Select Committee on Public Accounts Seventeenth Report


2  Contract price

7. The Department estimates the net present value of spending under the PPPs over 30 years to be £15.7 billion. The ultimate price of the deals is unknowable, since the contracts are re-priced every 7½ years. The reward premiums available to the private sector shareholders and funders reflect those of a high risk project rather than the limited risk to which they are exposed in these deals.[12]

Risks

8. Railtrack's entry into administration in October 2001 and ongoing disagreements between TfL and the Government about the PPPs illustrated the risks of costing asset maintenance and renewal when the condition is not well known, and highlighted the potential risks for lenders. The Government agreed to increase, from 90% to 95%, the amount lenders of £3.8 billion of senior debt would recover in the event of termination, leaving the lenders at risk for only £190 million. This increase was considered necessary to obtain the total amount of finance required from the bank and bond markets for all three deals. The original 90% was agreed because, unlike most PFI deals, in this case the senior lenders could not protect their investment by re-letting the contract to an alternative service provider.[13]

9. There are caps, caveats and exclusions to project risks borne by the Infracos. The risk of cost overruns in repairing assets of unknown condition, such as tunnel walls, is excluded because knowledge of their residual life and associated costs is incomplete. In the case of assets whose condition has been fully identified against specific engineering standards, the cost overruns that the Infracos have to bear are capped, so long as the Infracos can demonstrate that they are acting economically and efficiently. In the case of Metronet the limit in each 7½ year period is £50 million. Tube Lines carries £200 million in the first period and £50 million thereafter. There is no definition of economic and efficient behaviour in the contracts; an independent arbiter can make a ruling if asked. Exclusions to the risks borne by the Infracos include passenger demand, lower income with fewer users and capacity constraints in the face of increased use. These are borne by London Underground. Figure 3 summarises the financing for the deal and the limitations on the risks that each is bearing.[14]Figure 3: Senior debt and shareholder financing, and risk limitations
Source of finance Shareholder funds (£m) Senior debt (£m)
Tube Lines Metronet

(two Infracos)

Tube LinesMetronet

(two Infracos)

Planned270 3501,530 2,290
Standby45 60273 360
TOTAL315 4101,803 2,650
Risk limitations If acting economically and efficiently 190 maximum (at least 95% of senior debt is repayable by public bodies in the event of termination)
Repair costs for assets of unknown condition, e.g. certain tunnel walls
200 (50 after first period) on other cost overruns 100 on other cost overruns (50 each Infraco)


Source: C&AG's Report (HC 645) Figure 11, condensed, and paras 2.36, 4.12

Costs

10. Despite the Government's commitment to repay 95% of the debt in the event of termination and limited project risks, the debt was given a BBB grade rating by the rating agencies. Perceived risks leading to this low rating included potential disagreements about the appropriate level of funding between central and local government, and uncertainty around what might happen at the end of each 7½ year periodic review. Under a BBB rating, the lenders are charging about £450 million more in interest on the amount borrowed than they would charge on some £3.8 billion of direct Government loans with AAA rating.[15]

11. On the basis of the Infracos meeting their performance targets, London Underground will be likely to pay nominal post tax equity returns to investors of 18 to 20%, a premium of about 15% above the risk free rate of return of 4.5% at deal close. These returns are some 50% more than most deals with an established PFI structure. Investors may receive lower returns if the Infracos use all their standby funding or fail to achieve upgrades through inefficient and uneconomic behaviour.[16]

12. The Tube Lines deal was refinanced very early in the life of the PPP, in May 2004. The refinancing was in contemplation when the contracts were finalised, suggesting that a better deal for the public sector might have been possible. Refinancing reduces borrowing costs and the gains are shared between the public and private partners. Tube Lines has refinanced £1.8 billion of debt. TfL receives £50.4 million of the benefit initially, which represents a 60% share of the total £84 million gain. Its share rises over time to £58.8 million (70% of the total). This percentage is higher than that suggested in Treasury guidance on the sharing of refinancing gains, which calls for a 50-50 split. The public sector share is paid over to TfL, is not subtracted from the grant provided to it by the Department, and may be used in any part of London's transport network.

13. There is some scope for Metronet also to carry out a refinancing to achieve lower interest payments on its debt, which is held mostly in bonds. The amount of any such refinancing benefit will only be determinable at the time of refinancing and would be dependent on factors such as the underlying interest rates, the financing structure available at that time and the level of pre-payment penalties to its existing bondholders.[17]


12   Qq 5, 14-16, 25-27, 123, 182-183 Back

13   Qq 13-15, 45-47, 90-92, 121-122, 183-184; C&AG's Report (HC 645), para 2.36 Back

14   Qq 6-11, 75-76, 86-87; C&AG's Report (HC 645), paras 2.15, 4.12; C&AG's Report (HC 644), Section C1, paras 12-13, Appendix 2 Back

15   Qq 58-60, 184 Back

16   Qq 13-14, 182-184; C&AG's Report (HC 645), para 2.32 Back

17   Qq 136, 174-181, 185-186; C&AG's Report (HC 645), para 2.38; Treasury guidance on refinancing is available at:

http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media//FB2F8/PPP_Refinancing_Guidance_Note.pdf Back


 
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