Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of
Defence
The Report on Battlefield Helicopters published
by the National Audit Office on 7 April 2004 offered a number
of key recommendations for consideration by the Ministry of Defence,
which we have taken very seriously. In addition, this is an area
of capability which has been the focus of considerable work over
the course of this year within the Department. In view of the
time that has elapsed since the Report was prepared I felt it
would be helpful to offer a written memorandum, prior to the forthcoming
hearing on 25 October, updating you on the current position in
all these areas.
I would have liked to offer the memorandum a
little earlier, but conclusions were only reached on a number
of the key areas very recently. I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have on any of these areas at the session later
this month.
Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG
Permanent Under-Secretary of State
14 October 2004
NAO KEY RECOMMENDATION
1: STREAMLINE FLYING
TRAINING CONSISTENT
WITH THE
MAINTENANCE OF
FLYING STANDARDS,
WHERE POSSIBLE
CONSIDERING THE
OVERALL SINGLE-SERVICE
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
The Report acknowledges that significant advances
have already been made in this area. All three services continue
to research methods of streamlining flying training, and action
is taken where appropriate. Since publication of the NAO Report,
further efficiencies have been generated through adjustment to
course syllabi. Courses within the Elementary Flying Training
School and the Defence Helicopter Flying School (DHFS) have been
re-phased, joint Crew Resource Management training for Qualified
Helicopter Instructors and helicopter students has been set up,
and joint Aviation Medicine training is under consideration.
In the near term, the main prospect for generating
increased cost efficiencies will lie in adjustments to elementary
flying training, such as those being explored under the Army Flying
Training Study (AFTS), via which the Army is researching the potential
for conducting all-rotary training, designed to replace the course
currently conducted at the Defence Elementary Flying Training
School, prior to their pilots' entry to the joint DHFS basic and
advanced training. It is thought that this could reduce the training
pipeline length by around 11 weeks. A trial course is scheduled
to run in early 2005.
In the future, the introduction of the UK Military
Flying Training Sytem (MFTS) should offer substantial scope for
improving the delivery of more advanced flying training. The current
training fleet does not have the capability to download operational
training from advanced platforms, which means that there remains
a requirement for pilots to conduct training on more expensive
operational platforms, such as Apache. For example, in a simplistic
comparison with his RN Merlin colleagues, an Army AH pilot with
a total flying experience of 250 hours will have cost an estimated
£1 million more to train than the RN pilot (at 2003 prices).
This need for type-dependent flying training, with advanced skills
being learned on specific advanced platforms (or their simulators)
determines the differing nature of flying training pipelines within
each Service.
The UK MFTS Integrated Project Teams (IPT) plans
to conduct a full, two year, Rotary Wing Training Needs Analysis
into tri-Service flying training in order to identify and address
the future needs of the front line. This will build on the recommendations
of the 18-month study conducted by the Flying Training Development
Wing which concluded in mid-2004. The reason for not proceeding
more rapidly is the need to await decisions on future equipments
and associated manpower liabilities, establishments and operational
considerations, to ensure full training coherence.
At all times, quality is considered to be the
most important factor in producing military aircrew. The Report
recognises that the quality of output from the DHFS is acknowledged
by all three services.
There are limitations to how far joint training
can be achieved. It is not as simple as having one training system
for pilots across all Services. Adoption of best practice within
all three Services has reflected dissimilar requirements. Of necessity,
producing crews for the varying disciplines, of ship-borne, Attack
Aviation and Support Helicopter battlefield environments, requires
dissimilar, type-specific training to be carried out.
For example, the RN pilot, who is training for
a single-pilot, ship-borne role in a highly complex, integrated
weapons and sensor platform, will have more experience on type
than an RAF counterpart, but his overall total flying experience
of 250 hours will be almost exactly the same. The skills required
by the RN pilot by the time he reaches Limited Combat Ready (LCR)
status dictate an absolute need for him to be trained on type
(as opposed to flying an unrepresentative training platform).
Conversely, the RAF, in crewing its Support Helicopter fleet with
two pilots, can accept a less experienced ab initio pilot
on type, having a senior and more experienced aircraft commander
on board for every sortie.
In addition, the Services each have different
requirements from their training. While the AFTS is exploring
all-rotary training for the Army, the RN and RAF are also required
to operate Fast Jet and Multi-Engined Air Transport aircraft and
their conduct of Elementary Flying Training on fixed wing platforms
is an essential element for training and streaming pilots of the
correct calibre for these roles.
NAO KEY RECOMMENDATION
2: CONTINUE TO
WORK TOWARDS
A COMMON
APPROACH TO
AIRWORTHINESS THAT
OVERCOMES THE
INCONSISTENCIES IN
HAVING THREE
SEPARATE CHANNELS
OF DELEGATION
The Department's airworthiness policy and regulations
are joint. Within this joint structure, the individual Services
have developed their systems to meet the individual Service operational
needs. Key to this is a comprehensive understanding of all the
elements (eg Single Service training, trials and development,
ethos and modus operandi, as well as technical issues) that contribute
to aviation safety. The Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) rightly
expects the same standard of service to be delivered by each of
the three Service helicopter Release to Service Authorities (RTSAs).
The Department has recently undertaken a review
of all airworthiness in the military air environment that has
made recommendations for an audit process to ensure an early alignment
of Release to Service processes and products, ensuring a common
Service to Aircraft Operating Authorities (in this case the JHC).
Where discrepancies continue to exist, for example, issues arising
out of operating from ships, they will be quantified and where
possible a plan will be developed for migration to the common
standard.
Further work, in a study by the Defence Aviation
Safety Centre (DASC) due to report in November 2004, is to establish
the extent to which current tri-Service arrangements for ensuring
the safety and airworthiness of Service aircraft remain appropriate
in the emerging defence environment, and make recommendations
for the future.
Each Service uses the most appropriate internal
trials organisation (that is equipped with the appropriate aircraft
type and suitably experienced personnel) to assist in the development
of operational requirements, to provide independent safety advice
to underpin the aircraft Safety Case and in the development of
tactics and techniques for the effective employment of aircraft
and associated modifications.
The Department will always seek to nominate
the most appropriate RTSA. Wherever possible the Department nominates
only one RTSA for each mark of aircraft. Having two different
RTSAs for the same marks of helicopter was at odds with perceived
best practice and the airworthiness responsibility for the very
small fleet of Lynx Mk7 and Gazelle helicopters of 847 Naval Air
Squadron reverted back to the Director of Army Aviation. When
different operational requirements are met by the procurement
of different marks of the same airframe (such as the RN Merlin
Mk 1 and RAF Merlin Mk3), a single IPT is responsible for facilitating
the procurement. This approach minimises duplication of effort
in many areas, but the differing roles and operating requirements
and platform specification, particularly if operated by different
Services, is likely to drive a requirement for different RTSAs.
However, follow on work will examine the benefits of a Joint RTSA
organisation. Such a study will, necessarily, be lengthy and require
the full participation of all airworthiness stakeholders. It will
have to incorporate a full legal review of current airworthiness
(and Aviation Safety) policy and regulations together with consideration
of civil policy and regulation including international and European
issues.
NAO KEY RECOMMENDATION
3: CONSIDER IMPLEMENTING
THE ARMY
PRACTICE OF
USING NON-COMMISSIONED
PILOTS IN
BATTLEFIELD HELICOPTERS
THROUGH EXAMINING
THE IMPACT
OF SUCH
AN INITIATIVE
ON FLEXIBILITY
IN OPERATING
THE HELICOPTER
FLEET, AND
POTENTIAL COST
SAVINGS
An internal tri-Service study team has reviewed
the issue once again and its recommendations have been endorsed
by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. The findings are summarised
below.
The use of helicopters differs in each of the
three Services. RN helicopters are operated primarily in small
numbers, embarked as an integrated element of naval operational
capability, which includes warships, submarines and aircraft.
In the Army, helicopters are a Combat Arm, fighting alongside
Infantry and Armour, and their operations are integrated closely
with brigade, division and corps plans. In the RAF, helicopters
primarily operate in support of land operations but in view of
the limited number available and the high demand for their use,
they are normally assigned at the highest command level, operating
across brigade and divisional boundaries.
These differing roles have driven the policies
of each Service, which have evolved to reflect both the specialist
demands of the individual helicopter forces and the wider command
and leadership requirements of the parent Service. Within the
Army Air Corps (AAC), officers are employed and trained to become
the commanders, executive officers and staff officers of the Corps
and the wider Army. In their flying duties they operate as mission
commander. NCO pilots are almost exclusively employed in flying
appointments and they form the core of AAC aircrew experience.
In the RN, helicopter aircrew are required to act as both independent
flight commanders and specialist warfare officers, responsibilities
that require the experience, military and command judgement of
commissioned rank. RAF helicopter pilots are required to operate
their aircraft autonomously at strategic distances, in multi-national/joint
scenarios, where a thorough understanding of higher command intent,
threat assessment and enemy capabilities is essential. They are
also a vital component of the Service's Flying Branch, playing
their full part in command appointments and staff duties at all
levels within a Service which depends upon its aircrew to provide
its senior commanders and warfighters.
Following detailed examination of the competencies
required, the study found that it would be possible for NCO pilots
to operate in a small number of RN and RAF helicopter roles. However,
the requirement to maintain a minimum number of officers to provide
the necessary command and control element of the forces, both
on the ground and in the air, limited the maximum number of NCO
pilots the RAF and RN could support to a combined total of 156.
There was also a serious risk that the requirement for officer
leadership on deployed and embarked operations, could reduce this
number still further. The study found that the introduction of
this relatively small number of NCO pilots would reduce flexibility
of the forces involved and would have a negative impact on the
overall rank structure and development of commissioned warfighters
in the individual Service.
In costing the impact of the introduction of
156 NCO pilots, the study identified potential savings of approximately
£1.25 million; total savings being limited by the relatively
small difference in capitation rates between junior officers and
SNCOs, and the fact that specialist flying pay is paid to aircrew
based on experience not rank. Additionally, the study identified
that in view of the lower return of service of RAF/RN NCOs compared
with officers, the employment of 156 NCO pilots would require
the training of one additional pilot each year to maintain manning
levels, effectively negating the £1.25M capitation savings.
In summary, the introduction of NCO pilots to the
RAF and RN, while possible to a limited extent, would carry operational
and structural penalties, without providing significant financial
savings to the Department.
NAO KEY RECOMMENDATION
4: REDUCE THE
CURRENT SHORTFALL
IN BATTLEFIELD
HELICOPTERS BY
ELIMINATING INCORRECT
SPECIFICATIONS AND
SLIPPAGES IN
DELIVERIES
The Department acknowledges a current and projected
shortfall in Support Helicopter lift capability. The precise level
of the shortfall is, however, dependent on the assessment methodology
and its underpinning assumptions, including risk treatment.
The Department uses two slightly different methodologies
to inform its decision making. Operational Analysis (OA) is used,
primarily at the strategic level, to inform equipment procurement
decisions and future capability planning. OA uses a set of illustrative
future scenarios in which UK forces might be called upon to operate.
The scenarios are considered representative of anticipated future
operations and cover the spectrum of conflict and the range of
anticipated environmental conditions. Detailed analysis is carried
out to model the activity necessary to achieve operational success
within acceptable levels of casualties in the scenario, and to
determine the equipment capability required to support this. The
38% capability shortfall identified in the NAO Report is based
on results drawn from Operational Analysis (OA).
For planning purposes, the Department uses a
different methodology to determine the force structure required
to deliver our policy goals. This methodology is described in
the July supplement to the 2003 Defence White Paper. The methodology
uses the same concurrency assumptions as operational analysis,
but takes account of both historical evidence and policy judgements
about future operations, in determining the required equipment
capability. By way of example, based on experience of the last
10 years, we assume that on enduring operations, there is scope
for achieving the desired strategic effects with lower force levels
over the duration of the operation. Similarly, for intervention
operations, we attribute force elements against core tasks which
are required to achieve operational success but manage with more
risk on discretionary tasks which are assumed to be force-drivers
in OA methodology. The required force structure using this methodology
is smaller than the pure OA would indicate. Our analysis indicates
that the lift shortfall, calculated against the same Medium-Medium-Small
concurrency assumptions, is of the order of 20%.
Whilst acknowledging an overall shortfall in
Support Helicopter lift capability, the Department has demonstrated
regularly its ability adequately to support Small and Medium Scale
enduring Peace-Keeping Operations. Our policy assumption is that
in such operations once the joint force has been deployed and
stability established, lower force levels and lighter forces are
required. We therefore have much greater latitude to plan the
number of deployed helicopters in this type of operation compared
to intervention operations. This could mean that in enduring operations
in more benign environments, for instance in the Balkans, helicopter
and crew deployments would be drawn down as low as possible, and
would be lower than theoretical planning levels. In practice,
the shortfall has not prevented us from successfully supporting
recent operations in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Sierra Leone,
Afghanistan and Iraq.
In the short-term, we will be looking at ways
of improving our current capabilities as quickly as possible.
For example, a £1 million measure to upgrade the engines
on the Sea King Mk4 will increase the ship optimised Support Helicopter
lift capability significantly from Apr 06. Bringing the Chinook
Mk3 into service would, by 2008, increase the overall Support
Helicopter lift capability by around 13% (see below).
In the longer term, the NAO Report suggested
that future helicopter procurements would eradicate the current
capability shortfall by around 2017. Following this year's equipment
planning round, which reflected the analysis in the supplement
to the 2003 Defence White Paper published in July, `Delivering
Security in a Changing World', there has been some adjustment
and re-balancing of our priorities to ensure that we are achieving
the right spread of future capabilities from within the resources
available to us. We do not expect to eradicate the shortfall in
its entirety, but the newly formed Future Rotorcraft Capability
(FRC) programme (see below) should offer substantial improvement
over the current level of capability, delivered at a reduced cost
of ownership.
Chinook Mk3 Lessons Learned
The NAO Report identified the need for the Department
to learn lessons from the flawed procurement of the Chinook Mk3.
Following the problems experienced by the Ministry of Defence
in delivery of the Chinook Mk 3 helicopter, in September 2003
the Department undertook a formal investigation into the procurement
process with the aim of:
(a) Establishing the clear points of failure
in the project, including any deviation from laid down procedures,
and what might have been done differently (and at what stage)
to enable the project to be managed more effectively.
(b) Identifying whether the application of
Smart Acquisition processes, had they been in place, would have
prevented the same outcome in the same combination of circumstances
affecting the Mk3 project.
(c) Applying the lessons of this investigation
to develop any changes to the Department's approach to securing
Military Aircraft Release (MAR).
The investigation covered the project from its
inception in 1994-95 to late 2003, identifying the key decisions
made and interviewing the main players involved. This work produced
recommendations on how mistakes might be avoided, and issues of
process mitigated, in the future. The investigation was carried
out by senior acquisition personnel from the DPA.
From the recommendations, a detailed action
plan has been produced and progress on each of the actions monitored
and recorded. The recommendations covered a number of areas:
— Rigorous application of existing
procedures
— Safety requirements and procedures
associated with MAR
— Assessment of the impact had SMART
acquisition been implemented at the time
— Co-ordination across Customer Departments
for complex programmes
Significant progress has been made by the Defence
Procurement Agency in implementing the identified actions throughout
the Acquisition organisations and robust mechanisms have been
put in place to check the timely and efficient application of
improvement initiatives. Senior personnel are involved in championing
the improvements and ensuring that lessons learned are applied
across a broad range of acquisition programmes. A further review
of progress is planned for mid 2005.
Chinook Mk3 Way Ahead
The Department has completed a Combined Operational
Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal (COEIA) to identify the
best value for money solution for what to do with the Chinook
Mk3 platform.
This has identified the `fix to field' solution
as the probable value for money solution for the Chinook Mk3,
and it identified a technical solution, which has been ratified
by 3 independent technical advisors as being realistic. But before
committing to this and against the background of this project,
further work is being carried out.
A "Preparation Phase" was accordingly
approved in September to test, working closely with industry,
the assumptions that underpinned the COEIA, to validate the proposed
technical solution for "fix to field", and to identify
and mitigate technical and commercial risks. We expect to spend
around £13 million on this work. In the meantime, affordability
is being addressed through the Department's normal planning processes.
On current plans we expect to decide the way ahead next summer.
Until a decision is made, the value of the Chinook
Mk3 aircraft has been written down as a constructive loss of £205
million under prudent accounting practice in the Departmental
Annual Report and Accounts. The impairment arose as it was established
that, although the terms of the original contract had been met,
the helicopters did not meet the operational requirement and could
not acquire Military Aircraft Release. The value has been written
down to reflect the value of usable spares only.
Future Rotorcraft Capability (FRC)
The lessons of the Chinook Mk3 will be absorbed
into what is now known as the FRC programme, for which the IAB
endorsed the first phase of work in Sep 04. The supplement to
the 2003 Defence White Paper, "Delivering Security in
a Changing World", explained that we are in the process
of reviewing our future helicopter capability requirements and
our forward plans, focusing, in line with our wider policy, on
the effects required rather than on types and numbers of platforms.
Over the next decade, a significant part of
our existing fleet will retire from service. We therefore plan
to invest substantially in new helicopters in a relatively condensed
timeframe to replace and enhance the capability they provided.
We will invest around £3bn over the next 10 years in this
area. In the short to medium-term, we will also be putting additional
investment into our existing fleet. This gives us an opportunity
for holistic consideration of the future programme that we believe
will deliver a more coherent and more cost-effective future helicopter
programme. FRC absorbs, and will test the capability requirements
which underpin them, a number of programmes which were previously
self-sustaining:
— Support, Amphibious & Battlefield
Rotorcraft (SABR)
— Search and Rescue (SAR) (managed
as part of the SABR programme)
— Battlefield Light Utility Helicopter
(BLUH)
— Surface Combatant Maritime Rotorcraft
(SCMR)
— Merlin Mk1 Capability Sustainment
Plus (CSP) programme
— Health and Usage Monitoring System
(HUMS)—Lynx and Chinook
No decisions have yet been taken on the shape
of our future programme, or the individual components within it.
A number of considerations need to be taken into account. We hope
to have a clearer idea of the way forward towards the summer of
next year.
FRC is designed to provide a successful structure
for taking forward the procurement of helicopters for the foreseeable
future. FRC will be guided by smart acquisition principles, establishing
specific Key User Requirements (KURs) for equipment items from
the outset, with appropriate input from all stakeholders; this
should prevent equipment being procured to an incorrect specification.
Robust contractual arrangements will in due course be put in place
to minimise delays in delivery.
The Department is working closely with industry,
in particular AgustaWestland, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, both
for the provision of accurate data to inform our decisions, and
to ensure that we are fully aware of the consequences for industry
of any decisions we might take. In the longer term, we believe
that FRC will offer significant opportunities to industry.
NAO KEY RECOMMENDATION
5: SECURE ADEQUATE
PLATFORM CAPABILITY
ACROSS THE
SPECTRUM OF
PRESENT AND
POTENTIAL OPERATIONS,
AND ANTICIPATED
OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS
Battlefield helicopters are in constant demand
for global deployment. It follows that there is a continuing requirement
for the capability to operate across a wide range of environments.
Through the FRC programme, Key User Requirements (KURs) will be
established for all future helicopter platforms and their associated
equipment. Battlefield Helicopter KURs will be established from
the outset of the procurement process, with appropriate input
from all stakeholders, and will include the capability to operate
across the spectrum of present and potential operations in all
anticipated operating environments.
Given the Department's finite resources, we
are unable to equip all our existing platforms and systems for
operations across the full spectrum of conflict in all environments.
The majority of the UK Battlefield Helicopter fleet was originally
procured under a concept of operations focussed on NW Europe.
The Strategic Defence Review, and subsequent reviews, have shifted
our focus onto a more agile force deployable in a range of environments
across the globe. As a result, many of our aircraft require modification
to enable them to do so safely and effectively. Fleet-wide modification
for legacy platforms is deemed both unnecessary and prohibitively
expensive, in particular where we intend to procure new capability
in the near to medium-term. Consequently, we have to balance our
investments carefully. For equipment that is only of use in certain
operational scenarios or for specific conditions that may arise
rapidly, one approach is to employ the Urgent Operational Requirement
(UOR) Process.
The Department uses the UOR process to fine-tune
military capability through the rapid purchase of new or additional
equipment, or essential modifications to existing equipment, to
support current or imminent operations in specific environments.
In order to qualify as a UOR, it must be possible to field the
equipment in time to make a contribution to the operation. Consequently,
much of the equipment is theatre specific, "off the shelf",
and designed for immediate and short-term usage.
The Department reviews the status and ongoing
utility of all UORs as appropriate, normally at the end of an
operation. Where there is an extant requirement, the capability
is judged against current and emerging priorities and, subject
to the affordability of its support costs, is taken into the programme
on its relative merits. Clearly, our resources are finite and
not all UORs are deemed to be of sufficient priority and lasting
utility. For operations that develop into a more enduring commitment,
the process of review and assessment is conducted on an annual
basis, taking into account the changing roles of the forces deployed.
In sum, we seek to retain UOR equipment that
has enduring utility, enhances our capability and can be properly
supported and resourced throughout its life. A key aim of FRC
will be the early incorporation of the extant UORs on the Chinook
Mk2/2a into the baseline standard of the helicopter.
While in the future we aspire to have a helicopter
fleet that is capable of deployment in all environments, inevitably,
as technology moves on, and new military scenarios arise, there
will be a requirement to upgrade equipment to ensure that our
forces are supported by the foremost technology available. The
UOR process will therefore have an enduring utility.
| 
