Select Committee on Transport Written Evidence


Memorandum by Mowlem plc (LR 33)

INTEGRATED TRANSPORT:  THE FUTURE OF LIGHT RAIL AND MODERN TRAMS IN BRITAIN

INTRODUCTION

  This submission is made by Mowlem plc, one of the UK's foremost construction services companies that has significant experience of light rail systems in the UK.

  The Mowlem experience extends from building tramway systems in London in the early 1900's to the provision of the first light rail in Manchester under a design, build, operate and maintain contract taking full revenue and patronage risk. Mowlem also completed most of the London Docklands Light Railway (DLR) including the first and very successful PPP extension under the Thames to Lewisham.

  Our response to your enquiry is based on this experience which we feel is relevant to your Committee.

Q.  The costs and benefits of light rail.

  In 1992 the initial phase of Manchester Metrolink provided the benefit of a safe, reliable, comfortable and convenient means of transport for people travelling in from Bury and Altrincham to the city centre and for modal interchanges at Victoria and Piccadilly stations.

  After the first two years of operation the Metrolink carried over 26 million passengers and took over a million car journeys off the road, which endorses the need to have modern light rail schemes in our major cities.

  The capital cost of the Manchester system was minimised by the GMPTE undertaking the utilities diversions and street works upgrades separately so the main contractor was able to quantify the design build risk they undertook.

  One of the most significant benefits of the initial DLR was that it provided the infrastructure catalyst that attracted developers into the area which provided urban regeneration and increased land values which were used to fund the extension to Beckton.

  The capital cost for the initial DLR scheme was contained within a design build contract undertaken by GEC Mowlem who provided a complete system on time and to budget. Upgrading of the first contract works commenced before the initial scheme was completed.

Q.  What light rail systems need to be successful.

  A defined need which is a public transport corridor that links areas of demand and provides sufficient patronage and modal transfer to permit a high quality LRT scheme.

  Political will that supports and encourages LRT in conjunction with other transport modes to provide passengers with seamless, door-to-door journeys.

  Funding by both the private and public sectors that recognises an equitable share of risk to the party that is best able to manage it.

  A long-term view that recognises that LRT is value for money compared with buses which have lower capacity and higher replacement and running costs.

  An integrated public transport system where the LRT are not run as competition to other forms of transport.

Q.  How effectively is light rail used as part of an integrated transport system.

  Phase one of Manchester encountered particular difficulties in getting the funding and permission necessary to link it directly into the Piccadilly station so providing passengers with a direct connection between heavy and light rail.

  If this connection had not been achieved the benefits of integrating the modes would have been lost.

  DLR is a very good example of being part of an integrated transport system that provides real passenger benefits. People arriving by heavy rail at Waterloo can travel to Canary Wharf by underground and LRT and if arriving by bus at Lewisham, can go directly under the Thames by DLR to Canary Wharf.

  The DLR is presently being extended to Woolwich Arsenal via London City Airport which will provide a link into Bank station, it also links to Stratford station for heavy rail and Channel Tunnel rail link.

  All these modes can be used by purchasing one Travelcard ticket.

Q.  Barriers to the development of light rail.

  The track record for delivering of UK LRT schemes compared to that of EU is poor. The gestation period for development and funding of LRT projects is tortuous and complex with most schemes taking 5-15 years to deliver.

  Schemes such as Midland Metro and Sheffield have failed in meeting passenger forecasts predicted during the development stage, this has translated into poor revenue returns for the private sector. In addition, on Nottingham and Croydon, the transfer of utilities and full design & build risk has meant losses for the concession companies involved.

  The need to form multi-discipline consortia and the cost of bidding has also been a barrier when these schemes are procured on a PFI basis.

  The above factors have led to disillusionment and loss of appetite in pursuing LRT schemes in the UK, especially against a background of less risky and more certain PFI projects in the health and education sectors.

  The expectation from the public sector that good value for money is obtained by passing farebox risk to the private sector. This results in the public sector paying for a risk element or the concession companies going into receivership as a result of over optimistic forecasts.

Q.  The effect of different financing arrangements (public/private) on the overall cost of light rail systems.

  The PFI method of financing, building, operating and maintaining LRT schemes in the UK transfers most of the risks to the private sector; these risks have to be costed and financed, including those that are not fully defined such as revenue, patronage, planning, utilities, insurance, and long-term maintenance.

  The underpricing of these risks has led to the Croydon, Nottingham and Midland Metro schemes getting into financial difficulties with significant losses to the private sector companies involved.

  The consequence of this experience has caused cost escalation on the present LRT bids for Manchester extensions, Leeds and South Hants. Also, the withdrawal of companies from the Light Rail market and much higher IRR expectation for the financing agencies.

  The most successful example of financing an LRT scheme is the DLR which has used different arrangements during its development.

  The initial DLR was financed by the public sector using a design, build procurement when it was found that the traditional consultant design contractor build was too expensive.

  The extension to Beckton was traditionally procured using public funds that were generated by the sale of land at increased value on the Isle of Dogs. The value increased because the DLR provided the catalyst to attract developer funds which then regenerated the area.

  The DLR extension under the Thames to Lewisham was financed under a PPP procurement using public and private (mainly Bond) funds on an availability and part revenue risk, concession basis. The risk of rolling stock, operations, signalling, planning and most of the revenue was with the public sector.

  This project was completed two months early and on budget which is a great success when compared with the Jubilee Line which was being built at the same time on a traditional basis with public funds; it went significantly over budget and programme.

  The most recent DLR extensions to the Airport and Woolwich has used PFI procurement with the public sector paying an infrastructure availability fee for a concession period. The risk of revenue, patronage, rolling stock and its maintenance, the operatives and signalling system are retained by DLR. The private sector has the financing, design, build and alignment availability risk.

  This DLR model of financing and procuring Light Rail schemes gives a much better risk distribution between the public and private sectors in a way that provides a realistic cost for the scheme.

  In addition, the bidding process was short with an early selection of preferred bidder so bid costs were reduced.

  The bid documentation contained good surveys to allow below ground risks to be priced. The financing risk was definable, giving lower IRR based on availability fees.

  Much of this is because the authority is informed and has carried out the process previously; some attempt should be made to use the skills and best practice used in the DLR procurement to be transferred to other projects.

Q.  The practicality of alternatives to light rail such as increased investment in buses.

  Mowlem were involved in providing the dedicated guided bus ways for Leeds, the capital cost of these when compared with a single track on street LRT were cheaper but not significantly so.

  Where buses are using the roads they are adding to the surface deterioration and do not have to pay the full cost of repair and maintenance.

  Buses generally means fossil fuels.

  Buses are more expensive for larger passenger volumes but are effective in providing feeders to LRT termini.

February 2005



 
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