Memorandum by the Road Users' Alliance
(RP 39)
ROAD PRICING
The Road Users' Alliance (RUA) was formed two
years ago to provide a voice for those organisations with an interest
in ensuring the future of our road system. This includes not just
those who build roads and use the road infrastructure to carry
services, but all of us who count on roads to get from A to B.
RUA aims to secure sustained investment in the UK road network.
Its founding members include the RAC Foundation, the Builders
Merchants Federation, the National Joint Utilities Group, and
the Refined Bitumen Association.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The growth in the desire for mobility
and car ownership is a reflection of personal prosperity and quality
of life.
1.2 The UK currently has one of the lowest
levels of car ownership (9th in the EU) with 419 cars per '000
inhabitants (EU average 469) (RUA Road File).
1.3 Traffic is forecast to increase 50%
over the next 30 years as car ownership spreads to the lower paid,
failure to increase road capacity would reduce this increase to
33% but result in widespread and frequent gridlock. (RAC Foundation,
Motoring Towards 2050).
1.4 Roads play an important role in economic
growth—promoting flexible employment, generating retail
customers, enabling just-in-time manufacturing and delivery for
export or domestic sale. (65% in IOD survey report that poor transport
has a negative impact on business.)
1.5 The efficiencies of national entities
permitted by car ownership extend to state services—regional
hospitals, district magistrate courts, etc.
1.6 The UK has one of the worst congestion
problems (per cent of journeys liable to delay) leading to the
longest commuting times. (CBI).
1.7 The UK has the smallest motorway network
in the EU (15) expressed as km/car, km/capita, and km/unit of
GDP (except for Ireland) UK is 11th in terms of motorway kms per
land area.
1.8 UK motorists pay the highest motoring
taxes in Europe. They currently generate £42.2 billion pa.
UK investment in roads is amongst the lowest. The UK Central Government
budget for roads is only £6.7 billion (RUA Road File).
1.9 Public transport plays only a small
part in this issue. Rail accounts for 6.5% of UK journeys, 70%
of which are into or out of London. The best EU rail networks
account for about the same proportion of total travel. With the
anticipated growth in car use, even the achievement of a targeted
50% increase in UK rail travel will not impact on road demand.
1.10 The UK has the largest bus and coach
fleet in Europe. Bus use has been increasing in London. London's
bus subsidies are expected to rise to £0.5 billion pa.
1.11 Car travel in the UK is increasing
by more than total rail or bus travel every 10 years.
1.12 Rail carries 8% of freight tonnage
in the EU, 3% by value, a little less in the UK.
The UK road network is central to the UK economy;
it is quite inadequate by international standards.
2. ROAD PRICING
Any Road Pricing System should have the following
objectives:
2.1 To generate funding, additional to that
currently budgeted for roads, to construct and maintain road and
transport capacity-reflecting more closely both demand for travel
and the ratio between modes (ie 93% road to 7% rail). Any investment
should be justified by delivering a positive benefit to cost.
2.2 To promote the efficient use of road
space by encouraging alternatives to car travel—including
public transport, car sharing, off-peak travel, etc.
2.3 To be so organised so as to guarantee
that any additions to existing motoring tax revenues are dedicated
to transport improvement. An independent "Regulator"
would be essential.
There is a strong case for reducing or removing
the financing and operation of transport in general and roads
in particular from state provision and allowing the economics
of supply and demand to operate within the national and local
planning process.
Increasing the cost of motoring ahead of inflation,
by whatever means, will prevent the low paid from enjoying the
benefits of car ownership. Leaving aside the inequities of this
"exclusion", it will impact on the economy.
3. CHANGING THE
WAY WE
PAY FOR
ROADS
Different road payment policies different implications:
3.1 Urban Charging
3.1.1 An access tax, eg London Congestion
charge, limits road use to vehicles willing or able to pay (a
premium service). In the London zone the car was used by only
15% of travellers—the quantity and quality of public transport
was such that it limited the number of passengers affected and
modal switch was relatively painless.
Introduction of congestion charging has reduced
road traffic within its area of operation, although it has not
been a revenue earner; and, reportedly, it may have damaged some
business.
3.1.2 Urban charging system technologies
have to be non-stop/off-road and monitoring must cope with high
buildings, etc Inter-operability is an important issue but less
sensitive than on national networks.
3.1.3 The risks to city economies without
exceptional park-and- ride interchange facilities may prove too
high. Car friendly, out-of-town retail parks benefit so car traffic
may be generated elsewhere.
3.1.4 How many local authorities can afford
the public transport implications?
Promoting public transport is primarily an urban
objective. Public transport is expensive and demands substantial
public subsidy. It becomes cost effective where demand is high
and the provision of road space for cars would be even more expensive.
3.2 Facility Charging
3.2.1 The introduction of a facility tax
(toll) to pay for investment in a road, bridge or tunnel, has
resulted in the construction and maintenance of good quality infrastructure
across Europe, particularly when the toll is performance related.
3.2.2 Shadow tolls have worked as well when
the concessionaire is paid by the road authority against performance
criteria.
3.2.3 The M6 Expressway toll road promises
a premium congestion-free service. It was less used by freight
vehicles until the truck toll was reduced, since the cost: time
ratio was clearly unfavourable.
3.2.4 Price sensitive traffic uses the existing
motorway or other roads.
3.2.5 Avoidance of tolls such as that on
the Severn Bridge has resulted in the use of less suitable routes.
3.3 National Lorry Charging
3.3.1 Network user charge. Eg lorry road
user charging and road tolling in Austria and Switzerland, is
to recover cost from domestic and international traffic to fund
the construction and operation of the motorway network.
3.3.2 Secondary benefits have been a reduction
in traffic, achieved by freight companies improving their logistics,
(better load factors, fewer empty trips).
3.3.3 Such a system will be subject to EU
intervention to ensure cross border inter-operability.
3.4 National Car Charging
3.4.1 GPS location tracking methodology
(if reliable, probably augmented by microwave equipment) does
have privacy implications.
3.4.2 It would however offer better national
security, road safety, route finding and ultimately enable the
removal of traffic signs (replaced by in-car direction, hazard
warning and advice).
3.4.3 A national charge which was totally
flexible in terms of time and location would allow price signals
to deter use of the busiest roads at the busiest times and penalise
much less, users of the more remote network.
3.4.4 There could be complications combining
a national charging scheme with existing facility tolls. (Double
charging?)
3.4.5 A national scheme would have to address
the key issue of traffic displacement.
Traffic should use motorways and main roads
rather than residential streets and country lanes. Pricing should
not encourage displacement.
4. SHOULD ROAD
PRICING BE
INTRODUCED FOR
CERTAIN SECTIONS
OF THE
ROAD NETWORK
IN THE
SHORT TERM?
4.1 Yes, if the objective is a facility
tax (3.2 above) to fund urgent new road provision which would
otherwise not receive government funding; or would have to wait
years for resource from conventional budgeting or a national pricing
scheme.
4.2 This may promote schemes such as the
M6 expressway, seen by many as a poor alternative to widening
the existing road; but the speed of execution is the critical
factor.
4.3 Local congestion charging may be the
option for some local authorities; it is fraught with risk as
indicated by the London scheme. It does not raise significant
net revenue, it presupposes more public transport alternatives
than can be afforded or accommodated in most other cities and
may damage business. Accordingly, its introduction will be limited
or short-term.
5. IF ROAD
PRICING IS
INTRODUCED, WHAT
FACTORS SHOULD
DETERMINE WHICH
ROADS ARE
PRICED AND
WHAT TECHNOLOGY
SHOULD BE
USED?
5.1 As indicated above, speed and urgency
would favour conventional tolls on strategic route improvements.
5.2 A national scheme has overriding benefits;
it would involve all roads and require constant vehicle location
technology (see 3.4).
6. HOW "HIGH
TECH" DOES
ROAD PRICING
NEED TO
BE?
6.1 If it is accepted that the urgent provision
of more road facilities is the key objective, then the initial
selection of a facility charge (3.2) would be selected; the technology
could then be strictly conventional—toll plazas and/or automatic
tag reading.
6.2 National pricing requires an all-road
approach (see 3.4.5, displacement).
6.3 All-road Lorry Road User Charging can
be undertaken more easily and more quickly with in-vehicle monitoring
and charging systems which can be linked to the vehicle tachograph.
7. WHAT ROLE
SHOULD LOCAL
HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES
PLAY IN
INTRODUCING ROAD
PRICING?
7.1 There should be proper recognition that
there is a hierarchy of roads and public transport systems:
UK road network:
| |
Motorways | 3,476 kms
|
| Trunk roads | 9,340 kms |
| Principal roads | 37,292 kms
|
| Minor roads | 342,212 kms |
(RUA Road File) |
|
| |
The above includes by-ways, lanes, residential streets, and
town and city centre streets, roads which access them (bus routes).
7.2 Only some of those roads included in the top three
categories above appear on the current "strategic road"
map (The Future of Transport DfT Jul 2004) and 3,200 kms of trunk
road will be reclassified as "non-core".
7.3 There is a need for a national regulating body which
should designate what should constitute the UK's inter-regional
road structure and define what its design specification should
be. This network will then be subject to supervision by this national
authority and any charging system on it will have to meet EU standards
of inter-operability.
7.4 There will be other roads which are of regional strategic
significance; the Regional Development Agencies would typically
see the planning (and possibly funding) of this section of the
network as part of their remit. Its subsequent operation would
then be part of a national arrangement.
7.5 The local roads, cycle and footpaths, residential
streets, and all minor roads would tend to be a matter for the
communities which they serve.
7.6 Urban charging is expected to be the exclusive decision
of local authorities; the risks of its introduction are best assessed
by them.
7.7 What is striking about roads and local government
today is that there is limited discretion for transport priorities
to be set and investment decisions implemented, except by central
government edict.
7.8 The freedom for municipalities to issue their own
debt and raise local taxes would devolve accountability and transform
the speed and relevance of local investment.
7.9 Local roads might then be paid for via methods which
were not directly related to their use (local taxes) or by urban
road charging schemes at local discretion using number plate recognition
ie relatively "low tech".
8. HOW EASY
WILL IT
BE TO
MOVE FROM
INDIVIDUAL TOLL
ROADS AND
LOCAL URBAN
CONGESTION CHARGING
SCHEMES IN
THE SHORT
TERM, TO
NATIONAL ROAD
PRICING IN
THE LONGER
TERM, AND
WHAT NEEDS
TO BE
DONE TO
ENSURE TRANSITION
IS A
SUCCESS?
8.1 The supposition that the longer term will see a national
road pricing scheme is valid. The use of in-car meters, which
make journey costs certain and predictable, is most likely to
achieve the desired objectives of 2.0.
8.2 In-car systems will have to be inter-operable both
nationally and, probably, internationally.
8.3 Such systems should be fitted as original equipment
to contain costs as well as minimise the ease of tampering.
8.4 The "ownership" of each road as implied
in 7.0 would facilitate the transfer of charging to a central
system.
8.5 Assuming a full time location system, GPS + microwave
seems likely, the allocation of revenue to the appropriate "owner"
as well as allowing the "owner" to have a say in that
charge, appears quite feasible.
8.6 An additional facility offered by such a system is
automated parking advice and control; ie the opportunity to pre-book
a parking space and to pay for it without the need for parking
meters, requiring (fewer) wardens or pay points.
9. HOW WILL
LORRY ROAD
USER CHARGE
FIT INTO
ANY NATIONAL
ROAD PRICING
AND MOTORWAY
TOLLING DEVELOPMENTS?
9.1 An LRUC system which relies on tachograph and microwave
gantry detection as used in Switzerland and Austria is not suitable
for extension to private cars if it is mileage-based rather than
able to monitor and charge by location and time.
9.2 But a GPS + microwave system would appear to be operable
for all traffic.
9.3 It is assumed that toll road operators would have
to continue to have discretion on charges for the use of carriageways
"owned" by them. But, as indicated above, a national
authority could act as collection agent.
9.4 There would cease to be a need for manned toll plazas.
10. ARE THERE
OTHER MEASURES
WHICH COULD
REDUCE CONGESTION
MORE EFFECTIVELY?
10.1 Draconian financial penalties to ensure that car
use is limited to only the most well off might reduce the use
of cars, but must be rejected as inequitable, politically unsustainable
and economically damaging (see 1.0).
10.2 It is notable that the UK's fuel and motoring tax
policy has resulted in the highest fuel taxes in Europe, and a
proportionately low car population. But this has not prevented
the most severe congestion in Europe (see 1.6 above). This demonstrates
the central role of road capacity in determining congestion levels.
10.3 Apart from some new build the main need is for the
widening of some existing trunk roads, completion of missing sections
of dual carriageway, construction of by-passes, and junction improvements
by the replacement of roundabouts and traffic lights with under/over
passes and other pinch point removal. A programme with quite limited
spatial impact would reduce congestion considerably. Capacity
investment is essential if congestion is to be reduced and gridlock
avoided.
10.4 It must be recognised that car ownership and use
aspirations will continue to grow and "free" road use
allows inefficiencies in the use of even augmented capacity.
10.5 At current levels of tax, motorists will suspect
exploitation; acceptability will depend on whether there is a
pro rata reduction in existing motoring taxes.
10.6 However, if road-use taxes are collected by an independent
road authority additional revenue might be raised with limited
objection, if all the extra funds are guaranteed to be spent on
roads or other transport.
10.7 Fairness, privacy, social inclusion and accessibility
are probably best served by not introducing road pricing. The
existing per-litre fuel tax is seen by motorists to be fairer
and more private. Social inclusion and accessibility are promoted
by extending car ownership and the ability to use it, to the lower
paid.
10.8 If public transport becomes a normal mode in city
centres and a selective option in a multi-modal journey, rather
than a poor person's alternative to the car, it will make its
contribution to congestion reduction; but the potential for modal
shift is very limited.(EU average car share 80.4% versus UK 86.4%
RUA Road File.)
10.9 Road users do not trust government to act fairly
in this matter. The fuel protests indicated the political threat
that obtains.
10.10 Britons spend over £120 billion pa on their
cars and motoring. (RUA Road File) There is an indication from
research that motorists would actually pay more for better roads,
and even for public transport, provided the additional money was
collected by an independent authority with an auditable mandate
to deliver a better network. The current delivery is so bad that
it is surprising that there has not been more reaction to the
UK's motoring taxes.
11. CONCLUSION: ROAD
USERS' ALLIANCE
PROPOSAL
11.1 RUA believes that the UK economy is seriously threatened
by its poor quality roads, inadequate road maintenance and primitive
arrangements for the distribution of public utilities. The challenge
is different in towns and cities (streets) and connections between
them (motorways, trunk roads, etc).
11.2 There is a need to identify the core strategic network
which connects cities and major towns. The design of such a network
should enable traffic to flow uninterrupted (by-passing towns
and villages, over or under junctions, with separated facilities
for cyclists, pedestrians and horse riders). All underground utilities
should use conduits accessible off-carriageway.
11.3 This investment would involve additional road spending
of at least £70 billion, or £3 billion pa over 30 years
(Bayliss & Muir Wood). The total cost would be raised as a
direct road charge, either by way of a specific and identified
fuel tax or (when technology permits) by a usage fee paid on the
basis of place and time as tracked by land or space based sensors.
11.4 The construction and operation of such a network
would either be entrusted to a "Highways Agency" or
to Regional Municipal or Local Authorities. Of the essence, are
the separation of local from "through" traffic and the
reduction of congestion caused because "strategic" roads
also access local shopping or sports and entertainment complexes.
11.5 The major threats to any road pricing proposals
are:
11.5.1 They do not result in a better road service to
the paying customer.
11.5.2 They are seen as a way to merely boost national
or local budgets.
11.5.3 They are seen as an alternative to providing better
roads.
"You pay for good roads whether you have them or not;
it's not the wealth of a nation that builds the roads, but the
roads which build the wealth of a nation" (John F Kennedy)
November 2004
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