House of Commons - Transport

Select Committee on Transport Eighth Report

4 HM Coastguard

64. The Committee examined the work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) during the last Session and reported in June last year.[117] Many of the concerns we noted at that time related to HM Coastguard, whose watch staff co-ordinate maritime SAR operations at MRCCs and MRSCs. Most of these were raised with us again as part of this inquiry, most notably by the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS).[118] We also received some written material in confidence from serving coastguards and auxiliary coastguards, which served as extremely useful background but which we have not drawn on directly in this Report.

65. HM Coastguard remains an organisation undergoing a period of fundamental change: its staff used to be recruited from those leaving maritime service in the navy or merchant navy; nowadays, as Mr Quinn put it and the MCA confirmed,[119] "there is no longer this pool of recruits to come in with the background experience."[120] HM Coastguard is also now part of the MCA, rather than being a stand-alone organisation. We need to be confident that change is being managed by the MCA in a way which assures the public a competent and cost-effective service. To do so, we need a clear picture of what is really happening in operations rooms around the coast. While we were fortunate enough to pay a brief visit to the Dover MRCC, we need to base our report on a wider evidence base. Unfortunately, the evidence we received is not sufficiently clear.

Conflicting evidence

66. The evidence we were given by MCA management often conflicted directly with that of PCS, as recorded in Table 3.

Table 3: Conflict between evidence from PCS and MCA

Subject PCS view MCA management view

Staffing levels at MRCCs and MRSCs "There has been no coastguard station, to our knowledge, that has been properly staffed throughout the whole year."[121] This statement was subsequently qualified by PCS in further written evidence: "no Coastguard Rescue Centres and sub centres were fully staffed with qualified substantive grades during the past year on one or more occasions".[122]

There were vacancies for 21 Watch Officers, 1 Watch Assistant and 1 Watch Manager in the Eastern and Scotland & Northern Ireland Regions in January.[123]

PCS provided examples of occasions when they considered that operations rooms were inadequately staffed because watch staff were either absent, standing in for someone of a higher grade, or still under training.[124]
To the best of the Chief Executive's knowledge, it is not commonplace to have unqualified or inexperienced staff managing a watch.[125]

The Chief Coastguard said: "I think the PCS probably overstated that somewhat (…) That is not the evidence we are getting from our local managers."[126]

Vacancies are less than 2% across the organisation. There were only vacancies for 3 Watch Managers, 11 Watch Officers, 1 Sector Manager and 1 District Operations Manager on 2 March when PCS and the MCA gave oral evidence.[127]

The PCS was offered the opportunity to draft a paper on staffing complements for watch-keeping. Papers have been commissioned by MCA management from Regional Operations Managers, on which PCS were to be consulted.[128]

Skills of watch staff Staff recruited without seagoing experience are not gaining this experience before qualifying, as agreed following a previous recruitment review.[129]

Watch staff on probation and under training should be supernumerary to the complement until they are qualified.[130]

The training centre has only one Watch Officer course programmed for 2005, which would only provide 12 or 15 trained staff.[131]

Promotion from Coastguard Watch Assistant to Watch Manager can happen within 3-4 years, which is too quick; it should take 6 years.[132]
"Co-ordination Centre staff above Coastguard Watch Assistants (Operations) must hold an externally assessed qualification that demonstrates and confirms technical competence. CWA(O) staff undergo training lasting a year and although this is currently internally accredited, the MCA are seeking external accreditation in the future."[133]

The training centre has recently completed a Watch Officer training course, providing 13 trained staff. Another is just starting.[134]

"Watch Managers wanting to become SAR Mission Controllers are now required to undergo an intensive training course."[135]

Linking of pairs of MRCCs and MRSCs so that one can take over the operations of another if necessary ("pairing").
Planned closures of coordination centres
The removal of equipment from Forth MRCC is a precursor to the closure of co-ordination centres.[136]

MCA management is "forging ahead with station pairing regardless of the inherent risks associated with this strategy."[137]

PCS has not been consulted on the removal of equipment and transfer of control from Forth MRSC to Aberdeen MRCC.[138]
"Louise Ellman: Do you intend to close any more Rescue Co-ordination Centres?
"Captain Bligh: No. This is an old chestnut."[139]

"Louise Ellman: Does that mean you are ruling out more closures?
"Captain Bligh: Yes."[140]

Pairing ensures that some stations can assist their flank station in a major incident. It releases resources for prevention work.[141]

The changes at Aberdeen and Forth are a trial about which PCS was consulted.[142]

Reliability of the VISION incident management IT system "Operator confidence in the system is low because of long-standing faults and other technical problems such as systems lock ups, loss of data and messaging facilities."[143] "The new computerised incident and command system has now been fully installed in all Coastguard Rescue Coordination Centres. Initial system difficulties have been rectified, the roll out was completed in November 2004 and the system is now operating well."[144]

67. We find these contrary accounts frustrating, because they do not allow us to gain a clear understanding of what is really happening in the MCA. Mr Dave Clempson, the MCA Group President for PCS told us that "it seems to happen that we get treated as a union in a not very friendly way at times. The fact is that if they want to go ahead they do it and they close stations down and tell us afterwards."[145] The Chief Coastguard does meet the unions, and had already met them twice in 2005 when we took evidence at the beginning of March.[146] We conclude that relations between the MCA and PCS as organisations are poor, although we do not know whether this is a true reflection of industrial relations at the MCA more generally.

68. The obvious incompatibility of the evidence from the Public and Commercial Services union and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency has undermined our confidence in both organisations. As part of the Government response to this report, we would like to receive detailed position statements on each of the following issues: (a) staffing levels in Coastguard operations rooms; (b) skills of watch staff; (c) "pairing" of co-ordination centres and any planned closures; and (d) the reliability of the VISION IT system. We would like these position statements to be agreed jointly by the MCA and PCS wherever possible, and urge both parties to seek consensus. If agreement proves impossible, we invite PCS to submit its own observations to supplement the Government response. These should be supported by clear, hard evidence.

National Coastwatch Institution

69. The National Coastwatch Institution (NCI) is a voluntary organisation which was established in 1984. It aims to restore a visual watch of the UK coast, and over 1,000 trained volunteers—who are often retired—keep a daylight watch from 27 stations.[147] The stations are mainly in the south-west, although the NCI is planning further northward expansion.[148] Watch keepers maintain logs of the on- and off-shore activities they observe and report incidents to the Coastguard if necessary. Mr Jon Gifford, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the NCI, told us that watch keepers also worked with HM Customs & Excise (the NCI is an "Anti-Drugs Alliance Partner"), the Ministry of Defence, the RNLI, police, local authorities, and wildlife and pollution agencies.[149]

70. Mr Mark Danson-Hatcher, Deputy Chairman of the NCI's Declared Facility Inspection Panel, emphasised that the NCI provided a visual watch: "That is something no other agency really does to the same extent." This is indeed the case. When we asked the Chief Coastguard whether staffed watch stations were needed, he told us that:

150

71. The NCI pointed out that there was "much protest" when the Coastguard ceased its visual watch on the coast, and suggested that a visual watch is needed because "the coastline cannot be properly surveyed from MCA call centres".[151] Although the NCI has a memorandum of understanding with HM Coastguard, and reported its relations with MCA operations staff as "very good, excellent",[152] Mr Gifford suggested that, at the administrative level, he and his colleagues felt they were "tolerated, rather than wanted."[153] The Chief Executive of the MCA disagreed, and reported that he had received only the day before a letter from the NCI which thanked the MCA for its assistance.[154]

72. The MCA believes that the NCI should be treated as a fixed watch of members of the public who know how to provide a look-out service and can report events properly to the Coastguard.[155] Mr Gifford was clear that the NCI is not a rival organisation to the Coastguard.[156] The two bodies do disagree about the use by the NCI of former Coastguard stations as look-out posts: the MCA has refused the NCI access to certain former stations which now house radio equipment both on grounds of insufficient space and security.[157] The Minister confirmed that the reasons for denying access were "solid".[158]

73. The National Coastwatch Institution provides a helpful service, even if the MCA does not view it as essential. The NCI and the Agency should patch up any differences in their relationship and continue to work together to ensure safety around the coast. We understand the MCA has good reason for refusing the NCI access to some of its former coastguard stations, but believe it should review quickly the decisions which have been made to establish whether further access can be permitted. The NCI should not need to plead with the Department or the MCA Chief Executive in order to secure access; these matters should be resolved with less pain.

117 Transport Committee, The Work of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Fourteenth Report of Session 2003-04, HC 500 [2003-04] Back

118 SAR 08, SAR 08A Back

119 Q 301 Back

120 Q 245 Back

121 Q 236 Back

122 SAR 08A Back

123 SAR 08 Back

124 SAR 08A Back

125 Q 302 Back

126 Q 302 Back

127 Q 300 Back

128 Q 328 Back