Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180-199)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE
25 OCTOBER 2004
Q180 Mr Davidson: (b) is a "yes"
as well, is it?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: We have reviewed;
we are going to align Release to Service procedures, and we will
consider moving to a single Release to Service Authority.
Q181 Mr Davidson: You will consider?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: We are aiming
to do it, but we have to align our processes. These are safety
issues, these are not just organisational questions.
Q182 Mr Davidson: Can you understand
why we get frustrated sometimes?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Where discrepancies
still exist we will quantify them with the aim of getting rid
of them and moving to a common standard.
Chairman: That is a very good way of
summing-up the MOD position. We now have a few supplementary questions,
I am afraid, Sir Kevin, from Mr Williams, Mr Bacon, Mrs Browning,
Mr Jenkins, Mr Steinberg and myself. We will try and get through
them as quickly as possible.
Q183 Mr Williams: I do not apologise
for the fact that we are having to come back on supplementary
questions because of course this is really two separate reports.
What happened is that it should have been focused on on its own,
the actual availability of the helicopters and therefore concentrate
on the Chinook, and so on, and that should have been one report.
Then we should have had another report on the extremely important
changes that are taking place in terms of military organisation.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I do agree.
Q184 Mr Williams: That has confused things,
so we will go on, if I may, to a calmer stage of the Report. I
would like to start with you, Air Vice Marshal. As a helicopter
man you would agree with the sub-heading on page 2, "Battlefield
helicopters are a key capability"?
Air Vice Marshal Luker: Absolutely.
Q185 Mr Williams: In your military opinion,
looking at the trends in the type of aircraft that are available
and the type of warfare we are likely to be engaged in in the
future, do you see this as becoming more key or might it become
a diminishing role?
Air Vice Marshal Luker: In the
next 25 years I cannot see it diminishing. Beyond that, new technologies,
I am sure, will take over from where we are now.
Q186 Mr Williams: I then come back to
the point that my colleague, Ian Davidson, has been raising. In
your supplementary memorandum,[9]
Sir Kevin, you refer to your review and you say that NCOs could
fly Royal Navy and Royal Air Force helicopters, but it concluded
that in contrast to the Army, "these Services require pilots
to have the experience and military command judgment of officers".
That is different to what you have been arguing here today; what
you have been arguing today is that it will disrupt the system
if we go in and change things around. Why do Naval and Royal Air
Force helicopter pilots have a different quality of requirement?
It cannot be inexperience, so military command judgment?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I was stressing
the points that were most important for me in accepting what the
Vice Chief of Defence Staff proposed. The issue as I understand
it—and I am sure the Air Marshal should come in—is
this, that there is a view that in the RAF the RAF exist to fly
and pilots, including helicopter pilots, have a wider role than
just flying helicopters; they are the source of higher command,
both controlling flying operations and indeed in higher staff
posts. Also, when they are operating them RAF helicopters tend
to operate across a wide area, across major command boundaries,
and the argument therefore is that it is more suited for officers
to perform that function.
Q187 Mr Williams: Are you suggesting
then that that does not apply to Army pilots but it applies to
RAF or to Navy pilots?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: As I understand
it, the argument that is provided for me in the Report that I
received is that this is less true of the Army Air Corps, who
tend to operate within the battlefield context under a specific
command of the organic brigade to which they are assigned, and
therefore their role is less independent and requires less independent
activity at a distance, from a large geographical distance from
the home base. Naval pilots are usually single pilots, as opposed
to two—
Q188 Mr Williams: Are you suggesting
that the Army pilots get homesick when they are a bit further
away but that the others are all right? It is a nonsense argument.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: There is an
argument that there are different roles which underpin this. I
was not majoring on that as the main argument; the main argument
for me is, as I say, that there would be a structural upheaval
if we changed it. There is a lot going on via change. Goodness
me, this Report shows just how many different studies and activities
are underway within the helicopter community. And in terms of
straightforward value for money, from the accounting perspective,
there was not an argument to proceed. There is a different argument
about the quality of opportunity that Mr Davidson made which,
personally, I am very sympathetic to, which is why I do not think
this is going to remain a closed issue.
Q189 Mr Williams: We have had a rather
lengthy answer to a rather easy question. Air Vice Marshal, do
you really see major significant differences between the roles
in the Navy and in the Air Force? I remember when I was doing
my OP2 there was a sergeant pilot in the RAF who actually got
his commission at the same time as I did. So we have had NCO pilots
from way back in time. I find it very difficult to believe that
there is this major capability gap between the one type of pilot
and the other. When Sir Kevin rushes in to answer it suggests
to me that he does not want you to answer, so I would like you
to answer.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: It was a Report
to me, simply that—
Mr Williams: You see what I mean, Chairman?
Q190 Chairman: Just let the Air Vice
Marshal give the answer, as a son of an NCO, and let us finish
with this.
Air Vice Marshal Luker: I think
there are subtle differences, I do not think they are major, and
I think the major reason why the three Services would prefer to
continue the way they are at the moment are the ones we have already
articulated.
Q191 Mr Williams: We will move away from
that for a second, to Sir Kevin's relief. Obviously the availability,
both of pilots and of aircraft, is going to be a key factor. Back
to you now, Sir Kevin. It puzzles me that the Department has two
different methodologies, according to your own supplementary brief,
of assessing the measure of shortfall. It seems to be one which
is used in the Report, shows 38% which you, under your alternative
formula, say could be 20%?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes.
Q192 Mr Williams: Why do you have two
and how do you know which one is right? And why is it right for
one Service and not right for another?[10]
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Sorry, no, this
is not about one Service and another. But to answer your question,
as I said the 38% figure is the figure used by the Equipment Capability
Planners in their ideal world. It is, if you like, no risk; you
have all the helicopters you could possibly want for every mission.
The figure we used, 20%, is the one derived from the Defence White
Paper in 2003 and the capabilities derived from that, where one
is prepared to say that you do not need them all for every single
scenario. I quoted the medium-scale peacekeeping scenario.
Q193 Mr Williams: If we can go to the
first few lines of paragraph 4.2: "The Department does not
quantify"—it does not quantify, not does and
then takes other things into account—"the total amount
of helicopter lift required to fulfil its Military Tasks."
To someone outside the Military and outside the Department of
Defence it seems absurd that you can have military tasks. Do you
quantify the number of tanks you need and the number of ships
you need, but not the number of helicopters? And do you quantify
the number of fighter aircraft?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Clearly we do
quantify because we have those figures of 38% and 20%, but we
do look at the effects we create, not necessarily the precise
platforms we use, and of course there are certain interchangeabilities
here. You do not necessarily use a helicopter for something when
you could use other Forces for the same purpose. So there is a
degree of, if you like, military management that has to take place,
which is why you cannot be absolutely precise. I am sure the Air
Marshal could explain that.
Q194 Mr Williams: Not being absolutely
precise is one thing, but having 100% difference between the one
formula you used and the other formula you used—one says
20% and the other says 38%, that is double, that is 100% more.
Mixing the percentages it is double. I was not playing games,
I was just stating facts in a different way. For one quantification
to be double the other it must mean that there is a hell of a
danger if you are using the wrong one, particularly if it is a
low one.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I did explain
an example. Medium-scale peacekeeping, the Forces you need at
the initial phase of the six-month period of operation are not
the same as you are going to need towards the end.
Q195 Mr Williams: Of course not, I understand
that.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: That is the
answer to that particular question. One exercises those judgments,
the other one does not.
Q196 Mr Williams: But it still does not
answer my question, how do you get a 20% shortfall out of your
way of interpreting it when the other one, which you have accepted,
you do not have any reservations here, claims 38%?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: It is in the
Report. The 38% is taking absolutely no risks whatsoever and ensuring
that you have every helicopter needed for every possible task.
That includes discretionary tasks as well as what is essential
to be successful.
Mr Williams: When you are saying that
it is taking everything into account the other formula, which
is half as high, it seems an amazing gulf, particularly when you
look at what you signed up to, in paragraph 4.3, where the point
is made that the model which gives the 38% does not measure factors
such as mobility, amphibiosity, launch platform considerations,
load sizing to minimise attrition risks and through-life costs.
It does not take those into account, but not only does it not
take those into account it also in the next paragraph says that
furthermore it does not take into account the Harmony guidelines,
which is trying to get a more reasonable assessment of pilot needs.
Are you saying that these are taken into account in your 20% and
not in your 18%? That seems ludicrous, does it not?
Chairman: We are not getting anywhere.
Mr Williams: I want an answer.
Q197 Chairman: Try your best, and it
is the last question on this point, otherwise do us a note.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I will do you
a note. The 20% comes from our Defence White Paper calculations
which I can send you a note about to explain precisely what it
is.[11]
Q198 Mr Williams: Before we leave that,
it comes from your White Paper calculations and what you are saying
is it comes from the money that is available not from the equipment
that we need?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: That is also
true.
Q199 Mr Williams: I know, but I would
like to know the answer. If we are sending our troops out with
half the helicopters they should have because we are not providing
the money, let us say so, then you do not get the blame—or
at least the Air Vice Marshal does not get the blame, but you
and the Department and the Ministers might get the blame. We need
to know which it is. Saying that it is because of the White Paper
is actually saying a policy decision has been made—
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I was explaining
the methodologies.
9 Ev 22-27 Back
10
Ev 28-29 Back
11
Ev 28-29 Back
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