted to, could you not?

  Mr Jeffrey: I was going to come on to say that, and to say very clearly that there were mistakes made over this and it is a serious failure that we do take seriously. What Mr Sutton found was that, on the basis of legal advice that he took in the course of his investigation, it would have been possible to have adopted a more robust approach to deciding these cases than was in fact taken. That is not to say that the nine out of 10 cases that entry clearance officers would have wished to refuse would be refused under the new approach, but it certainly means that we were too ready in the past to accept that these applications were essentially unrefusable because of the nature of the agreement.

  Q11 Chairman: The reference is in Appendix 7, page 50: "Applications were approved against the advice of entry clearance staff. Some applicants had no appropriate skills in their chosen business. Applicants had no idea of what was in their business plan. Many applicants could speak little or no English. Some applicants were accepted who had previously entered the United Kingdom illegally" etc. These are the people you were letting in against the advice of your entry clearance officers.

  Mr Jeffrey: I agree, and I very much regret that that was happening. On the other hand, it has to be said that the view of the law which is now being taken, and which we will very quickly translate into guidance so that we can re-start the system in Bulgaria and Romania, is one that still does not say that simply because someone does not speak very good English or someone has not formulated a business plan, they can be refused on that ground alone. We will be guiding our staff in future, as we should have been doing all along—and I entirely accept this—

  Q12 Chairman: The obvious question is why did it take you so long to address this lack of understanding between the officers working for Mr Barnett's organisation and the officials working for your organisation? This is supposed to be joined-up government, is it not?

  Mr Jeffrey: It is, and I think it is more joined up in the sense that we work very closely with UKvisas now and have done for some time, but it took longer to address than it should have done. I readily accept that.

  Q13 Chairman: Sir Michael, lastly, when were you aware of Mr Cameron's concerns? Were you aware of them before he made them public?

  Sir Michael Jay: I was first aware of his concerns, as far as I have been able to ascertain from the papers and as far as my own memory recalls, when I was told on 19 March this year that a member of our embassy in Bucharest—

  Q14 Chairman: When did it become public? Remind me of the date.

  Mr Jeffrey: I think Mr Davis published his email on the 29th.

  Q15 Chairman: So you were aware on the 19th?

  Sir Michael Jay: The 19th was the day on which we became aware that a member of the embassy in Bucharest had told a member of staff that he had been in touch with Mr Davis and at that stage we became aware that this issue would arise.

  Q16 Chairman: Do you accept that this NAO Report, together with Mr Sutton's report, confirms in broad terms what Mr Cameron was alleging?

  Sir Michael Jay: I think what the Report shows is that the embassy in Bucharest and Mr Cameron, and indeed the embassy in Sofia, had been telling the Home Office for some time, drawing their attention to the fact that entry was being granted under the scheme to people who the embassy themselves would have refused. The Home Office's response to that was that they believed in good faith that they had very little if no room for manoeuvre under the terms of the ECAA and therefore they could not respond to the embassy's concerns. That was the basis. What Ken Sutton's report has shown is that the rules would, in fact, admit a more robust interpretation, which would allow normal entry clearance considerations to be taken into account. I do think that Mr Cameron brought the difference between the embassy and the Home Office out into the open. What I would like to do is to reiterate what Bill Jeffrey has said about the extent to which the Foreign Office and the Home Office and UKvisas both before but also since this matter came to light have changed and strengthened our procedures, I believe in some important fashions, and I think it now extremely unlikely that an issue of this kind would continue for so long without it being brought to the attention of senior management and Ministers. It is certainly our intention to ensure that that is the case.

  Q17 Jim Sheridan: Can I follow up the issue of lack of traceability when people come into the country on a visa? You may recall the 21 cockle pickers who died on the beaches at Morecambe. Basically, there was some concern that no-one knew who these people were, where they came from and who was responsible for them. Do you have any advice on how this could be put right for the future?

  Sir Michael Jay: It is a matter for the Home Office.

  Mr Jeffrey: As I was saying in response to the Chairman's question earlier, I think the best way in which we can deal with this is to have the kind of electronic system that the e-Borders programme would offer for recording movements in and out of the country, and we will then know who has over-stayed their legitimate visa. What is much harder to deal with are people—and the cockle pickers may have been among them—who enter the country illegally. There are fewer of these than there used to be, because we are working hard at the channel ports, but our best means of doing that is by deploying enforcement effort, by working very closely with the police, by making visits to places of employment where we think we may find illegal workers, for example, and we are building on that.

  Q18 Jim Sheridan: You indicated just now that there are fewer illegal immigrants than there used to be. Do you have any evidence to substantiate that?

  Mr Jeffrey: We certainly believe that there are fewer clandestine, illegal migrants coming across the Channel. There was a time in the latter part of 2002 when very large numbers were coming through the Tunnel, or smuggling themselves across the Channel. We have now effectively exported this, working with French officials on the French side, we have more detection equipment, and as a consequence, it is one of the things that has contributed to the very substantial reduction in asylum claims. There are now fewer people being detected in the Dover area, for example, as having come across the Channel clandestinely. One can never be certain, but we do feel that we are making a difference.

  Q19 Jim Sheridan: I understand them coming through the Dover entrance, but there are other entry points throughout the whole of the UK.

  Mr Jeffrey: We are trying to close them down. There are other ports where there is a possibility of displacement, and we are trying to anticipate that displacement by applying staff to routes where it is taking place.


1   Inquiry into handling of ECAA applications from Bulgaria and Romania, Ken Sutton, 17 June 2004 Back


 
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