Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60-79)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE
25 OCTOBER 2004
Q60 Mrs Browning: If you do not have
the figures today—
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I can certainly
say—I said to you I did not think any were being used for
spares at present and I can confirm that is the case.
Q61 Mrs Browning: Would you just check
and, if there is any difference in that—
Sir Kevin Tebbit: No, I can confirm
now that that is the case.
Q62 Mrs Browning: Thank you very much.
Can I ask you how things are looking now in terms of training?
How do you currently see the situation with the availability of
people to train as pilots and also the training schedule itself?[4]
Sir Kevin Tebbit: You are referring
to training in general?
Q63 Mrs Browning: Yes, the Apache particularly.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I have not come
prepared to discuss Apache training, I am afraid, because this
is not a hearing on Apache, but I can certainly give you a note
about the Apache training plan.
Q64 Mrs Browning: There is a shortage
of pilots, I understand, or not as many as you would like?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: That may well
be. I am not sure whether the shortage—
Q65 Chairman: Direct your question to
the Air Vice-Marshal. He can give a general answer.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: But I am afraid
this is not covered by this Report.
Q66 Chairman: I know, but it must be
in his mind anyway. Can he make an attempt at an answer?
Air Vice-Marshal Paul Luker: In
terms of training, I think we have got approximately the right
number of people now coming into the training system. In specific
terms of AH training, the Apache training, we have converted one
squadron and the first course has just finished, the second course
is in its final six month phase, and those courses have been fully
manned as they have gone into training, and the wastage rates
were very close to what we anticipated; so I think we are actually
on track.
Q67 Mrs Browning: Thank you. The reason
I am asking this, Chairman, why is this relevant to this Report,
is that it is alright to procure the machines, but obviously that
is not the only part of the picture; it is whether there are sufficient
properly trained people able to carry out sufficient flying hours
to be adequately trained. We know from the quote I gave on page
21 that when it came to Iraq there were serious problems with
desert training and deployment training at the time. So, it might
be helpful to know, that is why I am focusing on this aspect,
and I think that is quite a legitimate question to put to you
in the context of this Report?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: It may help
to say we will have two squadrons of the aircraft operating by
next February; so the operations are ramping up. I am not aware
of a particular training deficit in this area, but, you were right,
in general we would prefer to be able to give our pilots more
training than we do. That does not mean to say we are below absolute
standards of competence, but we are experiencing some shortfalls
in training.
Q68 Mrs Browning: Thank you. Mr Luker,
I understand that the Army draw a very, very valuable resource
to them through the training of NCOs in terms of pilot training,
but the Navy and the Air Force have some difficulty with this
pool of people from which to train because they believe they should
have officer status in order to contribute to the flying effort.
I wonder if you could just explain to me as a layman why it is
different for the Army and the Air Force, because again it seems
to me this is an area where there is a pool of people for training?
Air Vice-Marshal Paul Luker: I
think there are two answers, if you will forgive me because both
the Navy and the Air Force have different approaches to what they
do as well. The pool of pilots and observers in the Navy is quite
small. They are managed in a broad career as officers and, given
the small numbers, it would be very difficult to reintroduce as
pilots and observers an additional cadre as it were, of senior
NCOs. In the Air Force, where it was judged some time ago that
the Air Force was looking for officers as pilots across the board
irrespective of what they flew, pilots again are employed potentially
to fly any aircraft and they are trained as such at the start.
As a result of that, having a small pile of senior NCO pilots
within the helicopter community would make it quite difficult
to manage, and certainly in terms of cost it comes out as a very
neutral equation. By contrast, the Army is able to recruit widely
from a body of people who have spent all of their lives within
that one helicopter community, and, in simple terms, that is why
we have arrived at where we are. We will be starting from scratch.
I suspect we might have a different answer, but this is something
which has developed over something like the last 30 years, as
long as I have been flying.
Q69 Mrs Browning: I think this question
is for Sir Peter. In the procurement of the training of pilots
for the Apache helicopter it was changed at the last minute in
terms of the contract, the original contract perceived to be placed
with Westland and then went to a PFI bid, and it was suggested
at that time that we would save £23 million by switching
to the PFI contract. How much have we actually saved?
Sir Peter Spencer: I do not know.
I will have to send you a note.[5]
Q70 Mrs Browning: I would like that note,
Chairman, because, given the delay there has been in getting the
PFI contract in an operational state, I am very concerned that
we have not made the savings that were estimated?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: We did have
a hearing on Apache helicopters when we discussed this issue,
and this is why I mentioned to you that we changed the procurement
brief for training because the original proposal was too expensive,
and I think the Committee would not have welcomed it had we taken
the more expensive route.
Q71 Mrs Browning: I am not suggesting
in this question that you made the wrong decision. I am simply
asking you, having made the judgment to change the contract to
PFI, whether in fact you have made the savings that were anticipated
at the time?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Not in full.
Mrs Browning: Perhaps you would send
the Chairman a note?[6]
Chairman: Thank you very much. Gerry
Steinberg.
Q72 Mr Steinberg: Thank you, Chair. I
have to say, I do not know how we ever win. I always think it
must be good luck than good management, because when we get some
of the Reports that we get from the NAO and the Ministry of Defence
they are the most appalling Reports of performance and management,
and it cannot be a coincidence because it is month, after month,
after month, the same sort of incompetence that we get, and then
we get you, Sir Kevin, saying you have not come here prepared
to answer questions on the helicopter because it is not in the
Report. I would have thought that Apache helicopters were part
of our helicopter capabilities, because I do think that Apaches
are helicopters, are they not? They are, are they not? Yes, they
are. It took a lot to think about there!
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I am wondering
whether you really want to ask me any questions or whether you
want to make assertions and allow me to answer them.
Q73 Mr Steinberg: I want to ask some
questions and I want some answers, not some of the flannelling
that we get every time you appear in front of us. It is quite
amazing that every time you appear in front of us this Committee
loses its temper. It is not to do with anybody else. It just seems
to be your attitude, Mr Tebbit. The first page of the Report,
Mr Tebbit, it says, the very first page of the Executive Summary
says, note, "67 Apaches delivered to the United Kingdom but
not yet available for operations. Anticipated Initial Operating
Capability—August 2004." I would have thought it was
quite obvious that people were going to ask questions on the Apache
helicopters because we are talking about helicopter capability.
Are there Apaches included in our helicopter capability?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes, and I have
explained, September 2004, so I am sorry it is a month later than
we had said.
Q74 Mr Steinberg: You are sorry that
it is a month later, Mr Tebbit?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The initial
operating capability—
Q75 Mr Steinberg: A month later?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: From August
to September.
Q76 Mr Steinberg: A year and a half.
We had meeting here a year and a half ago. I think it was 12th
March 2003 that we had a meeting here when we talked about Apache
helicopters, and I do not know how late they were then. How late
were they then when we had the meeting in March 2003, and they
were not being used, they were in storage?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Let us be pleased
they are there now.
Q77 Mr Steinberg: They were not a month
late, were they? It is all right you saying, "Let's be pleased
that they are there now." That is a disgusting answer, to
be quite honest. You are saying it did not make any difference
in terms of Iraq, but of course it did, because if they had had
Apache helicopters in Iraq the troops would have been much more
protected than they were. As I said before, it is a case of being
good luck and not good management.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: They would not
have been available for operations in Iraq even if they had been
there to the original timescale, Mr Steinberg, because, as Mrs
Browning has pointed out, there are other lines of development
necessary to use these things effectively: it is to do with delivery,
it is also to do with training, it is to do with concepts of operations,
it is to do with logistics support; and even if the initial planned
date had been reached, they would not have been available for
that operation.
Q78 Mr Steinberg: How late were they?
From the date they were purchased and supposed to go into operation,
how late were they up to a month ago when they were actually brought
into service?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: We had our hearing,
as you say, 18 months ago, and that was discussed then and they
have now been brought into service. What I am saying is that—
Mr Steinberg: How late were they?
Chairman: Let him answer the question.
Q79 Mr Steinberg: He will not answer
the question?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I am. I am saying
since our last hearing we have achieved the target we explained
then, albeit in September not August.
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