Select Committee on Public Administration First Report


5  Accountability and reform

Inquiries and ministerial accountability to Parliament

167. Under the doctrine of ministerial responsibility ministers are accountable to Parliament for their own actions and those of their departments. This requires them to give information and explanations and to respond through remedial action and, in extreme cases, resignation to concerns and criticisms raised in Parliament. In its Report on the Role of the Civil Service, the Treasury and Civil Service Committee noted that the system of ministerial accountability depended "upon two vital elements: clarity about who can be held to account and held responsible when things go wrong; and confidence that Parliament is able to gain the accurate information required to hold the Executive to account and to ascertain where responsibility lies".[274]After the 'Arms to Iraq' inquiry, Lord Scott indicated that he "would reverse the order in which these 'two vital elements' are stated" arguing that "[t]he key to ministerial accountability must surely be the obligation to give information".[275] The focus on giving information was supported by the Public Service Committee (this Committee's predecessor) in 1996.[276] It is also found in the March 1997 Resolution on Accountability of both Houses, which states "It is of paramount importance that Ministers give accurate and truthful information to this House and its Committees […]. Ministers should be as open as possible with this House and its Committees […]".[277]

168. Giving information is essential to the accountability process. However, its provision is not an end in itself but a means by which government can be held to account. Thus it is inextricably linked with responsibility, the other "vital element". Inquiries, set up by ministers in response to public concern, are important in both respects. First, they provide the information required by Parliament. As the Government notes, "their findings can be used to inform wider Parliamentary debate or scrutiny of the relevant policy area".[278] Second, they may identify or clarify who is responsible. As Professor Bogdanor states of the Crichel Down (1954), Profumo (1963), Arms to Iraq (1996) and Kelly (2003) inquiries, their "constitutional purpose was to assist Parliament in pinning responsibility onto a minister".[279] Lord Butler explained how his inquiry found that "No single individual was to blame. […] After that, I think it is a matter for you in Parliament and for the public to reach their conclusions about where blame, if they want to place it, lies. What we did was to give an account of what happened".[280] In extreme cases, there may be a need for a minister to tender his or her resignation. The resignation of Sir Thomas Dugdale, after publication of the report on Crichel Down, provided the sole example of this occurring. The Budd Inquiry into the allegation made against the then Home Secretary that he misused his official position now provides a second.

169. More usually, the requirement is for ministers to respond to the findings of an inquiry by giving full explanations and, where appropriate, by taking remedial action to ensure that any mistakes identified are not repeated and recommendations are implemented. Lord Norton stated that "Ministerial accountability is retained in that ministers establish the inquiries and—while they may not have ownership of the reports—are answerable for action taken, or not taken, in the light of those reports".[281] A similar point was made by Sir Brian Bender, who believed there should not be too much separation between an inquiry and the minister. "Ministers are ultimately accountable to the public and to Parliament. It seems to me that separating it out calls into question to some extent their accountability to the electorate and Parliament".[282] Robert Francis QC also considered that providing "the result of the inquiry is made available to Parliament, either directly, or through general publication, they can only enhance democratic accountability by making facts known which might otherwise remain unknown and enabling politicians to make judgments".[283]

170. Inquiries, which Graham Mather describes as the "ultimate backstop of accountability", can therefore be seen as an adjunct to ministerial responsibility.[284] They are not a substitute for political accountability, which is to, and through, Parliament, but a mechanism which can aid the process. Parliament can hold the minister accountable not only for the inquiry's findings but also for giving effect to any recommendations that are made. As Lord Norton told us "it is up to Parliament to act on the information that been put in the public domain through the inquiry".[285] This includes "call[ing] the Minister to account… [and] check[ing] what the Minister has done".[286] It is therefore important that inquiries are not seen as a substitute for ministerial responsibility. They provide factual information and may identify where responsibility lies but they do not hold the government, or individual ministers, to account. This is Parliament's role or in Sir Michael Quinlan's analogy an inquiry provides the searchlight to assist Parliament's anti-aircraft batteries.[287]

A new model for inquiries

171. The consultation paper "Effective Inquiries" was published by the Government on 6 May 2004.[288] It took the form of a response to our Issues and Questions paper and underpinned the evidence given to us by Lord Falconer on 25 May 2004. In the paper the Government told us it believed, "that there is a strong case for considering what steps could be taken to make inquiry procedures faster and more effective, and to contain cost escalation". It wondered "whether current legislation provides a suitable basis for appropriate and effective inquiries" and thought that, "one option would be to create a new statutory framework for […] inquiries set up by Ministers to look into matters that have caused or have potential to cause public concern".[289] The Government has now introduced legislation in the House of Lords.

172. The main feature of this new model for inquiries envisages a wider general power for Ministers which would revoke and replace existing powers under the 1921 Act and in subject specific legislation such as the NHS Act 1977 and the Police Act 1996 under which inquiries such as Climbié and Lawrence have been held. Ministers would still be able to call ad hoc inquiries. It redefines the current conventions that it is for chairs of inquiries to determine how they will proceed.

173. Under the terms of the Inquiries Bill, Ministers would have the power to be able to commission inquiries, when they are necessary and to choose its panel membership and terms of reference in each case. However there would now be a statutory requirement for the Minister commissioning an inquiry to have regard to the need for impartiality and expertise in panel members. In addition, the Minister, as well as the Chair, would have a power to determine whether some or all of the inquiry should be taken wholly or partly in private. Ministers would gain the new power to suspend or end an inquiry or suspend its funds if the consider the terms of reference have been exceeded. There would be no requirement for the chairman to be a judge, but nor is this excluded.

174. There would also be other measures to help 'streamline' inquiries, such as an obligation on the inquiry panel to have regard to the costs to all those involved, and a reduced time limit on applications for judicial review of decisions relating to inquiries. The report of the inquiry would be published to the extent practicable with either the Minister or the chair able to take responsibility for this. The cost of the inquiry would also be published. Statutory inquiries would have the power to require witnesses to attend or to provide documents or other written evidence. Failure to comply or hinder the inquiry would become summary offences. The Lord Chancellor would have the power to determine rules of procedure for inquiries.

The Government's Inquiries Bill: Strengths and weaknesses

175. Putting the exercise of prerogative powers such as the initiation of inquiries onto a statutory footing is generally a highly desirable goal for which we have already expressed support.[290] In so far as the intention of the Inquiries Bill is to provide a more cost-efficient and effective way of conducting inquiries through a comprehensive statutory power which consolidates the 1921 Act and other subject specific legislation and fills in the gaps, it is welcome. However, the Bill as it stands raises a number of serious concerns:

a)  By abolishing the 1921 Act it finally removes the opportunity for formal parliamentary involvement in inquiries.

b)  It strengthens the Executive's position by enabling ministers not just to decide on the form and personnel of an inquiry before it has begun but also influence its operation. For example in creating powers to end or suspend inquiries (clauses 12 & 13), as well as to withdraw funding in cases where ministers believe an inquiry is going beyond its terms of reference, it calls into question the independence of inquiries and means that ministers rather than chairs, as now, are the interpreters of the terms of reference. In so doing the new legislation subverts the safeguards which were introduced when the original 1921 Act was debated.

c)  The legislation does not address the wider questions we posed at the beginning of this report about the purpose and nature of inquiries.

d)  As a result it does nothing to address the broader, more constitutional, issues about the circumstances in which Ministers should call an inquiry and determine its terms of reference and form. There is an assumption that one size fits all despite the acknowledgment of the wide variety of circumstances which apply.

Abolishing the 1921 Act

176. The 1921 Act was enacted very rapidly. Bonar Law agreed to the demand for an inquiry and a proposal for statutory underpinning on 22 February 1921.[291] The Bill was introduced on 4 March and received Royal Assent on 24 March[292]. Nonetheless in the space of barely two weeks of Parliamentary consideration, a number of significant issues were dealt with and resolved. The original text of the Bill provided for the establishment of an inquiry either by a Resolution of either House or by a ministerial undertaking; a power to the tribunal to exclude the public and the power to commit a person to gaol for three months for contempt. In the ensuing debate, the Bill received some important amendments which, as the table below shows, are in marked contrast to the proposed provisions of the Government's current Inquiries Bill.
Tribunal of Inquiries (Evidence) Bill 1921 Inquiries Bill 2004
—  the power of ministers to set up an inquiry under the act by means of an undertaking was removed; —  the draft legislation would restore this while at the same time removing the requirement for a parliamentary Resolution;
—  the power to commit a person directly to prison for contempt was qualified by referral to a High Court for punishment; —  the new legislation introduces summary offences for non-compliance with an inquiry;
—  the power to sit in private was overturned in favour of a presumption of openness subject to a public interest test. —  ministerial restrictions may apply, subject to which chairs are required to ensure reasonable public access to the evidence.

177. In addition there are certain points of detail which puts the new Bill at odds with the trend of evidence that we have been receiving. For example, there is no obligation on Ministers to consult on terms of reference despite the Government telling us that they "can see that there could often be a case for announcing the final terms of reference after a set period, perhaps of a few weeks, to allow for discussion and preliminary investigation, and to enable individuals or organisations with an interest to make representations to the Minister setting up the inquiry".[293] The Government also conceded that, "Inquiries can assist Parliament, because their findings can be used to inform any wider Parliamentary debate or scrutiny of the relevant policy area",[294] but the Bill removes one of the most direct means by which Parliament can influence the terms of such debate.

The need to amend the Inquiries Bill.

178. We are deeply concerned that the Government's Inquiries Bill threatens the last remaining role for Parliament in the inquiry process. Nonetheless it also provides an opportunity to update the current provision contained in the 1921 Act to reflect our recommendations for parliamentary involvement. To achieve this we propose that Clause 1 should be amended by means of an additional sub-clause to provide that, where the public concern relates to the conduct, actions or inactions of government—ministers or officials, the Minister will cause an inquiry to be called on the basis of a Resolution of both Houses of Parliament. We set out a suggested amendment at Annex 2. Individual motions for the Resolution could provide for: the form the inquiry should take; its terms of reference; any powers considered necessary; follow-up to the inquiry's report, including a requirement that the report will be debated in Parliament on a substantive motion; and remission, as appropriate, to a select committee for auditing, in due course, of the degree to which an inquiry report's recommendations have been implemented and changes wrought. This procedural framework should itself ideally be enshrined in a Resolution which would contain a presumption in favour of a parliamentary commission (see paragraphs 208-215 below) as the most appropriate form for an inquiry of this kind. Accordingly we recommend that Clause 1 should be amended to provide for parliamentary resolutions where the events causing public concern which may have occurred involve the conduct of ministers. We further recommend that the procedural framework for an inquiry called under this new sub-clause which we have described should be the subject of a Parliamentary Resolution once the Bill has passed into law.

Criteria and taxonomy

179. In its written evidence to us the Government has said that "There is no standard blueprint for the type of circumstances in which an inquiry might be needed. Matters triggering inquiries are, by their nature, difficult to foresee" adding that "A common theme tends to be that the subject matter of the inquiry has exposed some possible failing in systems or services, and so has shaken public confidence in these systems or services, either locally or nationally".[295] Speaking in the Lords second reading debate on the Inquiries Bill, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Department for Constitutional Affairs, Baroness Ashton of Upholland, believed it was difficult to identify criteria "partly because of the wide difference in the nature of inquiries. They are fundamentally different". She was, "not sure whether we would capture everything that needed to be considered".[296] Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC concurred, "I think it is not possible to define whether a public inquiry should be set up or not. My general approach has always been: if there is a national scandal or a national disaster and public opinion will only be allayed by having an independent inquiry, then that should satisfy the criteria for setting it up".[297]

180. Advice is therefore unclear. Frank Dobson revealed (and Sir Liam Donaldson confirmed) "that I was strongly advised not to hold a public inquiry. I felt this was partly because many involved knew it was likely to reveal an embarrassing 'can of worms'". [298] Sir Liam Donaldson acknowledged the difficulties but thought "we should have a try at it [establishing criteria], because at the moment it is just being done on judgment, experience and intuition, and I think it would be very helpful not least to have an auditable process: because increasingly we have judicial reviews calling for inquiries when departments might think that the inquiry is not the appropriate mechanism".[299]

181. Some of those who gave evidence to us did try and come up with a checklist of criteria. Lord Norton told us that:

    "There should, in effect, be a checklist for determining whether an inquiry is the most appropriate mechanism. The checklist would cover such questions as: Is the problem clearly defined? Does it have clear implications for public policy? Is the level of public concern sufficient as to justify triggering a public inquiry? Is there any established alternative available? Have other possible avenues been exhausted? Do the potential benefits of an inquiry justify the costs? These criteria could, if necessary, be embodied in a schedule to any new legislation […] governing the establishment and conduct of public inquiries".[300]

182. Alun Evans, secretary to the Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry thought the "suggestion of some type of menu which goes through a process of thinking does it fit within this, does it fit within that or is the inquiry not appropriate, would be worth doing".[301] He saw:

    "a number of elements which might call you to have a public inquiry: first, that something has demonstrably and seriously gone wrong, a big failing somewhere; second, that in a part of that there were either political, administrative or managerial failings or all three; and third, that the public or parts of the public have suffered harm in some way as a result of that failing. I think those type of areas would be the ones where you would then say do we need an inquiry separate from government to look into why this happened?"[302]

183. Dr Tim Baxter, secretary to the Ashworth Inquiry, added another: where "there is a reputation issue for the future of that area of public life".[303] Sir Ian Kennedy offered us further possible criteria: public confidence and trust in government or a public service cannot otherwise be restored; the integrity of system of justice is under challenge; misfeasance by government; a major disaster with loss of many lives; an issue of significant importance which also raises matters of wider public concern; value is added, i.e. issue cannot be examined as appropriately in any other way that is less expensive, less elaborate, and more speedy; or where new or poorly understood issues of major public concern are involved.[304]

184. Sir Ian Kennedy proposed "a gateway review, […] that you would have to go through before you are going to commit large amounts of public money to a particular way of looking into something because you would have to be satisfied that more efficient, more effective, more timely or less expensive means had been considered and found wanting".[305] While it is possible that an inquiry would not be called even where many of the criteria are met, we believe the time has come for setting out what such criteria are in order to improve clarity about the circumstances in which decisions to call inquiries are taken. We recommend that Ministers should justify their decisions whether to hold an inquiry or not on the basis of a published set of criteria and propose the following as a possible basis for this:
—  Can the nature of the problem be clearly described (e.g. a serious financial or economic loss, a major accident possibly involving fatalities, serious physical harm or death to one or more persons; a serious and demonstrable failure of public policy)?

—  Was it likely that political, administrative or managerial failings were a factor?

—  Are there clear implications for public policy including new or poorly understood issues?

—  Is there a high and continuing level of public concern over the problem?

—  Is there likely to be an adverse impact on public confidence in this area which cannot otherwise be satisfactorily resolved?

—  Are any established alternatives available (e.g. the legal system; the complaint and redress system; internal and external regulatory systems)?

—  Have these alternatives been exhausted or are they considered insufficient or inappropriate to meet the level of public concern?

—  Do the potential benefits outweigh the estimated costs (financial and other) of an inquiry?

Types of inquiries

185. It follows from the above that, once the decision is taken to hold an inquiry, the next question must be: what sort of inquiry to have? The traditional taxonomy of inquiries is well understood. At the top of the tree is the tribunal of inquiry under the Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, which the Salmon Commission proposed should "always be confined to matters of vital public importance concerning which there is something in the nature of a nation-wide crisis of confidence".[306] Below this are other statutory public inquiries which either impose obligations on Ministers to set up an inquiry or provide powers for them to do so. Schedule 3 to the Inquiries Bill sets out the scale of legislation concerned. There are also non-statutory or ad hoc inquiries, held either in public or private and essentially reliant on the cooperation of those involved. These have therefore tended to be used mainly where Government or public bodies are under investigation. Other variants include the now rare Royal Commissions; Committees of Privy Counsellors, which have resembled traditional inquiries as with the Franks and Butler reviews and over the years have included such topics as 'D notices', Ministerial Memoirs and review of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 stipulated in the Act itself; and Departmental Inquiries, which tend to consider various matters of policy. In addition to all these there are the parliamentary select committees.

186. A problem is that one form of inquiry is often indistinguishable from another with regard to the nature of the investigation, its sensitivity, and therefore how best to constitute its membership and terms of reference. In its guidance on inquiries the Council on Tribunals noted that "Ministers sometimes decide to set up a judicial inquiry without invoking the 1921 Act, notwithstanding the fact that the subject matter of the inquiry would fall within the Salmon criterion. The Scott Inquiry is an example. Such inquiries do not seem to differ from the 1921 Act inquiries save in respect of their powers".[307]

Politically Sensitive Inquiries

187. The categorisation of inquiries for the purposes of defining which should be the subject of our proposed principles and criteria should be straightforward. The Council on Tribunals was given a clear definition in their terms of reference when they were asked to provide guidance on inquiries after Scott, "inquiries set up by Ministers to investigate particular matters of public concern".[308] Although this definition is perfectly workable it does not deal with the matter which was of concern to Lord Woolf among others and which we are concerned to define more closely, i.e. those inquiries which for various reasons are considered to be politically sensitive. The concern for Lord Woolf was that "Whilst some inquiries are appropriate for a judge to sit on, other inquiries are of a highly politically sensitive nature and it is not appropriate for a judge to be involved. The Lord Chief Justice should be entitled to say not only who, but whether, a judge should conduct the inquiry at all".[309] It is a matter of concern to us too that where inquiries are "politically sensitive" Parliament should be able to exercise a legitimate role.

188. Sir Ian Kennedy also saw circumstances where calling a public inquiry was not only inappropriate but even damaging:

    "We have had Scott, we have had Hutton, we have had Butler, all of which were chaired by eminent people whose eminence was more highly regarded before than after, as it were. The moment they said whatever they said, they were in areas of clearly partisan politics where it struck me that whatever they were going to say, some would inevitably, for reasons that they perceive to be good, disagree. It follows that you would not necessarily advance public understanding and you would bring into disrepute the procedure of public inquiries".[310]

189. He thought the BSE Inquiry illustrated:

    "…the distinction I am trying to draw between where you are talking about the actions of government or a department and the actions of local authorities and all sorts of other disparate organisations. In my view, BSE does illustrate that where you have other players besides government, and lots of people were engaged, that may argue for it fitting within a public inquiry where it is not merely a government department having failed or not failed to meet whatever the government objectives might be. It is really a lot about the science and how much you knew, at what point you knew, and whether we can know it all. It was good to put that into the public domain".[311]

190. His conclusion, with reference to the Budd Inquiry, was that the "notion of a public inquiry, as we have experience of it […] is not a device which is suited to looking at l'affaire Blunkett. It is a matter for Parliament or others to find ways of looking at it".[312]

191. Sir Michael Bichard portrayed it as a continuum:

    "[At one end are] circumstances of fact which are not government-related, and may not even be local government-related, but they are issues of fact. Going a bit further along the continuum, there are issues of fact which also will cover issues of competence, but mostly official competence, whether it is central or local. […] If you go a bit further along the continuum, you will get facts with strong political overtones. If you go to the other end of the continuum, and you are actually talking about politically contentious issues with some facts. I think you should become more cautious about setting up an inquiry the further along that continuum you go. If you get to the far end of the continuum, then my view is it is a matter for Parliament to deal with these issues rather than to set up a public inquiry of the kind that we are representing here". [313]

192. Inquiries which could be considered to have a strong political element would include, for example, the Budd Inquiry, the Butler Inquiry, the Hutton Inquiry, the Sierra Leone Inquiry, the Franks Review, the Profumo Inquiry, and the Crichel Down investigation. A number of definitions have been offered for such inquiries. Sir Michael Quinlan described them as "…investigation into the doings of central government in major matters"[314]. Lord Scott, giving evidence to our predecessor committee said of his inquiry:

    "[It] was not an inquiry of the cataclysmic event type. It was not a Hillsborough, it was not an Aberfan, it was not a King's Cross inquiry where an event has happened and an inquiry is instituted to find out about it. It was an inquiry into the conduct of government in a particular area".[315]

193. Lord Heseltine talked of them "inquiries by government into the central machinery".[316] Sir Ian Kennedy provided a simple categorisation: Type A: those that involve the action or inaction of government, present or past. Type B: those that do not directly involve the action or inaction of government.[317] We acknowledge that this is not a straightforward exercise but it is clearly necessary to distinguish between those inquiries which may result in the conduct or actions of ministers being criticised directly and those which do not. We recommend the development of clear criteria for calling inquiries and a simple categorisation establishing a distinction between those which are politically sensitive and those which are not, on the basis of our exemplars, to ensure that calls for judicial public inquiries and the appropriate involvement of Parliament can be properly assessed and decisions on form can be taken on that basis.


274   Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Report of Session 1993-94, HC 27-I, para 132 Back

275   'Ministerial Accountability' in Government Accountability; Beyond the Scott Report (CIPFA, 1996) p. 5.  Back

276   HC (1995-96) 313, para 26 Back

277   HC Deb, 19 March 1997, cols 1046-79 and HL Deb, 20 March 1997, cols 1055-62. Back

278   HC 606-ii, GBI 09, Ev 41 Back

279   Response to Consultation, CP 12/04. Back

280   Q 500 Back

281   HC 606-v, GBI 13, Ev 105  Back

282   Q 606 Back

283   Response to Consultation, CP 12/04  Back

284   HC 51-II, GBI 20, Ev 40 Back

285   Q 426 Back

286   Q 446  Back

287   Sir Michael Quinlan, 'Lessons for Governmental Process' in Hutton and Butler-Lifting the Lid on the Workings of Power, W.G. Runciman ed. (OUP/British Academy, 2004) p 123 Back

288   "Effective Inquiries" Department for Constitutional Affairs February 2004 and HC 606-ii, GBI 09 Back

289   HC 606-ii, GBI 09 Ev 20 Back

290   Fourth report of Session 2003-04, Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament HC 422 Back

291   CJ (1920-21) Cols 881 and 882 Back

292   CJ (1920-21) Cols 2169 and CJ (1920-21) Col 2849 Back

293   HC 606-ii, GBI 09, Ev 24 Back

294   Ibid., Back

295   Ibid., Ev 21 Back

296   HL Deb, 9 December 2004, Col 1013. Back

297   Q 665 Back

298   HC 606-vii, GBI 18, Ev 152 Back

299   Q 571 Back

300   HC 606-v, GBI 13, Ev 105 Back

301   Q 360 Back

302   Q 361 [Mr Evans] Back

303   Q 361 [Dr Baxter] Back

304   Private presentation  Back

305   Q 670 Back

306   Cmnd 3121, p 16, para 27 Back

307   HC (1995-96) 114, para 5.9 Back

308   Ibid., para 1.7 Back

309   HC 51-ii, GBI 22, Ev 182 Back

310   Q 655 Back

311   Q 656 Back

312   Q 657 Back

313   Q 663 Back

314   "Lessons for Governmental Process" p 118 Back

315   HC (95-96) 313-III Q 398 Back

316   Q 627 Back

317   Private presentation Back


 
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