APPENDIX 93
Memorandum from Dr Robin Lovell-Badge,
former member of the MRC Task Force on the NIMR
1. As one of the NIMR representatives on
the Task Force, I would first like to give some of my overall
impressions of the process before specifically addressing, from
my own perspective, some of the questions supplied to the MRC
by the Select Committee. (N.B. my colleague Steve Gamblin has
largely focussed on a separate set of questions, so I have avoided
answering these so as not to duplicate our responses, but I should
state that we are entirely in agreement.) Many of my views have
been expressed previously in e-mail correspondence with the Task
Force Chairman, Colin Blakemore (CB), in particular in two messages
I sent on 22 and 26 July 2004, after the TF had essentially concluded
its business and before the MRC Council Meeting that was to look
at its final report. These e-mails were circulated to the Task
Force, and, according to CB's wish for openness and transparency,
were marked non-confidential. However, despite two requests, they
have not been made public and, in a recent letter (11 November
2004), David Smith, the TF Secretariat, has written to me to say
that he will not do so. I attach these messages and others as
supporting evidence for my position. I would ask that the Select
Committee gives due consideration to the appropriateness of this
material being made publicly available, although I still have
no reservations. I particularly encourage you to read my message
of 26 July, which is the last I include in the accompanying attachment.
2. I have worked at the NIMR since 1988,
and have been Head of the Division of Developmental Genetics since
1993. I am therefore very familiar with the Institute, its advantages
and disadvantages. I have always felt privileged to work there
and it has enabled me to make significant progress in my science.
For this reason I was enthusiastic to be part of the Task Force,
which had the specific remit of exploring ways of securing the
future success of the Institute. It was my wish that we would
be able to put forward sound ideas to enhance its ability to nurture
good science and scientists and to play an even greater National
role in the future. To make something the UK could really be proud
of. I believe this was also the goal of at least some of our international
colleagues on the TF, but perhaps we were all naive.
3. I have ended up being extremely disappointed
both with the process and with the outcome. Important issues were
frequently glossed over or not discussed at all and, in too many
instances, prejudice and hidden agendas have taken precedence
over evidence as means to reach conclusions. Despite public statements
to the contrary, there was in the end little unanimity on critical
issues. Moreover, the final TF report was submitted to Council
without several members of the TF having even seen information
that was only forthcoming in the last few days before its completion.
As the report did not adequately reflect my views, the appearance
of unanimity being more important to the Chairman than reality,
it was also submitted without my approval. Council have then based
their decisions on a document and a process that falls well below
my ideals and those I believe they should demand. There is no
logic in having the Mill Hill site as a comparator, without it
being a formal option for the future location of the Institute.
There is now a real danger that Council will pursue a decision
that will have a long-lasting deleterious effect on UK biomedical
research.
RESPONSE TO
SELECT COMMITTEE
QUESTIONS
Please refer to Appendix 61 for Questions.
4. Question 1. There have been similar,
at least spoken, trends in other countries, to push towards more
translational research. In the USA, this has coincided with a
change in Director of the NIH from Varmus, a basic scientist,
to Zerhouni, a clinician. Of course the former managed to double
the baseline NIH budget, perhaps leaving the latter with little
room for manoeuvre. (In fact Zerhouni has only allocated a very
small percentage of the NIH budget to clinical/translational initiatives.)
It is often stated that it is a good time to start translating
all the basic knowledge we have uncovered over the past decades
into real clinical benefit. However, this ignores the fact that
we are still so ignorant, and that it is an even better time to
do basic research, a time when we can build on the really important
breakthroughs made in recent years and gain real understanding.
The cynical view is that many feel it is easier to persuade politicians
to give money for "curing diseases" than it is to merely
provide knowledge. Of course we should also pursue translational
research, but not at the expense of the foundations on which its
future, and ours, will depend. This view was in fact supported
by most of the Task Force. It was felt that the Institute should
take on a greater role in facilitating translational research,
for example through training clinician scientists in research
methods, and by having more clinician scientists on staff, but
that it would be counterproductive to lose the excellent basic
science as this provides the necessary foundation to do the former.
However, this view has become distorted by statements issued subsequently—perhaps
as a justification for wanting to relocate the Institute to a
clinical setting.
5. The various consultations conducted on
behalf of the TF asked the question about the balance of basic
versus translational research. However, the views of many were
ignored, including clinician scientists working at NIMR, those
elsewhere with whom we collaborate, and basic scientists working
in more clinical settings.
6. Question 2. A greater emphasis
on translational research at NIMR would perhaps have only a modest
affect relative to the way the overall MRC budget is allocated.
However, it could mean the loss of a very critical driver of high
quality basic biomedical research in the UK. It may tip the balance
too far in a direction from which it would be hard to recover
in the future. And why choose the NIMR as the target for this
change, rather than other components of its portfolio, notably
those already co-located in clinical settings, especially if the
latter is felt to be such a persuasive argument ? Or why not plan
a new, additional venture rather than put at risk an internationally
competitive and highly renowned institute ?
7. Question 3. There was no evidence
to suggest that co-location would be of benefit to the work of
the Institute. (Indeed, some have tried to justify co-location
on the grounds that it may be the other way round—the Institute
might help the host institution—even at the risk of damaging
its own research.) Many of the best multi-disciplinary research
institutes around the world are not co-located, as is also the
case for almost all institutes with a national role (NIH in Bethesda,
for example). Indeed, the explicit reason the European Molecular
Biology Laboratories are not co-located with a university, is
to allow them to fulfil their international role.
8. Question 5. NIMR was asked to
nominate two internal representatives and three external members
to the Task Force. Unfortunately, one of the latter, Peter Gruss,
became unable in his view to devote sufficient time to TF business
and stepped down, but was not replaced. Both Richard Flavell and
Paul Nurse devoted considerable time and effort to the TF, despite
their very busy schedules. The MRC nominated two Council members,
Kay Davies and Dick Denton, the only two scientists on Council
that had not been part of the FIS subcommittee, although all had
signed up to its recommendations. They also nominated Steve Tomlinson
to represent both a clinical and an additional provincial viewpoint,
and Alan Bernstein as another international member. George Radda
was to begin as Chairman, but a considerable delay in organising
the first meeting meant that Colin Blakemore had already taken
over as CEO. Despite the obvious conflict, the latter was willing,
albeit with stated reluctance, to take on the role of Chairman.
John Skehel was meant to attend the meetings, except for occasions
when the question of his replacement as NIMR director was to be
addressed. He did attend parts of some meetings, although in the
end there was very little discussion that would have required
his exclusion. Alison Spaull attended as an observer, also nominated
by the MRC, and the others present were David Smith from MRC Head
Office as the Secretariat, and representatives from McKinsey's,
who were employed by the MRC to assist the Task Force.
9. There was clearly a wide range of views
held by the TF members. Steve Tomlinson admitted to the NIMR staff
during his only visit to the Institute in October that his view,
when appointed to the TF, was that NIMR should be closed and the
funds released should be redistributed around the country. Alan
Bernstein, who did not attend in person any meetings of the TF
and who by his own admission had not followed all the correspondence
or read critical documents, has well known opinions that there
is no need for bricks-and-mortar institutes. I do not know if
Colin Blakemore had fixed views at the beginning, but he seemed
to have started making up his mind already by the third meeting,
before we had gathered any real evidence, such as results from
consultations, the ARUP report on the Mill Hill site, details
of potential sites in central London and their costs, etc. His
ideas for a much smaller institute focussed on only a part of
the current range of science carried out at NIMR (which appear
to go against our final conclusions) were put to me in a `phone
conversation and then to the rest of the TF (but only in a confidential
e-mail) after I had challenged the ambiguity of the use of the
word "focus" in the draft report of the third meeting.
These views, and others based on a disregard for facts, have encouraged
the view that there were hidden agendas.
10. Several methods were used to communicate
TF progress to stakeholders. However, not all have been either
timely or appropriate. I give just a few examples:
(i) The reports from each of the TF meetings
were always delayed, as there would be disagreement over the wording,
which either failed to reflect decisions reached during the meetings
or where it had meanings that were too ambiguous. There were no
formal minutes taken.
(ii) There have been long delays and only
selective publication of e-mail correspondence between TF members,
even where messages have been marked non-confidential. Reading
the collection on the MRC website gives a very distorted view.
(iii) Inappropriate conversations or correspondence
by the Chairman with stakeholders, which have given strength to
the view that a hidden agenda was being followed.
Examples, being:
(a) a conversation with two young NIMR postdoctoral
researchers after the third TF meeting where he told them that
he had cancelled a proposed visit to the Institute—before
others had been informed—and that he was considering abandoning
the TF. (This followed a heated exchange during a TF conference
call earlier that day.)
(b) Sending out letters on behalf of the
TF, or draft reports of the TF meetings without agreement from
all members.
(c) After the last TF meeting, again prior
to the report being finalised, and against the spirit of our agreement
at the meeting, informing KCL and UCL that it would be a straight
fight between the two of them rather than saying that their bids
would be compared with Mill Hill. The report of the Fifth meeting
was only released for publication after acceptance of the conditionality
of any central London bid and after KCL and UCL were properly
informed. However, the Chairman selectively uses phrases from
this report, taken out of context and conveniently omitting the
conditionality, to pretend that there was unanimity for co-location
amongst TF members, when there was not.
11. Question 7. Apart from proposals
to move the Institute, the Task Force also considered options
to break it up into two or more separate locations. Splitting
the Institute would have inevitably destroyed its productive culture
and multidisciplinary interactions. It was clear from the outset
that this would not be attractive to NIMR staff. Consequently,
these options received no support from the majority of the Task
Force and they were rejected during our Third meeting. The only
one present at this meeting who tried to reinstate it was David
Smith. However, the split option was subsequently put back on
the table by the Chairman. It was argued that this was in response
to London HEI's who considered that such an option would be best
(from their point of view). In my opinion, it was ridiculous to
have the work of the TF sidetracked by external influences. Putting
this option back on the table also had consequences for the subsequent
work and progress of the TF. It wasted time and effort from the
HEI's involved, who could perhaps have better concentrated their
efforts on single-site bids. It was clearly never an option that
would receive sufficient support from TF members, yet we had to
devote a lot of valuable time to discuss it. This includes the
final meeting—where we had insufficient time to, for example,
debate the proposals from Mill Hill or even whether Mill Hill
should be an option. It also served to distort the balance of
options under consideration, with too much time devoted to the
need to exclude the split site, rather than focusing on the values
of an independent versus co-located site.
12. There was a suggestion, from Richard
Flavell, to hold a sixth TF meeting in an attempt to resolve some
of the unfinished business, after Council had made their preliminary
decisions. But this did not take place as it was decided that
the TF no longer existed.
13. Questions 8-10. There was considerable
ambiguity throughout the whole TF process as to the nature of
any financial constraints. We were at times told that we should
not think about them—a good argument can always persuade
Government or others to provide the money. At other times it was
made very apparent that there could be no increase in recurrent
expenditure from the MRC. The latter became of particular concern
to me when the details of the costs of running an Institute in
central London began to emerge. It would simply not be possible
to carry out the same volume of research on the same core funding
from the MRC. The co-location options had to be far less cost-effective,
especially if there was to be a change in emphasis, with a greater
proportion of clinician scientists on the payroll.
14. Having looked at all the evidence over
the course of the Task Force and subsequently, and being aware
of what is possible on the Mill Hill site, I am convinced that
remaining there is the best and most exciting option for the future
of NIMR. It should certainly not be excluded without a full and
proper, unbiased comparison with the central London bids.
23 November 2004
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