Appendix 2
Response from the European Space Agency
INTRODUCTION
ESA takes note with satisfaction of the general conclusions
of the House of Common Select Committee on Science and Technology,
as expressed in paragraph 119, and recommendations 18, 19, 20,
22, and associates itself in praising the UK Minister for having
given a rare example of keen interest and enthusiasm, which on
this occasion, unfortunately, met with adverse fortune.
I. In particular 22 of the report, welcoming the
UK's full participation in the preparatory phase of ESA's Aurora
space exploration, is seen by ESA with particular satisfaction,
hopefully setting an authoritative example for the yet undecided
ESA Member States.
II. ESA feels that recommendation 22 is based on
the various benefits produced by the Beagle 2 project, in spite
of its failure. These benefits are listed in detail by the Select
Committee and expressively summarised in the statement that "the
high public profile and ambitious nature of the Beagle 2 project
is likely to have generated an interest in science that countless
Research Council programmes could never match"(99). They
range from benefits to UK science and industry, by giving the
UK Government a head start in Aurora, to benefits to the public
understanding of space and education (96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
106).
III. While being sincerely happy that the benefits
noted in (II) above are recognised, ESA notes that most are direct
benefits for the UK and only indirect for Europe. ESA believes
that much was grounded in the fact that Beagle 2 was clearly labeled
as a UK enterprise, led by a Briton, Professor Pillinger, whose
talents as a scientist merge with equally outstanding talents
in communicating with the general public.
IV. ESA agrees that Beagle 2 was worth doing in spite
of its failure, but feels that the report discounts the fact that
most of the direct benefits to the UK were due to the unorthodox
way Beagle 2 was implemented. The Select Committee's recommendations,
if in place before the fact, would have led to the elimination
of most of the UK-specific benefits listed by the report. They
would also have been likely to lead to an early exclusion of Beagle
2 from the Mars Express programme.
V. Many statements in the report, which are negative
toward ESA, seem to be based on not taking account of two facts
which, unfortunately, seem not to have been explained to the Select
Committee:
i. Beagle 2 was never accepted by SPC as more
than a valuable complement to the core payload. It thus could
not have been a first priority element of the mission. The 1997
Mars Express Science Management Plan, which was agreed by the
SPC, states on page 1, in bold characters:
"The
Mars Express Orbiter spacecraft represents the core of the mission,
being scientifically justified on its own investigations such
as high-resolution imaging and mineralogical mapping of the surface,
radar sounding of the subsurface structure down to the permafrost,
precise determination of the atmospheric circulation and composition,
and study of the interaction of the atmosphere with the interplanetary
medium, while the Lander Modules are considered a very valuable
complement to the mission".
ii. Beagle 2 was only a small part of the overall
responsibility of ESA SPC at the time (see also VI below).
The report gives the impression of there being only
three players or groups of players, i.e. the Beagle 2 consortium,
the UK Government, and the ESA Executive (with an infinite reserve
of money). In fact, the ESA Science Programme had limited resources
and a multi-project plan to run, in which additional resources
to Beagle would have meant less resources to other, equally or
more important instruments, and less resources to other, equally
or more important missions.
There are two other statements by the Select Committee
report that seem to ESA misinformed:
" 26. After the failure of the Mars 96 mission,
ESA was in need of a success".
At the time ESA projects like the Infrared Space
Observatory (ISO), Ulysses, the Hubble Space Telescope and SOHO
were producing data, images and concepts which will stay with
us and are seen as successes by all observers. The failure of
Mars 96, being a Russian (or originally, a Soviet) mission, there
was no reason for ESA to feel implicated. While proposing a re-flight
of the European Mars 96 instruments, ESA wished to give a second
chance to scientists who, against the advice of ESA, had dedicated
years of work to put a payload on a Russian mission, which eventually
had let them down. The decision to fly Mars Express took place
in 1998-1999, by which time XMM and Cluster II were nearing launch,
ISO had terminated its record-breaking mission and Hipparcos had
produced its unique catalogue.
"117. ….ESA saw the Lander as a means of
enlivening an otherwise unambitious mission to Mars…".
This remark shows a regrettable failure to explain
to the Select Committee the remarkable technical and scientific
successes of the Mars Express mission. The unique 3-D images taken
with the (German) High Resolution Stereo Colour Camera alone show
that the statement in 117 is without foundation. Moreover, at
the time of the Mars Express conception, not even 50% of Mars
missions had achieved their objective. Therefore any Mars
mission was (and is) ambitious. In addition Mars Express was to
be one of the very few examples of cheaper-faster-better missions,
a catchword which was invented in the US, but whose most successful
application was with Mars Express in Europe.
VI. The Select Committee report candidly admits that,
had the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry already been
in place, Beagle 2 would not have made it on board the Orbiter
(83). Also, the reports recognises that when resources were not
forthcoming (recommendation 4), milestones were not met, tests
were not made (recommendation 6), recommendations made by reviews
were not implemented (recommendation 13 and 14), ESA made all
sort of exceptions in favour of Beagle 2 (in fact more than for
any other instrument). These exceptions would never have been
made, were it not for the personality of Professor Pillinger,
the interest of the UK Government (unparalleled in any Member
State), and the consensus wish of the SPC to take a success-oriented
decision for a worthy cause, with the UK bearing a large portion
of the cost. The gradual increase of support by the UK Government
was instrumental in obtaining a parallel, gradual increase of
support by the SPC.
Within this context, the Agency felt that it was
appropriate to make exceptions, and—if appropriate—it
might make exceptions again in the future. Ultimately, this concept
seems to be shared also by the Committee (83).
However, ESA does not accept that it could have tried
harder to persuade the Member States to provide the necessary
support once the Lander started to experience difficulties (83).
It is unfortunate that the point was not clearly made to the Committee,
that the SPC had wider responsibilities, namely to run a programme
which contained many missions and safeguard the interests of many
communities. The introduction of Mars Express, as mentioned also
in the Select Committee Report (25), was seen with displeasure
especially by the astronomical community even in the UK, and could
be obtained only by putting a remarkably low ceiling (150 M€)
to the costs. Secondly, the mission was clearly identified from
the start mainly as an Orbiter. Landers were almost immediately
excluded and then re-introduced in the mission (as nice-to-have)
under the assumptions that they would be financed by National
Agencies. Professor Southwood (46) tried to explain the difficulty
of requesting more money to an SPC, which thought that the maximum
had already been done for Mars Express. Had the SPC then turned
down such a proposal, that would have been the end for Beagle
2, as normally one must wait one year before presenting again
the same proposal to the SPC.
ESA is convinced that the request to provide more
support would have rendered the elimination of the Lander inevitable,
if the SPC was the only recourse. Since Beagle 2, this is exactly
what has happened with ESA's Mercury Lander, whose elimination
in 2003, long before the start of the implementation of the mission
(2005), many still regret. The elimination of the BepiColombo
Lander also indicates that lessons are quickly learned by ESA.
RESPONSES TO RECOMMENDATIONS
On the basis of this introduction, it becomes easier
to comment/respond to the various recommendations.
1. We welcome the establishment in the 2004 Spending
Review of a strategic fund to be allocated by the DGRC but are
not persuaded that it will rectify the serious weaknesses which
the Beagle 2 project highlighted in the Government's capacity
to respond to sudden demand. In the absence of other funding streams
to cater for such demand, we recommend that the Government considers
earmarking this fund primarily for major projects and facilities.
(Paragraph 33)
ESA need not comment.
2. BNSC was ill-advised to rely upon ESA to bail
out the project if it ran out of money rather than seeking to
establish with ESA and others firmer financial arrangements at
the outset. (Paragraph 37)
The difficulties explained in (V, i and ii), and
clearly not properly presented to the Select Committee, indicate
why, although the hope was there (37), the ESA Executive could
not have asked the SPC too soon for funds, because such a request
would have led to the immediate exclusion of Beagle 2.
That the hope of BNSC was well grounded is clear
from the subsequent facts, i.e. the large amount of funds for
Beagle voted by a large majority of Member States.
In conclusion, BNSC was not ill advised to rely upon
ESA, and both ESA and BNSC proceeded in the most logical way to
make sure that Beagle 2 would fly, thanks to funds to be granted
by the SPC.
The need for early firm financial arrangements is
recognised by ESA, also because the situation with payload funding
is deteriorating. New procedures have been explored and implemented
already for the provision of the Medium InfraRed Instrument (MIRI)
for JWST and might well become the norm for complex payloads on
ESA missions.
3. We commend the Government, and in particular
the Minister for Science and Innovation, for being enthusiastic
about the Beagle 2 project. It was an exciting scientific opportunity
with the potential to put the UK at the forefront of space exploration.
The Government should not be shy about taking risks in science
if the potential benefits are there. In our view, this was a risk
worth taking. Having taken this decision, it was then up to the
Government to fund it properly. (Paragraph 39)
ESA joins the praise to the UK Government.
4. The UK Government gave the Beagle 2 project
moral support but initially took on as little financial responsibility
as it could to ensure that the lander was not thrown off the Mars
Express mission. The absence of a commitment from the Government
at the outset to provide the necessary funding to support the
project in full made it less credible in the eyes of ESA and its
Member States, not to mention potential backers of the project,
the UK scientific community and the public. (Paragraph 45)
This recommendation agrees with recommendation 3
of the Joint ESA-UK Government Inquiry Commission.
5. The ESA leadership responded positively and
flexibly in 2000 to the financial difficulties in which the Beagle
2 team found itself and helped to keep the project alive. However,
there appears to have been a latent resistance among Member States
to the British-led lander, no doubt in part due to a perception
that this was an exercise in promoting UK national scientific
interests. This made it difficult for the ESA secretariat to push
for more funds when the project met further difficulties, although
we are not persuaded that every effort was made on this front.
(Paragraph 50)
In ESA's opinion, this statement is not borne out
by facts. There was indeed a limit in how far the SPC (Member
States) would sacrifice resources, which should be used for "core-mission"
instruments, in favour what was declared a "very valuable
complement" (see V above), i.e. the Lander. The nationality
of the Lander leadership is not the point, as exactly the same
reluctance would have been found whoever had led the Lander. The
grounds of the "latent resistance" were technical and
scientific, not political. It should be added that what resistance
there was, was very latent indeed. No instrument on Mars Express
got anything resembling the financial and in-kind support Beagle
got.
It may be added that the statements made by the Space
Science Advisory Committee (the highest Science Advisory Committee
of ESA) strongly supported Beagle 2 throughout its history. The
main concerns raised at the SPC were:
- the uncertainties in the external
(sponsorship) funding aspects;
- apparent absence of a firm and secured funding
commitment from the UK government side.
This unusual way of running a project having obvious
technical and schedule constraints was the main concern at the
SPC. In an extraordinary SPC meeting held on 13th November
2000 mechanisms for the participation of the European Scientific
Community, Communications/Outreach, Industrial Participation,
Increased Oversight role by ESA and Recompense to the ESA Scientific
Programme were agreed upon. After this the SPC approved with 11
votes for and only one vote against (2 abstentions) the extra
support to be given to the project. This was an unusually strong
support for this type of case. The leadership of the UK was never
questioned or objected to in the discussions at the SPC.
6. The failure of the project's backers to provide
the necessary funding for full testing had a major impact on the
ability of the project team to mitigate risks, delaying development
and testing until less than two years before the final launch
date. It added significantly to the risks already associated with
the project. (Paragraph 54)
This recommendation agrees with recommendations 13
and 14 of the Joint ESA-UK Inquiry Commission. In addition it
explicitly refers to recommendation 19 of the same Commission.
It can be added that due to loss of time at the beginning
of the Lander project, the model philosophy and the test programme
changed many times and were driven more by 'time available' than
by the actual need for comprehensive testing. Necessary tests
were spread over several models preventing the team from working
with a single test model having consistently undergone fundamental
test activities.
7. We conclude that the pursuit of sponsorship
income was an innovative and necessary attempt to meet the funding
gaps which were evident in the programme from an early stage.
But it did nothing to encourage a realistic assessment of the
risks of the project or an open dialogue between participants.
It also affected the credibility of the project, which had an
impact on the degree of support for it in some quarters. Whilst
in the right circumstances there may be a place for commercial
sponsorship in such missions, we believe that in this case the
DTI should have been focussing its efforts on finding sufficient
funding for the project rather than relying upon the securing
of commercial sponsorship. We recommend that in future the DTI
is extremely cautious about part-funding projects which are reliant
to a significant degree on the future attraction of commercial
sponsorship. At the very least, DTI needs to satisfy itself of
the availability of sufficient funding in the event that commercial
avenues prove unproductive. (Paragraph 59)
ESA fully agrees with the analysis of the difficulties
connected with the pursuit of sponsorship.
This goes with recommendation 3 of the Joint Inquiry
Commission. Sponsors do not wish to be associated with failures,
and would prefer to pay only when success is assured, i.e. at
the end of the mission, with the result that funds could never
be assured at the start of a project.
8. Had a Mars lander been part of the original
mission, and managed by ESA, we suspect that it would have been
given a priority commensurate with its potential scientific output,
with mass levels tailored accordingly to give it a greater chance
of success. (Paragraph 65)
As was pointed out above (V), since the formulation
of the Science Management Plan (SMP) in 1997, at the outset the
Mars Lander was no more than a "very valuable complement".
The SMP is agreed by SPC collectively and then sets the perspective
for the development by the Executive.
The original Beagle 2 proposal was for a 120 kg plus
margins Lander, which led to its initial rejection by the original
Peer Review Committee recommendation. Beagle 2 was then re-proposed
with a mass of 60 kg as an answer to the second AO and was selected.
However, it was considered and accepted as an "opportunity"
element of the mission having strict resource limitations partially
due to its late selection, but also due to the special nature
of being carried as a free flyer to Mars and released before the
orbit insertion. Since Beagle 2 was not part of the original mission
and not originally managed by ESA, responding to this recommendation
requires a lot of background assumptions on what resource scenario
is envisaged.
Once selected, Beagle 2 became one of the elements
of the payload. From the project point of view it was entitled
to the resources as announced in the July 1998 AO. In reality,
the support and help during development went well beyond that
for other instruments running into difficulties during development.
The Beagle 2 team exceeded their mass constraints from the beginning.
It must be noted that the Mars Express project was mass critical
in itself and all requests for mass increases had to be scrutinised,
also the ones from the payload, and sometimes resulted in rejection.
For instance, a much-needed ultra-stable oscillator critical to
the radio science team could not be approved. A particularly critical
aspect of a Beagle 2 mass increase was its consequential need
for higher in-flight ejection accuracy from the orbiter. ESA insisted
that, prior to agreeing the mass waiver, the Beagle 2 team demonstrate
the ability of the Lander to survive the entry phase with the
higher mass.
In summary: the Mars Lander never was an essential
("core") part of the mission and was not originally
managed by ESA. In spite of that, Beagle 2 got more support than
any other elements of the payload. Had it been part of the original
mission and managed by ESA, and had it met with even a modest
portion of the difficulties it actually met, it would have never
made it on board the orbiter.
9. Given the importance of the interface between
lander and orbiter and the importance of the former to the mission
as a whole, it was remiss of ESA not to ensure that it had the
role of at least a close observer from the outset of the Beagle
2 project. (Paragraph 66)
ESA had to adopt new management schemes to ensure
that the total cost of Mars Express did not exceed the tight budget
limitation imposed at the outset of the project. One of the cost-saving
measures was the transfer of the management of the interfaces
between spacecraft and PI-provided hardware to Astrium SAS, France.
In hindsight, it is generally accepted that this was a good decision
and it worked well with all other instruments. In line with the
AO, ESA treated Beagle 2 like all other instruments, applying
a traditional cycle of regular meetings, reviews during development,
and testing prior to final delivery.
10. It is extremely disappointing that ESA, the
UK Government and the project team were unable to co-operate in
such a manner as to give the lander the maximum possible chance
of success. We believe that both the Beagle 2 project team and
the UK Government should have done more to persuade ESA to take
greater responsibility for managing the lander project, if necessary,
at the expense of some UK ownership. For its part, ESA should
not have been influenced so much by the apparent attraction of
getting a lander for free, albeit at the expense of European ownership.
It should now recognise that this was a mistake and ensure that
it takes full management responsibility for similar future missions.
(Paragraph 69)
Substantially, this recommendation echoes recommendation
1 of the Joint Commission of Enquiry. In the precise case of Mars
Express, in consideration of everything that has been said above
about the lack of priority of the Landers and the scarcity of
resources, it is a safe assumption that, with these constraints,
the Lander would have been eliminated as soon as problems appeared,
as was the fate of the Mercury Lander.
In ESA's view, the Mars Lander was given maximum
chances of success within the given constraints precisely because
of the cooperation between ESA, the UK Government and the project
team, as the only possibility for ESA to have a Lander on Mars
Express was to have it—at least nominally—for free
(see also VI).
11. Had ESA implemented the lesson of earlier
failed missions on the importance of communication between lander
and orbiter, it would have secured a vast amount of information
which could have been used to help establish what happened to
the lander and therefore to reduce the risk of future failures.
It is a pity that this lesson had not been learned from two previous
missions. (Paragraph 70)
There were no lessons to be learned from the two
missions cited in the text (70). The Mars Climate Orbiter was
destroyed in the Martian atmosphere due to well-known reasons,
i.e. the confusion between centimetres and inches in the manufacturing
process, which led to an erroneous (too low) altitude at the Mars
orbit insertion.
The intended reference probably is the Mars Polar
Lander mission, which a few months later was destroyed during
its descent process. The landing was done without telecommunication
capability to any orbiting spacecraft. As a consequence, the understanding
of the failure in descent was left without a clear data support.
This happened in late 1999, with the report made in 2000, too
late to utilise any "lessons learned" aspect in the
Beagle 2 design. Mars 96 had two Landers and two large penetrators
onboard. None of these had descent phase telecommunication capability.
However since the entire mission never left Earth orbit due to
a malfunctioning of the launcher final stage, the landing on Mars
was never tested, which means that no data were available to learn
any lessons in this case.
However, lessons have been learned in Europe (and
outside), albeit not already for Beagle 2. All Landers since the
failure of the Mars Polar Lander have been equipped with descent
phase telecommunication capability. The now cancelled (French)
NetLanders, which can be considered as sisters to the Beagle 2,
as they originated from the Mars Express AO, were designed to
give information of progress during descent phase. The same is
true with the two NASA Mars Exploration Rovers successfully landed
on Mars in early 2004.
ESA asserts that lessons have been learned and taken
into account in later missions, but for ESA it was too late to
start implementing any changes in the Mars Express Orbiter design
in year 2000.
12. The project went well beyond the normal scope
of the work of a Principal Investigator. The consortium leadership
was understandably keen to maintain control over what was very
much the team's own initiative, which was pursued with admirable
determination and considerable success. The team was perhaps unduly
reluctant to accept that the project as a whole may have benefited
from greater involvement from ESA, which could have provided it
with the necessary financial resources. It was the absence of
the guaranteed funding that made a formal agreement between participating
parties difficult to achieve. This in turn was a fundamental weakness
in the project management. (Paragraph 75)
ESA agrees that the work of PI's in general is getting
more and more complex. Early PI's could afford to be simply scientists.
Now PI's are distracted from the scientific-technical aspects,
because they must also manage large consortia and look for resources.
Some years ago ESA requested the introduction of an Instrument
Manager in each team to take care of certain aspects. Other measures
are being introduced.
However one should note that the Beagle 2 Management
Plan, submitted as part of their July 1998-proposal for a 60 kg
Lander undoubtedly addressed the issue by exhibiting a functional
breakdown for Beagle 2 exactly similar to those of a spacecraft
project.
An additional fundamental problem was the withdrawal
of a key industrial partner responsible for the EDLS design and
manufacturing. These types of problems are typically encountered
at the system level, not at PI level. Furthermore the Assembly
Integration and Verification (AIV), was far beyond what a typical
PI (and even a project manager) can manage and control. Hence,
taking into account the extreme schedule pressure, the team can
only be admired and congratulated for their achievements.
"The absence of guaranteed funding [and of a]
formal agreement ….was a fundamental weakness in the project
management."(Paragraph 75)
This remark is acknowledged and the lesson was learned.
New procedures are being implemented since early 2003 to ensure
more robustness in funding through formal agreements. BNSC was
in the front line in implementing such a new policy with the European
Medium InfraRed Instrument (MIRI) for the James Webb Space Telescope.
The same policy is expected to be applied to all future missions
with PI instruments.
13. The establishment of the Casani review was
a useful means of gaining an independent assessment of the project.
Having commissioned it, ESA should have taken greater responsibility
for implementing the most important of its recommendations in
full. (Paragraph 79)
In its recommendation 5, the Joint Commission of
Inquiry report reaches the same conclusion, as mentioned in paragraph
79.
14. For far too long the Government failed to
ensure that the nature and extent of the risks were identified
accurately so that the funding necessary to help mitigate those
risks as far as possible could be provided. The failure by all
parties to establish at the outset some quite basic elements of
cost attribution accentuated funding difficulties. Once they became
financially committed, both the Government and ESA took steps
to monitor the project, but neither was willing or able to ensure
that the recommendations of their various reviews were fully implemented.
(Paragraph 88)
Recommendation 4 of the Joint Commission of Inquiry
goes in the same direction, as well as recommendation 2, as noted
in paragraph 82.
It can be added that ESA applied a traditional review
process on Beagle 2, very similar to the one for the other newly
developed instruments on Mars Express. Identified discrepancies
were listed and tracked in the overall project database. The closeout
of Beagle related actions probably took longer than usual due
to the longer-than-usual lasting design instability on Beagle
2. The restrictions imposed by access to ITAR regulated documentation
and documents considered by the Beagle team sensitive for future
business development, did not make it easier to achieve a timely
close out of open issues.
15. Relations between ESA and the UK side were
strained by different attitudes towards the lander. Professor
Southwood clearly had very strong doubts about the lander's chances
of success. He should have made these reservations clear—formally—in
order that they could be addressed. (Paragraph 91)
There is no indication that relations were unusually
strained. Some strain is certainly present when one side is bound
by certain constraints of mass and cost, while the other side
would be much more comfortable if they could be alleviated. However,
this situation reproduces itself with increasing frequency with
ESA missions, because the cost of payloads increases while national
resources tend to decrease. ESA is fully aware of the situation
(as the new policy put into place for MIRI-JWST and other missions
demonstrates) and, beyond some necessary formal statements, is
always ready to help, as amply demonstrated in the Beagle 2 story.
For example, when discussing the Beagle 2 partnership
at the SPC on 13th November 2000 the Programme Director
(at that time Professor R. Bonnet) stated very clearly: "If
the Agency did not step in, Beagle 2 had no chance." "If
the Executive was not absolutely sure that Beagle 2 could be saved
given the necessary resources, the present discussion would not
be taking place." "Every effort would be made to ensure
that the project was a success." "Commitments to that
end had been made at the highest level by the Agency and the UK."
After these clear and forceful statements by the Programme Director,
the SPC decided to give strong support to this approach, as indicated
above in the response to recommendation 5.
Paragraph 118 and recommendation 16 unequivocally
state that the decision to proceed in 2001 was the right one.
Professor Southwood, who became Director of the Science Programme
on 1 May 2001, saw a high-risk situation, in which however the
cancellation of the Lander was no longer a realistic option. Thus,
he took all available action to mitigate the risks. This lead
to the negotiation of the formal Heads of Agreement and to a situation
which allayed most doubts he had.
The question recommendation 15 raises is whether
any advantages would have resulted, had he made his reservations
clear—formally. ESA's opinion is that this would only have
added one more risk, i.e. that the UK side could have cancelled
the Lander. This would have been the wrong decision to take, as
long as (1) risk-mitigating actions could be taken and (2) resources
could be injected into the project.
16. By failing to subject the lander to sufficiently
rigorous scrutiny in its early stages and to provide the necessary
support, ESA and the UK Government left themselves with few options
when the project ran into serious problems. The decision to allow
the lander to proceed in 2001 was the right one. It was also the
only one realistically available. (Paragraph 94)
ESA applied the same review cycle to Beagle 2 as
to the other new instruments. ESA and industry reviewed the interfaces
to the orbiter and a rolling science review team, chaired by the
ESA Project Scientist, reviewed the payload. As the record shows,
deficiencies and design weaknesses were identified and the Beagle
2 team was tasked with the implementation of corrective actions.
As is usual in complex space systems, the resolution of one problem
requires design stability for other elements. Due to schedule
criticality and design changes, such a situation was hardly ever
achieved on Beagle. For instance, the close out of the recommendations
and actions of the Critical Design Review lasted about a year,
compared with typically 'weeks' for the other instruments.
17. ESA was not a disinterested carrier of a foreign
enterprise. ESA had called for proposals for Mars landers in 1997
and selected Beagle 2, in preference to two other bids, in 1998.
It had allowed the project to proceed when it failed to meet key
milestones and had stepped in to provide funding when the project
was in trouble. It was part of the project. It cannot dissociate
itself from the fate of the lander after the event. We commend
Professor Pillinger and his team for the enthusiasm with which
they conceived and pursued the project. For the sake of future
space programmes, however, they should also learn the management
lessons laid bare by Beagle 2. (Paragraph 95)
ESA tried to help wherever feasible by, for instance,
co-locating an experienced mechanical engineer at Astrium Ltd.
Three more engineers supported the Beagle 2 team on a full time
basis. The ESA Project Manager and Project Controller spent a
significant part of their time dealing with Beagle contractual
issues. Given a 10-strong ESA Mars Express team, ESA can hardly
be accused of lack of interest.
The selection process of Beagle 2 was not as simple
and straightforward as stated in recommendation 17. The original
Announcement of Opportunity for the Mars Express Mission was released
on 3rd December 1997. In spring 1998 the Peer Review
Committee recommended that no Lander Modules should be flown in
the present Mars Express mission. Later it was found out that
the mission could accommodate a single 60 kg Lander. A specific
AO was released in summer 1998, which led to the proposing of
a new Beagle 2 concept (shrunk by half in mass). The concept was
approved by the SPC conditionally until the end of Phase B (end
of 1999). In Nov 1999, after considering carefully the technical
and financial implications of the project, the SPC reconfirmed
Beagle 2 for flight.
ESA fails to understand the meaning of this statement.
All the efforts listed above, together with the decision of extra
funding for the Beagle 2 project, which was done at the expense
of the other Science projects, demonstrate that ESA, and especially
the SPC, shares the disappointment of this loss and, especially,
the loss in the excellent and promising science which really was
the main driver behind all Beagle 2 support decisions.
On the other hand ESA shares the benefits, e.g. development
of new technologies and progress in public understanding of space,
which resulted from the Beagle 2 enterprise.
18. We welcome the fact that the Government recognised
the wider benefits of Beagle 2 in citing public understanding
of science goals as one of the factors contributing to its support
for the project. (Paragraph 98)
No ESA comment needed.
19. We recommend that in future decisions on support
for collaborative and UK-led projects the Government sets out
the weight it assigns to the wider public benefits as well as
the economic analysis. (Paragraph 99)
No ESA comment needed.
20. We commend the efforts of the Government and
others to use the Beagle 2 project as a tool for science education.
We recommend that the use made of the lessons devised is monitored
and that, if successful, similar approaches are adopted with other
high profile science missions. (Paragraph 100)
No ESA comment needed.
21. We hope that the uneasy relationship the Beagle
2 consortium had with ESA does not colour ESA's view of the desirability
of future collaboration. (Paragraph 107)
ESA wants it to be understood that the "uneasy
relationship" of the Beagle consortium with ESA is regularly
reproduced with almost every payload on almost every scientific
mission. Actually, ESA is surprised that the Select Committee
felt the need to make an official plea asking that the "uneasy
relationship" should not colour ESA's view of desirability
of future collaborations, as there is no case on record in
which ESA ostracised any scientist or consortia.
22. We welcome the UK's full participation in
the preparatory phase of ESA's Aurora space exploration programme.
We hope that this engagement at the outset will help the UK shape
the content of the programme and gain substantially from it in
terms of industrial and academic participation. In view of wider
considerations relating to the educational, industrial and science
in society agenda, we believe that Government, not just PPARC,
should ensure that UK plc is in a position to build on the scientific
base established by the Beagle team and to support participation
in future planetary exploration missions, on a well defined multinational
basis. OST and DTI should examine the case for UK participation
from the point of view of their different objectives and provide
the appropriate support, to add to that of PPARC, in a co-ordinated
way. (Paragraph 109)
See (I).
23. The decision not to publish Commission of
Inquiry's report in full was based on the sensitivities of the
parties involved rather than any convincing legal or commercial
considerations. This is an affront to accountability. We recommend
that the full report be published without delay. (Paragraph 116)
In conclusion, ESA has felt the need to set the record
straight for the history of a project where new policies had to
be invented from day to day to solve the contrast between accepted
paradigms and a new, rapidly evolving situation, under tough constraints
of time and resources. It should be clear, however, that ESA also
appreciates the interest Select Committee itself, the thoroughness
of its study and above all the positive recommendations it made.
January 2005
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