PLATFORM TECHNOLOGY
86. The police currently record 10 DNA markers per
individual in order to generate a profile for the NDNAD. Professor
Sir Alec Jeffreys asserted that this was insufficient, arguing
that the number of markers collected should be raised to 15 or
16: "If you look, for example, at the Tsunami disaster, the
identification there is done on the sixteen marker system and
I would argue that the UK should be running at about that sort
of number".[184]
Sir Alec explained his reasoning as follows:
"10 markers give a chance of a match between
two unrelated people of, on average, 1 in 10,000,000,000,000.
While this is extremely low, the current size of the DNA database
coupled with very large numbers of speculative searches means
that even extremely rare chance matches will arise. This possibility
is admitted in the DNA database annual report [
] The chance
of a fluke match will be increased in those people who carry common
markers, to whom the 1 in 10,000,000,000,000 figure does not apply.
It will also be increased substantially in close relatives; for
example, siblings will have a roughly 1 in 250,000 chance of matching
over 10 markers".[185]
The additional six markers (to the 10 already used)
would, according to Sir Alec, "guarantee, with better than
99.9% certainty, that any false match would be detected in a given
case".[186]
87. Professor Jeffreys told us in oral evidence
that there would not be significant cost implications associated
with collecting sixteen markers for each profile: "There
are kits out there that will enable you to do a sixteen marker
test with no extra time or very little cost implication compared
to the ten marker test at the moment".[187]
On the other hand, he pointed out that changing the technology
platform of the NDNAD would be less than straightforward: "The
major problem is what we are going to do with the two and a half
million databases that are primarily ten marker. Do we go back
and re-test everybody and get them up to sixteen markers?".[188]
88. It has been argued that, since in the UK a conviction
could not be based on DNA evidence alone, the NDNAD should be
seen primarily as a screening tool. Dr Fereday used this latter
point as justification for not increasing the number of markers
utilised.[189] Dr Fereday's
view neglects to take into account the fact that the same ten
markers are employed for the "evidential match". Nimesh
Jani, Policy Advisor at the CPS, also told us that, as a prosecutor,
he would like to be able to work with DNA profiles that were essentially
unique, which would argue for increasing the discriminatory power
of a DNA match.[190]
Sir Alec suggested that "it would be reasonable for the database
to remain with 10 markers and for the additional 6 markers to
be used, following the identification of a suspect, to verify
or disprove the authenticity of the match".[191]
This would enable the discriminatory power of the DNA analysis
to be improved without necessitating a logistically difficult
and expensive change to the database technology platform. We
recognise that adventitious matches are extremely unlikely under
the current regime. Nevertheless, we find Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys'
warning that the "consequences of even one false match leading
to a conviction that was subsequently overturned could be severe
for the DNA database and its public acceptability" sufficiently
persuasive to merit a thorough investigation of the benefits and
risks of staying with the current 10 marker system and moving
to, for argument's sake, a 16 marker system. We therefore recommend
that the Government commission a cost-benefit analysis for this
move.
89. We also note that the new CPS guidance on DNA
charging states that a suspect may now be charged on the basis
of a DNA intelligence match, derived from the scene of the crime,
and a sample of DNA kept on the NDNAD, providing there is some
further supporting evidence.[192]
Moreover, whereas the previous ACPO guidance stated that where
a DNA match was based on SGM to SGM profiles (i.e. on six markers
only) it should be upgraded before charging, this may no longer
be deemed necessary depending on the strength of other supporting
evidence and what issues are raised by the defence.[193]
We are concerned that such decisions may be being taken
without proper scrutiny or adequate scientific input. Judge Thorpe,
Resident Judge at Chichester Crown Court, additionally drew our
attention to the need to review old cases where DNA profiles had
been collected using methods with less discriminatory power. He
told us that "Frankly, people on the FSS say, 'perhaps we
ought to go and look at it but nobody has asked me and nobody
is paying'. It is a matter of considerable concern".[194]
We agree, not least in light of the alarming statistic in the
NDNAD Annual Report 2003-04 that around 26% of matches between
SGM criminal justice sample profiles and crime scene profiles
were re-categorised as adventitious matches when the criminal
justice sample was upgraded from SGM to SGM Plus.[195]
The Government should continue
to make funding available to enable the upgrading of SGM profiles
currently stored in the NDNAD to SGM Plus profiles. We further
recommend that cases where DNA evidence has been used to convict
someone who continues to protest their innocence should be kept
live so that if another profile is added to the NDNAD that matches
that used in the conviction of the individual, it will be spotted
and acted upon. We understand that the FSS
will alert the police to instances where a newly added profile
matches a profile that has already been used for a conviction.
It is essential that the police then take appropriate action.
Other national databases
90. The police, understandably, are seeking to maximise
the value of the data that they already hold. One means of doing
this is through better use of, and greater connectivity between,
the existing police databases. The National Intelligence Model
is encouraging integration of intelligence sources, and the 2004
Bichard report into child protection, record keeping and information
sharing in Humberside Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary highlighted
the need for better police intelligence handling.[196]
Nevertheless, we heard in this inquiry that the police and Home
Office were not giving the necessary attention to the custodianship
arrangements for some of the other national forensic databases.
Tom Palmer from Forensic Alliance, for instance, informed us of
problems with access to the firearms database.[197]
Despite this, the Home Office told us that it had "no immediate
plans to alter the existing arrangements" for the firearms
database.[198] Other
key national databases include those that store information about
footprints and drug analysis data. Forensic Alliance also highlighted
the importance of sharing data between suppliers who are working
on the same case, calling for guidelines to be drawn up "to
ensure that as the market becomes more complex, common cause always
prevails".[199]
The police
and the Home Office must ensure that they give adequate attention
to the access and custodianship arrangements of other national
forensic databases and put in place mechanisms for data sharing
between suppliers where required.
91. At the international level, there are also arguments
for better harmonisation of national DNA databases to facilitate
the fight against crime. The European Network of Forensic Science
Institutes has been co-ordinating efforts to develop European
DNA databases and there is a European Council Resolution that
sets out the arrangements for the exchange of DNA profiles between
countries in Europe in support of criminal investigations.[200]
The Interpol DNA Gateway also provides for the transfer of DNA
profile information between two or more countries and for access
to a limited international database containing DNA profiles that
conform to Interpol standards.[201]
James Watson, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, has additionally
called for a global database to aid the fight against crime and
terrorism.[202] Increasing
the connectivity of different databases, whether at the national
or international level, may have significant ethical implications.
The Government must take this into account when considering the
linking or cross-referencing of forensic databases.
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Back
143
Q 399 Back
144
Ev 142 Back
145
Ev 142 Back
146
Q 569 Back
147
Q 570 Back
148
Q 400 Back
149
Ev 141 Back
150
Ev 142 Back
151
Q 400 Back
152
Forensic Science Service, The National DNA Database Annual
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153
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155
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157
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158
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160
Forensic Science Service, The National DNA Database Annual
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161
Ev 116, Ev 125 Back
162
Home Office, Review of the Forensic Science Service, July
2003 Back
163
Ev 131 Back
164
Ev 116 Back
165
Ev 193 Back
166
Ev 194 Back
167
Ev 141 Back
168
Q 571 Back
169
Q 575 Back
170
Q 575 Back
171
Ev 194-195 Back
172
Ev 195 Back
173
Ev 213 Back
174
Ev 195 Back
175
Ev 195 Back
176
Ev 141 Back
177
Forensic Science Service, The National DNA Database Annual
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178
New Scientist, Guilt by association, Frederick Bieber and
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179
Q 387 Back
180
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181
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182
As above. Back
183
Home Office, Police Science and Technology Strategy 2004-09,
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184
Q 389 Back
185
Ev 170 Back
186
Ev 170 Back
187
Q 391 Back
188
Q 391 Back
189
Q 579 Back
190
Q 501 Back
191
Ev 170 Back
192
The Prosecution Team, Guidance on DNA Charging, 16 July
2004 Back
193
Presentation by Karen Squibb-Williams, Science and Criminal
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194
Q 500 Back
195
Forensic Science Service, The National DNA Database Annual
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196
The Bichard Inquiry Report, HC 653, June 2004 Back
197
Q 236 Back
198
Ev 204 Back
199
Ev 197 Back
200
Council Resolution of 25 June 2001 on the exchange of DNA analysis
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201
www.interpol.int Back
202
Take everyone's DNA fingerprint, says pioneer, The Independent,
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