Supplementary memorandum submitted by
the Ministry of Defence
Question 62 (Mrs Browning): Can I ask you how
things are looking now in terms of [Apache] training? How do you
currently see the situation with the availability of people to
train as pilots and also the training schedule itself?
The Apache aircrew training system is efficient
and proving very effective. Aircrew Conversion to Type (CTT) training
takes place at the School of Army Aviation, Middle Wallop. This
takes approximately six months and includes a substantial package
of simulation and live flying. Having completed two development
courses, which also "trained the trainers", the first
front line squadron commenced CTT on 1 September 2003 achieving
the target set in March 2001. The second squadron has completed
its CTT and is now engaged with the rest of the Regiment (9 Regt
AAC) on Conversion to Role (CTR) training. The CTR training lasts
26 weeks and works to a programme developed by the Joint Helicopter
Command. There are no problems with the availability of people
to train as pilots.
Questions 69-71 (Mrs Browning): . . . it was suggested
that we would save £23 million by switching [Apache training]
to the PFI contract. How much have we actually saved?
The £23 million of savings are expressed
in Net Present Value (NPV) terms and translates to £45 million
in real terms. The figures represent the total savings across
the 20 years duration of the contract, ie approx £2.25 million/year
and have not yet been totally accrued. The Full Mission simulator
for Middle Wallop was delayed by 17 months from August 2000 to
December 2001 (due to technical difficulties in its development)
and this reduced the total achievable savings by approximately
£3 million to about £42 million. The annual savings
are, therefore, reduced to approx £2.1 million/year, which
means that over the four years of the contract so far that about
£8.4 million has been saved.
Question 80 (Mr Steinberg): How late were the
[Apache] helicopters coming into service?
The Department's original In-Service Date (ISD)
(defined as the delivery of the first nine aircraft) was December
1999. This ISD was set when the procurement was approved in 1995,
but was subsequently changed to December 2000 and was achieved
in January 2001. The delay was primarily because of technical
difficulties associated with replacing the original engine with
the RTM 322 (Rolls Royce Turbo Meca).
The Initial Operating Capability (IOC) was originally
scheduled for September 2002 this was then delayed to August 2004
and was achieved on 28 September 2004, effectively two years late.
The delays were due to technical problems with the Full Mission
Simulator (FMS) which led to late delivery of pilot training,
and the Conversion to Type training being increased from 15 weeks
to 26 weeks by the Director of Army Aviation.
Questions 101-103 (Mr Bacon): When will all 67
[Apaches] be out of the shed and operating? [Is] three to four
years of storage still accurate? Can you give us a note on the
up-to-date position and how it is going to progress?
All 48 front line Apache Helicopters are due
to be in use from 2007, which is when the final 8 aircraft are
scheduled be used by 4 Regt Army Air Corps (AAC) for Conversion
to Role (CTR) Training. Two aircraft per month will be released
to 3 Regt AAC in February, March, July and August, thereby completing
the first squadron, and the second squadron will be completed
at a rate of two per month from September to December 2005. A
further 16 aircraft will be released in 2006 to 4 Regt AAC, also
at a rate of two per month, from May 2006 and completing in December
2006.
The number of aircraft in storage at RAF Shawbury
at any one time varies due to System Enhancement Programme/Retrofit
After Delivery and servicing programmes. As at 14 October 2004,
20 aircraft were at RAF Shawbury, the remainder being with the
Field Army (Dishforth), the School of Army Aviation (Middle Wallop)
or undergoing a retrofit programme at Yeovil. Nine aircraft will
remain in long term storage as attrition reserve/sustainment aircraft
once fielding is complete.
Questions 192-197 (Mr Williams): Why do you have
two [methodologies for calculating how much capability is required]
and how do you know which one is right?
There is a range of tools and techniques which
can be used to determine the force structure and force level most
appropriate to any given scenario. These range from detailed mathematical
modelling through to military judgement. It is important to note,
however, that every campaign is different and that, in each case,
there are a range of options available to the planners. For example,
military capability can be utilised in different ways to achieve
the same effect, and factors such as precision, tempo and surprise
can act as force multipliers. Judgements about force levels are
influenced strongly by the perceived level of threat and the levels
of equipment and personnel likely to be available. Furthermore,
in the area of coalition operations, there is a degree of flexibility
in what force elements each nation contributes. In essence, there
are a range of methodologies which the Department can use to measure
equipment capability but the choice depends on the purpose for
which it is required and the outputs will vary depending upon
the underlying assumptions made.
OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
BASED METHODOLOGY
Operational Analysis (OA) based methodologies
inform decisions on future equipment capability. The OA is conducted
on a number of scenarios which provide illustrative situations
in which British forces might be called upon to operate, and assesses
the ability of competing platforms to provide a specific capability.
The modelling is optimised to discriminate between different weapons
or platforms that can provide a similar capability. It can also
give a broad indication of the upper ceiling of numbers required
to guarantee mission success in specific operations.
The first stage in the modelling is the development
of a campaign plan, which is undertaken by military experts. This
takes account of the objectives of opposing forces, the potential
contribution to the campaign of the UK's likely coalition partners
and real world geographical and environmental features. The campaign
plan is then broken down into discrete tasks, and the level of
a specific capability (such as rotary lift, anti-armour or amphibious
assault) required to meet each task is determined. By deriving
a model of the required operational effectiveness, detailed modelling
can then discriminate between the ability of competing systems
to meet the capability requirement. In this case, the modelling
was designed primarily to compare the contributions that could
be made by different types of support helicopter.
To inform decisions about required numbers of
force elements, the OA based methodology analyses a number of
different scenarios covering a range of operations and the results
are mapped against our concurrency assumptions.
The results of this OA based work were used
to project the 38% shortfall identified against the projected
future capability for the concurrency assumption of two Medium
Scale operations (one of which is enduring) plus an enduring Small
Scale operation.
CURRENT FORCE
STRUCTURE PLANNING
The other methodology, described in the supplementary
memorandum, [14]is
optimised for shorter term planning purposes and reflects the
capability of the currently planned force structure (ie the expected
force structure in 2008-10). It is used to inform shorter term
planning decisions on the demands of force generation to support
readiness profiles to meet standing commitments and contingent
operations.
As described in "Delivering Security
in a Changing World" the planning methodology assigns
force elements to the full set of Military Tasks using our policy
assumptions about the likely future range of operations. It thus
produces force packages of Force Elements for the full set of
deployed operations and standing commitments. In the case of the
capability delivered by Support Helicopters this methodology takes
account of the availability of other means of delivering in theatre
transport such as road vehicles from the force package assigned
to the operation. It also reflects our assumptions, based on recent
historical evidence that there is scope for achieving the desired
effects in enduring operations with lower force packages over
time. Of course as the size of the deployed force reduces the
number of support capabilities such as helicopters can reduce.
Compared to the OA based methodology this methodology does not
assign helicopters to meet every possible task but provides for
the core tasks required to provide operational success.
The results of this work were the 20% shortfall
described in the evidence session.
Question 221 (Chairman): [With regards to] the
scenario of pilots having to familiarise or train at the last
minute [because of Urgent Operational Requirements], I would like
you to do a further note on that because we are clearly worried
that pilots' lives are being put at risk. Would you do a note
for us on that, please, and a considered response?
Pilots' lives were not being put at risk. All
military aircrew are taught the necessary tactics to evade and/or
counter all threats, and the addition of a specific Urgent Operational
Requirement (UOR) can reduce the need to rely upon such tactics.
Whilst it is obviously desirable for aircrew to undertake as much
training as possible following a modification, the notion that
aircrew are endangered by not being able to train with the equipment
does not make allowance for the high level of competence that
those aircrew display in their routine flying. Aircrew are able
to learn much of the particular modification's capability and
utility through reading technical manuals, and their existing
competence enables them to adapt very rapidly to new capability.
As the NAO Report states, the Department's current
policy is only to deploy on operations aircraft which are suitably
protected by Defensive Aid Suites. This reflects the paramount
importance we place upon safety of our people, backed up by experience
gained on recent operations and exercises, including SAIF SAREEA
II.
Taking account of this policy, a Defensive Aid
Suite modification programme for Lynx was being pursued when Op
TELIC arose. Given the emerging operational requirement, UOR action
was taken to accelerate the existing programme for Lynx Mark 7
and Mark 9. While time only allowed for 24 suitably protected
Lynx helicopters to be deployed, which was not the ideal number
of aircraft, the capability was still available to make the operation
a success.
The NAO Report notes that Royal Navy and RAF
pilots already had individual and collective protection against
NBC. To bring Army pilots up to the same level of protection for
this operation, they were equipped with the same current aircrew
respirator solution (AR5) via UOR action. This equipment affords
the best protection currently available and is comparable to the
US equipment.
Limited training was available with the new
equipment, but sufficient for commanders in theatre to be satisfied
with the level of protection and training undertaken and to declare
their forces ready for action.
8 December 2004
14 Ev 22-27 Back
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