3 Improving the integration of emergency
care services
19. Under its 2001 Reforming Emergency Care strategy
the Department established the principle that all services must
be designed from the point of view of the patient and their needs
should be met by the professional best able to deliver the service.
The Department therefore recommended the integration of the system
of emergency care providers, including the development of Emergency
Care Networks to promote and co-ordinate cross-boundary working
between primary care trusts, acute trusts, social services, local
authorities, ambulance trusts, pharmacies, mental health trusts
and voluntary organisations. The Department also proposed that
healthcare professionals should be trained and empowered to use
their competencies and skills to practice autonomously, so that
for emergency conditions which are not life threatening a single
practitioner would manage the patient throughout their journey.[20]
20. To reduce delays further, acute trusts need to
look wider than A&E departments and the Department has assisted
trusts to identify 'bottlenecks' in the patient journey and develop
solutions (Figure 5). Primary care trusts, which allocate
financial resources for emergency care services, have however
found it difficult to remove these chokepoints because of funding
constraints. The Department acknowledged that the partly historical
basis of NHS finance meant allocations to some primary care trusts
were probably lower than they should be, but the Secretary of
State wanted to address this issue over the coming years.[21]
21. Although the NHS has developed new types of provider
and co-located services to improve access to emergency care, the
National Audit Office found that by and large the public continued
to expect provision of emergency treatment through A&E departments.
The acute hospital system could therefore become blocked, and
capacity could be released if patients were treated in alternative
ways. The level of public knowledge about the availability and
services of the different types of providers is not sufficient
for them to consistently make informed decisions about accessing
emergency care. The Department agreed there was confusion and
said it would consider renaming services to reflect their function.
A good public education policy was needed to ensure patients knew
what services were available to them, but it was no longer policy
for patients to be educated to go to the "right place"
for treatment.[22] Figure
5: Potential bottlenecks around an A&E Department
Source: National Audit Office
22. The ambulance service is not a free taxi service,
and the Department was challenging the perception that an ambulance
should always take a patient to A&E. Advertising campaigns
about 999 calls have been used, for example in London and Lancashire,
and the Department said that public behaviour could be expected
to change with experience of being treated at home or being provided
with different care pathways by emergency care practitioners,
instead of being transported to A&E. The Department was not
aware of any direct interventions by trusts, such as letters to
inform members of the public about inappropriate use of the ambulance
service.[23]
23. Although the Department promoted the idea of
Emergency Care Networks as the means of achieving its targets
for emergency care in 2001, the National Audit Office still found
that many of these cross-organisational and multi-disciplinary
networks were still in their infancy (Figure 6). Structural
reform, organisational boundaries, conflicting performance indicators,
and availability of funding and the way it is allocated were obstacles
to improved joint working. In its 2004 report, Transforming
Emergency Care in England, the Department identified strong
partnerships as the key to the issue of waiting times. The National
Director for Emergency Access believed that if Emergency Care
Networks were charged with commissioning all emergency services
for a locality, including social service support, improvements
would be possible.[24]
24. The Department believed that the move to a single
telephone call access system would provide a more patient-centred
response to requests for emergency care. Originally it had envisaged
that all services would be linked through a single point of access
- NHS Direct - and that a 'navigator' would provide assistance
to get the patient to an appropriate service as quickly as possible.
It remained committed to providing this simple local access to
emergency care through one national telephone number, but the
organisation to which the enquirer was connected would depend
on the locality, and could for example be an ambulance service,
a GP co-operative, or NHS Direct. It was also the Department's
intention that Walk-in-Centres, Minor Injury Units and Urgent
Care Centres should be integrated with the out-of-hours service.
GPs would continue to be rostered, but the talents of nurses and
paramedics will be utilised to a greater extent than currently.[25]Figure
6: Emergency Care Networks in Strategic Health Authority Areas
are at different stages of development
Source: National Audit Office
25. The development of emergency care and emergency
nurse practitioners has been an important change in the way emergency
care is delivered. They are trained to diagnose, treat and discharge
patients whose condition is not life threatening, and they are
able to determine the most appropriate care pathway for the patient
without reference to a medic. The National Audit Office found
the skill content was not consistent, and the length of courses
varied before the trainee could begin the role. The Department
assured us that it was working on agreeing some overall educational
standards for competence and skills and a set curriculum for local
universities.[26]
20 Transforming Emergency Care in England:
A report by Professor Sir George Alberti, Department of Health,
October 2004 Back
21
C&AG's Report, para 2.13 and Figure 9; Qq 49-51 Back
22
C&AG's Report, Summary
para 14; Q 71 Back
23
Qq 44-46, 71-72, 74 Back
24
C&AG's Report, Summary
para 19; Qq 27, 91-92 Back
25
C&AG's Report, Summary para 15 and Figures 13,
16; Qq 12, 35-37, 40, 71 Back
26
C&AG's Report, Case Example 10 and paras 2.29, 3.15;
Qq 39, 47 Back
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