Memorandum by Tramtrack Croydon Ltd (LR
16)
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT: THE FUTURE OF LIGHT
RAIL AND MODERN TRAMS IN BRITAIN
1. SUMMARY
1.1 Croydon Tramlink opened in May 2000
and provides an important fully accessible, environmentally friendly
transport link in South London. In its first period of operation
up to 31st March 2001, 13.3 million passenger journeys were made
in the 24 trams that run over the 17 miles of track. Trams serve
the centre of Croydon and are divided into three lines to provide
a service from Wimbledon to Elmers End, Croydon to Beckenham Junction
and Croydon to New Addington.
1.2 Operated by a concessionaire, Tramtrack
Croydon Ltd (TCL), on behalf on Transport for London (TfL), the
Croydon Tramlink provides a real alternative to the private car,
reduces pollution and improves journeys for thousands of people
every day.
1.3 Croydon Tramlink is successful because
it combines a series of public transport corridors which integrate
with public areas of demand. However the system would benefit
from restructuring of bus routes, improved interchange facilities
such as park and ride as well as new controls on parking and congestion
for cars.
1.4 Barriers to light rail development can
be addressed by a balanced approach to consultations for both
fixed infrastructure systems and bus services. Careful examination
is needed of suggestions that light rail schemes are more expensive
than other public transport options.
1.5 Tram systems in the UK have been treated
as new and untried public transport solutions however any future
building of a sequence of tram extensions allows public authorities
to benefit from both economies of scale and expertise.
2. THE COST
AND BENEFITS
OF LIGHT
RAIL
2.1 Croydon Tramlink was built as a discrete
"stand alone" system using a PFI procurement process
completed in 1996 that sought to allocate specific risks to the
private sector.
2.2 The system cost £200 million with
London Transport (TfL's predecessor) funding the diversion of
utilities for a further £25 million. TCL (the winner of the
tendering process designed to maximise the private sector funding),
contributed half the £200 million cost and took the risk
associated with project procurement costs.
2.3 The system was completed in May 2000,
six months later than expected. Overruns in excess of this are
not uncommon when considering any major infrastructure project:
the Jubilee line extension, for example, "slipped" by
two years according to the Treasury's Appraisal and Evaluation
in Central Government. What is exceptional, however, is that in
this case there was no additional cost to the public purse as
a result. Similarly extensions to the Docklands Light Railway
have demonstrated that once the risks associated with construction
of a particular type of system become known they can be well managed.
2.4 Shortly after opening, Croydon Tramlink
was carrying 16 million passengers per annum (60% of the expected
level). After five years of operation and beyond the initial growth
phase, this has now reached 22 million pa (80% of expectation).
The main reasons for this shortfall in patronage are:
— The policy pursued by Transport for
London of expanding bus services in direct competition to tram
routes. The level of bus mileage operated in Croydon is currently
32% higher than at the time when the Concession was granted, with
some routes running directly parallel to trams.
— The setting of bus fares on competing
routes at 20% less for cash and 30% less for all day and season
ticket holders than for tram fares. The effect of this ticket
pricing was predatory. In 2004, fares on buses were harmonised
resulting in an immediate 12% increase in passengers using the
trams.
2.5 Comparison of bus and tram costs suggest
that buses would have been a much more expensive solution to Croydon's
problems. Three buses are needed to carry the same number of passengers
as one tram. As bus speeds are about 55% of tram speeds, a further
twice as many buses are needed to service a corridor for each
tram. In London the average bus has a six year life compared with
30 years for the tram. Thus to carry the same number of passengers
a fleet of 144 buses would be needed to replace Croydon Tramlink's
24 trams and over 30 years 720 buses would have to be procured
to replace 24 trams. TCL is conducting a detailed assessment of
the impact of this on capital and operating costs but it is believed
that for the volume of passengers currently carried by Croydon
Tramlink, trams are the most economical mode.
2.6 Croydon Tramlink's impact in Croydon
has been profound. The Tramlink Impact Study, published by TfL
in 2001, explains this in detail, as does later work by Colin
Buchanan and Partners for the South London Partnership, published
in 2003. Between them these studies show:
— 19% of Croydon Tramlink passengers
switched from cars.
— £1.5 billion inward investment
into the Croydon area with vast retail, leisure, office and smaller
scale industrial development.
— Reductions in unemployment (35% in
one ward).
— Stimulation of commercial and domestic
property prices.
— Croydon Tramlink is liked by (and
carries) all sections of the community in notable contrast to
buses and heavy rail.
3. WHAT LIGHT
RAIL SYSTEMS
NEED TO
BE SUCCESSFUL
3.1 Croydon Tramlink is regarded as a success
by its local community. The expected patronage of 22 million in
2004-05 confirms it as the most well used modern tram system in
the UK.
3.2 Croydon Tramlink is successful because
the system combines a series of public transport corridors (in
this case they are orbital around the southern most tip of South
London) with the on street working in central Croydon and these
link clear areas of demand: home and work, education, shops and
leisure. The only major destination missing is the health sector.
Street level access and visibility has undoubtedly encouraged
passengers to use the tram as those parts of the system running
on more remote former heavy rail lines originally struggled to
grow patronage as quickly.
3.3 The following changes to integrated
transport in Croydon would encourage greater patronage and deliver
more cost benefits to the transport system:
— restructuring of buses to support
the tram's fixed infrastructure system;
— adequate modal interchange including
park and ride; and
— parking and congestion controls applied
to cars.
4. HOW EFFECTIVELY
IS LIGHT
RAIL USED
AS PART
OF AN
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT
SYSTEM
4.1 The experience of Tramtrack Croydon
shows that light rail can be a valuable and effective part of
the transport mix, but it needs to be:
— deployed for the most appropriate
types of journeys;
— developed in the context of an overall
network of public transport;
— integrated with other parts of the
transport system.
4.2 Outside London there is a requirement
for Local Transport Plans. This provides a stimulus to develop
a strategy to link key population centres, health and education
establishments, leisure centres and business communities with
appropriate public transport solutions driven by passenger requirement
and volume.
4.3 Croydon Tramlink were well integrated
with heavy rail and the Underground (at Wimbledon) within the
original designs. Unlike Nottingham, which has good park and ride
and reshaped bus services to support the tram system, Croydon
has no park and ride and very limited bus integration.
4.4 The bus services in Croydon do not integrate
effectively. Croydon Tramlink crosses 55 bus routes, however 35
bus routes run into the centre of Croydon and many are in competition
with Croydon Tramlink. The level of timetabled bus mileage has
increased by 32% since the Croydon Tramlink concession was signed.
This is largely due to the Mayor's London wide policy to improve
and increase bus services.
4.5 The increase in bus mileage has mainly
been achieved by simply increasing pre-existing bus service frequency.
There has been minimal bus route re-organisation into an integrated
network with well-designed interchange. Elsewhere in Europe the
introduction of a tram scheme would have been accompanied by restructuring
the bus services to provide "feeders". As a consequence,
TfL is paying the Croydon Concessionaire compensation for abstraction
of bus passengers from the tram as well as subsiding bus passengers.
It would instead clearly be much more cost-effective to avoid
establishing competitive transport modes.
5. BARRIERS TO
THE DEVELOPMENT
OF LIGHT
RAIL
5.1 The barriers to light rail development
fall into two general categories:
But each of the barriers can easily be addressed.
5.2 Legislative: Croydon Tramlink was the
subject of an Act of Parliament. More recent systems and any extensions
to Croydon Tramlink would be subject to the Transport and Works
Act procedure. In contrast, bus services of course do not need
this level of planning approval.
5.3 Tram systems that delay car drivers
are weighted against in appraisals. The current system allows
car driver delays to count against tram schemes and therefore
indirectly promotes congestion.
5.4 Costs consideration: Work done both
by TCL in relation to Croydon Tramlink and by the tram industry
into the costs of bus alternatives show that trams are incorrectly
perceived as expensive. Even with below forecast patronage levels,
trams in Croydon generate a significant annual operating surplus
(before debt servicing). This is in contrast to the subsidy necessary
for other transport modes in the area, in particular heavy rail
and buses (with fuel duty rebate and London rates subsidy). This
evidence, coupled to that outlined by Carmen Hass Klau, an eminent
German academic, in her book "Bus or Light Rail—Making
the Right Choices" and Barry Broe Director of Group Transport
Planning and Policy in his presentation "Why Light Rail offers
value for Money in London" at the Waterfront Conference on
Light Rail on 15 June 2004 clearly suggests that tram systems
are, in reality, the most economical long term transport solution
for routes carrying generally in excess of 3,000 passengers per
hour. Furthermore, in future, costs could be reduced still further:
— In Croydon, the build and planning
costs were influenced by a number of design features, such as
the strategy used to relocate utilities. Future tram schemes are
likely to benefit from "economies of expertise" and
therefore best practice relating to implementation and costs.
— Public Authorities can benefit from
both economies of scale and expertise by building a sequence of
tram extensions over time.
6. THE EFFECT
OF DIFFERENT
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS
(PUBLIC/PRIVATE)
ON THE
OVERALL COST
OF LIGHT
RAIL SYSTEMS
6.1 The concession holders of the Croydon
Tramlink have learned some critical lessons from the procurement
arrangements that applied to the scheme.
6.2 Future concession holders of transport
schemes should be able to control risk. TCL cannot control:
— The local economic environment,
— Planning consents along the Croydon
Tramlink route,
— Competing public transport services,
— General economic conditions and
6.3 Each factor has an impact on Croydon
Tramlink patronage. To encourage private investment scheme sponsors
have tried to provide assurance on things like fares and competing
bus services. As can be seen above this has not operated as expected
by the Concessionaire in Croydon. However despite the problems
associated with allocating revenue risk there is a strong argument
for revenue based incentives that ensure that the interests of
customers are not ignored.
7. THE PRACTICALITY
OF ALTERNATIVES
TO LIGHT
RAIL, SUCH
AS INCREASED
INVESTMENT IN
BUSES
7.1 The experience of Croydon Tramlink suggests
that buses are more expensive for the corridors with larger passenger
volumes. These high volume corridors exist in various parts of
London both radially and orbitally.
7.2 There is a practical limit to providing
capacity using buses. At capacities of 5,000 places per hour (60
buses per hour, 1 per minute ) streets (famously Oxford St) become
jammed with buses.
7.3 There are additional costs incurred
by bus services as opposed to trams, for example the level of
road surface maintenance caused by continual buffetting by heavy
vehicles focused on a relatively small road area.
7.4 Reliance on buses requires the greater
use of two increasingly scarce resources—labour (bus drivers)
and fossil fuels (oil based). Trams can (and in Croydon's case
do) use an increasing amount of renewable energy sources.
7.5 Buses are most effectively used for
low volume corridors and as feeders on to trams, metro services
and Heavy Rail which provide the high volume environmentally friendly
access to town centres.
Figure 1: Where are trams appropriate?
|
| Mode | Vehicle capacity
| Capacity on a corridor at
20 vehicles
per hour (passengers per hour)
| Approximate annual corridor load (millions of journeys)
| Inter-stop distance (km)
| Average speed (km per hour)
| Comment |
|
| Double deck bus | 80
| 1,600 | 3.8
| 0.3 to 0.5 | 10 to 12
| Slow to
unload
upperdeck
|
| Articulated bus | 120
| 2,400 | 5.8
| 0.3 to 0.5 | 10 to 12
| |
| 30 metre tram | 240
| 4,800 | 11.6
| | | |
| 40 metre tram | 320
| 6,400 | 15.5
| 0.5 to 0.8 | 18 to 22
| |
| Double 30 metre tram | 440
| 8,800 | 21.1
| 0.5 to 0.8 | 18 to 22
| |
| Light metro train | 1,000
| 20,000 | 48.0
| 0.8 to 2.0 | 20 to 30
| |
| | 20 vehicles per
hour can be
exceeded but
see below *
| Based on an
average
annualisation
of 2,400
| | | |
|
* 20 vehicles per hour has been used as frequency
which can be maintained reliably. Much greater frequencies can
be used but any small delay will then precipitate bunching and
irregular spacing especially buses.
Trams are most effective on corridors with
peak hour passenger volumes between 2,000 and 8,000 passengers
per hour.
Croydon Tramlink has 21 trams per hour on
the corridor from the East. This gives a capacity of 5,000 passenger
places per hour.
From the West there are six trams per hour
giving a capacity of 1,400 passenger places per hour.
Roger Harding
General Manager
February 2005
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