6 THE WAY FORWARD
129. The debate over the future of NIMR has polarised
opinion to a remarkable degree. The way the debate has been framed
has encouraged people to take a view either for or against Mill
Hill. This partisan approach has been extremely damaging to attempts
by MRC to engage NIMR in the decision making process. In reality,
as the Task Force has proved, there is a good degree of consensus
on the most favourable future for NIMR. Protests have intensified
as the prospect of change has appeared to draw closer. Indeed,
an impression has emerged in some quarters that NIMR at Mill Hill
will suddenly close. In reality, the transitional process of a
move to London would take around a decade. Whilst it is essential
to deal with the present, the medium and long term focus of the
current review should not be forgotten.
130. The Task Force was successful in establishing
consensus on the most favourable scenario for NIMR in a central
London university hospital site, provided that the chosen host
could offer the facilities and governance arrangements that compared
favourably with Mill Hill and would create an environment for
successful translational research. The Task Force was primarily
concerned with the principle of co-location in London. It was
not able to establish—because the details of the proposals
were still being developed—whether this ideal scenario is
likely to be achievable in practice and if it would represent
value for money compared to the maintenance and development of
the existing institute. These factors will depend upon the detailed
business cases worked up by the preferred bidder and the availability
of funding from OST, and possibly other sources. An MRC subcommittee
is currently considering in further detail the proposals of the
two bidders and expects to report back to the MRC Council meeting
on 9-10 February 2005, when a preferred bidder may be selected.
131. We have argued that the mechanisms that MRC
has used to reach this stage have proved less than ideal, but
the shortcomings of process were not so serious as to invalidate
the outcome. They should certainly not be used to deflect attention
from the task in hand. Too much work has been done and too much
has been agreed for it to make any sense to start the review process
all over again from square one. A new third process would prolong
the uncertainty and would not be guaranteed to reach a conclusion
that was acceptable to all sides. Tough decisions cannot be avoided
indefinitely. The question now for MRC is how best to take those
decisions and then implement them.
132. The proposed move to London is, as the Task
Force agreed, an attractive one in principle. Any move of this
nature carries its own risks. A research institute cannot be successfully
uprooted and replanted elsewhere without taking into account a
range of other factors. The right leadership, governance arrangements
and scientific match are all important in attracting the right
people and developing the right culture to ensure that the co-located
institute thrives in its new environment and develops the links
that will achieve the goals of its new mission. Equally, MRC must
be satisfied that the long term funding required to support the
renewed institute in central London is likely to give a scientific
return that exceeds that of the Mill Hill alternative. No less
important is the need to ensure that any transition process does
not do irreparable damage to the science being conducted at the
institute. This is of course a decision for the long term, but
it would nonetheless be a regrettable blow to UK medical science
if significant numbers of internationally highly regarded Mill
Hill scientists were to look elsewhere to continue their careers.
133. We believe that MRC should only begin the process
of transition when it is fully satisfied that the partnership
being offered by the preferred bidder is highly likely to be able
to match the ideal identified by the Task Force. It should not,
in its enthusiasm to embrace the new vision, be prepared to settle
for an option that does not exceed the current quality of the
research facilities and environment at Mill Hill. This has already
been a long process and it is in everyone's interests to clarify
the long term future of NIMR. The advantage MRC has is that there
is no compulsion for an early move. The buildings at Mill Hill
will not fall apart in the near future.
134. The main time constraints cited are the need
to avoid further destabilising the institute and the need to have
its future determined in time to begin the process of recruiting
a successor to the current Director, a process which needs to
start, according to the Chief Executive, in summer 2005.[263]
We are also aware that the two London bidders would like a swift
decision in order to facilitate forward planning. We recognise
the importance of minimising uncertainty and re-establishing some
stability, but the overriding consideration for the long term
must be to get the right decision on location for UK medical science.
Finding the right Director and meeting the desires of potential
bidders are important but secondary considerations.
135. If neither of the two London options meets MRC's
requirements the question remains as to what happens then. MRC's
position is that "all options" will be considered. We
assume that this includes the Mill Hill option, although MRC has
been noticeably unwilling to confirm exactly what these other
options include.[264]
We believe that, having got this far, MRC should not give up too
easily on the unanimous preference of the Task Force for a renewed
national institute in the London area. If this ideal scenario
appears likely to be achievable in the near future, MRC should
strive hard to establish the right partnership arrangements in
London. If not, we would support MRC's commitment to re-examine
all the options for the future of NIMR.
263 Ev 219 Back
264
Qs 37-40; Ev 172 Back
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