Memorandum by NUMAST (SAR 10)
UK SEARCH AND RESCUE
INTRODUCTION
NUMAST is the trade union and professional organisation
representing more than 19,000 shipmasters, officers, cadets, and
other professional staff working in the maritime industries at
sea and ashore. We welcome the Transport Committee's decision
to conduct an inquiry into the issue of Search and Rescue (SAR)
in the UK.
For an island nation, with an extensive coastline
and high levels of shipping and leisure maritime traffic, effective
search and rescue is a crucial asset—a fact that is underlined
by the increase in incidents, accidents and deaths that was instrumental
in the decision to undertake this inquiry.
The importance of adequate SAR cover has increased
in recent years as a growth in trade has resulted in additional
maritime activity around the UK coast. A significant proportion
of this shipping is of questionable quality, in terms of construction,
maintenance, crewing and operation. Similarly, the expansion of
passenger shipping—and the marked increase in the size of
cruiseships and passenger ferries—has also raised the potential
scale of maritime incidents and presented new challenges for SAR
services.
Against this background, NUMAST has—for
more than a decade—expressed considerable concern about
aspects of SAR provision in the UK. Much of this concern relates
to the absolute resources available for SAR. Furthermore, the
amalgamation of the Maritime Safety and the Coastguard Agencies
into a single organisation has increased the potential for conflict
over spending priorities and resource allocations.
NUMAST is concerned that the nature of SAR provision
within the UK can be characterised as "typically British"—with
inherited structures and systems and extensive reliance upon voluntary
and charitable services.
The following evidence is presented with the
hope of generating much-needed political support for fundamental
changes in the approach to SAR in the UK. Our evidence is presented
as direct answers to the questions posed in the committee's announcement
of the inquiry.
1. How effective are the UK's Search and
Rescue co-ordination arrangements?
UK SAR co-ordination arrangements appear, in
general, to be effective and there is no substantial evidence
to suggest that this is not the case. However, NUMAST questions
what work has been done at an official level to conduct comparative
studies of UK SAR performance in an international context.
NUMAST also believes that in recent years that
has been no substantial test of UK SAR co-ordination arrangements.
Fortunately, there have been relatively few incidents in which
a significant number of people have required rescue. The incident
with perhaps the greatest potential was the collision between
the containership Ever Decent and the Bahamian-registered cruiseship
Norwegian Dream in the eastern approaches to the Channel, about
four miles SE of the Falls Head Buoy, in August 1999. Ever Decent
had a crew of 17 and Norwegian Dream had some 2,800 persons onboard.
Subsequent investigations showed that the incident was a potential
near-disaster that would have severely tested SAR resources. It
certainly underlines the need to have adequate capacity to deal
with the demands posed by the latest generation of "mega-cruiseships"
and "cruiseferries", which are capable in some cases
of carrying more than 4,000 people. The International Maritime
Organisation defines a Mass Rescue Operation as one "that
involves the need for immediate assistance to large numbers of
persons in distress, such that capabilities normally available
to SAR authorities are inadequate". NUMAST believes considerable
attention needs to be paid to such a scenario and to address ways
in which co-ordination of resources and multi-agency communication
can take place efficiently and effectively.
NUMAST is also concerned at the way in which
one of the prime SAR resources—helicopters—are split
between the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and the Coastguard. This
can raise questions about the availability for civilian SAR and
also means that the location of assets is more often influenced
by military considerations rather than SAR demand. This latter
point is particularly acute in the NW of Scotland, a remote area
with frequently harsh conditions, yet where the already high SAR
demand has the potential to increase yet further with the development
of offshore oil and gas projects to the west of Shetland.
NUMAST also has concerns about the age of the
existing SAR helicopters and believes that a clear timescale for
their rapid replacement needs to be put into place. At the same
time, while helicopters have proved very successful as a prime
SAR resource, their limitations—such as range, survivor
capacity and ability to operate in adverse conditions—need
to be recognised and attention should be paid to non-traditional
alternatives, such as fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Such resources,
strategically located, would offer the capability of providing
extended coverage into mid-ocean areas and would also be particularly
useful in the event of a large passenger vessel incident.
2. Do Search and Rescue organisations receive
the resources, equipment and training they need to perform their
tasks effectively and efficiently?
As outlined above, NUMAST has concerns about
some of the key elements of SAR resources and equipment. While
actual public expenditure on maritime SAR has increased from £30
million in 1998-99 to £40 million in 2003-04, the increase
is largely in line with inflation over that time and follows a
period in which spending was being cut back under the previous
administration.
NUMAST has, for many years, expressed concerns
about the overall staffing and resources of the MCA. Given the
resources available, there is no doubt that the dedication and
professionalism of the staff achieves highly commendable outcomes.
However, NUMAST is particularly concerned that our long-standing
complaints about a shortage of professional surveyors presents
a potentially adverse impact for the proactive "prevention"
strategy within UK SAR—and for the first element of the
MCA's strategic approach to pollution matters (ensuring that ships
which operate in UK waters are safe).
As the 2001 National Audit Office report on
MCA Ship Surveys and Inspections concluded, the Agency "could
make a greater contribution to ship safety by focusing more of
its work where there is the greatest risk". NUMAST believes
that, as a result of staffing constraints, the MCA struggles to
target high-risk ships and fails to conduct inspections in remote
ports and at weekends.
NUMAST also notes the policy of significantly
increased dependence on auxiliary coastguards and is concerned
at the evidence of continuing under-staffing of watches at Coastguard
centres. It is of further concern that the growing reduction in
the UK's maritime skills base will create additional problems
in securing personnel with relevant seafaring knowledge and experience.
Despite improvements in IT and communications,
there is no substitute for local knowledge and experience—particularly
in coastal SAR operations—and NUMAST believes that there
should be no further reduction in the number of MRCCs and sub-centres.
3. How does the voluntary nature of some
of the Search and Rescue organisations affect the objectives and
targets which are fixed for Departments and Agencies with Search
and Rescue responsibilities, and their ability to meet those targets?
4. How dependent is the UK on voluntary organisations
for the provision of Search and Rescue services?
NUMAST believes it is appropriate to answer
these questions together. In relation to Q4, we believe the UK
is highly dependent upon voluntary organisations for the provision
of SAR services. Besides the SAR helicopter force, front-line
UK SAR assets comprise some 128 all-weather RNLI lifeboats, 175
inshore RNLI lifeboats, 410 Coastguard rescue teams, the four
ETVs, and one long-range maritime patrol aircraft. During 2003,
RNLI lifeboats were launched on a record 8,109 occasions. In the
same year there were 1,599 SAR incidents attended by the RN or
RAF.
The RNLI has traditionally performed an excellent
role in providing rescue services for commercial and leisure sailors,
but it is clear that it is facing severe challenges as a result
of structural changes in society. Its finances have been affected
by stock market fluctuations and a downturn in legacies (experienced
by other UK charities) and active participation has been adversely
affected—suggesting, NUMAST would argue, that in setting
targets for UK SAR agencies those responsible should be aware
that the voluntary sector can be subject to considerable external
pressures and significant fluctuations in income and support.
5. How do the UK's Search and Rescue arrangements
compare with those in other countries?
It is clear that the UK has an extensive, sophisticated
and historically significant provision of maritime SAR resources.
As noted above, the UK makes extensive use of voluntary support
for its SAR provision. The charitably-funded RNLI compares favourably
in terms of the number boat stations, fleet size and performance
targets, with the centrally-funded US Coast Guard.
It is also apparent that UK MRCC staffing standards
compare well with those of many other countries. There is also
evidence to suggest that the UK has fewer lives lost in SAR incidents
than some comparable countries.
However, NUMAST believes there is considerable
scope for much greater research into the comparison and benchmarking
of UK SAR with other countries. This is of particular importance
within the EU context, given the development of the European Maritime
Safety Agency and the further evolution of detailed EU maritime
safety policies in the wake of the Prestige and Erika disasters.
It is also important to review UK SAR capabilities
in conjunction with the ongoing review of offshore fire-fighting
arrangements and the work that is being done to create a coherent
national network of cover. The "market failure" of the
previous arrangements demonstrate the importance of having a fully
integrated approach, matched by adequate resources.
6. What improvements could be made to the
UK's Search and Rescue arrangements?
In presenting its evidence to the Committee,
NUMAST has sought to identify the most pressing issues affecting
maritime SAR in the UK and to highlight some realistic options
for addressing these points.
We recommend:
— an improved preventative strategy
to reduce the risk of SAR incidents from occurring. This would
focus upon improved inspections, increased targeting of substandard
vessels, and more in-depth checks of ships' hull and machinery,
shipboard conditions, and operational aspects;
— increased staffing and resources
for the ship inspectorate to address current limitations that
can result in superficial inspections, multi-tasking of surveyors
and restricted ability to conduct inspections with more than one
surveyor;
— more consultations between SAR providers
and "user" groups, to enable dialogue on issues of shared
interest and concern, early identification of problem areas and
input from maritime professionals;
— increased strategic SAR planning,
with defined pathways for consultation with "stakeholder"
groups;
— greater concentration upon the need
to respond to the challenges of mass rescue operations involving
high passenger capacity cruise ships and ferries;
— reflecting post 9/11 security concerns
in SAR planning and budgeting;
— reviewing the nature, scope, strategic
location and deployment of SAR assets and updating and expanding
SAR air capacity, including consideration of fixed and rotary
wing alternatives to helicopters. There is a need for integrated
SAR aviation support, which would give greater flexibility and
coverage. This is particularly important given that the responsibilities
for SAR cover both land and sea. It should be noted that such
assets are not "dormant" but have the potential to assist
in a wide range of major incidents and civil emergencies;
— further review of maritime SAR assets.
The contribution of the Emergency Towing Vessels should be noted,
although NUMAST would point out that it had to take many years
and considerable political pressure to reach the situation in
which we are today. The recent decision by Trinity House to order
a vessel with "rapid intervention" emergency capabilities
is welcome, but the potential use of such vessels for SAR purposes
should be considered. NUMAST believes this latter point demonstrates
the need for an "overall audit" of resources, capabilities
and future strategic planning—most notably for areas of
high vessel traffic density or with a high potential for significant
pollution or loss of life;
— review SAR communications, with due
consideration of the scope for improvements in multi-agency or
multi-unit situations, as underlined by the MAIB report on the
foundering of the fishing vessel Elhanan T in August 2003. In
relation to this, and other incidents, examine the case for better
integration of communication systems and command structures;
— despite improvements in IT and communication
systems, NUMAST believes there should be no further reduction
in MRCCs, sub-centres and their staffing; and
— the provision of statutory recognition
for voluntary work with the UK SAR agencies should be actively
considered.
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