Select Committee on Public Accounts Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-179)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

25 OCTOBER 2004

  Q160 Mr Davidson: This is correct, is it not, that it was expected to save £80 million over 15 years and now the savings, with half the time gone, is down to £10 million?

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: As I have explained, we have changed the nature of the contract because we have required a higher level of output from the contract.

  Q161 Mr Davidson: I understand all that.

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: It changes the figures obviously.

  Q162 Mr Davidson: But you have accepted this, though; you have accepted this Report.

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes.

  Q163 Mr Davidson: And the expectation was that you would save £80 million and it is now down to £10 million. Savings, as I understand it, mean the savings of having the PFI as distinct from doing it in the traditional manner and presumably the changes that you have made, upgrading and the like—improvements as distinct from re-writing—and improvements would have been done under the existing system, and, therefore, to compare like with like we still find ourselves in the position where the 80 has come down to 10?

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: I think it is very difficult to compare like with like in the way that you are suggesting because, as I say, so many changes have been made to the original contract that it is very difficult to separate it in the way you are suggesting.

  Q164 Mr Davidson: Is it not a reasonable way to read this paragraph, to which you agree?

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes. The savings have come down, as you say, from an estimated £80 million to the £10 million here. You asked me whether I thought that at the mid-term checkpoint these savings would come down further, and I said that there is no evidence to suggest that that is the case.

  Q165 Mr Davidson: We will wait and see, shall we? Can I clarify, in paragraph 3.17, where it is saying that there is an issue as to whether or not the contract provides sufficient incentives to the contract to react to new events, presumably this would not be a difficulty if the contract continued to be held in-house since, presumably, the incentive to react to new events would be the exigency for service?

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: It is not in-house, so it is a hypothetical question.

  Q166 Mr Davidson: It has some relevance obviously for when they are considering these other things in the future, does it not? The paragraph says, as I understand it, that basically the contractor has to be bribed or incentivised to respond to new events or to correct deficiencies. If the contract was in-house you would not need to incentivise, would you, you would be able to instruct?

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: One of the benefits of not having it in-house is that it is run as an independent, separate activity, so that despite all the pressures of our operational demands, like Operation TELIC, the through-put of pilots through the Flying Training School was not affected in any way. That was sustained as a completely autonomous activity because it was what was under the contract.

  Q167 Mr Davidson: Would you not have been capable of doing that, had you been running it?

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: I am not sure that we would, actually. If we had to run it all as a totally integrated operation it may have been more difficult. I do not know the answer to that question.

  Q168 Mr Davidson: That is a question of priorities. Maybe I can ask Mr Luker, surely it would have been possible, if this had been given sufficient priority, to have continued to run it as an independent unit?

  Air Vice Marshal Luker: I think what we have seen from it is that it has freed up some of our people to go and do things that we need them for on the frontline. So you would need to take that into account as well. But, frankly, it does not sit under my purview, so I am not really an expert who can answer it.

  Q169 Mr Davidson: Moving to the question of a common approach on air worthiness, again this reminds me of what the situation used to be in the shipyards, where you used to have enormous lines of demarcation, all based on vested interest, rather than having the efficiencies that we now have through flexibility. Does it not seem here that insufficient progress has been made in moving forward to best practice in terms of reducing the three separate streams and that, effectively, you are paying extra—we are paying extra—as a result of this insistence upon continued restrictive practices? Sir Peter, are you the best person to answer this?

  Sir Peter Spencer: What I can say is that we are moving in the direction of a much more integrated process along the lines that you have described, and it has already shown to have worked well in the case of the Attack helicopter which was going through it at about the same time. So it is a further indication that the management of Chinook Mark 3 was not as tight as it should have been, which is a point which has been conceded several times this afternoon already. I am continuing to take a very close look at that because clearly unless we engage people right from the outset to understand the safety issues and the airworthiness issues, and factoring and understanding the risks and shape the management of the projects accordingly, then we are not going to succeed. All of this is part of the risk reduction studies as we take this programme forward.

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: We are moving in the direction you are seeking; we are now harmonising it.

  Q170 Mr Davidson: Absolutely. I think you are. But do you both understand why we are somewhat frustrated when we find that the progress that you make on many of these areas is much more gradual than we would wish? It is a point that some of my colleagues made earlier on about lessons not being learned speedily enough; that we find difficulty in getting to terms with the reasons why the MOD, as a learning organisation, seems to be much slower at learning than many of the other organisations with whom we deal?

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: I think the reason is that we do have to have strong governance in safety is that the sort of things that the Ministry of Defence has to do do carry much greater risks than are normal in ordinary civilian life. So there is a need to ensure that people who are going to authorise—

  Q171 Mr Davidson: It sounds like an alibi rather than an explanation.

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: No. So what happens is that you have one organisation that sets the football field, the pitch, if you will, within which the various Release to Service Authorities can play, and they define an area within that pitch that is relevant to their particular operations. It is not because they are single services, it is because of the specific roles that the particular aircraft or aircraft type is going to perform. So at the moment we have three different Release to Service Authorities.

  Q172 Mr Davidson: I understand that. Other organisations deal with complex objectives.

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: I do not think it is a problem, Mr Davidson. We are aligning those three processes.

  Q173 Mr Davidson: We are not really getting very far. Could I just ask finally, Chairman, of the five recommendations—and I have only really touched on two of them, (b) and (c)—does the Department accept the thrust of the five recommendations on page 5? And, if so, when can we expect to see progress? Again, my concern is that lip service is often paid but progress is mighty slow.

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: Mr Davidson, this is merely a Report about what we are doing. This is mainly picking up what is happening in the Ministry of Defence, commending us for it, and saying, "Can you go further in certain areas?"

  Q174 Mr Davidson: Look at (c), " . . . the Army practice of using non-commissioned pilots". Basically, we are saying that you should consider doing this and you give me waffle—

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: That was not waffle at all. I said we have considered it, we have looked at it thoroughly, a report has been done—

  Q175 Mr Davidson: And you are not doing it.

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: There are 36 RAF pilots who came through from the NCO stream that are now officers. One-third of the Naval officers were NCOs originally. I agree with you about equal opportunities, but the idea that there is an old-fashioned anachronistic issue here is really not relevant. The reason for not changing is that it would create another large structural change for two Services—

  Q176 Mr Davidson: So that is a "no" then?

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: And there is not much value for money in it, as far as I can see.

  Q177 Mr Davidson: That is a "no" then, is it not? That is a "no" for (c).

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: That is not now; it is a "not now".

  Q178 Mr Davidson: It is a "not now". So how many of the others are "not nows" and what I would see as "no"?

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: The first one, "Streamline flying training consistent with flying standards," yes, indeed, we are doing this, we are continuing to do it.

  Q179 Mr Davidson: That is a "yes", is it?

  Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes. And the UK Flying Training System will help there.


 
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