| Summary
We undertook this inquiry as part of our scrutiny of the Research Councils and in response to concerns raised about the way in which the Medical Research Council (MRC) has handled the review of the future of the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR). As well as examining the processes used by MRC to conduct this review, we also felt obliged to investigate serious accusations about the conduct of the Chief Executive of the MRC, Professor Colin Blakemore, that were made during one of our oral evidence sessions.
We recognise MRC's responsibility to carry out periodic reviews of its major institutes. We found that the initial rationale for its establishment of the Forward Investment Strategy (FIS) review in 2002 was not clearly established and communicated. The focus of the review was too narrow and it did not provide the detailed analysis necessary to justify its proposals to move a scaled-down NIMR to Addenbrooke's in Cambridge. Furthermore, by failing to engage the NIMR workforce at an early stage, MRC lost the confidence of the staff of its largest institute, and this in turn contributed to the fragility of relations between them as the process of review continued.
We conclude that MRC was right to listen to the objections made in the consultation on the FIS conclusions and to establish a Task Force with a more inclusive membership to consider the issue afresh. However, the appointment as Chairman of the MRC Chief Executive, rather than a more independent figure, was naïve, given the reaction to the FIS proposals. The Task Force adopted sensible working methods; its meetings were chaired with objectivity and competence; and by publishing much material on the MRC website, it was more transparent than many similar bodies.
We found that the Task Force was unable to give proper consideration to all the cost implications of the proposed move to one of two university hospital sites in central London. We recommend that the MRC Council gives full consideration to all funding sources in reaching a final decision. This Report concludes that the Task Force reached its decisions in a rational and coherent manner and we are satisfied that the Task Force gave due consideration to the option of NIMR remaining at Mill Hill.
The consensus apparently established by the Task Force at its final meeting broke down due to a misunderstanding about the future of the institute in the event of neither London bid to host NIMR proving acceptable to MRC. The failure to clarify this point, and to counter fears that NIMR might be closed, was a serious error and contributed to the worsening relations between NIMR staff and MRC. The Task Force should have considered holding a further meeting to seek to resolve the differences of opinion between members on this issue.
We investigated the serious allegations of coercion against Professor Blakemore that were made. We found that the means by which he sought to achieve consensus on the Task Force could reasonably be interpreted as heavy handed and inappropriately forceful on occasion but we found no specific credible evidence of coercion. Although, like other Task Force members, he had his favoured options for NIMR, we found no evidence that he had a "hidden agenda" for the Task Force from the outset.
We also considered the opposition of staff at NIMR to the proposals and their engagement in the process. We commend the way the two NIMR representatives on the Task Force engaged with its work but we believe that many senior staff at Mill Hill were more intent on resistance than engaging with the review process. Their actions stopped only a little short of serious interference with the process and a deliberate attempt to undermine the position of the Chief Executive of their own organisation.
Looking to the future, we believe that MRC should be prepared to take the necessary time to ensure that any central London option it chooses exceeds the current quality of the research facilities and environment at Mill Hill. If the right London partner cannot be found, we support MRC's planned alternative of reconsidering all the available options for the future of NIMR.
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