House of Commons - Public Accounts

Select Committee on Public Accounts Eighth Report

1 Increased harmonisation between the Services

1. Since its inception in October 1999, the Joint Helicopter Command has taken steps to harmonise operating and engineering standards across the Services in accordance with one of the objectives set for it in the Strategic Defence Review. This development has tackled the inefficiencies that were apparent when the three Services independently deployed helicopters on operations. The Department had estimated that, in Bosnia in 1996, for example, it had deployed some 40% too many helicopters, leading to some duplication of capabilities, particularly combat service support.[3]

2. Battlefield helicopters continue to play a key role in the United Kingdom's military operations. They have been deployed on many operations, notably Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq. During the warfighting phase of Operation TELIC, 77 battlefield helicopters were deployed on what was the Joint Helicopter Command's largest operation to date.[4]

3. There remained a number of unresolved issues following the formation of the Joint Helicopter Command, including that of rank structures. In response to a recommendation made by the Committee in its Report on the Apache Attack Helicopter,[5] the Department had reviewed whether the Army's practice of using non-commissioned pilots to fly its helicopters should be adopted by the other Services across the rest of the battlefield helicopter fleet. The study found that the use of helicopters differed in each of the three Services and had led to policies that reflected both the specialist demands of the helicopter forces and the wider command and leadership requirements of the parent Service. Royal Navy helicopters were an integral part of the Navy's operational capability and, given the small number of officer pilots, it would be disruptive to introduce an additional cadre of non-commissioned officers. The Army's helicopters constituted a combat arm and operated under the specific command of the brigade to which they were assigned and required less independent activity at a distance from the home base. Non-commissioned officer pilots were almost exclusively employed in flying duties. The Royal Air Force's helicopters were normally assigned at a higher, "strategic", command level. Its officer pilots were therefore required to have a thorough understanding of higher command intent. The Royal Air Force also depended on its aircrew to act as a pool for the provision of its senior commanders and warfighters, including fast jet pilots.[6]

4. While there would be scope for non-commissioned pilots to operate in a small number of Royal Navy and Royal Air Force helicopter roles, the study had concluded that the requirement for each of these Services to maintain a minimum number of officers for the purposes of command and control would limit the number of non-commissioned officer pilots that they could support to a combined total of 156. While this would yield potential annual savings of around £1.25 million, the study found that one additional pilot each year would need to be trained to maintain manning levels. This requirement would effectively negate any savings made. The flexibility of the forces involved would also be reduced and there would be a negative impact on the overall rank structure and development of commissioned warfighters in the individual Service. These factors, together, persuaded the Department not to change its policy at this time.[7]

5. The Department considered that the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force required different qualities in their pilots to the Army but accepted that the differences in the capabilities of one type of pilot and the other were subtle. Army non-commissioned officer pilots flew the highly complex Apache aircraft, for example. Were the Services starting again, the position may well have been different. The Department said that, for reasons of equality of opportunity and best practice, there was a case for keeping the position under review. It would take the opportunity to do so when considering the planned introduction of the Future Rotorcraft Capability programme.[8]

6. There was still an unresolved discrepancy between the levels of command and the numbers of people and equipment deployed within Army helicopter squadrons compared to those within Royal Air Force squadrons. For example, in the Royal Air Force, squadrons were commanded by Wing Commanders, whereas in the Army squadrons were commanded by officers one rank lower, at Major. Whereas 38 Army officers operated 43 helicopters at RAF Aldergrove, 77 officers from the Royal Air Force were responsible for only 17 helicopters (Figure 1).[9] Figure 1: The establishment of the Joint Helicopter Force (Northern Ireland)

Source: Ministry of Defence

7. In examining whether cost savings could be made by using noncommissioned officer pilots across the three Services the Department had not examined the impact of using noncommissioned officer pilots on the Services' rank structures. Clearly, there would be scope for potential savings if the number of officers could be reduced. These benefits needed to be weighed against the disadvantages arising if a reduction in the officer pool had a detrimental effect on the ability of the Services to provide sufficient senior commanders.

8. In 1997, the Defence Helicopter Flying School was formed to provide a tri-Service focus for helicopter flying training. Variations in the way training was conducted across the three Services nevertheless remained, including the time taken for pilots from each Service to complete their initial training. The Royal Air Force initially trained its pilots on two different non-operational platforms, but the Royal Navy and the Army used only one before proceeding to operational helicopters.[10] The Department had sought to achieve further efficiencies from the Defence Helicopter Flying School by adjusting course syllabi and adjusting elementary flying training. A planned trial of the Army Flying Training Study in 2005 could lead to an 11 week reduction in the amount of initial training time required. In the longer term, the United Kingdom Military Flying Training System would examine the possibility of doing more flying training on relatively cheap, non-operational helicopters.[11]

9. While it took 110 weeks and 94 weeks, respectively, to train Chinook and Apache pilots in the United Kingdom, the United States Army was examining the feasibility of training its pilots on similar platforms in 44 weeks and 53 weeks, respectively.[12] The Department was cautious about adopting this approach in the United Kingdom. It pointed out that, even for the United States, this remained an unfunded aspiration. The differences between the timescales involved might revolve around time, cost and quality issues as well as whether some training was provided before or after pilots had been posted to their operational squadrons.[13]

10. The Department's training arrangements for the Apache Attack Helicopter and the Defence Helicopter Flying School were both contracted out under the Private Finance Initiative. It was originally anticipated that these contracts would yield savings of £23 million and £80 million respectively.[14] The anticipated savings from the Defence Helicopter Flying School had fallen to £10 million, however, because of a number of contract amendments, which partly reflected the increased throughput from the School of almost 40%.[15] The Department agreed that the original contract, signed in 1996, was not as taut as it should have been but said that it had recently agreed to share gains with the contractor from any third party usage.[16] In the case of the Apache, the Department accepted that, initially, there had been problems with the provision of training, although arrangements were now working well.[17]

11. Although there were joint regulations in place for ensuring that helicopters were airworthy, responsibility for applying these regulations was currently delegated by the Secretary of State to each of the Services. Each Service acted as a Release to Service Authority for its helicopters, which involved the provision of a clear statement that the aircraft was airworthy and fit for purpose.[18] While differing roles and operating requirements might continue to dictate the need for more than one Release to Service Authority for the same mark of helicopter, the Department would examine whether a joint Release to Service Authority was feasible.[19]

3 C&AG's Report, paras 2.6, 2.10. Combat service support consists mainly of administration and logistics, which is provided to combat forces. Back

4 ibid, paras 1.6, 1.9 Back

5 46^th Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, Ministry of Defence - Building an Air Manoeuvre Capability - The introduction of the Apache Helicopter (HC 533, Session 2002-03). Back

6 Qq 68, 186-187; Ev 7, 17 Back

7 Q 156; Ev 14 Back

8 Qq 68, 155-156, 186-190 Back

9 C&AG's Report, para 3.33, Figure 4 and Annex C Back

10 C&AG's Report, para 3.7 Back

11 Ev 23 Back

12 C&AG's Report, para 3.8 Back

13 Q 148 Back

14 Qq 69, 159-160 Back