Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-99)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE
25 OCTOBER 2004
Q80 Mr Steinberg: But that is not answering
the question. How late were the helicopters coming into service
from first being envisaged they were going to come into service?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I will have
to give you a note on that because I have not got that piece of
information with me.[7]
Q81 Mr Steinberg: I would have thought
you would have known. I would have thought Mr Luker would know
that?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Well, Mr Steinberg,
you are criticising me for events a long time ago. In this case
a 1995 procurement of Chinook. I have apologised for it; I have
said it was a flawed procurement; I am ready to talk about what
we are doing to prevent these things occurring in the future;
but I have to say you only want to dwell on the past.
Q82 Mr Steinberg: I am not trying to
dwell on the past, Mr Tebbit. What I am trying to do is to show
how incompetent the Ministry of Defence is: because you ballsed
up the Apache; you also messed up the Chinook; you also messed
up the Lynx. Three times three major acquisitions have all been
messed up by the Department. It is no good saying that the Apache
was a one-off, because it was not. I actually asked Sir Peter
a question on 25th February 2004. I will read it if you want.
What appeared to us to be a debacle of the Apache helicopter,
where we had brand new Apache helicopters, state of the art machines,
which could have been used apparently in the war in Iraq but were
in storage because there were no pilots to fly them. They had
not been trained. In this Report it seems you are going down exactly
the same line with the new Typhoon aeroplanes. You are not splitting
training and manufacture. You seem to have the same contract as
you had for Apache. Sir Peter responded that he thought there
was a misunderstanding of the statements of the training which
were on track in this case. What I would say in terms of whether
or not we are addressing that particular problem such as the attack
helicopter is that the first bullet to improve the ability to
manage projects on a war-like basis is precisely what we are talking
about, because what we are making sure is that not only do we
deliver the equipment but that it is affordable and sustainable
through life, that we are identifying the people we need to man
it, that we are identifying what we need to do to get them trained
and we are making sure we put the infrastructure into place so
that we can look after it as well. This is part of the remit of
the single resolution which looks across all of what in Army terminology
are called "the six lines of development" to ensure
that there is coherence and that we do not have the attack of
the helicopter again. I have found great difficulty in understanding
what you were saying, but I gather what you were saying was that
it will not happen again; but it did happen again. So every time
you come to us with a failure you tell us that it will not happen
again, but it does happen again. It happened again with the Chinook;
it happened again with the Lynx; it happened again with the Typhoon
planes.
Q83 Chairman: I think he has got the
message. Sir Kevin, what is the answer?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The answer .
. . I am not quite sure what the question is.
Mr Steinberg: I will tell you what the
question is?
Q84 Chairman: Do not repeat the entire
question!
Sir Kevin Tebbit: As I explained
at the beginning, this particular procurement, in my view, was
flawed at the outset, at the outset in 1995, and it went even
worse in 1997. I am sorry about that. I believe we are now putting
it right and have been putting it right through the various changes
we have been making to our procurement processes since then. There
is nothing I can do to put it right simply over night, but this
was—and you have heard from Sir Peter Spencer about the
reforms he is making to procurement and I have explained what
went wrong and what we are ensuring will not happen again. In
terms of Apache, yes, the training provision did go wrong. At
the time I think we took the right decision because of cost-effectiveness
reasons—it seemed too expensive to go down the route we
would otherwise have had—but we are now working well and
we have got Apache into service. As far as Typhoon is concerned,
I am not sure why you are linking that at all. This is a very
complex four-nation project. It is late—I accept that. It
is not simple to operate a four-nation project, but there is no
problem with training pilots on Typhoon, and it is a brilliant
aeroplane.
Q85 Mr Steinberg: Are the 67 Apache helicopters
part of the helicopter capability?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes; indeed.
Q86 Mr Steinberg: They are?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: They are not
all operating at present, no, but they are part of the helicopter
capability.
Q87 Mr Steinberg: When we were told that
you have 30%, 38% less capability in this Report of what you need
to be, now that the Apaches have been delivered, has that made
any difference?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: That was a reference
to lift helicopters. The Apache is an attack helicopter. It is
a different category.
Q88 Mr Steinberg: So that does include
. . . So you are still 38% below.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: 38% by one calculation,
as I explained, 20% by another.
Q89 Mr Steinberg: Could you turn to page
31? We are told on page 31 in paragraph 4.3 that there is also
an 80% shortfall in ship-optimised helicopter lift, and it goes
on to explain. What actions are you taking to ensure that as soon
as the amphibious part of the Rotorcraft is available; they will
go straight into service?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Firstly, we
are up-engining the Sea King Mk4s which will help to ease some
of this shortfall in ship-optimised helicopter lift. As I say,
also the capability can be addressed by deploying land-optimised
helicopters. Although that is quite tricky, we have done it, we
did it recently. It does mean extra costs in logistics and manpower,
but that is another way of mitigating that issue.
Mr Steinberg: Are you saying that you
have now learned your lessons after all of this sort of—
Chairman: Just say, "Yes"!
Q90 Mr Steinberg: —confrontation
that we have had?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I am saying,
"Yes".
Chairman: Is that it, Sir Gerry!
Q91 Mr Steinberg: One of these days I
will get a knighthood. Sir Kevin will make the recommendation!
Just before I finish could I ask you about the Chinook HC3 helicopter?
You say you have learned your lessons—this is the point
I was trying to get to right at the beginning and, if you had
answered the question when I had asked right at the very beginning,
we would not have got into the confrontation that we did. You
say you have learned your lessons, but you never do though, do
you?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I said we had
implemented them.
Q92 Mr Steinberg: But you never do: because
you have the Chinook helicopter. You read it and you just cannot
believe it. It would be actually funny, would it not, if it was
not so serious? The equipment that you wanted to put into this
helicopter cockpit would not fit?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: This was in
1997.
Q93 Mr Steinberg: Yes. You had eight
helicopters, costing £259 million, which I have helped to
pay for out of my taxes. We had them ordered in 1995?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Then there was
a requirement change before 1998.
Q94 Mr Steinberg: Yes. So we start off
in 1995 to buy equipment that we desperately need?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: We certainly
wanted it, yes; correct.
Q95 Mr Steinberg: It cost £259 million.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: That was the
estimate.
Q96 Mr Steinberg: But then you find out
that you cannot put the equipment in the cockpits?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: There is a bit
that comes before, Mr Steinberg. In 1997 there was a requirement
change.
Q97 Chairman: We have had all this history
already.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I know.
Chairman: Thank you very much.
Q98 Mr Steinberg: The final thing is
that they have been standing in storage, have they not, for 10
years?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: No. They were
not built. The project only began nine years ago.
Q99 Mr Steinberg: But they have been
on the cards for 10 years and they are still not working; the
same as the Apaches?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Can I explain
why we have learned the lesson and why I want to prove it? We
received them in December 2002. We have not rushed into other
solutions because we have been told that there is a good path
to make sure they are fit to fly under our standards, have got
the right defensive aids and health and usage monitoring and the
right special forces fit, but we are not simply saying, "Fine,
carry on", again. We are saying, "No", this time,
as we do with all projects now, we are evaluating them properly,
we are bounding the risk, we are spending some money (£13
million actually of tax-payers money) to make sure we have got
it right, and then we will make our decision. Meanwhile, we have
written them into the accounts at only spares value because it
would be improper for us to give a valuation until we know what
we are going to do about it. It is prudent accounting rather than
wasting £200 million. I do not know what answer we are going
to have, we will come to a conclusion very quickly, but I am as
irritated as you are about the failure of this procurement; all
I am explaining is that I am putting it right.
Mr Bacon: Sir Kevin, I do not want to
dwell on the Apache, but I do want to clarify something that you
said in an earlier answer which Mrs Browning had a go at, but
I am still not completely clear because I remember the original
report that said there were 67 helicopters worth £1200 million
in storage at Salisbury Plain at a cost of £6 million over
several years, three to four years. You said in answer to an earlier
question, "I am pleased to say" . . . I am talking about
Apaches?
Chairman: This, to be fair to Sir Kevin,
is not a hearing on Apaches. If you want to, use it as a background
to your question, but it is not fair on him. He is not briefed
to come to this hearing to talk about Apaches.
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