Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200-219)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE
25 OCTOBER 2004
Q200 Mr Williams: . . . and it takes
no account of actual need. We are now tailoring our assessment
of shortfall on a financial basis, not on a Military Task basis;
is that not the reality of it?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Not quite.
Q201 Mr Williams: Not quite but very
near.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: We have a scale
of operations that we should support—two medium and one
small-scales. The 20% funding refers to what we think we need
in order to effectively discharge concurrently two medium and
one small-scale operations. To that extent you are right, there
is still a funding issue but it is not as big as the 38%.
Mr Williams: We will really look forward
to this document.
Chairman: Thank you. Mr Bacon. I must
ask colleagues, please, to be fair to Permanent Secretaries that
appear in front of us, that the total time of questioning—and
can I appeal for short answers?—is 15 minutes.
Q202 Mr Bacon: A question for Mr Luker
and then one to Sir Kevin. In relation to the altimeter question
I asked earlier, can I refer you to paragraph 3.41, where it does
say: "The Chinook HC3 is currently restricted to day/night
flying above 500 feet in weather clear of cloud, and where the
pilot can fly the aircraft solely using external reference points
without relying on the flight displays." Are you saying that
notwithstanding all of that it would still at any one time be
possible for the pilot to tell his altitude?
Air Vice Marshal Luker: Against
what is displayed in front of him within a certain amount of accuracy,
yes.
Q203 Mr Bacon: So it is for other reasons
that he has to be able to fly it without relying on flight displays?
Air Vice Marshal Luker: Because
the aircraft does not meet our safety standards.
Q204 Mr Bacon: Sir Kevin, I would like
to explore a little further this question of fix to field and
the potential future use of the existing aircraft, that you referred
to in your supplementary note, and I think Mr Jenkins asked about
this as well. The £13 million preparation phase which is
now underway, which is referred to in your note, leading to a
final decision on the HC3, which is due in mid-2005, can you clarify
is that a final decision due in mid-2005 on whether the extra
£127 million referred to in paragraph 3.43 is going to be
spent?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I wish it were
as simple as knowing precisely what the figure was. That is why
we are doing a risk reduction study.
Q205 Mr Bacon: In the region of it?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes. To decide
whether the fix to field solution is indeed viable, is indeed
technically achievable. We have had some bad experiences.
Q206 Mr Bacon: Can I just clarify the
position? In paragraph 3.43 the phrase "fix to field"
is not used, but essentially the capability required by mid-2007
will necessitate additional funding, estimated to be in the region
of £127 million. That is the fix to field solution?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: It is to do
three things. It is to replace the avionics so that we can certify
airworthiness on the basis that meets British standards; it is
to provide the Defensive Aid Suites and the Health and Usage Monitoring
System that we would need to put in as a separate project anyway
because that came along through the life of the project—that
was not in the original specification. Thirdly, to meet the current
Special Forces' requirements where, again, over time we have learnt
that we need a higher quality provision than perhaps we thought
originally. So it is to do all three things. One-third is to sort
out this airworthiness issue, the other two elements are doing
those other two things. I would not like to say precisely how
much it is going to cost because until we have done that I am
not satisfied that we have an accurate figure yet.
Q207 Mr Bacon: So that is why it is in
the region of?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I am not satisfied
yet.
Q208 Mr Bacon: You mentioned Special
Forces. It is the government's policy that there should be an
expansion of Special Forces—it was announced recently—and
obviously Special Forces need things like Chinooks. Notwithstanding
the flawed procurement, which you call it, which is as thorough
a going "horlicks" as we have seen, is it nonetheless
the case, having spent £300 million—
Sir Kevin Tebbit: £252 million.
Q209 Mr Bacon: I read £259 million
but I was just rounding up.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: That was an
original assessment of how much it would cost.
Q210 Mr Bacon: I am sure it will be £300
million. But having gone so far, is it not your expectation that
it is likely to be sensible to go the rest of the way to get these
eight existing aircraft functioning, given the policies of the
government?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: That is why
we have changed. The policies of the government are very clear
but I am not prepared to just give aspirational optimistic views
until we understand precisely what is involved, and this is the
problem of what went wrong. People said, "It will be fine,"
but it was not and they did not do the risk reduction work and
until that work is completed I cannot give you that assurance.
Chairman: Thank you very much. Mrs Browning.
Q211 Mrs Browning: Just on a point about
the pilots and the staff needed to maintain the helicopters, could
you confirm that that group of people would be outside the government's
recent announcements in reducing manpower across the Services?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Yes, I have
no sense that Chinook pilots would be in any way involved in anything
of that kind. It is not a question I expected, which is why I
am hesitant; but the short answer is yes.
Q212 Mrs Browning: I understand, for
example, that within the Army now if people indicate that they
wish to leave the Service, rather than being encouraged to stay
for a couple of years they are invited to leave immediately, and
I wanted confirmation that not only the pilots but the engineers
who maintain the helicopters would not fall within that sort of
policy.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I am not aware
of that policy in the Army. Remember the changes in Army numbers
are very small. We have a current strength of 103,000 and what
we have announced is going down to something like 102,000, and
that is over quite a period of time. I am not aware of what you
are talking about in the Army, unless it may be in very specific
areas.
Air Vice Marshal Luker: May I
add a rider, lest there be confusion again? I do not think there
is any intent in terms of formed units of people in that sense,
but of course any individual might volunteer for redundancy if
there was redundancy available, and that would be true in the
Air Force. Or might wish to be part of those being considered
for re-brigading within their own Force. We are doing a logistic
transformation programme at the moment and we are doing other
programmes, which will change the nature and the balance of the
Forces that we have within the helicopter world.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Sorry, you were
talking about pilots?
Q213 Mrs Browning: I was talking about
pilots and also engineer support staff.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I could not
guarantee that in terms of engineer support staff because, as
you know, in this Report there is quite a lot about procurement
efficiencies. The end-to-end logistics process includes one for
helicopters and this concept of moving to depth and forward—actually
in the Report it is not called forward—support with the
contractor providing depth support and the Services doing the
forward element, that could affect things. I have no particular
information about this particular Force but more efficient procurement,
more efficient logistics can have an effect on things and probably
will in the Defence Logistics Organisation.
Q214 Mr Jenkins: Three quick points,
Sir Kevin, and if you do not know the answer—and you might
not—I would be grateful if you could send me some details
on it. How long do helicopter pilots serve after they have been
trained? How many leave and go to better paid jobs in civilian
life? And the third part, when we set up the Defence Helicopter
Flying School in the PFI, where did the company get their trainers
from?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The first answer,
the return of service, which is the important thing, for helicopter
pilots tends to be around 17 to 18 years—actually 16.5 is
the lowest in one of the three Services but 18 in one of the others,
so it is between 16.5 and 18 years' return on the investment in
flying or flying-related posts. That is the first answer. Sorry,
the second question?
Q215 Mr Jenkins: When they leave do they
go to civilian life and get better jobs as helicopter pilots?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: They quite like
it, which is why they last and stay that long. Currently there
are programmes to encourage them to stay even longer, extension
programmes with financial retention initiatives for the RAF; and
for the Army they are reviewing—and I think already changing—the
rules for when NCOs, for example, have to retire, to try to get
more service out of them. But when people go, often they still
do flying; they might even become part of the PFI organisation
that provides training.
Q216 Mr Jenkins: That was the third part:
when they set up as a company where do they get their trainers
from?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Many of them
I think are ex-servicemen.
Air Vice Marshal Luker: The large
proportion but they do come from the civilian field as well.
Q217 Mr Jenkins: So they were ex-servicemen,
they were not serving officers?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: They would be
ex if they were employed by the PFI company.
Q218 Mr Jenkins: I want to know if anyone
actually left to join the company?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I cannot say
that there would not be, but, as I say, the return on service
is pretty good in all of these Services.
Q219 Mr Steinberg: Two quick points,
I want to come back on a couple of things that you said. You said
that you were disappointed that we had not praised a good report
and that we had picked the points out that were not very good.
Surely a good report would not tell us that eight helicopters
costing £259 million, which were delivered in 2001, are still
in storage now and are not expected in service until 2007 at a
further cost of £127 million, Sir Kevin?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: What I meant
was the achievements of the Joint Helicopter Force and all of
the changes which are picked up in the Report and the NAO have
encouraged constituted, in my view, a tremendous achievement,
not just for the Armed Forces but also the civilians in logistics
and training and other areas. There are 13,000 people, I think,
in the Joint Helicopter Command who do tremendous work and much
of the Report is about the work they do. So without wanting you
not to, as it were, pose me hard questions, I think it is important
to recognise and acknowledge that. The second point, I did try
to explain that although I do not duck the criticism about this
flawed procurement—and I began by saying it was a deeply
flawed procurement and explained what we are doing about it and
where it went wrong—the whole of the costs to put it right
are not to do with the flawed procurement, they are to do with
upgrades that are still needed but which have arisen during the
course of that procurement. We fitted those upgrades to Chinook
Mark 2s and 2As and we need to do that to the Mark 3s if we are
to accept them into service for the role intended, and those extra
costs would come on top but within that overall amount of money.
In other words, only one-third of that money is to do with fixing
the airworthiness problem. It does not make it right, it does
not make it fine, but just to put it in perspective.
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