Select Committee on Science and Technology Fourth Special Report


Appendix 1

Government Response

INTRODUCTION

The Government thanks the Science and Technology Committee for its thorough report on the Beagle 2 project. It shares the Committee's view that Beagle 2 was an exciting and important project, both in terms of its scientific merit and the wider benefits for the UK. The Government confirms the Committee's observation that while the project was recognised to be high risk—as evidenced by the historic failure rate of Mars missions—the potential scientific benefits were very high. No definitive technical explanation for the loss of Beagle 2 has so far been identified. As the Committee succinctly notes: "on another day, the lander might have made it". The recent success of the European Space Agency's Huygens probe to Titan—which relied on contributions from some of the same British universities, laboratories and industrial companies as did Beagle 2—shows that the UK can succeed in planetary exploration. Nonetheless, the Government is determined to learn the organisational and management lessons from the Beagle 2 project.

The Government welcomes the Committee's clear statement that it should not be shy about taking risks in science if the potential benefits are substantial, and that in the case of Beagle 2, the project was a risk worth taking. The Committee's report also confirms that at no time did the Beagle 2 consortium expect sole source support from Government.

While the Government accepts the report's key point that it would have been better if full funding had been provided at the outset of the project, as the Committee also notes, the relevant Research Council did not have the necessary financial flexibility at that time to consider an unplanned project of the nature and size of Beagle 2. In this regard, the Committee broadly echoes one of the published recommendations of the European Space Agency (ESA)/UK Joint Inquiry that national agencies should 'ensure that the required financing is committed at the outset' of each phase of a prospective new project. In its response to the earlier report, the Government has agreed this principle. Indeed, if such funding had been available, some of the consequences referred to by the Committee would not have arisen. In particular, a smoother build-up of the industrial team would have occurred and the schedule for development and testing programme would have been less compressed. To an extent which cannot be precisely estimated, the overall project risk would have been reduced.

In general, a phased approach to funding such projects is a sensible one, particularly in managing risk in a step by step manner. Often large projects, or those with significant risk, undergo a preliminary study with limited initial funding in order to investigate risks, identify options and better estimate overall project costs. Suitable cost margins to cover the risks identified are also defined. On this basis a balanced and considered decision can be made whether or not to proceed to full implementation. Indeed, this approach is commonly used on spacecraft projects by ESA and other Agencies. In the case of the scientific instruments carried by these spacecraft, however, this has been less common, but it is becoming more necessary as the complexity of these instruments has increased. In the case of Beagle 2—which was treated as an instrument although had more of the characteristics of a complex small spacecraft—it is recognised that the absence of initial funding for definition and cost estimation was an unfortunate consequence of the lack of financial flexibility at that time.

The UK—through the Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC)—has therefore taken specific action to address this issue for future space science projects where national authorities are expected to contribute to instrument costs. It has worked closely with ESA to improve the arrangements put in place before new collaborative projects are started. The first result of this effort has been the signature in June 2004 by ESA, PPARC and the agencies of six other countries of a Multi-lateral Agreement which covers the provision of the Mid-Infra Red Instrument (MIRI) for NASA's James Webb Space Telescope. This is a project of comparable overall cost to Beagle 2 and one of equally great scientific potential. The approach which is being used marks a significant change with respect to previous ESA scientific missions.

In the past the funding and the development of the scientific instruments was agreed by the participating ESA Member States on the basis of purely informal arrangements with ESA. In this case, the Member States involved in MIRI have agreed on formally guaranteeing the required level of funding on the basis of a multi-lateral international agreement. This approach keeps the lead scientists ('Principal Investigators') in key roles. For MIRI, a preliminary study phase was executed with funding contributions from ESA Member States, including significant participation from the UK (PPARC). Risk assessment has been carried out and contingency cost allocations have been made by each national partner—for their own contributions—and also at an overall project level by ESA. Although the project is still in its early stages, progress so far has been smooth as evidenced by a successful Preliminary Design Review carried out in November 2004.

A similar formal management approach is being adopted for an instrument package to be flown on the Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA) spacecraft which will subsequently lead to LISA—the world's first space-based gravity wave observatory. The instrument project also involves UK contributions and the UK delegate to ESA's Science Programme Committee will act as the first chair of the European-level Steering Committee for the project. Further, in July 2004, ESA placed an €80m industrial contract with EADS Astrium Ltd. to build the spacecraft for LISA Pathfinder. We believe that this evidence of continued active engagement with new scientific programmes and the associated changes described above will allay the Committee's fears that ESA's experience with Beagle 2 may colour its view of the desirability of future collaborations with the UK as well as ensuring that the lessons from the project are not lost.

RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We welcome the establishment in the 2004 Spending Review of a strategic fund to be allocated by the DGRC but are not persuaded that it will rectify the serious weaknesses which the Beagle 2 project highlighted in the Government's capacity to respond to sudden demand. In the absence of other funding streams to cater for such demand, we recommend that the Government considers earmarking this fund primarily for major projects and facilities. (Paragraph 33)

Turning to the Report's detailed Conclusions and Recommendations, the Committee believes that the Beagle 2 project has highlighted a weakness in the Government's ability to respond to a sudden demand. The Government welcomes the Committee's recognition of the move in SR04 to provide greater flexibility in responding to emerging priorities. The funding concerned (£35m pa) from 2006-07 represents a significant sum and, as outlined in the Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004-2014, is intended for use "where it is necessary to focus research effort, build national capacity (including infrastructure) or to seize opportunities from international partnership". Major projects and facilities are therefore already envisaged as being within its scope. It is entirely possible, however, that proposals may emerge for important research effort which require relatively small investment to provide momentum and which could not properly be described as major projects or facilities, as suggested in the Report. The Government does not therefore believe that it would be right to limit the scope of the fund to such purposes. In addition, the Office of Science and Technology (OST) is in the process of developing a strategic financial framework to ensure the maximum benefit—including flexibility—is obtained from the Science budget as a whole.

2. We conclude that the pursuit of sponsorship income was an innovative and necessary attempt to meet the funding gaps which were evident in the programme from an early stage. But it did nothing to encourage a realistic assessment of the risks of the project or an open dialogue between participants. It also affected the credibility of the project, which had an impact on the degree of support for it in some quarters. Whilst in the right circumstances there may be a place for commercial sponsorship in such missions, we believe that in this case the DTI should have been focussing its efforts on finding sufficient funding for the project rather than relying upon the securing of commercial sponsorship. We recommend that in future the DTI is extremely cautious about part-funding projects which are reliant to a significant degree on the future attraction of commercial sponsorship. At the very least, DTI needs to satisfy itself of the availability of sufficient funding in the event that commercial avenues prove unproductive. (Paragraph 59)

The Committee recommends that in future the DTI is extremely cautious about part-funding projects which are reliant to a significant degree on the future attraction of commercial sponsorship. Noting the force of this argument—and while maintaining that there is a place for innovative funding mechanisms such as well-designed sponsorship—the Government agrees that the DTI should verify at the outset that such funds are "real", and, if not, satisfy itself of the availability of sufficient funding to bridge any shortfall.

3. Had a Mars lander been part of the original mission, and managed by ESA, we suspect that it would have been given a priority commensurate with its potential scientific output, with mass levels tailored accordingly to give it a greater chance of success. (Paragraph 65)

The Committee suggests that had a Mars lander been part of the original mission, and managed by ESA, it would have been given a priority commensurate with its potential scientific output, with mass levels tailored accordingly to give it a greater chance of success. However, it was the norm in 1997/8 to treat instruments (including landers) as nationally funded items and therefore the project began in response to an open Announcement of Opportunity. One of the Recommendations of the Beagle 2 Commission of Inquiry was that "Future lander missions should be under the responsibility of an Agency with appropriate capability and resources to manage it. The lander/orbiter mission should be managed as an integrated whole. Nationally—funded science instruments should be included in the lander on the same basis as on the orbiter". The Government has accepted this recommendation.

4. The ESA leadership responded positively and flexibly in 2000 to the financial difficulties in which the Beagle 2 team found itself and helped to keep the project alive. However, there appears to have been a latent resistance among Member States to the British-led lander, no doubt in part due to a perception that this was an exercise in promoting UK national scientific interests. This made it difficult for the ESA secretariat to push for more funds when the project met further difficulties, although we are not persuaded that every effort was made on this front. (Paragraph 50)

The Committee notes that the management of ESA responded positively and flexibly in 2000 to the financial difficulties of the Beagle 2 project. However, it is not persuaded that every effort was made by ESA on this front. For its part, the Government wishes to place on record its great appreciation of the considerable contributions—both financial and personal—made by the ESA Executive and other member states towards the completion of the Beagle 2 project.

5. It is extremely disappointing that ESA, the UK Government and the project team were unable to co-operate in such a manner as to give the lander the maximum possible chance of success. We believe that both the Beagle 2 project team and the UK Government should have done more to persuade ESA to take greater responsibility for managing the lander project, if necessary, at the expense of some UK ownership. For its part, ESA should not have been influenced so much by the apparent attraction of getting a lander for free, albeit at the expense of European ownership. It should now recognise that this was a mistake and ensure that it takes full management responsibility for similar future missions. (Paragraph 69)

The Committee suggests that ESA should not have been influenced so much by the apparent attraction of getting a lander for free, albeit at the expense of European ownership. It suggests that it takes full management responsibility for similar future missions. Both Government and ESA have accepted that future lander projects would be led by ESA or a comparable agency. However, in accordance with current practice, provision of instruments for ESA space science missions will in general continue to rest with the authorities within individual member states. Nevertheless, more formal arrangements on project funding, responsibilities and integration—as described above—are expected to reduce the risks associated with this approach by ensuring that responsibilities are clearly defined at the outset.

6. Had ESA implemented the lesson of earlier failed missions on the importance of communication between lander and orbiter, it would have secured a vast amount of information which could have been used to help establish what happened to the lander and therefore to reduce the risk of future failures. It is a pity that this lesson had not been learned from two previous missions. (Paragraph 70)

The Committee comments that ESA should have implemented the lesson of earlier failed missions on the importance of communication between lander and orbiter, and so would have secured a vast amount of information which could have been used to help establish what happened to the lander and therefore to reduce the risk of future failures. However, the event which led to a change in NASA policy (the loss of the Mars Polar Lander) took place in December 1999 and the increased priority for having communication between lander and orbiter was established later. NASA's Mars Pathfinder of 1996 had been successful using a "silent" Entry Descent and Landing System. Nonetheless, Government has agreed that future landers should have a descent communications system as recommended in the joint Commission of Inquiry.

7. The project went well beyond the normal scope of the work of a Principal Investigator. The consortium leadership was understandably keen to maintain control over what was very much the team's own initiative, which was pursued with admirable determination and considerable success. The team was perhaps unduly reluctant to accept that the project as a whole may have benefited from greater involvement from ESA, which could have provided it with the necessary financial resources. It was the absence of the guaranteed funding that made a formal agreement between participating parties difficult to achieve. This in turn was a fundamental weakness in the project management. (Paragraph 75)

8. The establishment of the Casani review was a useful means of gaining an independent assessment of the project. Having commissioned it, ESA should have taken greater responsibility for implementing the most important of its recommendations in full. (Paragraph 79)

9. For far too long the Government failed to ensure that the nature and extent of the risks were identified accurately so that the funding necessary to help mitigate those risks as far as possible could be provided. The failure by all parties to establish at the outset some quite basic elements of cost attribution accentuated funding difficulties. Once they became financially committed, both the Government and ESA took steps to monitor the project, but neither was willing or able to ensure that the recommendations of their various reviews were fully implemented. (Paragraph 88)

The Committee feels that the project went well beyond the normal scope of the work of a Principal Investigator and that the team was perhaps unduly reluctant to accept that the project as a whole may have benefited from greater involvement from ESA, which could have provided it with the necessary financial resources. The Government believes that by following the improved approach, both to provision of instrumentation for ESA space science projects and landers described above, it is both possible and desirable for Principal Investigators to maintain a strong scientific involvement in new projects while also ensuring that the correct management and cost oversight is maintained by ESA and the UK authorities.

Government and ESA have accepted that a more extensive risk analysis should be conducted at an early stage of such an exciting and complex project. These processes are built into the improved management structure of new instrument projects as described above. The Committee however confirms that such "high risk" projects can be justified by the high science return and even where there are demanding windows of opportunity, and this point is noted by Government.

Due to the way in which the project started, the Government agrees that it was not possible to retire all risks at the outset. As the project continued, it became apparent that too much reliance had been placed on access by UK industry to US experience, accentuated by ITAR considerations. As a result, additional risk mitigation technology development had to be undertaken in partnership between Government and industry.

10. Relations between ESA and the UK side were strained by different attitudes towards the lander. Professor Southwood clearly had very strong doubts about the lander's chances of success. He should have made these reservations clear - formally - in order that they could be addressed. (Paragraph 91)

The Committee suggests that relations between ESA and the UK side were strained by different attitudes towards the lander. However, Government believes that the situation was as follows: on first arrival in post, the ESA Director of Science was concerned about the viability of the project. Subsequently, and after negotiation of the Heads of Agreement, he no longer held those severe doubts and signed that Agreement on behalf of ESA. Both ESA and Government were aware of the residual risks and in particular the critical nature of further tests of the EDLS.

11. We welcome the fact that the Government recognised the wider benefits of Beagle 2 in citing public understanding of science goals as one of the factors contributing to its support for the project. (Paragraph 98)

12. We recommend that in future decisions on support for collaborative and UK-led projects the Government sets out the weight it assigns to the wider public benefits as well as the economic analysis. (Paragraph 99)

The Committee notes that in its assessment of Beagle 2, the Government took into account the benefits to the UK beyond the specific scientific goals. It recommends that in future decisions on support for collaborative and UK-led projects the Government sets out the weight it assigns to the wider public benefits as well as the economic analysis. The Government welcomes the recognition that it sought to take into account the wider technological and societal benefits of Beagle 2. More generally, the Government recognises the importance of the wider benefits of research in society including public understanding of science. A new regime of performance management is being developed which will look to include aspects of science in society to help government better measure the value of some of these benefits. Inspiring people and the generating public interest in science are very useful benefits, however the main driver for research is excellent science.

13. We commend the efforts of the Government and others to use the Beagle 2 project as a tool for science education. We recommend that the use made of the lessons devised is monitored and that, if successful, similar approaches are adopted with other high profile science missions. (Paragraph 100)

The Government welcomes the Committee's endorsement of the use of Beagle in science education. It will monitor and evaluate on a best-effort basis the use made of the lessons devised. It agrees that similar approaches could be used for other high-profile missions, and indeed new educational resources linking the Cassini-Huygens mission to schools' curriculum—and funded by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES)—have just been released by BNSC and by PPARC. Government is also pleased to announce that the DfES has recently joined the British National Space Centre partnership, with the expectation that space can be linked better to school education at policy and delivery levels, and that there will be a strategic framework including stakeholder organisations (Science Learning Centres, learned societies, etc) for further developments in this area.

14. We welcome the UK's full participation in the preparatory phase of ESA's Aurora space exploration programme. We hope that this engagement at the outset will help the UK shape the content of the programme and gain substantially from it in terms of industrial and academic participation. In view of wider considerations relating to the educational, industrial and science in society agenda, we believe that Government, not just PPARC, should ensure that UK plc is in a position to build on the scientific base established by the Beagle team and to support participation in future planetary exploration missions, on a well defined multinational basis. OST and DTI should examine the case for UK participation from the point of view of their different objectives and provide the appropriate support, to add to that of PPARC, in a co-ordinated way. (Paragraph 109)

Turning to the future, PPARC announced on 1 October its decision to invest £5.0m in planetary exploration, comprising of £3.5m in the preparatory phase of ESA's 'Aurora' programme, supported by an additional £1.5m in national work. This decision followed a detailed process of consultation with the UK planetary science, other interested research communities and the UK space industry on the UK's science and technology priorities. This contribution will make the UK the second largest contributor to the programme, thus precisely meeting the Committee's stated goal that future missions should be managed by ESA with strong UK participation. Moreover, it will allow the UK properly to evaluate the benefits and risks of the programme before any commitment to full funding is made. Given the likely timing of a decision on implementing the Aurora programme PPARC has also prepared, in the context of SR2004, an estimate of the likely cost of the UK achieving leadership in the programme.

The Committee suggests that in view of wider considerations relating to the educational, industrial and science in society agenda, the Government and not just PPARC, should ensure that UK plc is in a position to build on the scientific base established by the Beagle team and to support participation in future planetary exploration missions, on a well defined multinational basis.

The OST is responsible for distribution of the science budget and normally works with and through bodies such as PPARC to deliver outputs such as research and ensuring that UK plc is in a position to build on the research funded through the budget. In keeping with this approach, PPARC is taking two actions. First, PPARC is setting up a national Aurora Advisory Committee to provide detailed advice in assigning priorities to the UK's involvement in the preparatory phase of the ESA programme. In particular, it will guide the UK's interaction with the ESA Aurora Board of Participants, which is the delegate management committee. The Aurora Advisory Committee (AurAC) will be chaired by Dr Mark Sims of Leicester University. Dr Sims was the Mission Manager of Beagle 2. The membership will be selected by agreement with the Chair and will be drawn from both academia and industry. The focus of this group will thus be on maximizing the UK's influence in the ESA programme and the return to be obtained from PPARC's investment. For its part, DTI has developed and launched a Technology Strategy to be implemented through a new Technology Board which will assign priorities and funding to priority technology areas.

Secondly, an ad hoc Planetary Exploration Assessment Group will be created comprising representatives of all the potentially interested Research Councils; government partners plus the Chair of AurAC. This will be tasked with documenting and assessing the range of benefits that could be obtained from full participation in implementing a programme of planetary exploration. This Group will build on the cross-research council consultation exercise carried out by PPARC in 2004. It will take evidence from all interested external individuals and organizations and assist in providing advice to Ministers on whether such a programme should be supported by the UK.

In order to support the decision process, DTI is providing funds to undertake a systematic assessment of the opportunities for the UK in the exploitation of technology from a planetary exploration programme into non-space applications. Possibilities in areas such as healthcare and security are foreseen and the results of this study will be available within a few months.

15. The decision not to publish Commission of Inquiry's report in full was based on the sensitivities of the parties involved rather than any convincing legal or commercial considerations. This is an affront to accountability. We recommend that the full report be published without delay. (Paragraph 116)

The report was always seen by BNSC and ESA as an internal inquiry. Its purpose was to learn lessons for the future. There were also concerns about the confidentiality of commercial information. The organisations involved were given a strong indication that the information they supplied was only for the use of the inquiry. For these reasons the report was not published. ESA and the UK did however think it right that the recommendations of the report should be published as these covered the most important issues. The Science and Technology Select Committee was also confidentially given a copy of the full report. Subsequently, in view of the Committee's strongly held view that the report should be published in full, we have discussed the issue again with ESA and have persuaded them that the report should be published. We have also had further discussions with the other organisations involved about now publishing the report and they are aware that the report is being published today. The contents of the report have not been agreed with the parties.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Government appreciates the recognition given by the Committee of the efforts by all concerned to make a success of the project. We affirm that substantial benefits have been secured in positioning the UK to participate in future planetary exploration; in strengthening links between the academic and industrial communities; and in connecting the UK's science community with the wider society. In its report, the Committee raised important funding and management issues. The Government believes that these have not only been recognised but are already acted upon in the preparation of major space science projects.

February 2005


 
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