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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 6-ii House of COMMONS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE
THE FUTURE OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH
Monday 20 December 2004 PROFESSOR RICHARD FLAVELL and SIR PAUL NURSE Evidence heard in Public Questions 127 - 189
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the Science and Technology Committee on Monday 20 December 2004 Members present Dr Ian Gibson, in the Chair Dr Evan Harris Dr Brian Iddon Mr Robert Key Mr Tony McWalter Dr Desmond Turner ________________ Witnesses: Professor Richard Flavell, Chairman, Section of Immunobiology, Yale University School of Medicine (via telephone-link), Sir Paul Nurse, President, Rockefeller University, New York, (via video-link), examined. Q127 Chairman: Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us. The first question I want to ask you is about the words "without coercion" which were deleted from the statement that Professor Blakemore asked the Task Force to sign. Did you do that? Did you manipulate or seduce or whatever the words "without coercion" out of there? Why did you do that? Did you suggest anything else in that statement that might be changed, please? Paul? Sir Paul Nurse: This was a statement that was originally circulated a couple of months ago, I think around August, I cannot remember the dates. At the time I did not think it would be useful to sign such a statement. I suppose I felt that it was potentially provocative. Putting in words like "without coercion" seemed to me to be a statement that would be provocative, as if it was countering issues that were suggesting that there was coercion and I did not think that was very useful. That was what I thought in August. When it came back again a couple of weeks ago I read it very carefully because I think on the whole the Task Force operated reasonably well in extremely difficult circumstances, but when it came to this question of coercion again it seemed to me too pointed and I really wanted to try and get the Mill Hill members of the Task Force on board so that we had a united front over the process. I felt that putting those words in might be difficult for two reasons. One is that there was a lot of persuasion, there was lobbying and maybe more than is usual for such meetings, certainly more than what I am used to. There is a fine line between strong persuasion and coercion. I felt it was more like strong persuasion. Others, particularly if you are an employee, might have thought otherwise. The second reason I had some concerns about it was that although I did not feel I had been subject to any coercion, I was aware of these e‑mails that were around that I think you have discussed already. I was not aware of the telephone conversation between Robin and Colin until I read about it. I was aware there were thoughts that some of the persuasion was very strong and so I felt unable to say with complete confidence what had happened elsewhere, where I had not been, although in the meetings and conversations I had I would put it as strong persuasion rather than coercion. I do not know if that deals with the question for you. Q128 Chairman: Was there anything else that was added with your recommendation or taken out by your recommendation, Paul, besides that? Sir Paul Nurse: I talked about it with Dick Flavell who actually sent the e-mail back. He would probably be the better person to ask the question to. We removed "without coercion" and we took out another sentence a little further down which had been discussed more after the Task Force had been completed. I think it might be best to ask Dick about that because he was the one who removed the sentence. Q129 Chairman: Dick, what was it that you wanted to have removed besides the coercion phrase? Was there something else? Why do you think other people were not concerned about it, only you pair? Professor Flavell: I do not have the document in front of me now but I can certainly get that. There was a sentence which described a process. The process, as Paul just said, was something that happened afterwards and for that reason, because of the wording of the document, we both thought it was not appropriate for it to be in there. I would say there is nothing sinister behind that. It was just that we felt, independently and after we discussed it, that it was not a very good match for the document. Does that answer your question sufficiently? I can try and find that e-mail. Q130 Chairman: We have the documentation that says it was about Mill Hill being a baseline. Was that the phraseology that you wanted to remove? Would you just confirm that for the record, please? Professor Flavell: That is correct. Thank you very much. The reason was that that was brought in later as part of the process and by the Council. Q131 Mr Key: Sir Paul, we were told in evidence from Dr Lovell‑Badge that he received more than one phone call from Professor Blakemore late at night and at weekends and that he believed that other members of the Task Force had had this sort of pressure put on them. Did you receive any phone calls from Professor Blakemore exerting undue pressure? Sir Paul Nurse: I certainly received quite a few telephone calls from Colin. He certainly was trying to persuade me of certain opinions and situations. I would not say that I felt under enormous pressure, but then I am in a different position from Robin Lovell‑Badge as an outside person and not an employee. I certainly felt that there was a lot of persuasion going on, yes. Q132 Mr Key: Did that amount to coercion in your view? Sir Paul Nurse: Not coercion of me, no. Q133 Mr Key: Did you think this was regular lobbying that you might have expected if you were a member of the Task Force? Sir Paul Nurse: I would say it was just within limits but close to the limits in the sense that in my normal experience in such task forces I would not have so many one‑to‑one conversations outside such a Task Force. I think it was acceptable, but there was certainly a lot of it. Q134 Mr Key: Did you receive any similar sort of pressure or lobbying from the NIMR? Sir Paul Nurse: Not really, no. I was in conversation with the members of the Task Force. I had occasional conversations with John Skehel, who is the present Director, but they were more conversations in passing because I had lots to do with him wearing other hats as well. I would not say I was being persuaded of a particular position with my conversations with NIMR, no. Q135 Mr Key: Thank you, Sir Paul. Professor Flavell, did you feel any undue pressure or coercion from either the NIMR or from Colin Blakemore? Professor Flavell: I would say that I was lobbied in the same way that Paul mentioned by Colin on a couple of occasions. He sent me an e-mail once requesting my support for a particular position in July, I think, and we had certainly a phone call or two, one of which I remember was to ask me to sign that document that we have actually ultimately put together, the one that had the "without coercion" language in it. My perception of those contacts that Colin made is that they were not that of coercion, but obviously I am not an employee of the MRC and although I am not a peer of Colin (Colin is running a large organisation, I run a department of a university, etcetera), I felt that they were somewhat inappropriate, but I did not feel coerced. Q136 Mr Key: Were these concerns shared by members of the Task Force before the final meeting? Professor Flavell: Were what? Q137 Mr Key: The concerns about pressure, coercion and lobbying. Was there a general discussion by members of the Task Force before you came to your conclusions? Professor Flavell: No, there was not. These issues were not raised at any Task Force meeting. Mr Key: Thank you very much, gentlemen. Q138 Dr Turner: Paul, did you have the impression that anyone on the Task Force was running a hidden agenda or that there were conclusions to which the Committee was being surreptitiously steered? Sir Paul Nurse: I certainly did not at the beginning. I did begin to wonder a little bit when positions seemed to change somewhat between meetings. I remember one example where we discussed a split site alternative in central London. We had discussed this in one of the earlier meetings and we completely rejected that as being a reasonable solution. At the next meeting it came back again on the agenda and I could not really understand it because in principle we had rejected it. It is clear that it had come up in discussions between the MRC and probably Imperial College that a split site should be reconsidered, but what I felt there was that the Task Force had considered it, we had rejected it really completely and yet it came back again. That made me feel that sometimes there was more going on outside the meeting than I would normally have expected. Once again, this is a complex issue and I could imagine people changing their minds and coming back again without necessarily that meaning there was a hidden agenda. I think towards the end and certainly after the Task Force had finished, when there was still some unfinished business unfortunately, I began to feel that there was a stronger agenda emerging that was more antagonistic to Mill Hill than I had noticed during the Task Force. At the very beginning, no, but one or two times during the meeting I thought there were lots of discussions going on about outside changing approaches. At the end I felt it became more antagonistic towards Mill Hill. Q139 Dr Turner: Professor Flavell, what was your view on it? Professor Flavell: I think that Paul summed it up very well there. It was the same perception. For example, the subject of the so‑called "federated" option, which is the one to split up the Institute into a number of components, did appear in between two meetings and I did receive an e-mail soliciting my support for that, as I just mentioned. I would agree in general with Paul about this. However, I do not think I have any specific evidence of specific agendas. Q140 Dr Turner: Paul, how did you feel about the role of the Chairman of the Task Force? Was he a neutral, dispassionate Chairman acting as an equal member of the Task Force or did you feel that he was trying to guide the Task Force? Sir Paul Nurse: Colin came in to a very difficult situation and certainly took it on freshly. I felt he had an open mind and was considering all the alternatives. I thought he chaired the meetings well and reasonably fairly. He did express his opinions but I felt that was okay. It was more these outside discussions which made me more concerned because I do not know what else was going on in the one‑to‑one discussions. I always think in difficult situations like this you are best having more group meetings because one‑to‑one conversations can be so easily misinterpreted. I thought he handled the meetings very well in quite difficult circumstances. He did not interfere too much, he got the opinions that people had to say out there and I thought the actual meetings themselves were okay. What I cannot judge so much is what was going on outside those meetings. I knew things were going on because of all the e‑mails and so on and that is difficult for me to judge. Q141 Dr Turner: Professor Flavell? We seem to have lost Professor Flavell. Paul, where did this notion of the federated or split site come back from? Who resurrected it? Sir Paul Nurse: Colin brought it back. Professor Flavell: I am sorry but I lost the connection there for about two or three minutes and so I did not hear approximately that much time. Perhaps somebody could repeat very briefly what was said. I apologise. Q142 Dr Turner: The question was how did you feel about the role of the Chairman of the Task Force? Was he neutral or was he trying to guide the committee in any given direction? Professor Flavell: Paul, would you mind summarising what you have said so far? Sir Paul Nurse: I said that I felt he chaired the meetings fairly. I felt that he expressed his opinions but that that was balanced. It was more difficult for me to judge what was going on outside the meeting because I knew that there were lots of one‑to‑one meetings going on. I also said that I thought he had inherited a very difficult situation and it needed a lot of managing. Can I also add in addition to what I have just said that I think it is very difficult when one is a CEO of an organisation to chair a Task Force like this. It is easier if a Task Force reports to the CEO or the Chairman. In this particular instance obviously the Chairman had a double role and I think that is an extremely difficult role to manage. Q143 Dr Turner: Could I come back to the question of where the federated site or the split site option got resurrected from. Who resurrected it? Paul? Sir Paul Nurse: It was Colin who brought that idea back to the Task Force. I think it had probably been resurrected from his discussions with Imperial College and the University College, that is my understanding. Q144 Dr Turner: Richard, would you agree with that? Professor Flavell: Yes. Colin sent me an e-mail. I have got it here. You probably have this because I think you were sent everything. It is a confidential e-mail. It was sent on 28 March. I think Colin is saying in that e-mail his views on why he thinks that option really should be considered and what advantages it offers. So from that point of view I suspect that Colin is at least one of the people that favoured that option at that time and therefore suggested that we discuss it again. Q145 Dr Turner: Thank you. Can I ask you both in turn whether you felt that all the Task Force members approached the issues with an open mind? Did you feel that the two NIMR members were there to represent the views of the staff and the Director? Sir Paul Nurse: Obviously you should ask that directly of them. Everybody on the Task Force comes with a different position and with a different background. I think the Mill Hill representatives found themselves in quite a difficult position because I am sure they were seen by their colleagues at Mill Hill as having a role there to support them. I thought that during the meetings they handled themselves very well. They provided lots of information and background. They did lots of work. They were partisan in the sense that they were very positive about Mill Hill, but other members on the Task Force were equally partisan about other positions, like the fact that the universities were suffering greatly and the institutes like Mill Hill were perhaps absorbing too much of the resources. People came with different perspectives, but that is what you would expect. I thought the Task Force was put together in a way that would cover the range of views and opinions. Q146 Dr Turner: Richard Flavell? Professor Flavell: Both Robin and Steve Gamblin were very anxious, I think, and felt under a lot of pressure because of their two constituencies. They obviously had a strong advocacy position for their own institute which they, of course, were very fond of. That being said, however, they were very open to the various proposals that came forth. They supported the move to central London during discussions. They were open-minded about that. They raised what they thought were the pros and definitely the cons because they emphasised the fact that there was substantial translation already ongoing and they felt that that functioned reasonably well and therefore that distance was not as big a problem as others thought. As I said, nonetheless, they went along with that and when it came around to voting for it at various times they were in favour of that. The workings of that, given the circumstance, were pretty good. It is not surprising that they would have certain positions given the fact that they have worked there for so long and they love the place, but they were pretty open-minded for much of this discussion. Q147 Dr Harris: This is to Sir Paul and it is about the fifth meeting and the question of Mill Hill being either a full option or a fallback option. Do you recall saying after the presentation from Sir John Skehel at the final meeting words to the effect, "It's obvious that Mill Hill is not an option in the long run", because more than one person has said that you said that? Sir Paul Nurse: I definitely said that and I am happy to say why. I think there were two factors. One is that I happen to think that a central London location would be best. I also think that if a proper central London location could not be found then Mill Hill has done very well in the past - and I think I have said this in the written evidence - and it should be seen as a fallback position, particularly because that would have stabilised the institute. I think it is really important to know that all of this has got a potential risk for destabilising that institute and I felt as the fallback position that was really very important. Why I felt that in the very long term Mill Hill would not be right was partly political. People have been taking pot-shots at isolated institutes for many years and I felt personally that for those political reasons it would be important to try and get the institute closer with a higher education institute so that the universities would not keep taking pot-shots at it. Q148 Dr Harris: Sir Paul, can I just interrupt you to say that it is not going to be my intention to ask you to justify your opinion as a distinguished scientist on the Task Force, and indeed it is arguable whether that is in the remit of our inquiry, so you do not need to go too far down that path. You having said that, as you agree you said, do you think that then was the basis for the exclusion of Mill Hill as an option, at least a full option, by the Task Force in the summary of the fifth meeting or by the Task Force by a majority by the end of the process? Sir Paul Nurse: I am not sure because I argued that it should be considered as a fallback position, and indeed with Dick we both argued that there should be an extra meeting to consider that because I felt we were getting dangerously close to destabilising the institute without having that as a fallback position. I also felt that Mill Hill could act in the way that it had done. I just did not think it was ideal and I felt politically, as I said, given the atmosphere and the culture, that it would be safer for the institute if it were more associated with an institute of higher education. Q149 Dr Harris: Did you make the argument for the fallback position at that fifth meeting? Sir Paul Nurse: This is where the Task Force went wrong and this is where we really required an extra meeting, and I think it was a big mistake for us not to have one. We never considered what would happen if London did not come up with adequate facilities and resources. We thought - and this was, I think, universal across the committee - that a central London site was best. What we did not consider was what would happen if we could only find half a site or the money was not available That was a big error. We should have considered that because if central London was not able to come up with a good site then Mill Hill should have been kept going for the medium term, 15, 20 years even, until a central London site was found. I strongly believed that, and wanted to argue it. We never had the opportunity to do it because we never had an extra meeting to consider it. In the meeting you are talking about we did not consider that option. Q150 Dr Harris: Professor Flavell? Professor Flavell: At that meeting there were a lot of issues raised, of course. One was the issue of Paul making that statement. I also remember him saying that. It is possible that it was influential. One of the things that is worth remembering is that during the course of the Task Force meeting there was a straw vote held halfway through it, as I said, and a majority of the people that were there really gave a pretty equivalent assessment of Mill Hill as an option compared with the two central London options. Paul said his position. My position was the same as Paul's, that I favoured a central London option but we two, just as several others there, and I think it was five of the seven people there, said that we felt that a Mill Hill option was certainly viable. Again, this was not an official vote. This was a straw vote held as part of the process and it was stimulated by the consultants. The error that was made - and it was just a practical problem - was that we simply ran out of time to consider what to do following the discussion that really said the two central London options are the favoured positions, but then, as I said, we did not have that conversation about, "So then what are we going to do if it does not work out?". This is the position that Paul and I both felt the same about, which is that that should be Mill Hill for the arguments he has raised to you already. That is the process end of it. Is that clear? Q151 Dr Harris: Yes. If I can ask a summary question on that issue, and it relates to the fifth meeting and Sir Paul has already answered this, was it your impression that there was a consensus or majority at the fifth meeting of the Task Force for Mill Hill to remain either as a fallback or an active third option and, if not, was that simply because it was not discussed rather than that it had been rejected? Professor Flavell: There was a majority position at this straw vote that I have just mentioned that said that that was the case, that it should be considered. Paul, you can correct me if I am wrong, but I do not think it was discussed in the sense of should it be a full option or should it be a fallback option at that moment. As I said, the way the meeting progressed, when we had come back and formulated this end conclusion that the two London options would be the favoured ones, we did not come back and revisit that issue. That was an error on all our parts, for which I am happy to accept responsibility like the rest of them. Q152 Dr Harris: What do you think were the reasons why the consensus apparently achieved at the final meeting, because there was an agreed form of words produced as I understand it before the meeting ended, broke down? Professor Flavell: My reading of that is because we had not considered that "what if?" scenario, and therefore what was left hanging was, "If this all does not work out for whatever reasons, be they cost, governance, etc, what do we do?" Because that had not been considered and many of us - and I would be one - felt that that should be in there, I think that is why the consensus suffered. Q153 Dr Harris: Sir Paul? Sir Paul Nurse: I agree with Dick there. I felt we were remiss, as I said, in that we did not consider what would happen if a central London site was not up to scratch. There were several reasons why that might not have been. The reason we did not go down that route, incidentally, was that we were positive about the central London site in a theoretical way, that is, if it all worked. The consensus broke down, I believe, because we did not revisit this position. When it became clear that if the central London site did not work this then put the whole institute at threat because then the Task Force had not come up with that solution, I realised, and I think Dick (because we spoke about it) also thought strongly, that this was a dangerous situation and we needed to have an extra meeting to discuss that item, even if it was after the Task Force had finished, because what we saw was that the whole thing would unravel, the consensus would unravel, and what would also happen was that the people at Mill Hill would become extremely nervous and start looking for other jobs and so on, and I thought it was really important to try and avoid that. Unfortunately, that consensus has unravelled and we as a Task Force have to take responsibility, as Dick has quite rightly said, for not having dealt with it properly at that meeting in dealing with the fallback and then not having another meeting to pick up that lack. Q154 Dr Harris: Was that failure or omission at the fifth meeting to pin this down, this question of Mill Hill as either a fallback or a final option, a careless omission or do you think it was a deliberate omission with a purpose in order to that it could be then finessed in the final report to exclude it? Sir Paul Nurse: It was certainly careless on my part and I have really been kicking myself ever since then that I did not bring it up. I know I had to leave suddenly and so I was not concentrating too well. I can certainly say that for my part it was careless and I had no other ulterior motive. Q155 Dr Harris: Professor Flavell on that question? Professor Flavell: Yes, I can give you my own position there and then. I remember that going into this meeting we had felt that it was going to be very difficult to get a consensus position, and I think people were so excited on the one hand that consensus had been reached and, secondly, we basically were out of time because Paul had to leave to catch a plane, I think. From my point of view it was really an omission which I regret and I accept responsibility for. I do not have any evidence that there was an agenda on anybody else's part. It has never been declared to me but I do not have any evidence that there was not one, of course. I have no knowledge of it and so it would not be appropriate of me to suggest that. Q156 Dr Iddon: I want to address Sir Paul first with this question. It is really underscoring, Sir Paul, some of the answers you have already given. I want to ask were you satisfied that you fully considered all the options available for Mill Hill? My understanding is that the three options were either Mill Hill or the two London sites and that you favoured the two London sites. Is that correct? Sir Paul Nurse: It is correct. Q157 Dr Iddon: Is that also the opinion of Professor Flavell? Professor Flavell: Yes, that is absolutely correct. Q158 Dr Iddon: Did the Task Force, Sir Paul, consider the prospect of the redevelopment of Mill Hill in as much detail as it considered the other two options? It sounds from your previous answers as if the answer to that is, "Possibly no". Could I just underscore that? Sir Paul Nurse: I think, to be honest, we did consider it reasonably carefully. The focus did turn to central London for reasons to do with transport and contacts and semi-permeability with the higher education institutes, so we shifted from Mill Hill to central London fairly quickly, but I do think Mill Hill was considered as an option in a reasonable way. What we did not do, and I keep repeating that, of course, is consider it as a back-up option if central London did not work. I do think we considered it reasonably fairly. Q159 Dr Iddon: Professor Flavell, is that your opinion? Professor Flavell: I would put it slightly differently. I agree with Paul on most fronts. I think the one area in which we did not adequately consider the Mill Hill option was the area of cost. We did consider cost but the Mill Hill option provides a variety of cost scenarios and I do not think we really lined them up and said, "If, for example, the central London case falters on cost then we could go in this direction or that direction with the Mill Hill option". I think that was a mistake. Q160 Dr Iddon: I have one final question to put to both of you. Do you think that the Task Force should have been able to consider the Mill Hill Step Change Option which has been produced now or is it the job of the MRC to consider it? Sir Paul Nurse: The Task Force was set up with a prescribed role. It was advising the MRC. It is the MRC whose job it is to sort all of this out, so it is up to the MRC what they do. You could say that it is such a politically complicated issue that it might be politically expedient to involve the Task Force more in the future. I think that should be given consideration because everything is turning into such a mess, but constitutionally, in how it was set up, the Task Force has essentially done its business and it is now up to the MRC. I think the MRC could reconvene the Task Force to try and see whether we could find a way through it but that would be more a political consideration than anything that it would absolutely have to do. Q161 Dr Iddon: Professor Flavell, on the Step Change Option please? Professor Flavell: Could you please define "the Step Change Option" so I make sure I am responding to the right question? Q162 Dr Iddon: My understanding is that Mill Hill have put a fairly substantial bid together, which they call the Step Change Option, which they would like to see considered with the two London options. Possibly you are not aware of it; I do not know. Professor Flavell: I do not know the particular term. There have been several options proposed for Mill Hill of various costs. Let us put that aside for the moment Give me your question again and I will answer it. Q163 Dr Iddon: Do you think that the Task Force should have been able to consider the Mill Hill Step Change Option now produced, or is that better left to the MRC Council? Professor Flavell: I think that it would benefit the Council greatly to utilise the Task Force. I think it would be in its interests to do that because it is a pretty unbiased group. I think the workings of the Task Force have shown it to be able to function, to develop consensus, starting with a group of people who had very different positions. We had people in the beginning who wanted to close Mill Hill down, like Steve Tomlinson, who was a very flexible person. He developed different views when he heard the evidence, so I think it would be of substantial benefit to the Council to do that, but, of course, that is their decision. I would completely stand by any decision they make on that point. Q164 Mr McWalter: Professor Flavell, you have just referred to some matters to do with costs. Steve Gamblin said that the likely financial implications of the two central London options that appeared in the final Task Force report were only available to the Task Force a matter of days before the completion deadline and were added to the report rather than being part of the decision-making process. Would you agree that the Task Force did not give full consideration to the financial implications of the two London bids before reaching a decision to exclude Mill Hill as an option? Professor Flavell: I think that is true for many reasons. I am sure we do not really know the cost now of the central London options because they are complex, and I do not think we had sufficient information and so therefore cost was not sufficiently considered by us in our deliberations. That is at least my opinion. It was considered so it is not that there was no discussion about it, but I do not think we did an adequate job of doing that. Q165 Mr McWalter: Professor Nurse? Sir Paul Nurse: We did not do a proper job on costings, nor could we have done, to be quite honest. Both costings to my knowledge are not yet together. My view on the costing was that in the long run, over 50-70 years, the differences in costs between Mill Hill and central London were not going to be very different, and so we should be driven more by the science and by where better things could be achieved. I also thought that if there was a strong vision, which I think there is, the money would be found because we had many years in which to find it, so for me the costs became somewhat less important. We did not discuss them in detail. It is very difficult because there is a lot of chalk and cheese you have to compare here. Mill Hill is different from central London in how it would be set up. It could even take many months from now before we are fully aware of the costs, but there can be too much focus on the building costs. When you spread it over 50 years it becomes much less important. I kept emphasising that during the Task Force, that this was a decision for 50 years and we should not be influenced too much by the short term costs of building. Mr McWalter: Thank you, Chairman. Q166 Dr Harris: I want to go back to the question asked by Robert Key about the role of the Chairman because some comment was made about whether it was appropriate for the Chairman to be on the Task Force and I think that was a decision the Task Force was presented with by the Council and that he was involved in exerting some pressure, although neither of you described it as coercion. Looking at it as objectively as you can, do you consider in retrospect the actions he took to be unreasonable because too much emotion and time was invested or would you say that as a Chief Executive of a large organisation who was under pressure on a contentious issue it was appropriate to work behind the scenes to try and get consensus, even if that meant putting pressure on? Sir Paul Nurse: We put Colin in a very difficult position as both CEO and Chairman of the Task Force. It was very difficult for him to act in both roles. I did not realise this at the beginning but as it went forward I really felt sorry for the position he had. I have learnt something from this and that is that I think in the future where one has a major investigation of this sort probably the CEO should be kept separate and then the Task Force could report to the CEO, otherwise it is a bit of a mixture of roles. I think Colin was put in a very difficult position and it probably was not ideal, but I do not think anybody really fully realised that when the whole thing was set up. Q167 Dr Harris: Professor Flavell, do you think anyone could have done a better or different job in that position? Professor Flavell: I think in many ways Colin did a very good job. He started the process with an open mind. He had a skilful handling of the meetings with regard to the development of consensus. It was a terribly difficult job. I told him after the event, which is not very useful, that I thought it would have been better had he not been Chairman, but he pointed out to me that that was in fact determined by the Council prior to all of these things, so that was really not a negotiable item. I think he should have realised ‑ and this is easy to say at a distance perhaps and not so easy when you are in the midst of it ‑ that when you are a Chief Executive of an organisation and you are talking to one of your staff scientists it is very much a non‑equivalent position and that can be extremely intimidating. I do not think I ever felt intimidated by him but I would imagine that others may well have done because he is a strong advocate in certain cases. In many ways, as I said, I think he did a good job and, given the circumstances, for much of the process I felt quite satisfied with him. Q168 Dr Harris: You talked about sympathy. Do you have sympathy with Dr Lovell‑Badge and Dr Gamblin because it is unusual for staff to be on a Task Force of this stature? Clearly it could be argued they are in a difficult position because they had 12 other or so heads of divisions expecting them to deliver something that they could live with and a Director who is not backwards in coming forwards with views that are probably expressed quite clearly. Do you have sympathy with their position? Do you think that might explain ‑ and it is up to you to agree this or not ‑ the nature and timing of e-mail correspondence that kept re‑opening something where there was a striving for consensus prior to those e‑mails? Professor Flavell: Just as Colin was in a difficult position, I think Steve Gamblin and Robin were in an impossible position. They were being squeezed from both directions. I am sure they had pressure from their colleagues in the sense that there was the expectation that they were to present their views and they were getting pressure from Colin in the other direction. I think they were incredibly courageous raising some of these issues about the process about which they were uncomfortable with their Chief Executive. I do not know if I would have had the courage to do it. I admire them very much for what they did. I think they did it with the best of intentions. I do not think there is anything malicious about what they have done. I am sure you will have seen the documentation. There was an issue about e‑mails and how there was an attempt to modify the text of the document and there was a deadline and there were some e‑mails that were received a minute or two after the deadline and so on. I think we would have been wise as a Task Force not to have worried so much about the deadline in order to have a fair process covered. That is a mistake again we all accept responsibility for. I could have said something and I did not. There were some mistakes on all sides. Q169 Dr Harris: Sir Paul? Sir Paul Nurse: I think that they did have a difficult job. I know that they kept themselves away from all the discussions going on in Mill Hill, that is what they told me, so that they could keep some sort of level of independence, but they were under a lot of pressure. We did reach a consensus. The tragedy here is that I think we could have sorted all of this, I really believe it. They had signed up to the consensus and I think it has unravelled because we could not go one step further. I think they did a very good job in the circumstances. They have my sympathy just as Colin does as well. Q170 Dr Turner: I would like to ask both of you, starting with Paul, about the processes. You have both hinted that the processes of the Task Force were not perfect. I would like your view on that. No one has said anything yet about the role of the consultants serving the Task Force and the presentation to the Council. Can you comment on those? Sir Paul Nurse: I felt the consultants did a reasonable job. It is very consultants' speak of course, but I thought they did a reasonable job and I have no criticism of them. As regards the Council, I have had nothing to do with that, Dick can comment on it as he presented to Council. Part of the discussions went on with Dick there and part of it without Dick being there, so we do not have a full view of what happened there. I have had very little to do with the Council over this matter so I cannot comment on that. With respect to the process, we did follow the process in the sense of we had certain deadlines and we fitted it into those. I do think that had there been a bit more flexibility, as Dick has just hinted, particularly if we had had that extra meeting, we may have been able to sort this whole thing out before it unravelled and I think it was a mistake not to go down that line because we could have possibly generated another consensus over the fall‑back position as well. Although officially the process was followed, I do think that with greater flexibility we could have come to a better solution. Q171 Dr Turner: Richard? Professor Flavell: I agree with Paul on what he said earlier about the tragic outcome given the fact that at the fifth meeting we were very close. I did say we should have a sixth meeting and we did not do it and I think that was a mistake. The role of the consultants was quite essential and I think it was Colin who proposed it. He was very democratic about asking were we all in agreement about that and everyone was happy with it. They did an outstanding job. There is no way that we would have finished that process in those five meetings without that assistance. It would have been impossible just because of the extraordinary deadline. Q172 Dr Turner: Do you think it was sensible to conduct the final discussions not in the whole Task Force but in a whole series of bilateral discussions on the telephone, via e-mail and so on without all the members of the Task Force being able to participate? Do you think this was satisfactory? How many bilateral phone calls were there? Professor Flavell: There were lots of these things and that is why I felt we should have a meeting, because it certainly was not time efficient with all of this two‑person communication. In retrospect I feel even stronger that we should have had that meeting. Q173 Dr Turner: Paul? Sir Paul Nurse: I do too. We could have talked a bit more about the finances. We could have talked about the fall‑back options. Having all these bilateral discussions, one‑to‑ones, is a real formula for confusion and for misunderstanding. I think in a complex issue like this we are best having mainly the business going on in the meeting itself. When you have to mop up with lots of one‑to‑one conversations there really is just too much confusion that can arise from that. I think an extra meeting could have sorted this all out. Professor Flavell: There was at least one conference call in which a large number of us were present, I think possibly one person was not there, in which the fall‑back option was discussed extensively, but we could not reach a consensus at that meeting. That was pretty soon after the fifth meeting. I did not answer you about the issue of the presentation to Council and the reason is because I was not quite sure what you were asking. If you want me to say something perhaps you could clarify that. If not, that is absolutely fine. Q174 Dr Turner: It rather sounds as if you are both saying that the process started to break down after the fifth meeting. Would you agree with that? Professor Flavell: Yes. Sir Paul Nurse: Yes, it began to break down and that is why we needed another meeting, to rebuild consensus. Q175 Dr Turner: Did you think that the pressure to produce a final report to the MRC Council by 29 July was unhelpful? Did that bias the outcome? Sir Paul Nurse: It was unhelpful. We knew we had to be there. It was a very tough deadline. I think we should have put it off and said that we could not deliver and we needed an extra meeting. I think that would have been a better outcome. Q176 Dr Turner: Do you think there were any unreasonable attempts by Task Force members to unstitch a consensus once you had got one? Sir Paul Nurse: I think we have seen, and you have seen in your earlier meeting, that there is obviously now a lot of bitterness and acrimony around. I think that is a tragedy because I think we were very close to a reasonable solution and we could have got there. I think it has been unstitched now and as a consequence it will be more difficult to stitch it together, but because of the importance of the National Institute of Medical Research in the UK medical research portfolio it is absolutely essential that we do stitch it back together again. We have a responsibility for making this work. This is a tragedy and we seriously need to rebuild consensus and stitch things back together. I am afraid it will be more difficult now than it would have been had we been able to do it in July. Q177 Dr Iddon: Sir Paul, have you any advice to give the Science and Technology Select Committee or the MRC Council on how best to stitch it back together now or do you think the Council will have to proceed on the evidence that you have already given them? Sir Paul Nurse: It is very difficult for me to advise like this. I will state a couple of things, if I may. As I have just said, this is a very important issue. This Institute is a good Institute and it is very important for biomedical research in the UK, as you have seen from its international reputation. It has been a very difficult issue to handle. I personally have always thought that if Mill Hill was the fall‑back position then in fact these problems would go away because I think the central London site does have strong things going for it and the Task Force unanimously agreed it, including the two Mill Hill representatives. I think their concerns were at the time what happens if it goes wrong. If it goes wrong I think Mill Hill is a viable option. I personally would strongly advise that this Task Force be got together again, that we try and build a consensus, that we have some mediator to get these different groups back together again because without it, as I said, we are walking into a tragedy here. Q178 Dr Iddon: Professor Flavell? Professor Flavell: Could I add something there? Q179 Dr Iddon: I was going to ask you to do that. Professor Flavell: I completely agree with Paul. I was invited to present to Council and I really presented the arguments which I had solicited in part on Colin's request from Steve Gamblin so I could adequately present the Mill Hill representatives' views. I think that it is the absence of consideration of that which has caused all the trouble. The problem that needs fixing is to deal with that, to come up with a view on what should be done if these other options falter. I think explicit consideration of the Mill Hill option should be done and I think it would be best done by a more independent body than the Council because, of course, they are probably now under pressure and considered, at least in some quarters, to be biased. I am not referring to myself here. That is the most important issue and I think it would benefit Council enormously to deal with that issue, using an independent entity like the Task Force, for example. Q180 Dr Harris: There has been some conversation about the unravelling of the consensus that was reached at various meetings. What I could not understand at the beginning of this, if forms of words were agreed at the end of a meeting, like on 21 June, and then at the end of two conference calls on, I think, the 12th and the 19th, that that was a sensible way forward, to get agreement there, how on each of those three occasions it appeared to have come apart. I see here an e-mail - and I have read through them and I do not know if you both have, but there are e-mails on 12 July, for example, from Colin Blakemore - saying, "Dear All, Attached is a short paragraph that we drafted and agreed during the conference call that has just ended. Steven Robbins said they would communicate this to the heads of divisions and ask them to remove the reference to me on the NIMR website, so I am grateful to them for that". Do you think that e-mail is wrong in that there was not a consensus paragraph agreed at that conference call on 12 July, and indeed again on 19 July, or was it in due course unstitched by people who could not stick, for whatever reason, to what they had said at that meeting or conference call? Sir Paul Nurse: Evan, I cannot remember the precise details of the e-mail so I will answer in generalities if you do not mind. We did build consensus. What went wrong was that when it was realised that if central London could not deliver, because of the uncertainty around the Mill Hill site this would mean that Mill Hill might be closed with all the subsequent consequences. That led to a complete polarisation of the subsequent discussions and debate. That was utterly predictable given that we did not - and that was the problem with the Task Force - deal with the fallback position. I think the consensus unravelled because of the threat over the horizon. If we had dealt with that threat I do not think it would have happened. Q181 Dr Harris: The point I am making is that the conference calls I am talking about deal with the setting out of the divergence, so it is the paragraph that says, "Some on the Task Force feel X and some on the Task Force feel Y". I must correct myself: it was 15 July, the second conference call, when an even shorter e-mail says at 14.35, number 191, "Here is the new version of the little section on views" - that is the disparate views - "about the Mill Hill site just agreed during the conference call. Colin", and then that blew apart later on in e-mails and I am just wondering whether either of you can work out why, with experienced people on this Task Force, three assumed agreed positions that were confirmed after the event and agreed at the meeting or the conference call fell apart within a few days. Sir Paul Nurse: I cannot. I think it fell apart for the reasons I just said, that the logic went through that if central London does not work then the National Institute for Medical Research may be closed. I think that is why it fell apart. Q182 Dr Harris: Professor Flavell? Professor Flavell: Paul is exactly right. What happened was that we had a consensus at the meeting followed by a discussion on the Mill Hill fallback issue. The fact that no position could be formulated on that made it, I am sure to the Mill Hill representatives, implicit that if the central London option were not successful the institute would be closed and, of course, that led to a substantial hardening of positions, for understandable reasons, because they felt that that would be a disastrous outcome. I cannot speak for Paul, of course, but I would have felt that that would have been the wrong outcome as well. Paul probably would feel the same way and he should comment himself. Q183 Dr Harris: I am looking at my colleagues and I have read through this e-mail and I do not see any discussion of Mill Hill closing. I see an e-mail from RAF, which I think is Professor Flavell, on 15 July at 18 minutes past 7.00 pm that says, "Looks okay to me re the revised paragraph", and so it seemed that at that point you, as someone who is sensitive to this issue about the future of Mill Hill, were happy and it is followed by one from Professor Davies as well. I am looking for, if there is one, an alternative explanation as to why, despite you being happy and certainly no e-mail from Professor Nurse saying he was unhappy with any of those agreed paragraphs, it could not be made to stick. Professor Flavell: As you will appreciate, I do not have any of the e-mails in front of me. There are hundreds of them so I do not have any individual one. That date you were referring to - where does it sit with regard to the fifth meeting and these follow-up phone calls? Dr Harris: It is an e-mail sent after the second conference call after the fifth meeting where a paragraph was proposed coming out of the meeting that talks about "those who favour three site options recommend a straight comparison between proposals on a scientific value-for-money basis while the others suggest that if negotiations with UCL and KCL fail to produce an acceptable solution the Council should consult the Task Force again". I know it is hard for you to remember the detail. I feel I know it better having read this over the weekend. That is the paragraph we are talking about. Q184 Chairman: Can I interject? If you cannot remember this e-mail and we are just skating around it, would you say so? You have not got the details in front of you. Does that make a difference to your answers, because we can write to you about it? Professor Flavell: Yes. That may be better. This is an important issue we are trying to deal with and I do not want to make an off-the-cuff answer. I appreciate your bringing it up; it is a good point, but I would rather try and do it better. Sir Paul Nurse: I actually think it is more straightforward. It is what I said before. This whole thing unravelled because it suddenly looked as if the whole Mill Hill institute, the National Institute of Medical Research, was under threat. Because it was not going to be considered as a fallback option it was thought that meant as an agenda that it was going to be closed. It is as simple as that. Q185 Mr McWalter: It looks from the e-mails as if Professor Blakemore really did not want to discuss the Mill Hill option because he thought that would lose momentum behind the drive towards central London. Is that not right? Sir Paul Nurse: I cannot speak for Colin. You should ask him that directly, of course. We all were enthusiastic about central London. He might have thought continuing the debate about Mill Hill was a distraction. My concerns were more tactical to keep everything together, to keep them secure, and also that if the central London site did not work we would have some way of keeping these 700 or 800 scientists together. Q186 Mr McWalter: Professor Flavell? Professor Flavell: While you were talking I was thinking about that meeting. I think what was going on in that one case was that there was enormous difficulty in getting a position that people could agree with and Paul came up with a good suggestion, which was a compromise suggestion, on consultation of the Task Force. I think that is actually what had happened. I am sorry: I missed the detail of your question. I was just trying to reconstruct what had just been asked. Q187 Mr McWalter: I said that Professor Blakemore really did not want Mill Hill discussed in any detail to retain the site because he thought that would lose momentum from the drive to relocate in central London. Professor Flavell: I do not think I can really answer that. That is a question that Colin has to answer himself. Q188 Chairman: Let me just finish this hearing off, this stage of it, by asking you this. You have made some suggestions almost as if you would like to start all over again. I am not sure that is what you are saying but it sounded a bit like that. Do you feel that there are time constraints in making this decision? What is urgent about it? What difference would it make to science in Britain rather than making sure that the whole population who is interested in this seeing that there has been a fair and just process, looking at the whole thing? How would you feel about that? What would you do in this situation it the future and given the time constraints? Sir Paul Nurse: I think that we have to build up a working relationship between the staff at Mill Hill and the MRC administration. I think there is a breakdown of trust there, probably on both sides, and without a rebuilding of that trust we are not going to make much progress. Rebuilding of trust could be achieved if the issue of the fallback position for Mill Hill could be re-opened and re-discussed either by Council itself directly or by a new body or by the Task Force. I think that is the key issue that needs to be dealt with because if the central London sites do not deliver then if Mill Hill could be guaranteed as a site I think this problem would go away. First of all we need trust-building. Secondly, we need to have a process that will reconsider this fallback position and, thirdly, we have to get into discussions and try and deliver. Q189 Chairman: Professor Flavell, are there any time constraints in your opinion? Is it worth taking a long time to recreate this process, as Professor Nurse has indicated? Professor Flavell: I think it would be worthwhile. I do not think the amount of time would be astronomical anyway to resolve the issue. I do not think there is anything which is so time sensitive, with the proviso that I do not know the details of cost, budgeting, etc, for capital expenditure, but it would seem to me that it would be feasible to do and I think the most time-efficient way would be to use the Task Force. Let me emphasise I am not pushing for that. Of course, the decision needs to be made by, I guess, the MRC Council. I am totally happy with them deciding that. That is what I would do if I were in that position. Chairman: Thank you. That is fairly clear. Thank you very much, Paul. Thank you very much, Dick. We will see you again some time over this side of the big pond. Happy days over Christmas and New Year. Not too much eggnog, I fear. Professor Flavell: Same to you all. Sir Paul Nurse: Happy Christmas everybody. I will be back in Oxford in two days. |