Examination of Witnesses (Questions 300
- 319)
MONDAY 10 JANUARY 2005
PROFESSOR STEPHEN
TOMLINSON AND
PROFESSOR KAY
DAVIES
Q300 Dr Turner: Given what you have
said about the process, how do you account for the fact that it
has been suggested to us that a lot of the staff at Mill Hill
were feeling very uncertain about the future, i.e., uncertain
about whether there was a future for the NIMR wherever? Can you
account for that uncertainty having got about?
Professor Davies: It is very easy
to destabilise an institution, no matter what you say, because
science is very competitive. Any suggestion that either the institution
may change its shape because of a new director, or may get smaller
because it has a new location destabilises people- we have at
no stage ever given a message out that NIMR would be shut. We
have always endorsed the excellence of its science. Any change
causes some instability in institutions, and we were acutely aware
of that, and that is what you have seen. Maybe we did not communicate
well enough the process, but going back to what Nancy said, it
is very important that you do not let this prolong because it
will get worse. If you do want to take the opportunity of change,
you have got to be able to carry the troops with you and you do
not leave them in that unstable land for very long.
Q301 Chairman: The question you were
asked is, at what point has it got to an unstable condition? Is
it there already? Is it unstable at the minute, in your opinion?
Professor Davies: We need to do
something to reassure NIMR staff that they are valuable, define
their role in the portfolio of the NIMR, and the fact that here
we have a phased position that we are here now, and this is where
we might get to in thirty years' time; and that we need to work
together to get the best out of the science.
Professor Tomlinson: Can I add
to that that I suspect that people feel that there is some kind
of long or even short-term plan to close NIMR, but certainly the
task force has never said that. The expression "renewed institute
in central London" was in some ways coined to try to provide
that reassurance, that what we were about was relocating the whole
of the excellent internationally distinguished science from NIMR
to a central London location, as a renewed institute. I do not
think that any signals have been sent that NIMR as an institute
is going to be closed. The recommendation of the task force is
that it is relocated, that is not closed.
Q302 Dr Turner: The terms of the
bid invitations that you recommended included the accommodation
of everybody currently working in Mill Hill.
Professor Tomlinson: As far as
I personally am concerned, that was the inference that I drew;
that we were not talking about downsizing or splitting, we were
talking about the Institute as it currently is, in terms of numbers.
Q303 Chairman: Is the task force
disbanded now?
Professor Tomlinson: Yes. I believe
that we have been—well, I do not believe—I know that
we have been stood down, and if I was asked whether we would meet
again, I would say, "please, no".
Q304 Chairman: Do you think that
is the one unanimous thing we might get out of it?
Professor Tomlinson: In terms
of reconstituting the task force as it was, I think most people
would say I think—although it is not unanimous obviously—that
an additional meeting of the task force is not going to move us
on. It might well be that individual members of the task force,
some or all, may be consulted at some future point, but I do not
think an additional meeting now—Nancy referred to—I
think it has gone past that stage. If there was going to be a
sixth meeting, it was August or maybe late July.
Professor Davies: You have the
forward investment strategy, which was UK-based. The task force
was international, not just the UK. That is an important dimension
to remember. MRC got two types of view on the future of NIMR.
Q305 Chairman: You mean the flavour?
Professor Davies: Flavour as far
as the international side—what could happen elsewhere in
the world.
Q306 Chairman: They were not international
in the sense that they were working over there but they are British
boys?
Professor Davies: No, no, but
Dick Flavell has been there for many years. Paul has not, I agree.
Q307 Chairman: I will tell him he
is an American now!
Professor Davies: Absolutely.
Q308 Dr Harris: One of the things
we are trying to establish is whether the task force could have
been handled better to have reached a consensus, rather than effectively
a majority report. I want to ask you therefore about the last
meeting. I know that you, Professor Davies, were not there—and
then the conference call on 25 June. The things those had in common
were that there was a form of words agreed by all present which
then subsequently fell apart. I can talk you through the history
because I have read it several times now from the e-mails we have
been given, but there was a form of words agreed and then a few
days later, though not immediately, those were challenged, usually
from the Mill Hill side, although there were some other issues
as well. Then the conference call was held, which was fully attended,
I understand—
Professor Davies: It was not fully
attended throughout.
Q309 Dr Harris: Following the message
shortly after the telephone conference call on 25 June we see
that that then later fell apart on the 28th. A memo came in from
Robin Lovell-Badge saying that on reflection over the weekend
it was not satisfactory, what was written there. Do you think,
in the light of that, that it was not battened down tightly enough
at the meetings, or that it was just not going to ever happen?
Professor Tomlinson: I can speak
for the last meeting which I was present at, but I do not think
that I was present at the conference call. I can certainly speak
for the fifth meeting. As I have said already, that meeting was
a very productive, constructive meeting. People heard what was
presented to them, and we came away—I certainly came away
feeling that we had definitely reached a conclusion. There is
the summary, the report of that meeting, which clearly outlines
what the conclusion was. I think that probably what happened was
that people went away from that—most of us—thinking
we had cracked it, that it was now sorted; but then Robin and
Steve particularly, on reflection, felt that the conclusion that
had been drawn meant that Mill Hill was vulnerable to closure
in the short to medium term. That is my personal interpretation.
I do not know of any evidence that would support that.
Q310 Dr Harris: Presumably then they
were reassured at the conference call on the 25th because that
heads out of the meeting saying, "at the last full meeting
we want to thank you all for the amount of work you have done.
We have just completed the conference call and all the participants
agreed to the form of words in the attached version." Presumably,
following that period of reflection and worry, reassurance was
given, and an amended form of words was agreed. Is that how you
understood it? Why did that then fall apart?
Professor Davies: I think the
general uncertainty crept back in again.
Q311 Dr Harris: Why?
Professor Davies: Because they
were not totally convinced in their own minds. We had failed to
convince them, or they had to talk to other colleagues, which
made them feel a little uneasy about the situation.
Q312 Dr Harris: Do you think the
task force could have done more to reassure them at the fifth
meeting and in that conference call?
Professor Davies: I have thought
a lot about that, and I am not 100% convinced we could have done
that.
Professor Tomlinson: I think it
is natural that they would consult with their colleagues. They
were there as nominees and representatives of the National Institute
for Medical Research, and they would go back to their colleagues
and report the results of the discussions. Naturally, if they
had colleagues then saying "we do not like that very much
and we think you ought to go back to the MRC and the task force
and say that we do not like it very much", that was their
job, so it was bound to happen, I guess.
Professor Davies: Maybe we could
have been a bit more explicit in the sense that we could have
said that our strongly-favoured option would be relocation, exploring
relocation to KCL and UCL; but that in the end we would obviously
return to a comparison with Mill Hill, which we did not state.
That might have been more reassuring.
Q313 Dr Harris: It happened again.
I refer to what we have at 246 in our evidence. "We had held
a final telephone conference call on Monday, 19 July, to check
word by word through the task force report"—this is
Professor Blakemore—"by most members of the task force
including Steve Gamblin and Robin Lovell-Badge. By the end of
that call we had, after some discussion, reached agreement on
the wording of the entire executive summary and the rest of the
text." There are a few figures missing. For the third time
agreement appeared to have been reached for a unanimous report,
with presumably concessions and reassurances having been made;
and again that fell apart because there was then a huge series
of substantive amendments which appear to be after a deadline—whether
that is relevant or not—it probably is not to this line
of questioning. Why do you think that happened? Do you think it
is inevitable that nothing could be done because this was the
third attempt to make unanimity stick?
Professor Tomlinson: I think we
can only speculate. Your speculation might be right, that we were
getting then to the point where it was really impossible to repair
the rifts that had developed.
Professor Davies: The only thing
that might have changed that is if we had had a sixth meeting,
because very often you can do things face-to-face in a way that
you cannot by way of conference call. We did not have a sixth
meeting. In retrospect—I am not saying it would have been,
but it might have been helpful.
Q314 Dr Harris: The comment was made
that the wordings used in these reports were deliberately vague
to achieve a consensus that was never there. Do you think that
is a fair criticism?
Professor Tomlinson: No. Certainly
if I go back to the record of the fifth meeting of the task force,
I think it was pretty clear. It was relocation to central London
effectively with a managed transition from Mill Hill.
Q315 Dr Harris: I know that Robert
Key might want to come in on this issue, but in your view was
Mill Hill given adequate consideration during the fifth meeting
and in the process, in respect of whether it should be an active
option or a fall-back option, or do you think the task force in
the end was wanting some more data, information, and chances to
discuss the status?
Professor Davies: Can I make a
comment on the meetings before the fifth meeting, and that is
that it was incredibly useful to have Robin Lovell-Badge and Steve
Gamblin there because they could always remind us what was going
on in Mill Hill; so whenever we said that we should move to central
London because we needed translational research, they could remind
us of the significant amount of translational research that was
going on at Mill Hill. It was not just translational research;
it was also the ability to interact in a multi-disciplinary way
with physics, chemistry, nanotechnology—all of the tools
of medicine, which are different from the clinical interface.
There were two factors here. Again, Robin and Steve could remind
us what was going on in NIMR, because not all of us had ever visited
Mill Hill before. Therefore, up to the fifth meeting, we were
very well informed about what Mill Hill was doing, and we always
considered it—but I cannot comment on the fifth meeting.
Q316 Mr Key: I will ask this of each
of you in turn. Always and everywhere there is understandable
institutional inertia when these sorts of decisions are made.
In this very sad row, is it about institutional inertia or have
fundamental errors been made by the MRC sufficient to invalidate
any decision they might make about the future of NIMR?
Professor Davies: I do not think
it did. I think the MRC have done a very good job here. As we
have said, the FIS came to its conclusion about NIMR not having
a future in a 20 to 30-year time frame in Mill Hill. They then
put that out to consultation and the thing that came back said,
"you should pay more attention to Mill Hill". They responded
by setting up a task force. That was done in a very transparent,
open way, which had international representation. It had representation
from Mill Hill on it. I do not believe that the MRC could have
done a better job than that. I think the fact that it is a difficult
situation in that it is a difficult decision, and it is very important
that we do not destroy an institute. It takes a long time to start
a new institute, even if you gave me 100 million today—please,
if you would like to do that—
Q317 Chairman: No chance.
Professor Davies: It would still
take 10 years to do it because it takes that long to gel something
like that. We have a fine Institute in NIMR, currently led by
Sir John, and we do not want to destroy it. I think the MRC did
all it could to ensure that that does not happen.
Professor Tomlinson: I think we
are forgetting what the consensus was at the end of the fifth
meeting—and it is difficult for me to convey the optimism
and the excitement that there was about a renewed institute, and
our National Institute for Medical Research. In my evidence I
said that originally, before I started on the task force, my prejudice,
as a provincial lad, would have been to close it down and redeploy
resources elsewhere. It was the strength of the arguments around
this exciting new vision of relocation of a distinguished National
Institute for Medical Research relocating into central London
to produce the added value—it was the excitement of that
vision that was driving us, and I really think that that is still
there. It is not about closing the National Institute for Medical
Research; it is about a renewed National Institute for Medical
Research for the 21st century.
Q318 Mr Key: Professor Davies, could
I return to the meeting that you could not make, the fifth meeting
of the task force. You told the consultants before that meeting
that you had in mind a possible model for development of some
form of transitional research on the Mill Hill site, if the task
force favoured that option, but after that meeting your position
was evidently not clear to everyone. You e-mailed the task force
on 9 July and said: "Sorry not to make myself clear. As I
said in one of my recent e-mails, we all agreed at an earlier
task force meeting that the Institute should be in London; thus
Mill Hill would be the fall-back position. However, as I understand,
because of our clear preference for KCL or UCL, until we have
explored those bids the task force has not examined the presentation
by NIMR." Are you happy that your consideration here was
given proper time for consideration by the task force?
Professor Davies: But I discussed
that at length. The report of the task force was sent to me while
I was in a conference on June the something—Monday the 21st
probably. I was rather surprised by that report, and therefore
I talked to other task force members and Colin Blakemore, and
when I had finished discussing with people I was perfectly satisfied
that I could endorse it.
Q319 Mr Key: You had not changed
your mind.
Professor Davies: No. I was always
very keen to explore translational research in a multi-disciplinary
way and explore what a UCL/KCL type option could offer.
| 
