Examination of Witness (Questions 693-699)
9 DECEMBER 2004
RT HON
LORD MORRIS
OF MANCHESTER
Q693 Chairman: We particularly wanted
to speak to you, Lord Morris, because of your role in setting
up an inquiry of a kind that a government did not want to have,
which has now reported. We would very much like to hear how you
went about setting up such an inquiry. You have heard our discussion
about how we have inquiries when ministers do not want to have
them, so our question to you is: how did you manage to do it?
Lord Morris of Manchester: I was
involved, Dr Wright, in many debates, first of all in the House
of Commons and then, since 1997, in the House of Lords, in opening
parliamentary debates about the still medically unexplained illnesses
of thousands of our troops involved in the 1990/1991 conflict.
I was told by the then Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence,
Nicholas Soames, in 1997, that only one of our troops could have
been affected by the fall-out from the demolitions at Kamisiyah[3]in
Southern Iraq, in March 1991. In the United States there was very
considerable concern about the numbers of their veterans of the
first Gulf conflict, who were presenting medically unexplained
illnesses, in many cases illnesses that looked as if they had
to do with neurological damage. There were people in the United
States who held very firmly to the view—including distinguished
scientists and medical specialists—that the fall-out from
the demolitions at Kamisiyah had been inadequately investigated.
However, I was told in 1997 that only one of our people could
have been involved. It was not until 2000 that I was told in the
House of Lords, and Paul Tyler was told in the House of Commons,
that the MoD's revised estimate was 9,000 of our people could
have been affected by the fall-out. Incidentally, the fall-out
included sarin and cyclosarin. That was made eminently clear by
the United States authorities. As you may know, it is now felt
in the United States that they must assume that all of their troops
deployed for the liberation of Kuwait in 1990/1991 could have
been exposed to fall-out from the demolitions. Indeed, a recent
report goes further and says that the fall-out went far into Saudi
Arabia and deep into Iran, as well as covering the whole of the
battlefield from 1991. That is just one example of the difficulties
one has in trying to establish possible causes for these medically
unexplained illnesses. I was not alone in expressing considerable
anxiety about the lack of authentic information about the health
effects of the multiple immunisation programme used for our troops
in the first Gulf conflict. I had asked again and again about
information available to the MoD on the health effects of the
multiple immunisation programme. On 22 January 2003—and
I direct the Committee's attention in particular to this question—I
asked HMG whether they were now able to respond in full to a written
question I had asked on the vaccines used during the 1990/1991
Gulf War. The reply came on 9 October. The convention is in the
House Lords that the answer to a question for written reply, which
is usually in pursuit of factual information, will be given within
two weeks of tabling the question. Here, my question had been
tabled in January 2003 and the reply ultimately came on 9 October
2003. Perhaps I could just quote from parts of the reply which
I think are extremely important in terms of the illnesses I have
been talking about, and highly relevant to why I sought a public
inquiry. The reply covered twelve and a half columns of Hansard.
A great deal of the information must have been readily available
when I tabled the question in January 2003, but it came after
a great deal of pressure on 9 October. In part it says: "As
you know, personal medical records FMed4 were generally not taken
to the Gulf during the 1990/1991 conflict and were therefore unavailable
for recording of vaccination details. However, the names of those
who received vaccinations should have been recorded on temporary
nominal rolls compiled in the theatre. Whenever possible, details
should also have been recorded on form BMed27 but many personnel
who deployed to the Gulf did not carry these documents. The details
recorded on nominal rolls and BMed27s should have been transcribed
on to FMed4s on return from the Gulf. In many cases this did not
happen and the vaccination records of many Gulf veterans are incomplete
as a result. Estimates of the precise extent to which vaccination
schedules were completed in practice therefore are not readily
available; similarly, the extent to which defence medical services
staff discussed with patients issues such as what other medication
individuals were receiving is not readily available. The nerve
agent pre-treatment sets, NAPS tablets, designed to protect troops
in the event of exposure to chemical warfare agents, each contained
pyridostigmine bromide. The instructions for taking NAPS tablets
were not subject to a restriction on co-administration and never
have been." That was summarised by the ex-service community
as an admission that medical records were in chaos; that it was
impossible for general practitioners meeting patients who had
been serving in the conflict to know what their medical records
were. That was just one example.
Q694 Chairman: The bit we would really
like to get to—these are all the reasons you came to think
that there needed to be a proper inquiry into what had gone on.
You pressed the Government and they did not want to have one and
said "no" repeatedly. Discovering what you had discovered,
how did the next bit happen?
Lord Morris of Manchester: I asked
for a public inquiry in one debate after another. I was told that
it was not time yet, that the Government had not closed its mind
to a public inquiry, but did not feel it was timely. That is why,
as I said in announcing the Lloyd inquiry on 14 June this year,
in a statement in my name, as honorary parliamentary adviser to
the Royal British Legion, and as, incidentally, and uniquely for
a non-American, a co-opted member of the United States Congressional
Committee of Inquiry, their select committee, as it were, on Gulf
War illnesses—that was my background—
Q695 Chairman: How did you go about putting
an inquiry together?
Lord Morris of Manchester: I think
I should explain that it was not just that the recommendation
for an inquiry was rebutted[4]In
February of this year a class action taken by 2000 veterans was
found to be "currently unviable", as the lawyers said,
not because any of the lawyers were not convinced that these illnesses
were directly related to Gulf War service but because they would
have to prove legal liability on the part of the MoD and negligence.
In my mind, that recalled Thalidomide. I was very deeply involved
in that, as you may know, and, as the then Minister for Disabled
People, I appointed the late Sir Alan Marre to undertake the inquiry
that finally resolved it. I was quite used to having appointed
inquiries as a minister. I was involved in the vaccine damage
controversy in 1978, leading to the vaccine damage payments scheme.
I had been involved, as President of the Haemophilia Society in
achieving the inquiry into, and the final settlement of, the claims
of people with haemophilia who had been infected with HIV by contaminated
NHS blood products, so I was concerned that here there had been
an attempt at legal action in the Gulf case. I was told by Stephen
Irwin QC, as Chairman of the Bar Council, and therefore holding
a very senior position in the legal profession—he wrote
to me saying that he regretted that the class action had been
found unviable and he said: "We had asked the Government
to consider instituting a full public review of the position of
veterans as has been called for by the Royal British Legion, and
to instigate a process of conciliation with the veterans groups.
This should be designed to mark the effects of war service on
the veterans who are suffering and to make good by ex gratia
payments the deficiencies of the war pension scheme." He
said to me in addition, "If the Government are not prepared
even now, on the collapse of the class action, to undertake a
public inquiry, will you try, with your long experience in this
field?" I had been in parliament, as you know, then already
for 40 years in both Houses. I then looked at it. It was quite
clear to me that I needed a senior former High Court judge. All
my inquiries among Law Lords led to the door of the Rt Hon the
Lord Lloyd of Berwick. I think there is no more respected former
High Court Judge and Lord of Appeal at Westminster.
Q696 Brian White: All the evidence the
Committee has just had says, "if you want an effective public
inquiry, do not go to judges" so why did you choose a judge?
Lord Morris of Manchester: It
was because of my discussions with lawyers and other people knowledgeable
about the case—
Q697 Brian White: To find a scapegoat?
Lord Morris of Manchester: I am
not certain what arguments informed the evidence you have just
heard. I am saying that the advice I had was to try to find someone
who was at once independent and experienced as a former High Court
judge and Lord of Appeal. Lord Lloyd accepted the suggestion and
became the Chairman of the inquiry. Moreover, I approached Sir
Michael Davies, who had recently retired as Clerk of the Parliaments,
and therefore a very senior official of Parliament, who undertook
to join Lord Lloyd. I think if you had Erskine May, you could
hardly have had a more authoritative person on the ways of Parliament
than Sir Michael Davies. I had as well a very eminent doctor in
Norman Jones[5]All
this information is available from the website. My experience
in the past had been, as I said, to appoint a former senior civil
servant, Sir Alan Marre[6]who
had worked for me. I had not appointed a judge then. I had not
approached any judge in other cases in which I had been involved,
but in this particular case I was advised that it would be particularly
helpful if I could get a lawyer of undoubted distinction. I think
anyone who knows anything about Lord Lloyd—whether the people
have made any comments this morning I do not know, but it struck
me that he was definitely a person who could undertake an inquiry
of excellence.
Q698 Brian White: But in an adversarial
way.
Lord Morris of Manchester: If
you look at his report, he has not done it adversarially at all.
It is published. I have said of the report that it was: "Scrupulously
fair and balanced in its judgment, the report's conclusions are
argued with excelling clarity and a relentless and compelling
logic. Its purpose is not to apportion blame but to end deadlock
and, by unravelling the truth about Gulf War illnesses, to let
right be done." I cannot think of any panel of people[7]who
could have done this job more ably than it has been done. I understand
that one of the people you heard from this morning was a former
civil servant who worked for me in the 1970s.
Q699 Mr Hopkins: Can I ask about the
appointment of a judge? Because it was an independent inquiry,
were you looking for someone who had enormous stature and responsibility,
who happened to be a judge; or did you feel it necessary to have
a lawyer, a judge?
Lord Morris of Manchester: I did
not come with any predisposition. It was suggested to me that
a retired judge would be someone that could do the job and might
undertake the job if time was available. But I had no predisposition
to approach only a judge. My concern, having been involved in
trying to unravel the truth about these illnesses over a very
long period was to get on with it, to find someone who would be
credible as the head of a public inquiry of this standing. It
is not for people in executive government, who have chosen one
judge after another. The last public inquiry that most people
are aware of was the Hutton inquiry.
3 Note by witness: Demolitions by US forces
of Iraqi chemical weapons stores Back
4
Note by witness: the request had been repeatedly turned
down by the Government Back
5
Note by witness: Emeritas Consultant Physician at St Thomas'
Hospital Back
6
Note by witness: to the Thalidomide Inquiry Back
7
Note by witness: Lord Lloyd, Sir Michael Davies and Dr
Norman Jones Back
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