Memorandum by Norman Andrew Kellett Esq
(LR 26)
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT: THE FUTURE OF LIGHT
RAIL AND MODERN TRAMS IN BRITAIN
1. INTRODUCTION
I am a retired Civil Servant, formerly working
within the Criminal Justice system, and have a user's interest
in the development of best practices in the field of urban public
transport. I am grateful to the members of the Transport Committee
for this opportunity to make a submission and contribution towards
their deliberations.
2. LIGHT RAIL
AND TRAMWAYS—WHAT
ARE THEY?
Let us define what we are talking about—Light
Rail is considered to be a railway, fully segregated, but with
tighter curves and steeper gradients than found in "heavy
rail" systems, and utilising lightweight vehicles. UK examples
are Tyne & Wear Metro and London's Docklands Light Railway.
The current debate is not, however, about such systems but about
tramways—rail-guided, steel-wheeled vehicles used singly
or in multiple units on metal tracks laid both in street surfaces
and in fully or partially segregated rights of way, powered by
electricity drawn from overhead conductor wires. UK examples include
Croydon Tramlink, Sheffield Supertram, Nottingham Express Transit
and Manchester Metrolink (the latter displaying many metro features,
due to its origins as a pair of "heavy rail" lines).
My submission will concentrate on the role of
the tramway in relation to your subject matter.
Due to their capacity to move large numbers
of people, tramways occupy a defined sector of the urban public
transport spectrum—they are needed when ridership (actual
or potential) in a travel corridor is required for 3,000 to 15,000
people per hour per direction—below this sector, buses are
the optimum solution, above it, Light Rail (above) or metro is
needed.
Although the lower and upper margins of this
sector are "negotiable", the core is not, and attempts
to utilise other modes of transport prove to be ineffective or
inappropriate. In the UK, the realisation has begun to dawn that
the bus is not the "one-size-fits-all" solution it was
made out to be, and that increasing investment in buses, in the
wrong context, is a waste of scarce resources. This is a stinging
nettle, but it has to be grasped if progress is sought.
My submission to Members is that trams are vital
in certain roles—no other mode is suitable.
3. THE BENEFITS
AND COSTS
OF TRAMWAYS
3.1 Benefits
Capacity—(bus—up to 100, tram—up
to 300 due to vehicle length) a long tram has the ability of the
whole vehicle to follow a fixed "swept path", especially
in city centres—lengthy steered vehicles cannot make sharp
turns without fouling adjacent vehicles or the kerb, and become
difficult or impossible to handle in confined spaces, but trams
of 45 metre length or more can be accommodated without problems
in city streets.
Pollution-free at point of use, resulting in
cleaner air;
Noise-free—resulting in a quieter environment
for passenger and pedestrian alike;
Comfortable—providing a superior travel
experience as a result of steel-railed track with smoother and
controlled acceleration and braking (buses tend to throw you about
due to hard suspensions, poor road surfaces and poor driving standards);
Tried and Tested Technology—developed
over more than 100 years, with world-wide endorsement—new
systems are being opened each year, and others extended.
As a result of their inherent characteristics,
trams bring a widening circle of benefit:
— safety for road users, due to the
predictable, fixed path;
— ability to penetrate pedestrian-only
areas—bringing people to where they want;
— higher operating speeds, especially
where traffic priority is in-built (frequently);
— reduction in congestion (this may
then fill up again, but total capacity is raised);
— creation of new travel capacity,
but ensuring it is by public, not private, transport;
— encourages new public travel patterns
and a gradually increasing patronage;
— less vibration and vehicle noise,
both in the vehicle and in neighbouring buildings;
— confidence in the service—shiny
rails give an expectation of a tram coming soon;
— "sexy image" (some say)—perception
of a modern, vibrant, going-places city;
— encourages development of commercial
and industrial activity;
— assists regeneration of socially
deprived areas;
— results in modal shift from private
transport by offering an acceptable experience;
— encourages city centre revitalisation
and enhancement—a pride in the place;
— Kyoto-friendly, both as a means of
transport and in encouraging less motor usage;
— long-term future (at least 50 years)
encourages local stability and development;
— has the perception of not getting
caught up in traffic—therefore quicker, better;
— traffic management of adjacent traffic
is often included in the package;
— enhanced environment around the tramway—planting
and street furniture;
— greater disabled access and in-vehicle
space for wheelchairs, buggies, etc;
— an efficient crowd-mover when needed,
especially in extremis (eg big events).
3.2 The Downside
HM Government shows itself to have a high profile
awareness of the problems when considering investment in new tramway
systems, to the point of allowing itself only grudging recognition
of the benefits. These problems include—
Capital Costs of planning, infrastructure and
vehicles (this is the major problem);
Scarce Resources available—at the end
of the day, this is a matter of will-power;
Power station emissions—traction current
supply for tramways forms only a tiny proportion of the national
demand for electricity, and is comparatively cleaner than the
fuel usage of the internal combustion engine.
3.3 Costs
Planning—these will include specialist
advice about routing, surveying, public consultation and enquiry,
legal matters, cost of submission to Dept for Transport (10 years
ago this alone was estimated to be in excess of £2 million—it
will have gone up considerably in view of the mass of new regulations
and legislation now in place, as well as the Department's more
complex requirements), and the tendering processes;
Construction—all groundwork is now expensive,
and diversion of utilities particularly so (tramway promoters
now have to make a virtually free gift of new underground infrastructure,
paying 92.5%—in Germany it averages 60% and in France nil);
costs depend upon the amount of street running and the availability
and condition of railway formations that are included in the routing;
Vehicles—regrettably, new trams are expensive,
although they have a working life of thirty years and a larger
capacity than buses—a new Bombardier Cityrunner tram (with
100% low floor) cost the Austrian city of Linz about £1.5
million (2003). There have been attempts to introduce standardisation,
without success, but the limited availability of the number of
manufacturer's designs tends to enforce a degree of standardisation;
however, not every design suits every city's needs.
Operating Costs—statistics are almost
impossible to track down (commercial confidentiality), and different
operators will use differing bases of calculation. It is to be
expected that total operating costs (including maintenance) will
probably not be fully met by fare-box income. The National Audit
Office report (23 April 2004) indicated that "systems need
to be, and to be seen to be, viable" (p.33)—this to
attract private firms to be operators.
Full costs of a new system vary widely, as the
number of factors (and their relative importance or weakness)
will have differing effects in differing locations. According
to the above NAO report, the Nottingham tram system (1.5 routes,
and using a fair amount of railway-type running) cost £180
million for 14 route miles.
As I write this, the town of Angers (France)
(regional population 227,000) has announced a decision to build
a new 12km (7.5 miles) tramway with 32 trams, open by 2009—total
cost (£117 million)—with a second route under evaluation
also.
3.4 Conclusions
As members of the Committee who have visited
tramway systems—particularly European systems—will
be aware, trams are simply a part of life, which are accepted
as the norm—ordinary, unspectacular—it is only the
British who seem to have difficulties and make a huge fuss about
them. The French roll up their sleeves and get on with new systems
and new extensions, whilst the British dither hesitatingly on
the side, wringing their hands in doubt and trepidation, looking
for cheaper ways out of their problems and seeking solace in their
usual comforting haven—buses for everything. The French
find the money, and glow with pride at the results; the British
(especially politicians) faff around. Generally, tramways are
seen as a natural part of the urban infrastructure, and the service
they provide, with their inherent benefits, is good and provides
an acceptable travel experience for motorists; yes, they are costly
to build, but you have to bite the bullet—once they are
in place they are of huge importance in the local economy and
style of life, over a long period.
4. WHAT LIGHT
RAIL/TRAMWAY
SYSTEMS NEED
TO BE
SUCCESSFUL
Traffic Levels—requiring correct choice
of corridors and routes
Integration with other transport links
Finance—a sound financial framework
Attitudes—imaginative, pro-active, flexible
non-bureaucratic management attitudes.
BUT define "successful"—is this
"doing the transport job effectively" or "making
a profit"? The two are very different. Is the basis of the
Committee's judgement "forget quality, think cost"?
Modern European tramways are successful—and expanding—because
they do the job better than other modes at a funding level that
is acceptable; the British approach has consistently been to put
finance first, transport second.
4.1 Traffic Levels
The great strength of the tram is its ability
to move large flows of passengers (see 3.1 above)—this is
its intended role. Full trams, running frequently, cheaply and
dependably, attracting and handling large numbers of passengers
(including new ridership) are successful. This, in turn, generates
greater fare-box income.
4.2 Integration
Sheffield was the classic example of a free-for-all,
with competing deregulated buses operating at artificially cheaper
fares (and a politically-inspired fares policy on the trams of
"premium fares for premium ride"). Integration, properly
functioning, is a cardinal requirement of a successful use of
trams. In Geneva, this has resulted in the formation of an operator
(Unireso) drawn from the local public transport operator, Swiss
railways, the lake steamer operator, and provincial bus operators
who come into the city. Through-ticketing and a universal fares
policy are a requirement.
4.3 Sound Financial Framework
Success must be judged by the ability to move
people by giving large numbers of them an acceptable transport
experience, especially as compared with a car journey (acceptable
by their standards) rather than by year-end profit and loss figures.
If profitability is put before all other considerations, the service
deteriorates, as accountants start to dictate policy—vehicles,
trackwork, services all start to be cut back in a cycle of decline.
If an operating profit cannot be achieved, satisfactory and reliable
subsidy in one form or another would be needed (not on a hand-to-mouth
basis). Most places in the world accept that there might be an
ongoing price to pay for the service and benefits of tramways,
and are willing to carry this through other means; the service
provided is of public benefit and enhances the local economy.
Accordingly, the PFI arrangements, with private
capital carrying the risks, are seen to be something of a failure,
with risk-averse government and public bodies trying to shovel
off the main financial risks to private enterprise (which, fingers
burned, is now assessing the risks too highly). Take a look, instead,
at the French way of funding.
4.4 Imaginative, Flexible Pro-active Management
A management which thinks "we are stuck
with this fixed tram route and can do nothing with it" is
blinkered, negative and dead to potential and initiative. This
is what happened in the mid-twentieth century when local authorities,
having proudly built and introduced the Corporation Tramways,
then ran them by a committee who were often too short-sighted
and bureaucratic to have the vision; the tramways withered whilst
the expanding bus industry cashed in on the opportunities afforded
by development and extension of towns and cities. Modern-day tramway
management needs to be pro-active for opportunities, both in running
the services and in expanding the network of routes. In this latter
respect, the monumental hurdles laid down by the regulations and
the Dept. for Transport are a major disincentive, involving a
huge expenditure of time and money just to lay one metre of extra
track. However, a good UK example of what can be done is Sheffield,
where the original Supertram operator made a loss, and ridership
failed to measure up to expectations; once the franchise passed
to Stagecoach, they were able, with the existing trams and track
layout, to turn the business around into profit. Imaginative and
pro-active management! A positive, supportive government outlook
would help; it is absent.
Members of the Committee will, therefore, understand
that an appropriate definition of "successful""
is vital if sound future decisions about tramways are to be made.
Do trams have to solve a transport problem or are they to be a
financially profitable operation?
5. HOW EFFECTIVELY
ARE TRAMWAYS
USED AS
PART OF
AN INTEGRATED
TRANSPORT SYSTEM?
Integration is a management state of mind—something
human—and will not happen if it is not wanted or planned.
This in turn depends upon the local public transport arrangements—if
it is in the control of one authority, which is able to plan routes,
services and fares, or whether services are provided by a number
of competing and overlapping operators, each out for his own slice
of the market.
Deregulation is hostile to integration, and,
politically, integration has been seen by some as a monopoly,
a cartel and probably bureaucratic.
Light rail and tramways are as capable of full
integration as any other mode within the transport network where
services are planned rather than being left to market-driven forces.
This begs the question as to whether the Committee
considers public transport to be a public service, over which
the authorities have firm control, or a competitive and unconstrained
market-place enterprise, where profit is the driving factor.
To a lesser degree, the infrastructure will
dictate how much integration takes place. Where a tramway is purely
street-based it has close interaction with road traffic (including
buses), but where it is based on a railway formation (as were
the two initial Manchester Metrolink routes), the trams mostly
run remotely from roads and the points of integration are fewer.
In urban public transport, the 1986 Act deregulated
local services and saw integration as a form of suppression of
competition. Through ticketing is still seen in this way, and
indeed some hold that it is contrary to anti-monopoly legislation.
6. BARRIERS TO
THE DEVELOPMENT
OF LIGHT
RAIL AND
TRAMWAYS
Attitude—the prevalent UK official outlook
that is cynical about, and hostile to, tramways—regardless
of their merits; this is often heavily encouraged by the bus lobby,
and means that tramways have an in-built uphill task to overcome
prejudice.
Costs—the relatively high capital cost
of new infrastructure and vehicles is seen as a high mountain
to climb—why climb it when you can go round it cheaply in
a bus?
Applications—are time consuming, very
expensive and very uncertain in possibility of success—the
Dept. for Transport has too often demanded fresh plans, lower
costs and revised objectives, causing expensive delays and rising
costs in the interim.
Financial provisions (capital)—promoters
find the arrangements for financing new construction to be expensive
and difficult to set up, and inadequate in their provision of
monetary levels. They also are beginning to baulk at having to
carry a disproportionate level of financial risk.
Financial provisions (operating costs)—forecasting
ridership levels is a difficult task (mankind is not blessed with
prophecy), more so when compulsory as part of a business plan;
shortfall in the early years is dreaded,
Local opposition ("not in my back yard")—often
ill-informed and misplaced ("Don't want trams because of
the fire risks from their fuel tanks"—Nottingham 2004);
opposition often comes through worry about the construction chaos,
although this is true of any major road project. It is usually
forgotten once the trams are running.
Over-engineering—regrettably, in many
cases the overhead current supply is too costly and unsightly,
designed by companies whose experience is heavy-rail based, and
who import railway structures into a street scenario somewhat
inappropriately.
Regulatory demands—increasing demands
in relation to safety and access increase costs and complexity.
Utility diversion—it is regarded as necessary
not have underground installations below the tracks, and these
must be resited prior to track installation—this is time-
consuming, disruptive and costly, and utilities concerned receive
new pipes and conduits as a virtual free gift (they pay only 7.5%)
whatever the state of the originals.
Politics—interference from politicians
at national and local level bedevils public transport, and results
in poor decisions. Where there is all-party support for a tramway
(as there was in Croydon), the path is considerably smoothed,
where there is infighting, problems follow. Currently, Midland
Metro's plans to extend their tramway into the streets of central
Birmingham are on hold because one political party has decided
it wants an underground metro rather than trams—long delays!
7. EFFECT OF
DIFFERING FINANCE
ARRANGEMENTS (PUBLIC/PRIVATE)
ON TRAMWAY
COSTS
7.1 This is not a subject on which I am
qualified to comment—the Committee will doubtless receive
informative and professional submissions from other parties.
7.2 The heading seems to imply, prima facie,
that the Committee is wondering whether a revision of the proportions
of capital finance as between both sectors might have a major
effect on total costs. In the sense that the private sector seems
to believe currently that the state funding is risk-free but their
own funding is risk-heavy (and therefore costed inappropriately),
it is possible that a major amendment of the proportionality might
have an advantageous effect upon costs.
7.3 The consortium which succeeds in its
bid will normally have a DBOM contract for a specified period
of years (Design, Build, Operate and Maintain) (Nottingham is
differently set-up). This has the advantage that it keeps everything
"in-house"; it has the disadvantage that each player
within the consortium will be looking to make its own substantial
profit from its own sector of the enterprise, and that a series
of complicated contracts (not always watertight) will exist within
the consortium. It is a fact that this is the way the industry
operates, there being no one supplier who can provide a complete
unified tramway service to promoters.
7.4 If risks can be seen to be covered automatically
within the financial arrangements, without slamming the brakes
on the whole enterprise at each adverse turn, then costs may,
indeed, fall back to something like original levels. Such risks
include construction cost over-runs (perhaps due to unforeseen
circumstances, such as external delays, ground conditions, man-made
or legal complications) and late delivery penalty clauses; they
may also include lower than expected ridership figures.
In the latter case, it must always be remembered
that the choice of mode of travel is that entirely of the customer,
and people can be unpredictable and independent in their choices
and their timing.
7.5 You may wish to look in detail at the
French method of finance—it seems to work satisfactorily
for all parties (there would not be so many new French tramways
if not).
7.6 It does, however, seem that you may
have the question back-to-front: financing should be influenced
by total cost, not the other way around. In the past, cutbacks
in finance have meant corners cut on new systems, with loss of
efficiency and quality, For example, it is commonly said that
the finance of the first phase of Manchester Metrolink was cut
down, resulting in the purchase of fewer vehicles, resulting further
in an inability of meet an increasing passenger demand and an
increased service capability. Shot oneself truly in the foot.
7.7 You may wish to ascertain in detail
from a current proposer a full breakdown as to how the total proposed
cost is arrived at, with his comments about each item, its cause,
its basis of calculation, its relevance and the reasons for its
inclusion.
8. PRACTICALITY
OF ALTERNATIVES
TO TRAMWAYS,
SUCH AS
INCREASED BUS
INVESTMENT
8.1 It was stated above [para. 2] that tramways
have the role of fulfilling a specific segment of the urban public
transport spectrum, and that no other mode is capable of fulfilling
that segment satisfactorily. It follows that increased bus investment
would therefore be a waste of money—the transport need would
lack a transport solution.
8.2 It is accepted that novel forms of bus
are being developed (in terms of guidance systems), but these
require a continuous infrastructure in order to operate, and construction
costs therefore are become similar to that of the tried and tested
tram.
8.3 Further investment in buses as a substitute
for trams would instead provide us with increased problems attendant
upon bus operation—noise, vibration, fumes, poor quality
ride, traffic congestion.
8.4 The bus has a poor public image, and
is, in some senses, played out (except in London)—more of
them will not improve that image.
8.5 Over very many years Government thinking
has continually returned to this theme, perhaps proving that its
preferred option is still misplaced and inappropriate, but certainly
demonstrating the official fixation with the bus, despite weighty
submissions to the contrary (see the submissions to Transport
Sub-Committee's Light Rapid Transit Systems report of May 2000
(HC153)).
8.6 Transport systems in Europe and the
USA (all operators of buses) continue to demonstrate that, in
appropriate locations, tramways are the most suitable and effective
mode of transport. They demonstrate faith in an effective transport
solution for a real transport requirement—some UK transport
authorities are also endeavouring to prove the same point, but
are facing too many hurdles in doing so.
8.7 A bit of history for you. By 1969 the
city of Geneva had converted all its tramways to bus or trolleybus
operation, except for one route; it was realised that this route
carried 20-25% of all the passengers of the system, and buses/trolleybuses
would not cope; instead, the tramway was retained, developed,
modernised—so that, now, tramways are being extended, and
taking over certain sections of rubber-tyres routes. The message
to your Committee is clear. Investment in alternatives is unlikely
to be productive, and is inappropriate.
9. CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Integration—perfectly workable
if the will is there; in fact, trams thrive in an integrated transport
system, but do less well in a free-for-all deregulated system.
9.2 Tramways work—with technology
that has been tried and tested world-wide for more than a century,
tramways continue to prove themselves.
9.3 Cost—is a disincentive, but a
nettle to be grasped; the provision of tramways is seen by many
cities as a public service, and they recognise both that the benefits
enrich and enhance the city, and that quality comes with a price
tag, which they will accept.
9.4 Alternatives—the bus is not an
effective or viable substitute—buses have had the road to
themselves in the UK since 1962 (except in London and Glasgow
)—if they are the perfect one-size-fits-all solution, why
are our urban roads jammed with private traffic, and why are transport
operators looking to the tram for a better solution?
9.5 History—after the War, our cities
scrapped their run-down tramways, often for political reasons,
in favour of the "cheaper" option of buses, destroying
millions of pounds of previous investment. Voices at the time
urged them instead to retain, develop and extend tramways selectively,
but to no avail. A generation later we are faced with starting
from scratch, an expensive legacy of earlier mistaken policies.
Cities abroad elsewhere did not make the mistake, and have not
had to face the bills.
I recommend these thoughts to your consideration.
I hope they will be of help, and I will be happy to answer further
questions if you so wish; I thank you for your time and attention.
February 2005
| 
