Conclusions and recommendations
1. The formation of the Joint Helicopter Command
has led to efficiencies in the deployment of battlefield helicopters.
Previously capabilities were duplicated when the three services
independently deployed helicopters on operations. For example
in Bosnia in 1996 40% too many helicopters were deployed.
2. The Department
is seeking to harmonise further single-Service practices in training
and airworthiness. Although these are common airworthiness
regulations, responsibility for applying them remains with the
three Services. The Department should review whether
having a single organisation that decides whether a helicopter
is airworthy and can enter service would be preferable to current
arrangements.
3. It takes 77 Royal Air Force officers to
run 17 helicopters in Northern Ireland while the Army has 38 officers
to run 43. Following on from its review
of officer/noncommissioned officer aircrew the Department
should now examine whether the leaner Army command structure should
set the pattern for harmonisation.
4. There remains a sizeable 20% to 38% gap
between the numbers of helicopters needed and those available.
The Department currently has two different methodologies for measuring
this gap and it should establish which of its two current methodologies
is the more appropriate.
5. Helicopters and aircrew may not be ready
in time through over-reliance on Urgent Operational Requirements
to cover equipment shortages. The Department
expects that Urgent Operational Requirements will continue to
be needed on future operations. It should put in place plans to
mitigate the risk that capability gaps will not be filled in an
effective or timely manner.
6. The Department has bought eight Chinook
Mk 3 helicopters which have not entered service and which it cannot
use. The acquisition of the Chinook Mk3
is one of the worst examples of equipment procurement that the
Committee has seen. Only 45 of 100 'essential elements' set out
in the Department's requirement were actually specified in the
contract. Not enough work was done early on to translate the key
requirements of the user into a specification that the contractor
had to deliver.
7. In order to prevent a recurrence of this
flawed procurement, the Department should examine all such projects
on a case by case basis to ensure that Smart Acquisition principles
are implemented consistently and with rigour.
One way of doing this would be to introduce a process of peer
review which would assess whether Smart Acquisition principles
had been properly applied.
8. The Department was unable to say who was
responsible for the flawed procurement of the Chinook Mk3.
No one seems accountable when things go wrong. It is time the
Department implemented our previous suggestion that all aspects
of a project should be accounted for by a single individual who
would have the role of Single Responsible Owner.[2]
9. The Department should determine whether
there is any beneficial use that can be made of the Chinook Mk3.
It has written down the value of the Chinooks
in the accounts to the value they would have if broken up for
spares, while suggesting that other nations, including
our Allies, would judge the Chinook Mk3 to be fit for purpose
and safe to fly. The Department's current review of how it applies
safety procedures to equipment should provide an opportunity to
resolve the issue. At the end of the day we are left with a
quarter of a billion pounds of taxpayers' money spent on helicopters
that simply cannot fly and that is of deep concern to the Committee.
2 43rd Report from the Committee of Public
Accounts, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 2003
(HC 383, Session 2003-04) Back
| 
