Summary
In October 1991 the battlefield helicopters of the
Royal Navy, Army, and Royal Air Force were brought under a single
"Joint Helicopter Command". The Joint Helicopter Command
is responsible for training, standards, doctrine, and support
for operations. In April 2004, the Department had an overall fleet
of 357 battlefield helicopters to operate in support of land,
amphibious, and Special Forces' operations.
On the basis of a Report from the Comptroller and
Auditor General,[1] we
took evidence from the Ministry of Defence (the Department) on
three main issues: the scope for increased harmonisation in helicopter
support and training; helicopter and equipment shortages and the
procurement of the Chinook Mark 3 helicopter.
We found that the formation of the Joint Helicopter
Command has avoided the duplication that occurred when the three
services deployed their helicopters separately. Further progress
can, however, be made in the harmonisation of training practices
between the three services and the Department should review whether
efficiencies could be gained from having a single body responsible
for airworthiness rather than the three separate arrangements
currently used. There are also striking differences in the command
structures of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Army. In Northern
Ireland it takes 77 RAF officers to run 17 helicopters while the
Army has 38 officers to run 34. The Department should consider
whether the approach used by the Army should be the baseline for
harmonisation.
As regards the number of helicopters, there remains
an alarming gap, 20% to 38%, depending on how it is measured,
in the numbers of helicopters needed and those available. The
Department is no longer proposing to fill this gap and this will
potentially increase risks, including the risk of overstretching
equipment and pilots.
The gap in helicopter numbers has been exacerbated
by the fact that the Department cannot use 8 Chinook Mark 3 helicopters
purchased in 2001. The Department failed to specify what its requirements
were for independently validating the manufacturers' software
codes and therefore are currently unable to assure themselves
that the helicopters can fly safely. Only 45 of 100 'essential
elements' set out in the Department's requirement were actually
specified in the contract. This was one of the worst examples
of equipment acquisition that the Committee has seen.
1 C&AG's Report, Ministry of Defence: Battlefield
Helicopters (HC 486, Session 2003-04) Back
| 
