Conclusions and recommendations
1. Space projects are expensive and the results
uncertain. The technology,
the long timescales of space missions, and the dependence on collaboration
all pose risks to successful completion. Some projects, such as
Beagle 2, have failed, while many have been delayed.
2. The Partnership needs to improve its risk
management by:
- applying sufficient resources
at the initial stage of a project to identify and mitigate the
technical and construction risks;
- addressing the risks posed by collaborating with
other space bodies, such as ESA and NASA, by reference to recently
issued Treasury/OGC guidance on managing risks with partners;
and
- dealing with risks explicitly in appraising funding
of projects, and highlighting those that remain after mitigation
and management.
3. The
loss of Beagle 2, which was due to land on Mars in December 2003,
was associated with poor risk management that left it with no
real prospect of success. The project suffered from an over ambitious
time schedule, punishing weight constraints, poor management and
uncertain funding. BNSC and the Department should only proceed
with such ambitious projects if sufficient resources can be committed
from the outset to give a reasonable prospect of success, making
due allowance for risk.
4. The Partnership has strategic objectives
for benefiting from the United Kingdom's space programme, such
as improving UK productivity, but lacks systems to track progress
against these objectives. The National
Audit Office proposed a range of possible performance indicators
to remedy the gaps, such as the proportion of industry turnover
associated with space-derived products and services, which the
Partnership would do well to follow up.
5. The Partnership has estimated that the
benefits for the United Kingdom of having a European satellite
navigation system, the Galileo project, rather than depending
on those operated by the United States and Russia will be worth
£6 billion from an investment of just £78 million.
The Transport Select Committee investigated this project in detail
and were "not convinced that the cost and benefits (of Galileo)
have been properly assessed". We agree with their conclusion
that BNSC should seek independent validation of their estimates
of costs and benefits for the Galileo project.
6. BNSC should encourage ESA to review its
procurement policy of "fair return", whereby
the value of contracts any member state receives is broadly proportionate
to its financial contribution to the Agency. Such systems can
increase costs and reduce value for money.
7. Large firms and some smaller firms which
are members of space Trade Associations are aware of the support
available from BNSC on competing for space contracts, but other
small firms are not. Drawing upon its
own databases of the space industry BNSC should promote its advice
and support services to all segments of the industry.
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