Memorandum by The Institution of Electrical
Engineers (CSE 06)
In its evidence the IEE concentrates on creating
appropriate career paths for professionals in the Civil Service
and the causes of IT procurement problems in the public sector.
We would like, in particular, to highlight the following points.
The key to improving the success rate of Government
IT procurement is to view projects holistically as "change
projects enabled by IT" and to plan and budget for them accordingly.
Fully planning and budgeting for the "people" dimension
of such business change projects would not only double the traditional
costs but would also expose the true complexity of the project
and raise the key issues to do with competency to deliver the
intended outcome. This would however be likely to sharply reduce
the true total lifecycle cost as well as dramatically improving
the service delivered.
Appended to our evidence is that from the UK
Computing Research Committee, (an expert group reporting to the
IEE, British Computer Society and Committee of Professors and
Heads of Computing). This describes the contribution to quality
which could be made by adopting "formal methods" for
high impact IT systems. As the largest customer for IT systems
in the UK, the Government has a responsibility to explore this
approach more thoroughly.[18]
The skills needed in Government to handle IT
enabled change projects include professional IT skills and, in
particular, more hybrid professionals with competency in management
and project management. A more general culture of interchange
between the public and private sectors should be encouraged. IEE
recommends that it should be a fundamental requirement for progression
in the Senior Civil Service that the candidate has spent a minimum
of two years in the private sector.
The IEE is the largest professional engineering
society in Europe and has a worldwide membership of around 130,000.
It is an innovative organisation for electronics, electrical manufacturing
and IT professionals. Around 20% of its membership is engaged
in IT and it provides a range of specifically targeted products
and services to meet their needs.
IEE EVIDENCE TO
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON EFFICIENCY
OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE
Question 7—Does the Civil Service have the
right skills to help the Government deliver public services?
The Civil Service does not have ready access
to the correct skills at senior levels (eg within the Senior Civil
Service (SCS). Much has been made of the divide between generalists
and specialists. This is to miss the point. The SCS needs individuals
who are multi-skilled. Generalists who are also capable well trained
managers/directors. Engineering specialists who are also highly
competent project and programme managers—with all the "people"
and "business change" skills that this implies. Lawyers
who fully understand the implications for citizens and business
of the policy options that they consider. Such people need careful
selection, development and training. Typically they need experience
across a range of roles during their career development. They
need exposure to private as well as public sector practice. There
has been much rhetoric but insufficient widespread action on these
points from successive Cabinet Secretaries.
Question 8(a)—How does the performance of
the Civil Service compare with that of its equivalents in other
countries?
Whilst it would be wrong to lose sight of the
strengths of the UK Civil Service, lack of corruption, political
neutrality and strong commitment to public service, the Civil
Service (and for that matter the Government) seems pre-occupied
with top-down command and control. Sadly there can be a preoccupation
with slavishly following the defined procedures whilst losing
sight of the end goal—real deliverables on the ground.
In terms of successful deployment of public
sector IT systems, other countries, notably Canada and Australia
have better track records. However in the private sector the UK
leads both Canada and Australia in the equivalent deployments
(see Business in the Information Age—Benchmarking Study
2004 from DTI/Booz Allen Hamilton).
Question 8(b) Who or what is mainly to blame for
the recent problems in government IT procurement and project management?
Our answer to this question is in two parts:
WHOLE PROJECT
CONSIDERATIONS
The key problem in the UK public sector stems
from a lack of recognition that, in the words of the CSSA report
"Getting IT right for Government" in 2000: "there
is no such thing as a computer project, merely business change
projects mediated by new IT systems". This manifests itself
as a failure to recognise the need to plan and budget properly
for all the elements of business process change: training, internal
communications, incentives, changes to performance management
and measurements systems, and so on. This failure stems from the
top, with inadequate definitions in the Treasury procurement guidance
the "Green Book". Fully planning and budgeting for the
"people" dimension of such business change projects
would not only double the traditional costs but would also expose
the true complexity of the project and raise the key issues to
do with competency to deliver the intended outcome. This would
however be likely to sharply reduce the true total lifecycle cost
as well as dramatically improving the service delivered.
PROCURING AN
IT SYSTEM THAT
IS FIT
FOR PURPOSE
A recent study of problems of large scale projects
by the Royal Academy of Engineering[19]
reported that poor project definition is one of the major contributors
to project failure. The Academy also observed that there is a
greater tendency for poor project definition in the public sector,
where systems are intended to meet political ends, and the practicalities
often have not been thought through. It is also the case that
this was a problem of large nationalised industry projects in
the 1960s and 70s but which has been eliminated in the private
sector by adherence to proper engineering discipline.
Recent work by the Office of Government Commerce
has addressed the management failures that have contributed to
failures of Government IT projects, with recommendations relating
to the appointment of "senior responsible owners" and
guidelines for Gateway Reviews. More recently, the OGC and Intellect
(the trade association for companies in the IT industry) have
collaborated on a Code of Conduct to improve sharply the professionalism
of the relationship between suppliers and Government. These are
worthwhile initiatives and we support them, but in our opinion
they do not get to the heart of the problem.
Computer systems are intrinsically complex.
This complexity is so great that it guarantees that any serious
attempt to specify the system will contain errors, omissions and
contradictions. Further mistakes will be made during design and
programming. Many of the faults in the specification will only
be discovered after a development contract has been agreed; the
resulting changes to the specification will then be contract variations,
leading to delay, cost overrun, and transfer of risk from the
supplier back to the customer.
These problems are avoidable, by following disciplines
analogous to those used in engineering industries when very complex
products have to be developed. Such methods exist and have been
shown to work repeatedly, and very cost-effectively. Unfortunately
they are diffusing only at a snail's pace into the largest IT
suppliers.
The companies that can offer these methods are
disadvantaged in the market for two reasons:
— They tend to be small hi-tech
companies employing a small number of very highly qualified people,
but the sheer scale of Government IT contracts mean that only
two or three of the very large IT suppliers are perceived to be
credible bidders.
— They are often undercut by suppliers
who bid an unrealistically low price for the job in the certain
knowledge that further work will be required to make it perform
as required and that contract revisions will restore their margins.
As the largest customer for IT systems in the
UK, the Government has a responsibility to explore this "formal
methods" approach more thoroughly. For further information
see the input to the IEE's evidence from the UK Computing Research
Committee, appended.
Question 9—. . . what are the advantages
and disadvantages of tenure?
There are significant advantages to tenure—not
least in helping to maintain the public service ethos of the Civil
Service, however it can make the Service insular and isolated
from the practicalities of private sector life. There should be
extensive exchange of staff between the public and private sectors
at a range of levels (to the benefit of both sectors). It should
be a mandatory requirement for promotion to the SCS that a candidate
has spent at least two years on one or more secondments to the
private sector. The process of opening the more senior SCS roles
(former grade three and above) to competition from private sector
applicants should be extended, to ensure private sector expertise
could continue to leaven the SCS.
Question 10—. . . career anchors . . .
Such an approach, if fully implemented, would
be likely to be effective. At present the SCS treats those (such
as Agency Chief Executives) on contracts from the private sector
with a degree of condescension—"not real civil servants"
and seems quite surprised when they turn out to be more than capable
of contributing more generally . . . A greater interchange would
undermine such outdated attitudes.
Question 11—. . . business rules . . .
So long as secondments are a matter of public
record, the fears of undue influence by the private sector back
into the public sector following such secondments are over stated.
Given the visibility, it is more likely that the reverse will
be true, the Civil Servant will bend over backwards not to favour
the company with whom they have worked for fear of such an accusation.
It should be made possible for Senior Civil Servants to more easily
join quoted company boards as non-executive directors.
Question 14—Does the Civil Service manage
its staff effectively?
Management could certainly be improved. Indeed,
the impression is often created that the Civil Service sees management
as a second class activity [yet all the failures discussed above
are failures of management].
The Civil Service may have a fear that giving
staff more exposure to the private sector, through secondments
and work placements, might lead to an unacceptable level of staff
opting to leave for the private sector. This perception reflects
poor communications of the benefits of public sector employment,
most notably the high value of current public sector pension arrangements
compared to typical private sector schemes. The benefits of civil
servants gaining private sector experience, as part of their training
and career development, would be substantial. To reinforce this,
more could be done in these circumstances to support outward secondees
seeking to return to civil service departments and make use of
their acquired skills. Without that clear commitment, the civil
service will indeed lose staff to the private sector. It should
also be communicated more strongly that the Civil Service would
welcome back those who have left, spent a spell in the private
or voluntary sectors, and seek to return.
The service would also benefit from moving more
to a culture of measuring "outputs" rather than "inputs",
for example "deliverables" rather than "effort"
and "presence".
Question 15—Could the Civil Service do more
to attract talented people . . .?
Yes it could. The Civil Service should make
clear that the public and private sectors are not separated by
an "Iron Curtain" of public appointments rules. It should
emphasise a "mixed economy", encouraging transfers in
both directions. It should emphasise training and career planning
with a clear commitment to develop multi-skilled individuals.
IEE
December 2004
18 Appendix A has been appended to the evidence received
from the British Computer Society (CSE 04), on Ev 67. Back
19
The Challenges of Complex IT Projects, A report of a working group
from the Royal Academy of Engineering and the British Computer
Society, April 2003. Back
| 
