Appendix 1
Government Response
INTRODUCTION
The Government thanks the Science and Technology
Committee for its thorough report on the Beagle 2 project. It
shares the Committee's view that Beagle 2 was an exciting and
important project, both in terms of its scientific merit and the
wider benefits for the UK. The Government confirms the Committee's
observation that while the project was recognised to be high risk—as
evidenced by the historic failure rate of Mars missions—the
potential scientific benefits were very high. No definitive technical
explanation for the loss of Beagle 2 has so far been identified.
As the Committee succinctly notes: "on another day, the lander
might have made it". The recent success of the European Space
Agency's Huygens probe to Titan—which relied on contributions
from some of the same British universities, laboratories and industrial
companies as did Beagle 2—shows that the UK can succeed
in planetary exploration. Nonetheless, the Government is determined
to learn the organisational and management lessons from the Beagle
2 project.
The Government welcomes the Committee's clear statement
that it should not be shy about taking risks in science if the
potential benefits are substantial, and that in the case of Beagle
2, the project was a risk worth taking. The Committee's report
also confirms that at no time did the Beagle 2 consortium expect
sole source support from Government.
While the Government accepts the report's key point
that it would have been better if full funding had been provided
at the outset of the project, as the Committee also notes, the
relevant Research Council did not have the necessary financial
flexibility at that time to consider an unplanned project of the
nature and size of Beagle 2. In this regard, the Committee broadly
echoes one of the published recommendations of the European Space
Agency (ESA)/UK Joint Inquiry that national agencies should 'ensure
that the required financing is committed at the outset' of each
phase of a prospective new project. In its response to the earlier
report, the Government has agreed this principle. Indeed, if such
funding had been available, some of the consequences referred
to by the Committee would not have arisen. In particular, a smoother
build-up of the industrial team would have occurred and the schedule
for development and testing programme would have been less compressed.
To an extent which cannot be precisely estimated, the overall
project risk would have been reduced.
In general, a phased approach to funding such projects
is a sensible one, particularly in managing risk in a step by
step manner. Often large projects, or those with significant risk,
undergo a preliminary study with limited initial funding in order
to investigate risks, identify options and better estimate overall
project costs. Suitable cost margins to cover the risks identified
are also defined. On this basis a balanced and considered decision
can be made whether or not to proceed to full implementation.
Indeed, this approach is commonly used on spacecraft projects
by ESA and other Agencies. In the case of the scientific instruments
carried by these spacecraft, however, this has been less
common, but it is becoming more necessary as the complexity of
these instruments has increased. In the case of Beagle 2—which
was treated as an instrument although had more of the characteristics
of a complex small spacecraft—it is recognised that the
absence of initial funding for definition and cost estimation
was an unfortunate consequence of the lack of financial flexibility
at that time.
The UK—through the Particle Physics and Astronomy
Research Council (PPARC)—has therefore taken specific action
to address this issue for future space science projects where
national authorities are expected to contribute to instrument
costs. It has worked closely with ESA to improve the arrangements
put in place before new collaborative projects are started. The
first result of this effort has been the signature in June 2004
by ESA, PPARC and the agencies of six other countries of a Multi-lateral
Agreement which covers the provision of the Mid-Infra Red Instrument
(MIRI) for NASA's James Webb Space Telescope. This is a project
of comparable overall cost to Beagle 2 and one of equally great
scientific potential. The approach which is being used marks a
significant change with respect to previous ESA scientific missions.
In the past the funding and the development of the
scientific instruments was agreed by the participating ESA Member
States on the basis of purely informal arrangements with ESA.
In this case, the Member States involved in MIRI have agreed on
formally guaranteeing the required level of funding on the basis
of a multi-lateral international agreement. This approach keeps
the lead scientists ('Principal Investigators') in key roles.
For MIRI, a preliminary study phase was executed with funding
contributions from ESA Member States, including significant participation
from the UK (PPARC). Risk assessment has been carried out and
contingency cost allocations have been made by each national partner—for
their own contributions—and also at an overall project level
by ESA. Although the project is still in its early stages, progress
so far has been smooth as evidenced by a successful Preliminary
Design Review carried out in November 2004.
A similar formal management approach is being adopted
for an instrument package to be flown on the Laser Interferometer
Space Antenna (LISA) spacecraft which will subsequently lead to
LISA—the world's first space-based gravity wave observatory.
The instrument project also involves UK contributions and the
UK delegate to ESA's Science Programme Committee will act as the
first chair of the European-level Steering Committee for the project.
Further, in July 2004, ESA placed an €80m industrial contract
with EADS Astrium Ltd. to build the spacecraft for LISA Pathfinder.
We believe that this evidence of continued active engagement with
new scientific programmes and the associated changes described
above will allay the Committee's fears that ESA's experience with
Beagle 2 may colour its view of the desirability of future collaborations
with the UK as well as ensuring that the lessons from the project
are not lost.
RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS
1. We welcome the establishment in the 2004 Spending
Review of a strategic fund to be allocated by the DGRC but are
not persuaded that it will rectify the serious weaknesses which
the Beagle 2 project highlighted in the Government's capacity
to respond to sudden demand. In the absence of other funding streams
to cater for such demand, we recommend that the Government considers
earmarking this fund primarily for major projects and facilities.
(Paragraph 33)
Turning to the Report's detailed Conclusions and
Recommendations, the Committee believes that the Beagle 2 project
has highlighted a weakness in the Government's ability to respond
to a sudden demand. The Government welcomes the Committee's recognition
of the move in SR04 to provide greater flexibility in responding
to emerging priorities. The funding concerned (£35m pa) from
2006-07 represents a significant sum and, as outlined in the Science
and Innovation Investment Framework 2004-2014, is intended for
use "where it is necessary to focus research effort, build
national capacity (including infrastructure) or to seize opportunities
from international partnership". Major projects and facilities
are therefore already envisaged as being within its scope. It
is entirely possible, however, that proposals may emerge for important
research effort which require relatively small investment to provide
momentum and which could not properly be described as major projects
or facilities, as suggested in the Report. The Government does
not therefore believe that it would be right to limit the scope
of the fund to such purposes. In addition, the Office of Science
and Technology (OST) is in the process of developing a strategic
financial framework to ensure the maximum benefit—including
flexibility—is obtained from the Science budget as a whole.
2. We conclude that the pursuit of sponsorship
income was an innovative and necessary attempt to meet the funding
gaps which were evident in the programme from an early stage.
But it did nothing to encourage a realistic assessment of the
risks of the project or an open dialogue between participants.
It also affected the credibility of the project, which had an
impact on the degree of support for it in some quarters. Whilst
in the right circumstances there may be a place for commercial
sponsorship in such missions, we believe that in this case the
DTI should have been focussing its efforts on finding sufficient
funding for the project rather than relying upon the securing
of commercial sponsorship. We recommend that in future the DTI
is extremely cautious about part-funding projects which are reliant
to a significant degree on the future attraction of commercial
sponsorship. At the very least, DTI needs to satisfy itself of
the availability of sufficient funding in the event that commercial
avenues prove unproductive. (Paragraph 59)
The Committee recommends that in future the DTI is
extremely cautious about part-funding projects which are reliant
to a significant degree on the future attraction of commercial
sponsorship. Noting the force of this argument—and while
maintaining that there is a place for innovative funding mechanisms
such as well-designed sponsorship—the Government agrees
that the DTI should verify at the outset that such funds are "real",
and, if not, satisfy itself of the availability of sufficient
funding to bridge any shortfall.
3. Had a Mars lander been part of the original
mission, and managed by ESA, we suspect that it would have been
given a priority commensurate with its potential scientific output,
with mass levels tailored accordingly to give it a greater chance
of success. (Paragraph 65)
The Committee suggests that had a Mars lander been
part of the original mission, and managed by ESA, it would have
been given a priority commensurate with its potential scientific
output, with mass levels tailored accordingly to give it a greater
chance of success. However, it was the norm in 1997/8 to treat
instruments (including landers) as nationally funded items and
therefore the project began in response to an open Announcement
of Opportunity. One of the Recommendations of the Beagle 2 Commission
of Inquiry was that "Future lander missions should be under
the responsibility of an Agency with appropriate capability and
resources to manage it. The lander/orbiter mission should be managed
as an integrated whole. Nationally—funded science instruments
should be included in the lander on the same basis as on the orbiter".
The Government has accepted this recommendation.
4. The ESA leadership responded positively and
flexibly in 2000 to the financial difficulties in which the Beagle
2 team found itself and helped to keep the project alive. However,
there appears to have been a latent resistance among Member States
to the British-led lander, no doubt in part due to a perception
that this was an exercise in promoting UK national scientific
interests. This made it difficult for the ESA secretariat to push
for more funds when the project met further difficulties, although
we are not persuaded that every effort was made on this front.
(Paragraph 50)
The Committee notes that the management of ESA responded
positively and flexibly in 2000 to the financial difficulties
of the Beagle 2 project. However, it is not persuaded that every
effort was made by ESA on this front. For its part, the Government
wishes to place on record its great appreciation of the considerable
contributions—both financial and personal—made by
the ESA Executive and other member states towards the completion
of the Beagle 2 project.
5. It is extremely disappointing that ESA, the
UK Government and the project team were unable to co-operate in
such a manner as to give the lander the maximum possible chance
of success. We believe that both the Beagle 2 project team and
the UK Government should have done more to persuade ESA to take
greater responsibility for managing the lander project, if necessary,
at the expense of some UK ownership. For its part, ESA should
not have been influenced so much by the apparent attraction of
getting a lander for free, albeit at the expense of European ownership.
It should now recognise that this was a mistake and ensure that
it takes full management responsibility for similar future missions.
(Paragraph 69)
The Committee suggests that ESA should not have been
influenced so much by the apparent attraction of getting a lander
for free, albeit at the expense of European ownership. It suggests
that it takes full management responsibility for similar future
missions. Both Government and ESA have accepted that future lander
projects would be led by ESA or a comparable agency. However,
in accordance with current practice, provision of instruments
for ESA space science missions will in general continue to rest
with the authorities within individual member states. Nevertheless,
more formal arrangements on project funding, responsibilities
and integration—as described above—are expected to
reduce the risks associated with this approach by ensuring that
responsibilities are clearly defined at the outset.
6. Had ESA implemented the lesson of earlier failed
missions on the importance of communication between lander and
orbiter, it would have secured a vast amount of information which
could have been used to help establish what happened to the lander
and therefore to reduce the risk of future failures. It is a pity
that this lesson had not been learned from two previous missions.
(Paragraph 70)
The Committee comments that ESA should have implemented
the lesson of earlier failed missions on the importance of communication
between lander and orbiter, and so would have secured a vast amount
of information which could have been used to help establish what
happened to the lander and therefore to reduce the risk of future
failures. However, the event which led to a change in NASA policy
(the loss of the Mars Polar Lander) took place in December 1999
and the increased priority for having communication between lander
and orbiter was established later. NASA's Mars Pathfinder of 1996
had been successful using a "silent" Entry Descent and
Landing System. Nonetheless, Government has agreed that future
landers should have a descent communications system as recommended
in the joint Commission of Inquiry.
7. The project went well beyond the normal scope
of the work of a Principal Investigator. The consortium leadership
was understandably keen to maintain control over what was very
much the team's own initiative, which was pursued with admirable
determination and considerable success. The team was perhaps unduly
reluctant to accept that the project as a whole may have benefited
from greater involvement from ESA, which could have provided it
with the necessary financial resources. It was the absence of
the guaranteed funding that made a formal agreement between participating
parties difficult to achieve. This in turn was a fundamental weakness
in the project management. (Paragraph 75)
8. The establishment of the Casani review was
a useful means of gaining an independent assessment of the project.
Having commissioned it, ESA should have taken greater responsibility
for implementing the most important of its recommendations in
full. (Paragraph 79)
9. For far too long the Government failed to ensure
that the nature and extent of the risks were identified accurately
so that the funding necessary to help mitigate those risks as
far as possible could be provided. The failure by all parties
to establish at the outset some quite basic elements of cost attribution
accentuated funding difficulties. Once they became financially
committed, both the Government and ESA took steps to monitor the
project, but neither was willing or able to ensure that the recommendations
of their various reviews were fully implemented. (Paragraph 88)
The Committee feels that the project went well beyond
the normal scope of the work of a Principal Investigator and that
the team was perhaps unduly reluctant to accept that the project
as a whole may have benefited from greater involvement from ESA,
which could have provided it with the necessary financial resources.
The Government believes that by following the improved approach,
both to provision of instrumentation for ESA space science projects
and landers described above, it is both possible and desirable
for Principal Investigators to maintain a strong scientific involvement
in new projects while also ensuring that the correct management
and cost oversight is maintained by ESA and the UK authorities.
Government and ESA have accepted that a more extensive
risk analysis should be conducted at an early stage of such an
exciting and complex project. These processes are built into the
improved management structure of new instrument projects as described
above. The Committee however confirms that such "high risk"
projects can be justified by the high science return and even
where there are demanding windows of opportunity, and this point
is noted by Government.
Due to the way in which the project started, the
Government agrees that it was not possible to retire all risks
at the outset. As the project continued, it became apparent that
too much reliance had been placed on access by UK industry to
US experience, accentuated by ITAR considerations. As a result,
additional risk mitigation technology development had to be undertaken
in partnership between Government and industry.
10. Relations between ESA and the UK side were
strained by different attitudes towards the lander. Professor
Southwood clearly had very strong doubts about the lander's chances
of success. He should have made these reservations clear - formally
- in order that they could be addressed. (Paragraph 91)
The Committee suggests that relations between ESA
and the UK side were strained by different attitudes towards the
lander. However, Government believes that the situation was as
follows: on first arrival in post, the ESA Director of Science
was concerned about the viability of the project. Subsequently,
and after negotiation of the Heads of Agreement, he no longer
held those severe doubts and signed that Agreement on behalf of
ESA. Both ESA and Government were aware of the residual risks
and in particular the critical nature of further tests of the
EDLS.
11. We welcome the fact that the Government recognised
the wider benefits of Beagle 2 in citing public understanding
of science goals as one of the factors contributing to its support
for the project. (Paragraph 98)
12. We recommend that in future decisions on support
for collaborative and UK-led projects the Government sets out
the weight it assigns to the wider public benefits as well as
the economic analysis. (Paragraph 99)
The Committee notes that in its assessment of Beagle
2, the Government took into account the benefits to the UK beyond
the specific scientific goals. It recommends that in future decisions
on support for collaborative and UK-led projects the Government
sets out the weight it assigns to the wider public benefits as
well as the economic analysis. The Government welcomes the recognition
that it sought to take into account the wider technological and
societal benefits of Beagle 2. More generally, the Government
recognises the importance of the wider benefits of research in
society including public understanding of science. A new regime
of performance management is being developed which will look to
include aspects of science in society to help government better
measure the value of some of these benefits. Inspiring people
and the generating public interest in science are very useful
benefits, however the main driver for research is excellent science.
13. We commend the efforts of the Government and
others to use the Beagle 2 project as a tool for science education.
We recommend that the use made of the lessons devised is monitored
and that, if successful, similar approaches are adopted with other
high profile science missions. (Paragraph 100)
The Government welcomes the Committee's endorsement
of the use of Beagle in science education. It will monitor and
evaluate on a best-effort basis the use made of the lessons devised.
It agrees that similar approaches could be used for other high-profile
missions, and indeed new educational resources linking the Cassini-Huygens
mission to schools' curriculum—and funded by the Department
for Education and Skills (DfES)—have just been released
by BNSC and by PPARC. Government is also pleased to announce that
the DfES has recently joined the British National Space Centre
partnership, with the expectation that space can be linked better
to school education at policy and delivery levels, and that there
will be a strategic framework including stakeholder organisations
(Science Learning Centres, learned societies, etc) for further
developments in this area.
14. We welcome the UK's full participation in
the preparatory phase of ESA's Aurora space exploration programme.
We hope that this engagement at the outset will help the UK shape
the content of the programme and gain substantially from it in
terms of industrial and academic participation. In view of wider
considerations relating to the educational, industrial and science
in society agenda, we believe that Government, not just PPARC,
should ensure that UK plc is in a position to build on the scientific
base established by the Beagle team and to support participation
in future planetary exploration missions, on a well defined multinational
basis. OST and DTI should examine the case for UK participation
from the point of view of their different objectives and provide
the appropriate support, to add to that of PPARC, in a co-ordinated
way. (Paragraph 109)
Turning to the future, PPARC announced on 1 October
its decision to invest £5.0m in planetary exploration, comprising
of £3.5m in the preparatory phase of ESA's 'Aurora' programme,
supported by an additional £1.5m in national work. This decision
followed a detailed process of consultation with the UK planetary
science, other interested research communities and the UK space
industry on the UK's science and technology priorities. This contribution
will make the UK the second largest contributor to the programme,
thus precisely meeting the Committee's stated goal that future
missions should be managed by ESA with strong UK participation.
Moreover, it will allow the UK properly to evaluate the benefits
and risks of the programme before any commitment to full funding
is made. Given the likely timing of a decision on implementing
the Aurora programme PPARC has also prepared, in the context of
SR2004, an estimate of the likely cost of the UK achieving leadership
in the programme.
The Committee suggests that in view of wider considerations
relating to the educational, industrial and science in society
agenda, the Government and not just PPARC, should ensure that
UK plc is in a position to build on the scientific base established
by the Beagle team and to support participation in future planetary
exploration missions, on a well defined multinational basis.
The OST is responsible for distribution of the science
budget and normally works with and through bodies such as PPARC
to deliver outputs such as research and ensuring that UK plc is
in a position to build on the research funded through the budget.
In keeping with this approach, PPARC is taking two actions. First,
PPARC is setting up a national Aurora Advisory Committee to provide
detailed advice in assigning priorities to the UK's involvement
in the preparatory phase of the ESA programme. In particular,
it will guide the UK's interaction with the ESA Aurora Board of
Participants, which is the delegate management committee. The
Aurora Advisory Committee (AurAC) will be chaired by Dr Mark Sims
of Leicester University. Dr Sims was the Mission Manager of Beagle
2. The membership will be selected by agreement with the Chair
and will be drawn from both academia and industry. The focus of
this group will thus be on maximizing the UK's influence in the
ESA programme and the return to be obtained from PPARC's investment.
For its part, DTI has developed and launched a Technology Strategy
to be implemented through a new Technology Board which will assign
priorities and funding to priority technology areas.
Secondly, an ad hoc Planetary Exploration Assessment
Group will be created comprising representatives of all the potentially
interested Research Councils; government partners plus the Chair
of AurAC. This will be tasked with documenting and assessing the
range of benefits that could be obtained from full participation
in implementing a programme of planetary exploration. This Group
will build on the cross-research council consultation exercise
carried out by PPARC in 2004. It will take evidence from all interested
external individuals and organizations and assist in providing
advice to Ministers on whether such a programme should be supported
by the UK.
In order to support the decision process, DTI is
providing funds to undertake a systematic assessment of the opportunities
for the UK in the exploitation of technology from a planetary
exploration programme into non-space applications. Possibilities
in areas such as healthcare and security are foreseen and the
results of this study will be available within a few months.
15. The decision not to publish Commission of
Inquiry's report in full was based on the sensitivities of the
parties involved rather than any convincing legal or commercial
considerations. This is an affront to accountability. We recommend
that the full report be published without delay. (Paragraph 116)
The report was always seen by BNSC and ESA as an
internal inquiry. Its purpose was to learn lessons for the future.
There were also concerns about the confidentiality of commercial
information. The organisations involved were given a strong indication
that the information they supplied was only for the use of the
inquiry. For these reasons the report was not published. ESA and
the UK did however think it right that the recommendations of
the report should be published as these covered the most important
issues. The Science and Technology Select Committee was also confidentially
given a copy of the full report. Subsequently, in view of the
Committee's strongly held view that the report should be published
in full, we have discussed the issue again with ESA and have persuaded
them that the report should be published. We have also had further
discussions with the other organisations involved about now publishing
the report and they are aware that the report is being published
today. The contents of the report have not been agreed with the
parties.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Government appreciates the recognition
given by the Committee of the efforts by all concerned to make
a success of the project. We affirm that substantial benefits
have been secured in positioning the UK to participate in future
planetary exploration; in strengthening links between the academic
and industrial communities; and in connecting the UK's science
community with the wider society. In its report, the Committee
raised important funding and management issues. The Government
believes that these have not only been recognised but are already
acted upon in the preparation of major space science projects.
February 2005
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