Memorandum by the National Foot &
Mouth Group (GBI 23)
INQUIRY INTO
GOVERNMENT USE
OF THE
INQUIRY MECHANISM
We would be grateful if the Committee would
have regard to the following issues when preparing its report
relating to the above matter.
The National Foot & Mouth Group submitted
detailed written and oral evidence to all the Inquiries set up
by the UK Government in relation to the UK Foot and Mouth epidemic
of 2001. We were also fully involved in the EU Parliament FMD
Inquiry.
We submit the following in relation to the manner
in which the Government's Lessons Learned Inquiry was conducted.
It is our contention that the way the Inquiry was conducted militated
against many of the key issues being raised, investigated and
appraised. As a result the Inquiry procedure has not fulfilled
its brief and many of the lessons of the 2001 FMD experience have
not been learned.
Our representation is based on our experiences
of that Inquiry.
1. CONTEXT AND
PRINCIPLES
In order to fully identify and assess the relevant
issues involved the Inquiry needed to be transparent and open.
However from Day 1 we did not know who had been called to give
evidence, what that evidence was, and whether it had been subject
to the appropriate questioning to test and determine its validity.
Unlike a Public Inquiry process; where the scope
and remit of an Inquiry is determined in a pre-inquiry meeting
where statements of case are presented, with the Lessons Learned
Inquiry we had no way of knowing what issues were to be raised
by the Government in determining its response to the Inquiry,
nor what the Government's position on these issues would be.
It should be noted that the only statements
of the Government's stance prior to and during the Inquiry had
been by way of press releases, statements to the House or press
coverage of Ministerial statements and Government advisers during
and since the epidemic.
Unlike a Public Inquiry process, there was no
disclosure of written or oral evidence from any witnesses either
in advance of the Inquiry—or even during the Inquiry.
Most importantly the Lessons Learned Inquiry
allowed no examination or questioning of either written or oral
statements of any of the Government representatives, advisers
or agencies in order to assess their validity or veracity.
We are still of the view that much of the evidence
presented on behalf of the Government has not been subject to
objective analysis, examination and assessment by those competent
so to do.
2. SELECTION
OF THOSE
CALLED TO
GIVE EVIDENCE
TO THE
INQUIRY
We do not know what mechanism was used to select
which witnesses were called to give evidence to the Inquiry.
However it is apparent that, with the exception
of our organisation and one other, the remaining witnesses were
all those that had been involved in delivering the Government's
policies and responses to the epidemic.
We append at Appendix 1[54]the
list published by the Lessons Learned Inquiry of those called
to give evidence. It is evident that the vast majority were drawn
from Government offices, Government advisers or Government agencies.
Most notable in its exceptions is that of Dr
Paul Kitching. As Head of FMD at the Institute of Animal Health
at Pirbright when the disease first appeared on 19 February 2001
he was immediately involved in advising the Government on disease
control.
He continued to advise MAFF, the Chief Veterinary
Officer and the Minister, Nicholas Brown, for the first eight
critical weeks of the epidemic, until his departure to take up
a pre-arranged post at Winnipeg University.
Dr Kitching presented evidence to the EU Inquiry
which was critical of the UK handling of the disease—and
yet he was not called to give evidence to Lessons Learned.
We append the transcript of this evidence—Appendix
2[55]It
was, and is, of fundamental importance in determining the lessons
of the 2001 epidemic to establish whether the right policies had
been pursued. It was therefore crucial to the Inquiry that such
evidence should have been heard.
Our contention is that the Government Inquiry
failed to take evidence from those with differing views to that
of the Government.
In addition, there were several scientists and
leading members of the veterinary profession who had expressed
deep concerns and reservations at the policies adopted by the
Government in controlling the epidemic, and they too were not
called to give evidence. However they were called to the EU Inquiry.
See our letter to the PM of 24 July 2002 already submitted to
the Select Committee for details of this.
In failing to take account of differing and
dissenting views than those that were being expressed by the Government
and its advisers the Inquiry process has failed to fully assess
many of the key issues.
Many of these issues were contentious during
the outbreak and have continued to give rise to subsequent concerns;
namely in relation to the costs of the epidemic and in regard
to what actions would be taken in the event of a future outbreak.
As yet they still remain unresolved. It is worth
noting that only in the past week the EU had determined not to
pay the UK compensation for many of the costs incurred during
2001. Only one third of the sum claimed by the UK will now be
paid by the EU.
In failing to take into consideration the expert
witness of those who questioned the efficacy of the adopted policies
and the manner in which those policies were executed, the Inquiry
has omitted significant and relevant information from its investigation.
The Government Inquiry mechanism is not capable
of delivering true and accurate findings if it cannot take into
consideration and assess those views at variance to those of the
Government.
3. LACK OF
INDEPENDENCE
The Lessons Learned Inquiry was conducted under
the auspices of the Cabinet Office. It never felt free of Government
control or independent in exercising its duties. We have already
raised the issues of those called to give evidence and the closed
nature of the Inquiry. Our experience of dealing with the Lessons
Learned Inquiry was in total contrast to that afforded by the
European Parliament Inquiry.
The European Inquiry was accessible to all those
wishing to submit evidence. All written evidence was made available
on a dedicated web site. Oral sessions were held in public and
were freely reported in the press. We were asked on two occasions
to take part in EU Parliament Inquiry hearings. The EU Parliament
also took oral evidence from us during two open sessions in the
UK; extending its number of visits here to specifically take oral
evidence from the Group.
By contrast it was extremely difficult to gain
access to the Lessons Learned meetings, entrance was by invitation
only and were not open to the press. We append two letters sent
to the Inquiry on the matter. Firstly, that we had no notice of
its private visit to Gloucestershire. We subsequently had to obtain
tickets and travel to Builth Wells—a 200 mile round trip—to
take part in the only meeting in the area. We then wrote again
to the Inquiry asking for a meeting as we had only two minutes
to raise our concerns in Builth Wells. Appendices 355 and 3a55.
When we were eventually afforded an oral session
with the Inquiry we did not meet Dr Anderson, but the secretary
and two assistants. The report that the Lessons Learned Inquiry
then prepared of our two hour session was so brief as to be meaningless.
It was sent to us for agreement only days before the report was
published.
After several emails and phone calls the secretariat
did eventually agree to an extended report—we append both
the LLI draft and the final version to demonstrate this and to
show the detail of issues raised and the cursory manner in which
the LLI wished to represent them. Appendices 455 & 555.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This organisation, many others and individuals
felt completely disillusioned and let down by the Lessons Learned
Inquiry and its modus operandi. We were indeed very grateful to
the EU Parliament for conducting such an open and transparent
investigation which properly assessed the issues and addressed
the concerns.
Having witnessed at first hand the economic,
social and personal costs which ensued from the adopted policies
none of us who presented evidence wanted to endure or undergo
the experiences of 2001 ever again.
However the aspect which most concerns us is
that the purpose of the Government's Lesson Learned Inquiry has
not been met; ie to assess what lessons must be learnt to ensure
we are in a better position to respond should another FMD outbreak
occur.
In excluding so much expert witness evidence
and by conducting the Inquiry in private the Inquiry failed to
fully and properly investigate the efficacy and validity of the
adopted policies and their execution.
In addition the Inquiry chose to completely
ignore the empirical data which we submitted to demonstrate the
failure of the adopted policies and their ensuing cost. Several
scientific papers have now emerged, including those commissioned
by Defra, which further demonstrate that the adopted control measures
and, in particular, the contentious pre-emptive culls, were not
the best way for the epidemic to have been handled in the 2001
epidemic.
It would indeed be timely for a proper, open
and fully independent Inquiry to now be conducted to fully assess
the matter—and for lessons truly to be learnt.
If Government inquiries are to have a meaningful
role we urge that the Public Administration Select Committee ensures
that future Government Inquiries are open, transparent and independent
of Government influence and, most importantly, seen to be so.
Janet Bayley
NFMG Co-ordinator
We append the various documents referred to
in our submission and would be grateful if the Select Committee
would also have regard to our letter to the PM submitted by Nicholas
Soames MP on our behalf and already presented to the Select Committee
by Mr Liddell-Grainger[56]
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