Select Committee on Public Accounts Twentieth Report


2  Management of risks following deal signature

8. Seven months into the deal, Mapeley approached the Departments with a number of financial claims and requested more money to deal with a serious cash flow problem. It took the Departments some time to establish the nature and extent of Mapeley's financial problems. Following favourable movements in the commercial property market, the company's financial position improved and its shareholders provided further short term funding. However, even with this improved financial position, the deal was finely balanced.[8]

Contingency planning

9. The Departments and the banks that had lent money to Mapeley to buy the estate had "step-in rights" to take over the contract in the event of Mapeley's failure. Nevertheless, before the signing the contract, the Departments had not worked out all the consequences if Mapeley did fail. Since contract signature the Departments had considered what their position would be with the banks and how taxpayers' interests could be safeguarded. The Departments were still trying to encourage a greater degree of openness with Mapeley and its bankers. They had also commissioned work to build a better financial model of what would happen if, for instance, the property market collapsed.[9] The Departments considered that their risk management strategy would provide an early indication if Mapeley were likely to get into financial difficulties again, and they expected Mapeley or its bankers to tell them if further problems were anticipated.[10]

10. In the STEPS deal, the money borrowed by Mapeley is secured on the Departments' estates, giving the lenders a higher degree of security than is normally the case under PFI arrangements.[11] In a standard PFI deal, finance raised by the private sector is secured on the future cashflows of the project. Since those cashflows are dependent on delivery of a service to the public sector, lenders to a deal will only recoup their investment and make a return if the project is successful.

11. The arrangements for the termination of PFI deals because of contractor default had never been tested, so nobody could be sure what would happen. It was normal to give banks and other lenders a commercial incentive to step in and sort things out so that the public sector continued to get a service, which was better than a system that gave financiers an incentive to step in to protect their own interests, regardless of public sector concerns. The Departments were still looking at what they would need to do to ensure that facilities management services for the estate were protected. The contract would not become void if Mapeley failed and the Departments retained rights of occupation over the buildings.

Negotiations with Mapeley

12. At the time the C&AG's Report was published, the Departments and Mapeley were still negotiating a number of outstanding claims arising from the procurement process, such as discrepancies in property information. Data on the estates had changed throughout the procurement process as the Departments moved in and out of properties and service delivery altered. Only when the estates had been brought together under the STEPS deal had Mapeley concluded that there were discrepancies in the information provided by the Departments. [12]

13. Seven months into the deal, Mapeley had asked the Departments for an additional £27 million, based around some of the changes that had occurred in the estate. When this request was refused, Mapeley decided to fund the shortfall itself, and was now in further discussions with the Departments over variations and changes in the contract. Unless service delivery levels changed or the Departments decided to remain in buildings they had expected to vacate, Mapeley assured us that it would not ask for additional money again.[13]

14. The contract had not been put together in a completely satisfactory way and that was why negotiations were still ongoing. The Departments expected, however, to resolve the outstanding issues by the time HM Revenue and Customs comes into existence in Spring 2005.[14]

Performance measurement

15. There had also been contractual disputes about the performance measurement system under which Mapeley provided services for the estate. The system had been developed by the Departments and supplied to all three bidders for their consideration. Shortly into the operation of the system, it had become clear to both parties that Mapeley was devoting its resources to fixing reported faults, and was not undertaking preventive measures to avoid further problems occurring (Figure 4).[15] Figure 4: Problems with the performance measurement system
  • the system was overly complicated and required significant resources from Mapeley and the Departments to operate;
  • the outputs did not always provide meaningful information to either party;
  • Mapeley believed that failure points awarded under the system accumulated too rapidly, leading to unfair deductions which Mapeley considered to be punitive;
  • the Mapeley Help Desk, which formed the basis for much of the performance data, focused on reactive tasks rather than the necessary balance of planned preventative and reactive tasks;
  • the waiver process, which allowed performance deductions to be by-passed in certain circumstances (for example, where the Departments' own actions had prevented Mapeley from delivering services) was not applied consistently.

16. Nearly four years into the contract, the performance measurement system was still not working satisfactorily and the Departments were working with Mapeley to resolve the remaining problems. The estate had been managed internally for probably over 50 years and when it was transferred, Mapeley had been unsure how many calls would be received by its help desk or how many orders for new work it would get. It had also been difficult to get a performance measurement system up and running as the Departments had no previous experience of being a customer.[16]

Continuity of staffing

17. A number of key staff in the Departments had moved to other jobs very soon after contract signature, leaving only one key member of the original STEPS team still involved in the deal. There were also a number of management changes at Mapeley shortly after the contract was signed. The deal was still bedding in and, while there had been moves on both sides to work in partnership, it had not yet been fully achieved.[17] It had also taken three years for the Departments to appoint a professional contract manager.

18. Significant turnover of staff after contract signature had been expected because of the different skills needed to procure a PFI deal, as opposed to delivering, managing and running a contract. But the Departments accepted that they had not recruited a professional contract manager soon enough and should have put in place earlier the people who were going to operate the deal, so that there could have been a proper hand over.[18]


8   C&AG's Report, paras 15-16 Back

9   Q 183 Back

10   Qq 109-110, 143 Back

11   C&AG's Report, para 3.16 Back

12   Q 100 Back

13   Qq 35, 90, 101, 103 Back

14   Qq 107, 144 Back

15   C&AG's Report, paras 17-18; Ev 21 Back

16   Qq 23, 108, 112, 146-147  Back

17   C&AG's Report, para 19 Back

18   Qq 72, 106, 117 Back


 
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