Select Committee on Public Administration Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 202 - 219)

THURSDAY 13 JANUARY 2005

PROFESSOR HARRY BRIGHOUSE, DR PHILIP HUNTER CBE AND MR MARTIN WARD

  Q202  Chairman: Could I call the Committee to order and welcome our witnesses this morning to help us with our inquiry into what we call Choice and Voice issues. We are looking particularly this morning at how some of these arguments relate to the field of education, and we are delighted to have with us Professor Harry Brighouse of the University of Wisconsin, Dr Philip Hunter who is the Chief Schools Adjudicator, who I was delighted to know in a former incarnation when you were Director of Education in Staffordshire, and Mr Martin Ward, who is Deputy General Secretary of the Secondary Heads Association. Thank you very much for coming and for your very useful notes that you have sent to us before hand. We hope we are going to have an interesting discussion because you do not all take the same view on these matters, which is why we wanted to have you along. Would any or all of you like to say anything by way of general introduction, some initial points?

  Professor Brighouse: Maybe it would help if I said a couple of words.

  Q203  Chairman: Perhaps give us a central proposition just to get the juices going early in the morning.

  Professor Brighouse: I thought my remit was to talk a little bit about the evidence concerning choice in the United States but also to talk a little bit about the kind of choice scheme that you might use. The first thing I want to say is a note of caution, not about choice in particular, but about educational reform in general. Choice and vouchers in the US are talked about a lot of the time by proponents as if they are some sort of magic bullet. You get it all in place and you are going to get these fantastic improvements in test schools, et cetera. My reading of the actual evidence of the way things have worked out in a whole variety of schemes is that this has not worked like that. There have been various kinds of benefits from various kinds of schemes and no benefits from some others, but what is generally the case with school reform is that you cannot expect that a reform is going to get you massive gains of whatever it is that you want to gain. Most reforms get you fairly small incremental gains, and, of course, those compound over time and it is worth doing it, but you should not anticipate from any kind of reform that you are going to get some sort of great transformation in the kinds of outcomes. That was the first thing I thought I would say. The second thing, the evidence about choice in the United States is mixed and it is also very hard to learn from. I said this in the paper that I sent out. If you want to do what some people call policy borrowing, you do not want to adopt a policy, you need to adapt it: because policies are carried out in very specific conditions and the specific kind of political or institutional environment in which a reform is adopted has an enormous impact on what kinds of result the reform gets. My case study, I suppose, is the Milwaukee case. In Milwaukee they adopted a quite radical voucher scheme targeted completely to low income parents where the parents could send their kids to private schools with the state paying for it. I am a supporter of the scheme. I think it has been basically a good thing. It has not had a tremendously exciting impact on schools, but it seems to have had some impact on achievement. The contextual conditions which have enabled it to do the good it has done are just not present in the UK. In the US private schools cost about half as much per pupil as state schools. In the UK they cost about twice as much per pupil as state schools. It is also the case that selection is just not an ingrained part of the culture of schooling in the US, either private or state schooling, and so it was easy to get especially the Roman Catholic schools that participated to accept a scheme in which they were not allowed to select kids. They are not allowed to select on the basis of ability, they are not allowed to select even on the basis of behaviour, previous behaviour. I do not envisage in the next ten years the emergence of a private sector in the UK which works at half the cost of the state schools and is happy to accept a scheme in which they are not allowed to select kids. What you need to do if you want to look at these kinds of programmes and get the kinds of outcome that they have got is figure out how to adapt them to the environment, and so my recommendation is to do that within the state system here. The adaptation would be an adaptation which did not use private schools, used only state schools, but made state schools a bit more vulnerable than they currently are to the choices of parents.

  Q204  Chairman: I was tempted to come back, but let us have the opening gambits and then we will pick it all up. Martin Ward.

  Mr Ward: I think the points that I would want to make to underline that are in the paper I have submitted are, first, that there are other choices than of school, and those other choices may well be more important and significant for the young people and their parents in reality, although we tend to be obsessed with choice of school. Given that we are obsessed with choice of school, I spent most of the space I had in the paper talking about that, but it is worth underlining the point that that is essentially an urban obsession rather than being common throughout the country, especially, of course, a metropolitan obsession, and in many rural areas, or in small market towns where there is only one secondary school, there is no effective choice of school for parents of 10 year olds as they are looking to the next phase. In those circumstances most of those parents use the local school and are very content with it; and where there is dissatisfaction it is because parents have been offered a notional choice which they have then not been able to exercise in the way that they want. They have been told: "You have got six schools to choose from", and they have said, "I will have that one then", and have been told, "Sorry, it is full"; and that is when parents tend to become very dissatisfied with the school process.

  Q205  Chairman: Thank you for that. Dr Hunter.

  Dr Hunter: My central proposition is that there are two perfectly legitimate and sensible objectives for government, for local government and central government. The first is to improve schools, particularly schools that are not performing terribly well, and that does two things: first of all, it raises standards, improves the education for lots of children, but, secondly, it increases choice, because it means that more schools are favoured by parents who will then want to send their children there. That is the first legitimate objective. The second one is to try and enhance choice per se. You can do that. There is a lot of choice in education already, but there are things that you can do from time to time, and that improves choice and that is a good thing to do, but it does not, it seems to me, have an impact on standards. You do not raise standards by setting out to improve choice.

  Q206  Chairman: Thank you for that. That is the point I wanted to pick up immediately with Professor Brighouse. Are you telling us that all the evidence (especially that in the US) is that choice by itself is not a great driver of improved standards? When the Committee visited the United States last year and we went to North Carolina the evidence that we were given, and I think you referred to some of the published material we saw, suggested that in that situation the development of Charter Schools had had a positive effect on standards both in those schools and in the rest of the public school system. Are you telling us as a researcher that the idea that choice is a route to improve standards and improve quality is not right?

  Professor Brighouse: No, I am telling you to be cautious about your expectations. Let me say a word about the Charter School example. My colleague, John Witte—I think I am allowed to tell you this—sent me an email just before I came over very tentatively saying our Charter School study— He is doing a very large Charter School study that is showing some interesting competitive effects. In Caroline Hoxby's paper on the Milwaukee scheme what she claims is that the Milwaukee scheme has driven up standards in the public schools. I am sorry, state schools. There is this terminological problem: when I say public I always mean state. He is saying something similar is happening in his Charter School study. One of the problems is that there are lots and lots of Charter Schools. Every state that has Charter Schools has a different Charter School charter. It has got a different set of rules. So really it is not the case that there are Charter Schools; there are 26, 28 different phenomena, there are 28 different sets of legislation. It is also the case that Charter Schools in most of the states tend to emerge from dissatisfaction within a particular school district. So you tend to get Charter Schools not because the state has said, "We want to have a whole bunch of Charter Schools", but because it tends to be enabling legislation that says, "You can have some Charter Schools if you can put forward the right conditions", and then people from the bottom up say, "We want to have a Charter School here to do this or to do that". In those conditions you might get genuine improvements. What is difficult to know, even when you get improvements, is whether it is the choice or whether it is the intervention of fact, whether it is the excitement of a new programme. I am saying be cautious, I am not saying that you do not get benefits or that it will not look as though you will not get benefits.

  Q207  Chairman: Does not the exit option, which is a form of competition, by itself lever up standards. If providers know that people can go elsewhere, does that not have a built in driver towards increased performance within it?

  Professor Brighouse: Let us go back to Milwaukee again. What is not clear from Caroline Hoxby's study is whether that is the mechanism that is going on or whether there is a different mechanism at work. If that were definitely the mechanism, I think you could have a general expectation that in normal conditions the option of exits, the fact of choice would drive up standards somewhat, but we do not know whether that is really the case. Her study does not distinguish between inter-school competition, competition between schools, and political competition; so what may be happening in Milwaukee, and just watching what has been going on it has looked like this, is that you have a superintendent and a fairly well organised political coalition which is responding to the voucher scheme by trying to be more innovative, trying to drive up standards. These are the things they might have wanted to do anyway, these are the things they might have been trying to do anyway, and maybe the voucher scheme has made it easier for them to do it, but that is different from a proper market working. It is not clear that it is the market itself driving up standards; it may be a sort of competition between the market and the political facts that is pushing up standards.

  Q208  Chairman: Let me move on and ask Mr Martin Ward next: when I read what you wrote and listening to you, you do not like all this kind of stuff very much at all. What I really want to ask you is if choice, as you say, in most places does not exist because that is not how it is in many rural and, you say, school town areas, and if where it does exist you say that it raises expectations that it cannot fulfill and causes problems, why do we not simply go to a system very much like the mainstream American system where people get assignment to schools? Would that not be more straightforward? Let us not go through the myth of choice, let us just tell people where they are going to go to school?

  Mr Ward: That perhaps would be a better arrangement. I do not think that it is one that we would want to advocate at the present time and starting from where we are. There has been a period when the whole notion of choice has been sold very heavily to the public at large and to parents in particular to an extent that it has become very uncomfortable to oppose it in a total way, in the sort of way that you are suggesting. I suspect that many of our members would prefer a return, if you like, to a system like that—where there was relatively little choice in any sense promised or offered to parents, but that one simply took one's child to the nearby school. "This is the school to which you go." You live in the catchment area of such and such high school, so your child goes there. As I say, many of my members would prefer that. By no means all of them; and certainly some of them are sold on the notion of choice, competition between schools and so forth. I guess that the point that I made to begin with is just an observation that if you go to Saffron Walden, or Market Harborough, or Driffield, that sort of size of town where there is one school, effectively that is what everybody does—their children get to 11, they go to the first school—and, if you ask the parents in those schools are they satisfied with them, the answer will almost invariably be, "Yes", and the sort of satisfaction rating that those schools have got is at a level that most commercial organisations which are driven by competition would love to have. They get a great deal of support from their parents and they are generally very well regarded. Of course, if there is a monopoly there may be complacency, and one has to accept that, and I would accept that certainly there will be instances where schools in situations like that are resting on their laurels and not doing as much as they could to improve matters because life is comfortable and they do not have any competition. That is the down side of it, but the upside of it is just to observe that where there is less choice, on the whole people are more satisfied.

  Q209  Chairman: One way of tackling the down side is to have published information, league tables, those kinds of external pressures, but you say you are against those as well.

  Mr Ward: We do not like the league tables. It is not that we dislike the notion of publishing information and making parents and young people more aware of what the circumstance is. What we set our face against is the particular way in which that has been done in recent decades where, for a start, the league tables are published in a very simplistic way as a league table, the implication being that you can somehow sort a very complicated set of organisations like schools out into a single pecking order against one criterion. Yes, you can, but that is extremely misleading. It is not, in fact, helpful to the parent who is looking for which school to send their ten year old to next year.

  Q210  Chairman: Let us try one more thing on you, which is that, as you rightly say, much of the problems concern urban areas and that is where the school choice issue presses greatly: London is the acute case, as you can see in the appeal figures. Surely in areas like that we do have choice, we have choice by estate agents. Are we not looking for other models of choice that will get us round the fact that there is something like a 30% house premium around popular schools so, in fact, we do ghettoise education in urban areas. Is it not proper to look for mechanisms that will break out of that?

  Mr Ward: Yes, I think it probably is. The notion that there is some sort of covert process going on is one that does concern us. In particular, as I said in this paper, it concerns me that some schools, effectively, are in a position to select their pupils even though there may be no overt or properly worked out mechanism by which they are doing that; and that clearly raises extra dangers that that selection will be done in an unfair and unhelpful fashion. Therefore, and I come back to the point that Philip Hunter made, it is very important that all the schools in those areas should be acceptable to the parents. That may be a rather idealistic solution, but it would certainly be very helpful if we did not have such a sharp pecking order as we do in a number of urban areas, and in London in particular, where parents almost feel that if they do not get their child into the first school or the one or two schools which are deemed to be superior then they have failed and their children will in turn fail. That is never the case, in actual fact, but parents do feel that. If we can improve all the schools to the point where they are content to use the school that is nearest to them, then that would be a better solution. Therefore, we would feel that there is a need, moving on somewhat slightly to the diversity point, not so much to create different types of school from which parents can choose, but to make sure that different types of experience are available to young people in all the schools so that parents and their young people have the really meaningful choices, which is the choice of what to study and how to study it.

  Q211  Chairman: I want to bring colleagues in, but I just want to bring Dr Hunter in first so that we have all had an opening shot. Can I try the question on you? One idea that is put forward again particularly for the urban areas, that we might simply have a system where anybody can apply to any school and we have a kind of lottery that enables people to get in. Again, something which happens in the United States with, for example, the Charter Schools and seems to be accepted. When the Committee went to the United States we were surprised at the idea that the lottery was used as it was conspicuously the fairest way to allocate school places where there was over-subscription. Philip Hunter, you say in your note to us that you do not like this because it promotes traffic congestion. Surely that cannot be a clinching argument against giving people more access to all schools?

  Dr Hunter: No, I do not use that as a clinching argument, but say as an aside normally parents do not like the roads being clogged up by children buzzing between schools across towns. We have a system where anybody can apply for any school, and the problem arises with those schools that are over-subscribed, and schools can, and do now in England, use lotteries on occasions. We approved a lottery in Brighton, I think, a couple of months ago, so there is nothing to stop a school using a lottery if that is what it wants to do. I think the problems with it are twofold. The first is that you want to see admission criteria for schools that parents can look at and get a pretty good idea about whether it is worth applying for that school or not. Using distance or the catchment area or feeder primaries, or what have you, as the tie-breaker means that a parent cannot guarantee whether they get into that school if they apply for it because they do not know who else is applying, but they can get a pretty good idea from past experience about whether, if they put their name down for that school, they would get in, and that seems eminently sensible. With a lottery you cannot do that, and I think that is a disadvantage. The second is, of course, that many schools want to be neighbourhood schools, wanting to respond to the needs of their neighbourhood, and I think it is very difficult to say to a parent, where there is a neighbourhood school trying to do that, "You cannot get in there because someone from seven miles away has been chosen instead of you." I think there are certain circumstances where it is possible to argue, sensible to argue, that there should be a lottery, but I think in most cases distance of some kind, catchment area or feeder primaries, something like that, seem to be a more acceptable way to parents.

  Q212  Mrs Campbell: I think the point that none of you have addressed is the point that the Chairman made to you about middle-class catchment areas around good schools, which certainly happens in the city that I represent, so there is a huge house premium if you choose to buy a house near a good school, a good secondary school particularly. It does not seem to me that this is very fair. You are giving choice to some people, you are giving choice to the parents who can afford to pay that extra premium for their home near a good school, but you are not giving a choice to other people who finish up in areas where the schools are not so good. Do you want to comment on that?

  Dr Hunter: I would just say that, of course, that happens to some extent. I would question some of the figures, I think, that some estate agents have come up with, about the 30% business. I think a lot of that is associated with things other than the school, but people choose to buy houses where they buy them, and for lots of reasons, and it is true that the school is one of them, but it seems to me it is a question of what you are trying to achieve. You either want to see neighbourhood schools which are  responding to the needs of their particular neighbourhood, and that works very well in large areas of the country, I have to say, if you look at Cannock, for example—

  Q213  Chairman: Just to take an example!

  Dr Hunter: There are a number of schools there. It is quite true that some of those schools find it easier to get higher examination results than others, but you only get into a real problem if there is a sink school, and that is a real problem and it is a real problem in parts of Hull and Stoke and other parts of the country, but you have to tackle that problem. You cannot improve a school by forcing parents to send their children there. It just does not work. You have to find more money to spend on those schools, you have to train the teachers, you have to give them support, sometimes you have to close them down, but that is the way to tackle it, not through the admission system.

  Q214  Mrs Campbell: I am interested to hear what Mr Ward has to say to that?

  Mr Ward: A process very similar to that was used certainly in the City of Hull, and Philip Hunter has just mentioned it. Hull has got major problems now. I know Hull—I used to live and work there—but back in the 1970s, and through into the 1980s to some extent, they operated a system very like that in which all the young people aged 10 were assessed and they were then allocated to schools in such a fashion that at least nominally all the schools had a similar intake in terms of ability. That was deeply unpopular with parents and young people to the point that it eventually had to be abandoned because many young people were making longer journeys than they strictly needed to make and their parents would say, "Why is it that my child at the age of 11 has to get on a bus and be driven all the way across the city to such and such a school?", and they were not, on the whole, very impressed by answers along the lines of, "We are balancing the intake in all the different schools."

  Q215  Mrs Campbell: If I can interrupt you for a moment. That is one model. I do not think I would propose that model. The sort of model that we saw in the United States is where parents choose a school, choose a Charter School. If that school is over-subscribed, then the school's allocation of pupils depends on a lottery; so you are only getting people allocated to the school who have chosen that school in the first place. Why can we not use some sort of system like that? It would overcome this problem that we have of schools in, shall we say, good areas being attended by children from middle-class families who probably have a number of educational advantages anyway. In my area, at one school I have got half the parents who are FRSs. You would expect the school to be good under those circumstances?

  Mr Ward: Yes. I do not think we would have any objection to the use of a lottery system as such. The objections are the ones that Philip Hunter has already made, that it clearly does increase the amount of travelling that is going on. There are ecological objections to that. I appeared before the Transport Select Committee last year when they were looking at travel to school, because they are trying to reduce the distance that children travel to school, and, other things being equal, we would all prefer that that distance be reduced for those reasons and also because it is wasteful of the time of the children concerned to be making longer journeys than they strictly need to make. The other point is that it is that much more difficult for parents to plan to have any expectation of what the outcome of that lottery will be. I suppose we could overcome that by conducting the lottery a long time in advance, and parents would then be able to plan for at least a year, say, before the actual transition took place. I do not think we would oppose lotteries as such, but we would still prefer, and I am sure most school leaders would prefer, to have a system in which there is a set of local schools and essentially there are four or five primary schools and the children from those schools move on to the secondary school. That also makes the transition at age 11, which is already difficult for children, rather easier than if they leave the primary school to one of a whole lot of different secondary schools so their friends go elsewhere and they arrive at a secondary school that is trying to coordinate an intake that has come from 40 or 50 different primary schools with the different experiences that those children have had.

  Professor Brighouse: I am much more sympathetic than these guys are to the problem. What we have in the States, the normal method of allocating children to school is that wealthy people get the school of their choice, which is the one that they move to be near, and everyone else gets the one they had to live near because that is where they could afford to live; and if a wealthy person does not like the school, (a) they can exercise the pressure that middle-class people are very good at exercising anyway to get the kid moved or to get them into a better situation at school, and (b) if it does not work they can get out, they can go to a private school. You did not even mention this. If I am really unsatisfied, I have enough money that I can send my kid to a private school, I would not, just to tell you. We have choice, we already have choice. It is just part of the system in that system; it is just choice for one set of people. Other people's kids, their children are allocated to school by the school district, which makes the choice for them. There are lots of studies in the UK of the way that parents choose, and there are lots of studies which show—their researchers do not put it this way but this is what they mean—that middle class educated parents make good choices and working-class, uneducated parents make less good choices. That is irrelevant to equity. What is relevant is whether those parents make worse choices than the state does, not whether they make worse choices than middle-class parents do. In many parts of the United States I am absolutely convinced that the state makes worse choices for working class kids than their parents would. It systematically does it with respect to all sorts of conditions that poor people have to face, and I am sure it does it for their kids and their schools. I think it is a serious problem. It is not a serious problem in some places, but it is a serious problem in others. It is also true that the problem with the lottery, and I am a big advocate of lotteries—I think we should introduce them and that should be a way kids are allocated to school—but there is a problem with them in the neighbourhood school problem, and it is the one that Phillip mentioned, which is that it is hard to plan your life around them because you have no idea basically, it is completely random whether your kid gets into the school you chose.

  Q216  Mrs Campbell: If I could interrupt, you could take away an element of uncertainty by saying that if one child from a family is allocated to a school by a lottery then subsequent siblings will automatically go to that school?

  Professor Brighouse: Where lotteries are used in the States every single instance of a lottery that I know of has a sibling rule. I have never heard of one that does not have a sibling rule. That is always part of the lottery. The other thing, and this is expensive, is to build in extra capacity to schools, just build in extra capacity so that if a school gets 100 more people wanting to go to it than it anticipated, it can take them. Building in spare capacity is going to be unpopular with the Treasury, it is also going to be unpopular with the newspapers because they will say there are all these empty places; the government is spending all this money on places that we are not filling. If you want schools to work like a market, if you really want to replicate something like a market, you need spare capacity, and you also need to have mechanisms for closing schools, schools which nobody has chosen or hardly anybody has chosen. There should be no school in which more than 50% of the kids did not choose to be there. Maybe if it is like that for one year it is okay, but if it is like that for any length of time, it should be closed, and it should be closed regardless of what system we use, but if you are going to be able to close schools, you have to have capacity in other schools and you have to build in this capacity for fluidity, and that is expensive.

  Q217  Mr Prentice: If you allow popular over-subscribed schools to expand capacity you may be destroying the very thing that makes the school attractive to parents in the first place?

  Mr Ward: If I could come in, Chair. I think that is right. The consequence of a free competition would tend to be, presumably, that the successful schools will grow and grow. It may be that they would then become elephantine and unpopular and that would balance matters. In practice, I suspect that they would become elephantine but would continue to grow so that there would be a tendency to have fewer, larger schools, and that, I do not think, is a consequence that many parents would prefer. On the whole, if you ask parents, other things being equal, they prefer their children to be in smaller schools, but, of course, the schools are slow to turn—they are like super-tankers, they do take a long time to turn around—and they are large capital items. It is difficult then to follow a fashion. If you are making motor cars and everybody this year decides they want green, you put lots of green paint in the sprayers and everybody has a green car; there is no particular problem about that. It does not matter. If we all decide to drive green cars that is not something that would concern anybody, I do not suppose, but if in a town where there are four or five schools everybody decides they are going to go to school A and that means that over a period of time the other four close, we will have an enormous school which, in fact, will be unsatisfactory for everyone.

  Dr Hunter: Just a couple of points, just to finish off the lottery first. I ought to say that I am not against lotteries where that seems a sensible thing to have. It is just that there are very few schools that have chosen to go down the lottery route, and I think I can understand why they have done that, but, as an adjudicator, if a school comes along with a lottery and wants to put it in, clearly one would sell it on its  merits. The question, I think, for you, as a Committee, is, if you like, who decides that there should be a lottery? Is the Government going to decide that there shall be lotteries everywhere, despite what head teachers and governors and other people might want locally? I would advise that these things ought to be settled locally so that schools can respond to their local service providers. If that happens to be a lottery, that is fair enough.

  Q218  Chairman: Hold on for a second. A school that is sitting in one of these nice areas, not necessarily with half the parents with FRSs, but in a decent area, a good school, it is doing all right. The system is working for that school. It has no incentive to start experimenting with lotteries to get other kinds of people in; it wants the people that it has got; it gets to the top of the league table.

  Dr Hunter: I think that is a very good point. We have these things called admission forums, which is the place they ought to be discussing this sort of thing and ought, in my view, to have some powers to be able to get stuck in if that is a system that seems to work for the whole area. At the moment they do not have any power, and I would like to see them have more powers to do that.

  Q219  Mrs Campbell: You were suggesting that individual schools should have that choice?

  Dr Hunter: Yes, they do have that choice.


 
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