2 Managing risk on space projects
4. Space based projects are inherently risky. They
involve the development and use of advanced technology. Many space
missions have life cycles, from development through launch to
exploitation, of decades. Many projects involve collaboration
with other countries, with multilateral space agencies and companies
from other nations, which poses further risks. Effective assessment
and management of risk is therefore a crucial determinant of value
for money.
5. There are a number of examples where the assessment
and management of risk within the UK's civil space programme could
have been better. For example, the NAO's analysis of the Department's
national space programme showed that many of the business cases
supporting the various elements had not addressed factors such
as changes in the space market or delays to launches, and they
had not developed risk management strategies.[5]
6. The Beagle 2 project which was part of ESA's Mars
Express mission to Mars was put together at relatively short notice
by ESA to compensate for the failure soon after launch in 1996
of a planned Russian mission to Mars which had incorporated European
instruments.[6] The timescale
for putting the mission together was constrained because 2003
represented the best opportunity to send a spacecraft to Mars.[7]
7. A number of factors increased the risks to the
project, or hindered their assessment or management.
- ESA originally indicated that
a weight allowance of 200kgs would be available for a lander,
but subsequently cut that allowance to 60 kg. This necessitated
a complete redesign of the lander and took time out of an already
short schedule.
- This tight mass limit constrained the ability
of the consortium which developed Beagle 2 to manage identified
risks. Although the lander that was launched was overweight ESA
had not formally given prior derogation from the mass limits.
- Public funding for Beagle 2 proceeded in a series
of seven increments because the science and space support budgets
were already heavily committed. None of the funding appraisals
formally assessed the chances of success for the overall project.
- ESA treated the Mars Express space craft and
the Beagle 2 lander as two separate projects. This decision hindered
the management of the enterprise not least because ESA undertook
no real oversight of the Beagle 2 lander until very late in its
development.
- The lander did not include a means of communicating
with the Mars Express orbiter.
8. Because of concerns about the development and
the funding of the Beagle 2 lander ESA requested an independent
review of Beagle 2—the Casani review—which reported
in September 2000. The key findings of this review were that:
- there was no margin available
in the proposed mass of the lander;
- the contingency in the schedule which the consortium
had to meet to fulfil the launch date of June 2003 was inadequate;
- the management of the consortium arrangement
was fragile;
- although the project had a risk management plan,
risk management in the classical sense would continue to be non-existent
unless mass and schedule margins were restored;
- if each of the findings (of the review) were
satisfactorily addressed then the design of the lander's systems
and sub-systems would be satisfactory - with the exception of
the airbags designed to cushion the landing of Beagle 2 on Mars.[8]
9. The Casani report concluded that if its findings
were fully addressed the project was "challenging but eminently
doable".[9] However,
our colleagues on the Science and Technology Committee who have
reported on the Beagle 2 project found that having commissioned
the Casani review ESA did not take responsibility for implementing
all the review's main recommendations.[10]
The Science and Technology Committee also reported that the Director
of Science Programmes at ESA had very strong doubts about the
lander's chances of success but that he did not act upon those
concerns.[11] In these
circumstances it is not clear to us that Casani's findings had
been satisfactorily addressed before final decisions to proceed
had been taken.
10. Other projects in the United Kingdom's national
space programmes operated by NERC and PPARC also demonstrated
the difficulties that can arise on complex projects, particularly
those involving partnerships. For example, the project run by
NERC known as the High Resolution Dynamics Limb Sounder (HIRDLS),
a joint project with NASA designed to measure gases in the earth's
atmosphere, suffered a series of technical and other delays which
deferred its launch by six years to 2004.[12]
5 C&AG's Report, para 4.4 Back
6
Q 7 Back
7
Q 16 Back
8
C&AG's Report Figure 18, Qq 8, 58 Back
9
Q 8 Back
10
12th Report from the Science and Technology Select
Committee, Government support for Beagle 2 (HC 711, Session
2003-04), para 79 Back
11
ibid, para 91 Back
12
C&AG's Report, Figure 20 Back
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