Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160
- 179)
MONDAY 20 DECEMBER 2004
PROFESSOR RICHARD
A FLAVELL AND
SIR PAUL
NURSE
Q160 Dr Iddon: I have one final question
to put to both of you. Do you think that the Task Force should
have been able to consider the Mill Hill Step Change Option which
has been produced now or is it the job of the MRC to consider
it?
Sir Paul Nurse: The Task Force
was set up with a prescribed role. It was advising the MRC. It
is the MRC whose job it is to sort all of this out, so it is up
to the MRC what they do. You could say that it is such a politically
complicated issue that it might be politically expedient to involve
the Task Force more in the future. I think that should be given
consideration because everything is turning into such a mess,
but constitutionally, in how it was set up, the Task Force has
essentially done its business and it is now up to the MRC. I think
the MRC could reconvene the Task Force to try and see whether
we could find a way through it but that would be more a political
consideration than anything that it would absolutely have to do.
Q161 Dr Iddon: Professor Flavell,
on the Step Change Option please?
Professor Flavell: Could you please
define "the Step Change Option" so I make sure I am
responding to the right question?
Q162 Dr Iddon: My understanding is
that Mill Hill have put a fairly substantial bid together, which
they call the Step Change Option, which they would like to see
considered with the two London options. Possibly you are not aware
of it; I do not know.
Professor Flavell: I do not know
the particular term. There have been several options proposed
for Mill Hill of various costs. Let us put that aside for the
moment Give me your question again and I will answer it.
Q163 Dr Iddon: Do you think that
the Task Force should have been able to consider the Mill Hill
Step Change Option now produced, or is that better left to the
MRC Council?
Professor Flavell: I think that
it would benefit the Council greatly to utilise the Task Force.
I think it would be in its interests to do that because it is
a pretty unbiased group. I think the workings of the Task Force
have shown it to be able to function, to develop consensus, starting
with a group of people who had very different positions. We had
people in the beginning who wanted to close Mill Hill down, like
Steve Tomlinson, who was a very flexible person. He developed
different views when he heard the evidence, so I think it would
be of substantial benefit to the Council to do that, but, of course,
that is their decision. I would completely stand by any decision
they make on that point.
Q164 Mr McWalter: Professor Flavell,
you have just referred to some matters to do with costs. Steve
Gamblin said that the likely financial implications of the two
central London options that appeared in the final Task Force report
were only available to the Task Force a matter of days before
the completion deadline and were added to the report rather than
being part of the decision-making process. Would you agree that
the Task Force did not give full consideration to the financial
implications of the two London bids before reaching a decision
to exclude Mill Hill as an option?
Professor Flavell: I think that
is true for many reasons. I am sure we do not really know the
cost now of the central London options because they are complex,
and I do not think we had sufficient information and so therefore
cost was not sufficiently considered by us in our deliberations.
That is at least my opinion. It was considered so it is not that
there was no discussion about it, but I do not think we did an
adequate job of doing that.
Q165 Mr McWalter: Professor Nurse?
Sir Paul Nurse: We did not do
a proper job on costings, nor could we have done, to be quite
honest. Both costings to my knowledge are not yet together. My
view on the costing was that in the long run, over 50-70 years,
the differences in costs between Mill Hill and central London
were not going to be very different, and so we should be driven
more by the science and by where better things could be achieved.
I also thought that if there was a strong vision, which I think
there is, the money would be found because we had many years in
which to find it, so for me the costs became somewhat less important.
We did not discuss them in detail. It is very difficult because
there is a lot of chalk and cheese you have to compare here. Mill
Hill is different from central London in how it would be set up.
It could even take many months from now before we are fully aware
of the costs, but there can be too much focus on the building
costs. When you spread it over 50 years it becomes much less important.
I kept emphasising that during the Task Force, that this was a
decision for 50 years and we should not be influenced too much
by the short term costs of building.
Mr McWalter: Thank you, Chairman.
Q166 Dr Harris: I want to go back
to the question asked by Robert Key about the role of the Chairman
because some comment was made about whether it was appropriate
for the Chairman to be on the Task Force and I think that was
a decision the Task Force was presented with by the Council and
that he was involved in exerting some pressure, although neither
of you described it as coercion. Looking at it as objectively
as you can, do you consider in retrospect the actions he took
to be unreasonable because too much emotion and time was invested
or would you say that as a Chief Executive of a large organisation
who was under pressure on a contentious issue it was appropriate
to work behind the scenes to try and get consensus, even if that
meant putting pressure on?
Sir Paul Nurse: We put Colin in
a very difficult position as both CEO and Chairman of the Task
Force. It was very difficult for him to act in both roles. I did
not realise this at the beginning but as it went forward I really
felt sorry for the position he had. I have learnt something from
this and that is that I think in the future where one has a major
investigation of this sort probably the CEO should be kept separate
and then the Task Force could report to the CEO, otherwise it
is a bit of a mixture of roles. I think Colin was put in a very
difficult position and it probably was not ideal, but I do not
think anybody really fully realised that when the whole thing
was set up.
Q167 Dr Harris: Professor Flavell,
do you think anyone could have done a better or different job
in that position?
Professor Flavell: I think in
many ways Colin did a very good job. He started the process with
an open mind. He had a skilful handling of the meetings with regard
to the development of consensus. It was a terribly difficult job.
I told him after the event, which is not very useful, that I thought
it would have been better had he not been Chairman, but he pointed
out to me that that was in fact determined by the Council prior
to all of these things, so that was really not a negotiable item.
I think he should have realised—and this is easy to say
at a distance perhaps and not so easy when you are in the midst
of it—that when you are a Chief Executive of an organisation
and you are talking to one of your staff scientists it is very
much a non-equivalent position and that can be extremely intimidating.
I do not think I ever felt intimidated by him but I would imagine
that others may well have done because he is a strong advocate
in certain cases. In many ways, as I said, I think he did a good
job and, given the circumstances, for much of the process I felt
quite satisfied with him.
Q168 Dr Harris: You talked about
sympathy. Do you have sympathy with Dr Lovell-Badge and Dr Gamblin
because it is unusual for staff to be on a Task Force of this
stature? Clearly it could be argued they are in a difficult position
because they had 12 other or so heads of divisions expecting them
to deliver something that they could live with and a Director
who is not backwards in coming forwards with views that are probably
expressed quite clearly. Do you have sympathy with their position?
Do you think that might explain—and it is up to you to agree
this or not—the nature and timing of e-mail correspondence
that kept re-opening something where there was a striving for
consensus prior to those e-mails?
Professor Flavell: Just as Colin
was in a difficult position, I think Steve Gamblin and Robin were
in an impossible position. They were being squeezed from both
directions. I am sure they had pressure from their colleagues
in the sense that there was the expectation that they were to
present their views and they were getting pressure from Colin
in the other direction. I think they were incredibly courageous
raising some of these issues about the process about which they
were uncomfortable with their Chief Executive. I do not know if
I would have had the courage to do it. I admire them very much
for what they did. I think they did it with the best of intentions.
I do not think there is anything malicious about what they have
done. I am sure you will have seen the documentation. There was
an issue about e-mails and how there was an attempt to modify
the text of the document and there was a deadline and there were
some e-mails that were received a minute or two after the deadline
and so on. I think we would have been wise as a Task Force not
to have worried so much about the deadline in order to have a
fair process covered. That is a mistake again we all accept responsibility
for. I could have said something and I did not. There were some
mistakes on all sides.
Q169 Dr Harris: Sir Paul?
Sir Paul Nurse: I think that they
did have a difficult job. I know that they kept themselves away
from all the discussions going on in Mill Hill, that is what they
told me, so that they could keep some sort of level of independence,
but they were under a lot of pressure. We did reach a consensus.
The tragedy here is that I think we could have sorted all of this,
I really believe it. They had signed up to the consensus and I
think it has unravelled because we could not go one step further.
I think they did a very good job in the circumstances. They have
my sympathy just as Colin does as well.
Q170 Dr Turner: I would like to ask
both of you, starting with Paul, about the processes. You have
both hinted that the processes of the Task Force were not perfect.
I would like your view on that. No one has said anything yet about
the role of the consultants serving the Task Force and the presentation
to the Council. Can you comment on those?
Sir Paul Nurse: I felt the consultants
did a reasonable job. It is very consultants' speak of course,
but I thought they did a reasonable job and I have no criticism
of them. As regards the Council, I have had nothing to do with
that, Dick can comment on it as he presented to Council. Part
of the discussions went on with Dick there and part of it without
Dick being there, so we do not have a full view of what happened
there. I have had very little to do with the Council over this
matter so I cannot comment on that. With respect to the process,
we did follow the process in the sense of we had certain deadlines
and we fitted it into those. I do think that had there been a
bit more flexibility, as Dick has just hinted, particularly if
we had had that extra meeting, we may have been able to sort this
whole thing out before it unravelled and I think it was a mistake
not to go down that line because we could have possibly generated
another consensus over the fall-back position as well. Although
officially the process was followed, I do think that with greater
flexibility we could have come to a better solution.
Q171 Dr Turner: Richard?
Professor Flavell: I agree with
Paul on what he said earlier about the tragic outcome given the
fact that at the fifth meeting we were very close. I did say we
should have a sixth meeting and we did not do it and I think that
was a mistake. The role of the consultants was quite essential
and I think it was Colin who proposed it. He was very democratic
about asking were we all in agreement about that and everyone
was happy with it. They did an outstanding job. There is no way
that we would have finished that process in those five meetings
without that assistance. It would have been impossible just because
of the extraordinary deadline.
Q172 Dr Turner: Do you think it was
sensible to conduct the final discussions not in the whole Task
Force but in a whole series of bilateral discussions on the telephone,
via e-mail and so on without all the members of the Task Force
being able to participate? Do you think this was satisfactory?
How many bilateral phone calls were there?
Professor Flavell: There were
lots of these things and that is why I felt we should have a meeting,
because it certainly was not time efficient with all of this two-person
communication. In retrospect I feel even stronger that we should
have had that meeting.
Q173 Dr Turner: Paul?
Sir Paul Nurse: I do too. We could
have talked a bit more about the finances. We could have talked
about the fall-back options. Having all these bilateral discussions,
one-to-ones, is a real formula for confusion and for misunderstanding.
I think in a complex issue like this we are best having mainly
the business going on in the meeting itself. When you have to
mop up with lots of one-to-one conversations there really is just
too much confusion that can arise from that. I think an extra
meeting could have sorted this all out.
Professor Flavell: There was at
least one conference call in which a large number of us were present,
I think possibly one person was not there, in which the fall-back
option was discussed extensively, but we could not reach a consensus
at that meeting. That was pretty soon after the fifth meeting.
I did not answer you about the issue of the presentation to Council
and the reason is because I was not quite sure what you were asking.
If you want me to say something perhaps you could clarify that.
If not, that is absolutely fine.
Q174 Dr Turner: It rather sounds
as if you are both saying that the process started to break down
after the fifth meeting. Would you agree with that?
Professor Flavell: Yes.
Sir Paul Nurse: Yes, it began
to break down and that is why we needed another meeting, to rebuild
consensus.
Q175 Dr Turner: Did you think that
the pressure to produce a final report to the MRC Council by 29
July was unhelpful? Did that bias the outcome?
Sir Paul Nurse: It was unhelpful.
We knew we had to be there. It was a very tough deadline. I think
we should have put it off and said that we could not deliver and
we needed an extra meeting. I think that would have been a better
outcome.
Q176 Dr Turner: Do you think there
were any unreasonable attempts by Task Force members to unstitch
a consensus once you had got one?
Sir Paul Nurse: I think we have
seen, and you have seen in your earlier meeting, that there is
obviously now a lot of bitterness and acrimony around. I think
that is a tragedy because I think we were very close to a reasonable
solution and we could have got there. I think it has been unstitched
now and as a consequence it will be more difficult to stitch it
together, but because of the importance of the National Institute
of Medical Research in the UK medical research portfolio it is
absolutely essential that we do stitch it back together again.
We have a responsibility for making this work. This is a tragedy
and we seriously need to rebuild consensus and stitch things back
together. I am afraid it will be more difficult now than it would
have been had we been able to do it in July.
Q177 Dr Iddon: Sir Paul, have you
any advice to give the Science and Technology Select Committee
or the MRC Council on how best to stitch it back together now
or do you think the Council will have to proceed on the evidence
that you have already given them?
Sir Paul Nurse: It is very difficult
for me to advise like this. I will state a couple of things, if
I may. As I have just said, this is a very important issue. This
Institute is a good Institute and it is very important for biomedical
research in the UK, as you have seen from its international reputation.
It has been a very difficult issue to handle. I personally have
always thought that if Mill Hill was the fall-back position then
in fact these problems would go away because I think the central
London site does have strong things going for it and the Task
Force unanimously agreed it, including the two Mill Hill representatives.
I think their concerns were at the time what happens if it goes
wrong. If it goes wrong I think Mill Hill is a viable option.
I personally would strongly advise that this Task Force be got
together again, that we try and build a consensus, that we have
some mediator to get these different groups back together again
because without it, as I said, we are walking into a tragedy here.
Q178 Dr Iddon: Professor Flavell?
Professor Flavell: Could I add
something there?
Q179 Dr Iddon: I was going to ask
you to do that.
Professor Flavell: I completely
agree with Paul. I was invited to present to Council and I really
presented the arguments which I had solicited in part on Colin's
request from Steve Gamblin so I could adequately present the Mill
Hill representatives' views. I think that it is the absence of
consideration of that which has caused all the trouble. The problem
that needs fixing is to deal with that, to come up with a view
on what should be done if these other options falter. I think
explicit consideration of the Mill Hill option should be done
and I think it would be best done by a more independent body than
the Council because, of course, they are probably now under pressure
and considered, at least in some quarters, to be biased. I am
not referring to myself here. That is the most important issue
and I think it would benefit Council enormously to deal with that
issue, using an independent entity like the Task Force, for example.
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