Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220-228)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE
25 OCTOBER 2004
Q220 Mr Steinberg: The last point I want
to make is that you put great store by the fact that you believed
that the training of our pilots produces the best pilots but also
puts them in absolutely no danger at all because it is the safest
way of doing it. Yet if you read 4.10 on page 33—and I only
bring that up because you actually said that, and if I had had
more time before, and I accept that I had already had my fair
share, I wanted to talk about the training of pilots and the length
of difference between American training and British training—and
if you read the paragraph where it says, "For example, such
was the haste to deploy refitted Lynx Mk7s on Operation TELIC,
that two aircraft flew direct from modification at the Defence
Aviation Repair Agency, Fleetlands, to embarking ships. 3 Regiment,
Army Air Corps were, therefore, unable to familiarise themselves
with new Defensive Aid Suites until they arrived in the Gulf,
not having had the opportunity to practise with suitably equipped
helicopters during their previous year's training." In other
words, the pilots were actually sent to the Gulf who were not
fully trained, who in fact were not to the standard that you would
have expected or hoped, but yet they were sent, which contradicts
what you were saying originally about the training of Apache helicopter
pilots, and also the fact that presumably if they were not fully
trained then you were sending them into the Gulf with the danger
of them being killed.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I was actually
talking about the training provided by the Defence Flying Training
School and that system, that is to say the basic training and
the training to type. I was not referring to the precise operational
specific training, although perhaps the Air Marshal could say
something about that since it is more in his province when it
comes to sending people into scenarios.
Air Vice Marshal Luker: I would
agree that we had not given people sent out to the Gulf all of
the training we would have liked to have given them, but we always
make the assumption that there will be some time in theatre to
be able to make good the bits that we have not done. That has
a certain risk to it but that is the way that we have managed.
What we are good at, I think, is inculcating in our people the
ability to take on new equipment, new techniques, new environments
very quickly, and we try to do that through a generic basic training.
In that—and it sounds boastful—I do not think there
is anyone who can beat us in the world.
Q221 Chairman: That last question relates
to the question I asked earlier about paragraphs 4.7 and 4.8 on
some of the critical capability shortfalls, Air Vice Marshal,
and with the scenario of pilots having to familiarise or train
at the last minute, so I think I would like you to do a further
note on that because we are clearly worried that pilots' lives
are being put at risk. Would you do a note for us on that, please,
and a considered response?[12]
I wanted to ask you why, as a matter of interest, Army air helicopter
squadrons are commanded by majors but RAF ones are commanded by
Wing Commanders? Would it not be cheaper if Army crews operated
the Chinook and Puma fleets?
Air Vice Marshal Luker: I think
this is another of those legacy issues that we have from all three
Services where we call the same things different names and different
things the same names. It is possible within the Army to find
a wing that is made up of four people and it is commanded by a
Lance Corporal. It is possible to find a wing in the Air Force
which is made up of about 500 people. The short answer is that
squadrons in the Air Force are different in size and numbers of
people and numbers of equipment to those that you find inside
the Army, and the nearest comparable unit is a regiment to an
RAF squadron. That is why the rank ranging is done in the way
it is.
Q222 Chairman: That is a very fair answer.
Peter, I apologise, you have not had much of an outing this afternoon,
a man of your distinction, and I am sure you are rather upset
about that, are you not? Perhaps I can give you a shout very late
on. Can you assure the Committee that under Smart Procurement
the problems with Chinook will not reoccur?
Sir Peter Spencer: I cannot give
any absolute assurances about any procurement programme because
we deal with uncertainty and technological risk. What I can assure
you is that we will do the risk examination with great care; that
we will not be unrealistic in raising expectations as to time
and cost and we will put in the right amount of contingencies
and it will certainly have the full force of the corporate governance
that all of my projects now have, with the new arrangements inside
the Defence Procurement Agency with three full-time operations
directors who look at these programmes very carefully every month
and in particular detail every four months.
Q223 Chairman: Thank you. We know that
with this Chinook Mark 3 you did not obtain the software codes
of the US made equipment, and that is what we have been told about
today. Are you going to ensure that this is not a problem with
the Joint Strike Fighter?
Sir Peter Spencer: We are still
working through the issues on Joint Strike Fighter and you do
not necessarily have to have access to source code to achieve
adequate safety assurances, as we demonstrated with the Attack
helicopter.
Q224 Chairman: Sir Kevin, you said in
your supplementary memorandum[13]
that we do not expect to eradicate the shortfall entirely.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Correct.
Q225 Chairman: So we recognise that that
shortfall is there, it is not going to be overcome, and that is
something that we should be concerned about, should we not?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: The future Rotorcraft
programme is there to make things a lot better. I cannot, rather
like the Chief of Defence Procurement, simply say it will become
completely eradicated; what I can say is that we will have a more
robust Force than we have at present, and determined to get value
for money from it. I cannot promise when we will close the shortfall.
Q226 Mr Jenkins: That is also derived
from the White Paper, I assume?
Sir Kevin Tebbit: No, but this
is a genuine point.
Q227 Chairman: I meant it as a genuine
point.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: I am very happy
to send you the calculations based on the White Paper policies.
Q228 Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you very
much for appearing before us. As usual, Sir Kevin, you have come
on a sticky wicket and we are grateful to you for trying to answer
our questions. But at the end of the day we are left with a quarter
of a billion pounds of our taxpayers' money spent on helicopters
that simply cannot fly and that is something we are naturally
concerned about. You have taken us to task for referring to the
Apache, but we can only in conclusion quote Lady Bracknell, that
once is unfortunate, twice looks like carelessness.
Sir Kevin Tebbit: Mr Chairman,
you did ask me about, on the one hand, were we taking enough account
of the safety of our people in various areas, nuclear, biological
and the rest of things? Part of this issue is because we do take
care of safety, we are not prepared to cut corners and that is
where we find ourselves. I think it is very unfortunate. The effort
we put in on safety, on Defensive Aid Suites as well, shows that
we are careful in that area as well as in the rest.
Chairman: Thank you very much, gentlemen.
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