Select Committee on Public Accounts Twenty-Sixth Report



Summary

The Ministry of Defence (the Department) meets the additional capability requirements of specific operations through a process known as Urgent Operational Requirements. The process aims to deliver the speedy and flexible procurement of capabilities using a streamlined version of the Department's normal procurement processes. Urgent Operational Requirements have been a major feature of the United Kingdom's recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Approved expenditure on Urgent Operational Requirements to support operations in Iraq currently stands at £811 million, and for operations in Afghanistan, £148 million. Urgent Operational Requirements for the Iraq operation accounted for 35% of the additional costs of the operation.

The Committee took evidence from the Department on 29 November 2004 on the basis of a report from the Comptroller and Auditor General.[1] The Committee examined three main issues: the importance of identifying and costing likely Urgent Operational Requirements; improvements to the way the Department captures data on the Urgent Operational Requirements process and outcomes, and the scope to apply lessons from Urgent Operational Requirements to the regular procurement programme.

The Armed Forces are likely to have to undertake a wide range of operations in the future, and so Urgent Operational Requirements will continue to be an important part of the Department's business activity. The Department does not have a dedicated staff responsible for processing these requirements and, although staff have performed impressively in supporting recent operations, it is timely for the Department to review its arrangements.

The Department lacks a system for comprehensively recording whether Urgent Operational Requirements are delivered to the theatre of operations in time, or how effective they prove to be, and did not have full information on urgent requirements for the war-fighting operation in Iraq until the Committee's hearing, 18 months later. It is proposing a range of actions to improve on this situation, and to introduce performance measures of the Urgent Operational Requirements process under the direction of the Senior Responsible Owner.

It is highly regrettable that only two-thirds of Urgent Operational Requirements were fully delivered in time for the start of warfighting in Iraq. The Department has nevertheless performed creditably in processing and, in the end, delivering Urgent Operational Requirements which meet the needs of users in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has demonstrated that its standard practices for procuring Defence equipment can be successfully adapted to deliver requirements speedily and successfully where necessary. Sensible use of a range of procurement practices, providing they achieve transparency and accountability, can help to avoid an overly bureaucratic and risk-averse approach both in procuring Urgent Operational Requirements, and in the Department's mainstream procurement activity, which has been beset by cost overruns and delays.



1   C&AG's Report, Ministry of Defence: the rapid procurement of capability to support operations (HC 1161, Session 2003-04)

 Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2005
Prepared 30 June 2005