| 1. | The reasons for taking a long term look at the direction and viability of NIMR at Mill Hill were not presented in a coherent or convincing way to NIMR staff or the wider community. The initial proposal for the FIS review made no reference to the simultaneous strategic science review. MRC was right to broaden any initial focus on NIMR to include other facilities, but the consequence was that management at NIMR gained the impression that the focus was really on Mill Hill and, rightly or wrongly, confidence in the ensuing process of review was damaged at the outset. (Paragraph 18)
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| 2. | We were told by members of the committee on the Forward Investment Strategy that their work was "not about money" and yet cost was one of the two reasons given for its conclusions. It is regrettable that confusion over the justification for the conclusions of the FIS review was allowed to develop. (Paragraph 24)
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| 3. | The break up of a world renowned national institute and relocation elsewhere is a risky strategy. It should not be proposed without the most careful consideration and assessment of all the costs and benefits. The FIS Subcommittee report did not provide the level of detailed consideration that was required to support such a radical proposal. (Paragraph 25)
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| 4. | By asking the FIS committee to focus only on how its facilities might best meet the vision it has established, MRC fuelled concerns in the minds of some there was a preconceived agenda in relation to Mill Hill. More importantly, it did not given the impression that it was taking a holistic and comprehensive approach to realising the vision of the future that it had agreed with its stakeholders. (Paragraph 28)
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| 5. | The perception that the work of NIMR was under attack by the FIS process was allowed to build up. The inability of MRC to convince the staff at Mill Hill that it valued the work conducted there contributed to the deterioration in relations that was to occur over the ensuing months and represents a regrettable management failure. (Paragraph 30)
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| 6. | It is essential for any organisation contemplating radical change to engage with those affected from the start in order to persuade them of the case for change and to maintain the morale of the workforce. MRC failed to do this adequately in the case of the FIS Subcommittee and thus passed up the chance to work with NIMR to effect change in a consensual manner. Greater engagement throughout its work may have fostered a more co-operative attitude at NIMR from the start, although there is evidence to suggest that some staff there were intent upon resistance, whatever the merits of the case. By seeming to impose change on a surprised and unconvinced work force, MRC lost the confidence of the staff of its largest institute. This in turn coloured the attitude of NIMR to the future efforts of MRC to consider the issue afresh and contributed significantly to the increasing fragility of their relationship. (Paragraph 35)
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| 7. | MRC should be given credit for listening to the Forward Investment Strategy consultation and, contrary to fears in some quarters about the imposition of the FIS proposals, reconsidering its options. The establishment of a Task Force with a remit to start again was the right decision. (Paragraph 36)
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| 8. | The evidence we have seen suggests that both Dr Lovell-Badge and Dr Gamblin participated in the Task Force with objectivity and professionalism and handled a difficult situation very well. (Paragraph 41)
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| 9. | Given what had gone before with the FIS Subcommittee, it was naive of the MRC Council not to foresee the dangers of asking its Chief Executive to chair a Task Force seeking to undertake a fresh and open-minded review. (Paragraph 44)
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| 10. | We conclude that, as far as we can tell, Professor Blakemore handled the meetings of the Task Force with professionalism, objectivity and competence. (Paragraph 45)
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| 11. | We believe that the Task Force was sensible in agreeing and publishing a summary after each meeting. The proceedings of the Task Force were more open and transparent than those of many similar bodies and members should be commended for adopting this approach. (Paragraph 49)
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| 12. | We recommend that, before reaching any final decision on the future location of NIMR, the MRC Council satisfies itself that it has given full consideration to the availability of funds from all potential sources. (Paragraph 59)
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| 13. | We conclude that the Task Force went about its decision making on a future location for NIMR in a rational and coherent manner and are satisfied that it gave due consideration to the benefits of NIMR remaining at Mill Hill for the long term. (Paragraph 64)
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| 14. | It was, given the starting positions of Task Force members and the disagreements during its proceedings, a commendable achievement to reach a consensus and agree unanimously on a set of conclusions. (Paragraph 66)
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| 15. | At the fifth meeting the Task Force seemed to avoid resolution of the status of Mill Hill as an "active" third option, as a fall back option or neither. In retrospect, this was a major failing of the Task Force as a whole, and in particular of those present at the last meeting. Whilst the focus on the preferred options was understandable, it was remiss of the Task Force not to consider the status of Mill Hill as an option and to leave the position unclear. This failing led to different interpretations of the conclusions of the Task Force and undermined the rest of the process. (Paragraph 75)
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| 16. | We conclude that Professor Blakemore did everything he reasonably could to take on board late amendments proposed by NIMR Task Force members whilst preserving the will of the majority on the Task Force. (Paragraph 81)
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| 17. | It was extremely regrettable that the Task Force members who agreed the wording of texts at the final meeting, again at the conference call on 25 June and then a third time at the final conference call on 19 July subsequently objected to the words that had been agreed. We can understand the frustration of other members and the Chairman of the Task Force with the disintegration of the consensus. NIMR staff members of the Task Force did a remarkable job given the pressure they were under and deserve to come out of the process with great credit. However, the unravelling of agreed texts on three occasions suggest that the pressure to renege on agreements reached in the Task Force proved too great and made the job of running the Task Force and achieving consensus almost impossible. (Paragraph 83)
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| 18. | We conclude that the failure of the Task Force or MRC to counter authoritatively the fears that NIMR might be closed if the London options failed was a serious error: it contributed further to the uncertainty surrounding the institute's future and contributed to the worsening relations between NIMR staff and MRC. (Paragraph 87)
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| 19. | We conclude that the Task Force should have given serious consideration to having a further meeting in order to try to reach an agreed position on whether Mill Hill should be an active third option or a fall back position. The Task Force had already managed to reach a consensus against what must have appeared, at times, to be long odds. Of course, a further meeting may not have been able to reach a form of words that was agreeable to all sides, but, in view of the way in which the Task Force had already worked together to resolve differences of opinion and taking into account the consequences of a divided or minority report, it was worth a try. The Task Force should have considered holding an extra meeting rather than continuing with publication of the report as it stood, if necessary, by asking the MRC Council for more time. (Paragraph 88)
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| 20. | We agree with most Task Force members that, given what has happened since, it would not be realistic to reconvene the Task Force at this stage. In view of the very public disagreement there was on the Task Force we believe it unlikely that a re-convened meeting could reach agreement at this stage. (Paragraph 89)
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| 21. | We conclude that the publication of the booklet setting out the work being done at NIMR served to align the work of the Task Force with an assessment of the quality of the science at NIMR. (Paragraph 125)
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