Memorandum by pteg (LR 55)
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT: THE FUTURE OF LIGHT
RAIL AND MODERN TRAMS IN BRITAIN
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 pteg represents the seven Passenger
Transport Executives of England and Scotland which between them
serve more than thirteen million people in Strathclyde ("SPT"),
Tyne and Wear ("Nexus"), West Yorkshire ("Metro"),
South Yorkshire, Greater Manchester, Merseyside ("Merseytravel")
and the West Midlands ("Centro"). Transport for London
(TfL) is an associate member of pteg. The PTEs plan, procure,
provide and promote public transport in some of Britain's city
regions with the aim of providing integrated public transport
networks accessible to all. The PTEs have a combined budget of
more than a billion pounds a year, and are funded by a combination
of local council tax and grants from national government. They
are responsible to Passenger Transport Authorities (PTAs), made
up of representatives of local councils in the areas they serve.
2. UK LIGHT RAIL—A
SUCCESS STORY
2.1 The PTEs are the largest bloc of light
rail promoters, and were the first to reintroduce the tram to
British city streets with Manchester Metrolink in 1992. Four of
the seven currently operational UK light rail schemes were promoted
by PTEs. All PTEs have plans for new schemes, or for extensions
to existing networks.
2.2 pteg recently published a review, by
consultants Steer Davies Gleave (SDG), of the record of light
rail in the UK. The report ("What Light Rail can do for Cities"),
found that UK light rail is popular, with all schemes operating
at, or near, capacity at peak times. Overall there has been a
52% increase in patronage since 1999 with significant flows being
carried outside the rush hours. This increase has come despite
significant increases in fares, and at a time when patronage of
the bus network outside London has fallen.
2.3 This success has come despite limitations
on the abilities of promoters to secure integration of light rail
with other modes—in particular with bus services. Under
bus deregulation buses can, and do, compete head on with light
rail services. This contrasts with European light rail schemes
where bus networks complement, rather than duplicate, light rail
systems. But despite these limitations the SDG report finds that
integration has been a realised objective of UK light rail schemes.
It finds:
— there are numerous successful Park
and Ride sites on all systems outside London;
— the level of priority, and effective
traffic management, secured by promoters for light rail has improved;
— there are some excellent examples
of integrated design of tram stops with bus stations, rail stations
and major development sites;
— and there are well developed (voluntary)
integrated ticketing schemes in most instances.
2.4 The report also found that UK light
rail has improved both the image and the economy of the areas
it serves. The report concluded: "All UK schemes have had
positive effects on the image of the city in which they have been
built, which has brought benefits in terms of attracting inward
investment as well as business and tourist visitors. Beneficial
effects on property values, both commercial and residential have,
without exception, accompanied implementation of tram schemes
in the UK. Tram schemes have played an important part in delivering
regeneration and shaping how and where it occurs."
2.5 On social inclusion, UK light rail is
proven to improve access and mobility for people with disabilities.
For example interviews undertaken on behalf of TfL among people
with disabilities indicate that because the Croydon Tramlink service
is both fully accessible and highly reliable, it is becoming more
popular than services which are specifically targeted at disabled
people—like Dial-a-Ride. Light Rail can also help tackle
social exclusion by provide far better linkage between deprived
areas and job opportunities. This has also been the case on Croydon
Tramlink where the tram almost halved the journey time between
the isolated estates of New Addington and Croydon town centre.
2.6 UK Light Rail has improved the environment.
SDG estimate that 22 million car trips a year have been taken
off the roads by light rail schemes. UK Light Rail's safety record
is also excellent. In 2001 there were 0.00007 people killed and
injured on UK light rail per billion passenger kilometres travelled.
The comparable figures for other modes were 196 killed or injured
per billion passenger kilometres by bus and coach; 2,335 killed
or injured per billion pedestrian kilometres, and 5,549 killed
or injured per billion motorcycle kilometres.
3. LIGHT RAIL—PART
OF THE
PUBLIC TRANSPORT
SOLUTION IN
THE CITY
REGIONS
3.1 Light rail has proved to be successful
because of its unique characteristics. In particular it:
— penetrates town and city centres
with permanent, visible and acceptable infrastructure;
— delivers predictable, regular and
fast journey times, providing a high capacity service on simple
and easily understood routes;
— operates to a generally high level
of reliability due to segregation from other traffic, priority
at junctions and contractual incentives to operators;
— has accessible, well equipped and
visible stops;
— provides a high ride quality throughout
the entire journey;
— can be effectively integrated with
new developments and park and ride facilities;
— creates an opportunity to renew both
the fabric of the urban areas it serves, and the image of those
areas; and
— delivers permanence of infrastructure,
vehicles and operations, creating confidence amongst individuals
and business to make long term locational decisions that produce
long-term patronage growth.
3.2 This helps to explain the high modal
shift that UK light rail has achieved, with about 20% of peak
hour light rail users having previously travelled by car. At the
weekends modal shift can be as high as 50%. Reductions in road
traffic of up to 14% after the introduction of tram schemes have
been recorded.
4. ARE BETTER
BUS SERVICES
A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE?
4.1 One consequence of the escalating costs
of light rail proposals is that it has become increasingly fashionable
to suggest that better bus services can do the job of light rail,
at far less cost. There is also an ever widening range of public
transport vehicles and systems that aim to provide many of the
benefits of light rail at lower cost.
4.2 These alternatives to light rail include:
— upgrading the quality and reliability
of conventional bus corridors through extensive bus priority,
high frequencies and good quality stops, vehicles and infrastructure;
— superior quality conventional buses—the
design of which aims to replicate, both externally and internally,
the qualities of a tram;
— guided buses—buses equipped
to use some of form of busway, which can be delineated either
physically or electronically; and
— hybrid modes—such as trolleybuses
which also have their own diesel engine allowing them to operate
as conventional buses.
4.3 The PTEs' approach is to try and find
the most appropriate public transport solution which meets the
specific circumstances and challenges of a particular corridor
or network. Often this will be through making comprehensive improvements
to conventional bus services. All PTEs are involved, with their
constituent District Highway Authorities in projects that deliver
bus priority measures and whole corridor upgrades.
4.4 The PTEs have also been leading the
way in pioneering the implementation of guided bus and tram-like
bus vehicles. Examples include:
— three operational guided bus corridors
in West Yorkshire;
— the planned Leigh guided busway in
Greater Manchester—where the intention is to use tram-like
buses; and
— involvement with First Group over
their plans to introduce "ftr streetcars" (conventional
buses designed to resemble trams) in British cities.
4.5 However, the unique characteristics
of light rail give it significant advantages over bus alternatives
which make it the right option for many busy corridors. Some of
these are set out in para 3.1, but there are others. Light rail
can move relatively high volumes of passengers more efficiently
than the bus alternative. Light rail has the potential to carry
flows of up to 20,000 per hour (around four times more than conventional
bus and twice that of the largest, tram-like bus alternative).
It can also carry those greater numbers of passengers more comfortably,
rapidly and reliably than the bus alternative. A further benefit
of the higher capacity offered by light rail is to reduce the
congestion caused by large numbers of buses circulating in city
centres.
4.6 At higher levels of demand (over at
least 2,500 passengers per hour per direction) light rail becomes
a cheaper means of providing the same capacity as the bus alternative
and leads to even higher levels of benefits. This is because at
high levels of demand very large numbers of buses are required
to provide equivalent capacity. This entails high staffing and
vehicle costs and leads to roads becoming congested with buses.
4.7 Light rail's advantages over the bus
alternative are reflected in the much higher levels of modal shift
that light rail achieves. As set out in para 3.2, peak hour transfer
from car to tram is consistently around 20%. This compares with
estimates of between 4% and 6.5% resulting from significant improvements
to bus corridors. Finally, as the SDG report shows, improvements
to bus services (often perceived as potentially temporary) do
not have the same catalytic effect on urban regeneration and city
image that can be triggered by the tangible and permanent commitment
to an area that light rail represents.
4.8 Some argue that as new tram-like bus
vehicles, operating on guided systems, become available then the
characteristics of light rail can be replicated by the bus. However,
it should be remembered that the more tram-like the bus system,
the more tram-like are the costs. For example significant improvements
in the speed and reliability of a bus-based system cannot be secured
without provision of extensive segregated sections of route, requiring
land and property-take commensurate with that of LRT. Dedicated
busways are also difficult to insert into town and city centres
in an acceptable way. If LRT levels of accessibility, visibility
and security at stops on a bus-based system are required then
the costs of these stops will be similar to those of a light rail
system.
4.9 To conclude this section, the bus will
remain the mainstay of public transport provision in the city
regions, and there is much the PTEs are doing, and can do, to
improve the quality of services. New and more tram-like bus vehicles
and systems are becoming available and the PTEs have, and will
continue to, pioneer these new options where appropriate. Alternatives
to light rail are examined and re-examined, as a matter of course
during the development of light rail proposals. However, light
rail remains the best choice for many busy corridors with a proven
record of providing a high capacity and high quality service which
triggers significant reduction in car use and contributes to urban
regeneration.
5. HOW CAN
LIGHT RAIL
BE DELIVERED
FASTER, BETTER
AND CHEAPER?
5.1 The 2004 NAO light rail report scoped
out some of the areas in which light rail could be delivered faster,
better and cheaper. pteg is committed to working with the Government
and the industry to follow up the NAO's recommendations.
Faster
5.2 A report into the comparative performance
data from French Tramways systems for pteg by Faber Maunsell in
2003 showed that French cities are able to implement light rail
schemes much faster than is generally the case in the UK. For
example, the implementation of the Lyon tramway scheme took approximately
three and a half years—from the beginning of preliminary
studies to the opening day of service. It took 15 years for Sheffield
Supertram and 13 years for Croydon Tramlink to go through the
same process. In France a Mayor can stand for office on a pledge
to build a tram scheme and have that tram operational before the
end of his or her first term. The NAO found that in the UK "it
takes too long for local authorities to be granted the necessary
legal powers for light rail systems and whether schemes will be
funded is uncertain". The protracted approval and procurement
process for UK Light Rail schemes leads to both higher development
costs and higher construction costs (currently rising at around
10% a year in real terms). Patterns of development and land-use
can also change, as can the policy context in which schemes are
evaluated (leading to round after round of scheme reappraisal).
5.3 The Government's intention to devolve
more of the decision-making process on major schemes, like light
rail proposals, could help to speed up the planning process. However,
care needs be taken to ensure that devolution to regional bodies
does not become an additional tier of decision making, adding
further costs and delays in the procurement and implementation
of light rail schemes—the majority of which will always
be promoted by sub-regional bodies like PTEs.
Cheaper
5.4 The significant increases in the cost
of new light rail schemes is the reason given by the Government
for its decision not to authorise funding for the extensions to
Manchester Metrolink and for the new Leeds Supertram and South
Hampshire Rapid Transit systems. One of the principal reasons
for the higher than anticipated cost of new schemes has been the
Government's preference for a form of PFI under which a single
consortium finances, designs, builds, maintains and operates a
light rail scheme under a thirty year contract. This form of PFI
was intended to transfer the risks associated with a light rail
scheme to the private sector. These risks include the effect on
revenue of aggressive competition from bus operators or changes
in labour costs or of private motoring.
5.5 On some operational schemes procured
in this way, such as Croydon Tramlink, the consortium's calculations
of these risks proved to be erroneous; leading to financial losses
for the consortium. This has led to a more risk averse and cautious
approach from consortia bidding for new schemes. This in turn
has led to bids for new schemes being much higher than had been
anticipated by scheme promoters. Simpler and more conventional
forms of procurement offer the opportunity to reduce the costs
of new schemes. For example the costs of Leeds Supertram have
been substantially reduced because the promoters—Metro (West
Yorkshire PTE) and Leeds City Council—are now proposing
to share some of the risks, including during the operation and
maintenance phase. This will enable the financial risks associated
with the scheme to be better managed and more realistically reflected
in bid costs. For example if patronage falls below agreed benchmarks
the promoters will cover part of the cost of the shortfall.
5.6 The NAO identified other areas where
costs could be reduced, including those associated with diverting
utilities, and from greater standardisation of tram systems and
their components.
5.7 One way in which these, and other cost
issues, will be addressed is through UK Tram—a new body
which will bring together scheme promoters, the industry and the
Government. UK Tram will host a series of task groups (which will
bring all the relevant parties together) and which will be dedicated
to achieving efficiencies in key areas.
Better
5.8 The introduction of a new light rail
scheme should offer an opportunity to recast the local public
transport network to ensure that bus services feed into the new
light rail service, and that buses which formerly operated on
the light rail corridor can be redeployed elsewhere. This is the
approach taken in mainland Europe. In this way light rail becomes
part of fully integrated public transport networks, which London
and most cities in mainland Europe already enjoy. However, outside
London the bus industry is deregulated which means bus operators
can—and do—operate in direct competition with light
rail.
5.9 The Government has raised the prospect
of allowing PTEs to promote light rail schemes in combination
with proposals for bus "quality contracts". This would
enable PTEs to franchise a network of complementary bus services
on a light rail corridor and prevent wasteful competition. PTEs
are considering this option, however under current legislation
the process for implementing a quality contract is convoluted,
difficult and stacked against the proponent. Although the Railways
Bill will amend the legislation to make it easier for PTEs to
introduce a quality contract to replace a rail service, it will
not, unless amended, reduce any of the obstacles which stand in
the way of quality contract proposals which are designed to complement
a light rail scheme.
6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1 UK Light Rail is success story. Its
quality and reliability means that all schemes now operate near,
or at, capacity in the rush hours, with a significant number of
users having transferred from the car. It has contributed to regeneration
and, given the constraints imposed by bus deregulation, has achieved
a high degree of integration with other modes. UK Light Rail takes
22 million car journeys off the roads every year and does so with
an admirable safety record.
6.2 The bus will remain the mainstay of
public transport provision in the city regions and new forms of
guided, high quality and tram-like bus systems are being pioneered
by the PTEs. However light rail has clear advantages on busy corridors
where its greater capacity, speed, quality and reliability have
led to far higher levels of modal shift than improvements to bus
services have hitherto come close to achieving.
6.3 The cost of new light rail schemes has
escalated recently—mainly because the Government's preferred
form of PFI has not proved to be fit for purpose. pteg is committed
to working with Government, and the industry, to reduce procurement
and other costs, in order to deliver new light rail schemes "quicker,
better and cheaper".
6.4 The PTEs are proud of their role in
bringing the tram back to British city streets and remain fully
committed to light rail as the right solution for key urban corridors.
Tim Larner
Director, Support Unit
February 2005
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