Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280
- 299)
MONDAY 10 JANUARY 2005
PROFESSOR STEPHEN
TOMLINSON AND
PROFESSOR KAY
DAVIES
Q280 Mr Key: There was no other evidence
apart from that one person that you are aware of.
Professor Tomlinson: That I am
aware of.
Q281 Mr Key: Professor Davies, at
one point you took offence at the suggestion from the chairman
that you might succumb to pressure on the issue of Mill Hill as
an option. What sort of pressure was exerted on you? Were you
conscious of the pressure?
Professor Davies: No. It was just
lots of telephone calls and lobbying, which I have already referred
to.
Q282 Mr Key: Were you aware that
other people might be under pressure or succumbing to pressure?
Professor Davies: I was aware
that Robin Lovell-Badge was under pressure or becoming under pressure.
Q283 Mr Key: Anybody else? Can I
ask both of you whether the chairman sought to persuade the task
force to reconsider the federated option for Mill Hill split into
several parts within London, after that had been rejected by the
task force? Did he ask you to reconsider?
Professor Tomlinson: After we
had reached a conclusion?
Q284 Mr Key: Yes.
Professor Tomlinson: No. That
option, as I understood it, was considered as one of the options
at the first meeting.
Professor Davies: And again at
the second meeting probably.
Q285 Dr Harris: You said you thought
that Robin Lovell-Badge was under pressure. Who do you mean under
pressure from?
Professor Davies: From the whole
process, the Task Force and Colin Blakemore.
Q286 Dr Harris: Not from NIMR?
Professor Davies: Well . . .
Q287 Dr Harris: I am going to let
you answer that in the way you want.
Professor Davies: Robin certainly
indicated that he felt under pressure. He never indicated he felt
under pressure from NIMR and generally both Steve Gamblin and
Robin played a very professional part in this whole exercise,
but it was very difficult for them because they would have to
go back with interim reports where there were vagaries. There
was paranoia about whether the NIMR was going to be closed, and
we never mentioned that NIMR could be closed at any stage. What
we are looking at is a two-stage process: what NIMR can offer
now, which is excellence of science, and what it might do and
contribute best to the MRC portfolio in the 20 to 30-year time
frame; and that is going to be a phased transition, whatever the
time-frame. MRC Council are very clear on this.
Q288 Dr Harris: Some strong allegations
have been made about the chairman of the task force, Colin Blakemore,
putting undue pressure and indeed threats to Robin Lovell-Badge
in particular; and the implication is—and I do not have
the specifics in front of me—that this was on more than
one occasion. Obviously, that has been rejected and that has been
denied by Colin Blakemore—and indeed we have seen evidence
to show a reasonably friendly exchange of e-mails even after some
of these cases took place. Did you, at the meetings you attended,
in retrospect I accept, and indeed at conference calls, detect
that there was this problem underneath, that someone had been
threatened allegedly?
Professor Davies: No. There was
disagreement when we had the final conference call, trying to
put the final report together, when there was clearly no consensus
on the wording, particularly of whether Mill Hill should be a
fall-back option.
Q289 Chairman: Did the task force
discuss how to prevent all this lobbying and scurrying about and
all this kind of stuff—how to ignore it or just to run with
it? It seems to me somebody has to be tough and say, "cut
it, stop it". Was that discussed?
Professor Davies: It was only
after the fifth meeting that things started to go wrong. Before
then, this was part of a constructive dialogue that went on between
the meetings.
Professor Tomlinson: I would endorse
that. The exchange of e-mails between meetings was essential because,
as we all recognise, the people involved with the task force were
very busy people. We had five meetings, which were lengthy meetings,
and conference calls in between. Just because there was a great
deal of e-mail correspondence and even telephone calls does not
mean that there is a conspiracy; it is a task force trying to
inform itself.
Q290 Chairman: It sounds as though
it was a continual task force meeting.
Professor Tomlinson: It was, you
are quite right.
Q291 Chairman: Day to day. Meetings
are usually meetings, and then you get on with your work or whatever.
Professor Tomlinson: I accept
that.
Q292 Chairman: You were carrying
on all the time with the issues.
Professor Tomlinson: One of the
issues definitely, as Kay has already said—and certainly
after the fifth meeting when we thought that we had reached a
conclusion—was that clearly that conclusion was not acceptable
to some members of the task force. That was extremely disappointing,
particularly because of the nature of that fifth meeting and the
excitement that people all felt about the consensus that had been
achieved.
Dr Turner: What is your impression of
the role of the chairman in the operation of the task force? Did
you feel he was an impartial arbiter and an equal member of the
task force, or did you think he was leading the task force?
Q293 Chairman: Or like me—completely
neutral!
Professor Tomlinson: I think that
Colin was in a difficult position, and this was discussed at the
first meeting of the task force—what exactly his role would
be, when there might be potential conflict of interests. Indeed,
that was one of the reasons why we sought the support of the consultants,
who I might say were extremely good. The company concerned had
put in some very high-quality people who supported the task force,
both in terms of gathering information and in terms of facilitating
the meetings. If you are asking me whether Colin Blakemore started
off with a pre-conceived idea, he certainly did not betray that,
as chairman of the task force. Indeed, when things got difficult
at the fifth meeting, you will see from the evidence that he offered
to step down as chairman, and the task force reaffirmed that he
should remain as chairman. That would be rather strange if we
had no confidence in his chairmanship, if the task force had agreed
that he should remain.
Professor Davies: As part of the
process of the meeting you have to understand that the consultants
did facilitate it greatly, not just during the meeting but they
also made a summary towards the end. They would put the points
up in a flip chart and we would go through the points and agree
the consensus that we had reached. It was not Colin Blakemore
who did that; it was done jointly, so in no way was it steered
by Colin as chairman.
Q294 Dr Turner: Various members of
the task force have suggested that the chairman was in a difficult
position because obviously he was Chief Executive of the MRC at
the same time as chairing the task force. Do you think that that
might itself have been a complicating factor?
Professor Tomlinson: I think that
if we were to start again, the question would have to be asked.
The counter argument to that, in other words that Colin as chairman
was inappropriately leading—and I do not believe he was,
let me emphasise—is that having been a senior scientist
involved with the MRC for many years and knowing biomedical research
and health sciences research in the UK extremely well, and knowing
the MRC, having been involved with it and knowing its vision for
the future and its strategy, then there you have a chairman with
the appropriate background. If you are suggesting that you could
have somebody else, who did not happen to be the chief executive
officer of the MRC, then maybe in the future one might, if it
were to happen again—God forbid—have to address that
question because he was in a difficult position.
Q295 Chairman: How was he appointed
as chair? Was he elected at a meeting? How did it happen?
Professor Davies: He was elected
by MRC Council, Sir George Radda was CEO at that time
Q296 Chairman: He did not volunteer!
Professor Davies: No, he did not
volunteer.
Chairman: I bet he would not do it now!
Q297 Dr Turner: I do not think he
would! Equally, representatives from the NIMR were in a slightly
sticky position, or could have felt that; so how do you think
they performed? Do you think they were representing views of Mill
Hill or were they being independent?
Professor Davies: From a personal
point of view, I thought that they would just present a narrow—which
I knew they would not—let me rephrase that. There was always
a possibility that they would take a very personal view from the
NIMR point of view, but they did not; they acted in a very professional
way and engaged in all of the discussions as scientific members
of the community, and nothing to do with whether they were members
of NIMR or not. Obviously towards the end, once the issue of the
fall-back position was raised, that did change; but I think they
did an excellent job. Their contributions were very much appreciated.
Q298 Dr Turner: Do you think that
there would have been any difference in the acrimony that has
emerged if it had been a completely independent task force or
completely independent chairman?
Professor Davies: I think it is
a question of balance. I think the Task Force was a model of transparency.
What we have got here is that some of the snags have been completely
opened in some ways. I think if we had excluded people from NIMR,
we would not have been able to engage their views all the way
through, which I believe we did.
Q299 Chairman: Did their views change?
Did their body language change at the meetings, during those meetings?
Professor Davies: Their body language
changed, but certainly their views evolved the same as ours did.
Professor Tomlinson: I support
that. I support the view that Steve Gamblin and Robin Lovell-Badge
were also in an extremely difficult position; but they certainly
did engage in all five meetings of the task force. In addition,
Steve was particularly exercised about the clinical links and
he took the trouble to come to Cardiff to see me, initially on
his own, and subsequently with a number of colleagues, to talk
around the issues, particularly of translational research, but
especially of the training of clinician scientists. In terms of
engagement, I do not think they could have been more engaged.
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