Memorandum by AEA Technology Rail (LR
57)
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT: THE FUTURE OF LIGHT
RAIL AND MODERN TRAMS IN BRITAIN
AEA Technology Rail has had involvement in supplying
specialist technical assistance to most of the UK tram and light
rail networks. Since 2000 we have also participated in two major
European Commission funded research projects specifically targeting
cost reductions in procuring, building and operating light rail
systems. The first was "Obstacles to the Internal Market
in Rail Mass Transit" (OIM Report) published in October 2000.
More recently we have participated in a Light
Rail Thematic Network (LibeRTiN), part of the fifth framework
for sustainable growth and development, as one of five partners,
all major rail and light rail consultants bringing together experts
from all areas of the European light rail industry along with
UITP and UNIFE. The goal of the project was the search for a sector
wide consensus in fostering simplification, modularisation, interchangeability
of light rail subsystem, identifying and applying best practice
in developing improved standards for light rail. Our role in this
project included leading the work on the tendering process and
on the wheel-rail interface (derailment and ride quality). Other
topics covered include fire safety, loading parameters, maintenance
management, structure gauging, noise and vibration, access, electromagnetic
compatibility and heating, ventilation and air-conditioning.
Both projects concluded that there were significant
benefits to be achieved in the procurement and management of light
rail systems for operators, promoters and suppliers if:
— Greater harmonisation and standardisation
was applied to LRV and system design.
— Railway standards applicable to LRT
and tramway systems were amended to include light rail specific
clauses.
— A harmonised procurement and tendering
process with appropriate risk allocation was developed—particularly
in the UK this would lead to significant cost and timescale reductions
for light rail schemes.
It was estimated that a common language procurement
specification to universal European standards for equipment could
lead to a reduction of 1 to 4 years in the procurement and construction
process and saving of over 10% of the cost of LRVs. Further savings
can be achieved through better management of system interfaces
such as wheel/rail as this would significantly reduce many of
the problems experienced by all the UK light rail systems.
For more detailed conclusions see www.libertin.info
These conclusions are broadly in line with those
of the NAO report on UK light rail systems published in April
2004, leading to a perception that light rail systems in the UK
would perform better with improved overall process management
and the transfer of expertise from one project to the next.
There are three specific areas we wish to expand
upon.
1. PROCUREMENT
Light rail schemes from Manchester in 1992 up
to Nottingham in 2004 have been procured by a contract with a
single private sector consortium which is expected to assume a
high level of risk. For many reasons, this approach does not represent
best value for money for the public sector promoter.
The main reason is that the consortium is required
to take on risks which it is not able to control. The consortium
therefore increases its price by an amount sufficient to indemnify
it against this risk.
The private sector is generally best placed
to manage cost-side risks (such as construction cost overrun or
unreliability of the completed infrastructure or vehicles), but
has very little control over revenue-side risks. For example:
— The outline business case will be
based on ridership forecasts prepared by the promoter. These have
in the past been over-optimistic, so each bidding consortium will
probably have to spend a significant amount on reviewing or repeating
this work. The bid price will reflect the cost of this work, both
for the won bid and for previous lost bids.
— The private sector has no control
over local policies such as traffic restraint and parking, which
affect the attractiveness of the private car compared with light
rail and therefore influence the number of passengers and the
fares that are charged. If these policies result in traffic congestion
blocking the light rail tracks, the service may also become less
reliable (so less well-used) and more costly to operate.
— Except in London and Northern Ireland,
private sector bus operators have extensive freedom over routes,
timetables and fares. Therefore bus competition is a significant
risk to the light rail provider. It may appear to be a good thing
for the passenger, but in fact the bus operator will tend to cream
off the most profitable flows and leave light rail to pick up
the others. In most other countries where light rail operates,
the buses form feeder routes to do what they do best—carry
lower passenger flows in areas where traffic congestion is not
significant. It is not within the scope of this memorandum to
comment on bus deregulation in a general sense.
As a direct result of managing these risks when
costing a UK light rail project, major vehicle manufacturers estimated
that this equated to additional costs of 60% above other European
projects.[16]
Further questions arise when an initial light
rail network is to be extended. There is a choice between placing
a single-option contract with the existing consortium, buying
them out of the remainder of the operating period, or having two
operators on the same network. None of these options is particularly
attractive to the public sector promoter.
Consortia will generally include a vehicle supplier
and an operator. Following recent mergers there are only three
major and about three smaller light rail vehicle suppliers in
Europe, and a similar number of transport operating groups with
light rail experience interested in bidding for UK work. There
is a wider choice of civil construction firms, but few of these
have experience of building light rail infrastructure. Since it
is very difficult for a single bidder to participate in more than
one consortium, public sector promoters seeking consortia to bid
for a light rail scheme may face a limited choice of credible
bidders and this lack of competition is likely to increase the
price.
Furthermore, under bus deregulation the bidder
that includes the dominant local bus operator is able to offer
a higher degree of integration and therefore a more attractive
public transport network for the city in question. It is also
faced with a much smaller bus competition risk than its competitors.
This bidder therefore has an advantage over its competitors, and
may choose to increase its bid price accordingly.
The Edinburgh and Merseyside light rail schemes,
currently under development, are not adopting the consortium route
but are procuring vehicles, infrastructure and operations separately.
Docklands Light Railway has also taken this approach. The Leeds,
South Hampshire and Manchester proposals, whose funding bids were
recently rejected by DfT, are likely to be looking at similar
methods to reduce risk premium.
2. STANDARDISATION
Although they share fundamental parameters such
as track gauge and electric supply voltage,[17]
there is little standardisation between the UK light rail networks.
No vehicle from any of the networks could run in passenger service
on any of the others without quite extensive modifications. So
when new vehicles are needed, each network has to undertake its
own specification and procurement process and pay a high unit
cost for a small order.
The UK is uniquely disadvantaged in this respect.
In Germany the networks in the different cities evolved independently
so there is also a degree of incompatibility between them. However
as many of these individual networks are much larger on their
own than the total size of the UK light rail networks in aggregate,
any incompatibilities are much less of a handicap. France has
been building new networks, many of a similar size to those in
the UK, but while their vehicles are visually very different they
are based on a small number of fundamental designs. Even North
America has achieved a better degree of standardisation, with
several instances of vehicles being transferred between networks
and at least one of an unwanted option on an vehicle order being
transferred to another city which needed this type of vehicle.
At least three of the UK's light rail schemes
have had technical problems arising from poor specification of
the vehicle-infrastructure interface. While these risks are in
theory transferred to the provider consortium, experience suggests
that this body lacks either the knowledge or the incentive to
manage this problem across the interface between its component
companies—despite the high level of penalty payments and
other costs incurred if opening is delayed. These problems are
now sufficiently well-known that future consortium bidders are
likely to assume they will occur and include a price premium for
the associated risk!
Without careful specification of standards and
interfaces by the public sector, the consortium is also incentivised
to build an infrastructure which is compatible only with whatever
vehicle is being offered. When network extension or increasing
demand creates a need for more vehicles, there may be a limited
choice of compatible offers or the need for a non-standard design
may increase the price. The UKtram body being set up (with Transport
for London in the lead) has expressed an interest in building
on the work of LibeRTiN to develop standards which are directly
applicable in the UK.
3. COMPARISON
OF LIGHT
RAIL AND
BUSES
Docklands Light Rail vehicles are driven automatically,
but this is only possible where pedestrians and other road vehicles
have no access to the track. The unusual environment of Docklands
made automation an appropriate choice, but these factors are unlikely
to occur elsewhere and (apart from Docklands extensions) all current
and proposed UK schemes use manually-driven trams[18].
As well as segregated tracks, trams can use
a reserved lane in the street, a lane shared with buses or with
general traffic, or (at low speeds) a pedestrian area. Buses can
operate on the highway, on bus lanes or on bus-only routes known
as busways. Guided busways are also in operation, where the bus
runs between closely-spaced kerbs and is steered by lateral guide
wheels[19].
These run in Leeds, Crawley and Ipswich. Other UK cities (but
few in other countries) are actively developing guided bus schemes.
The simplest and cheapest way to build light
rail is to use a former railway or spare space alongside an operating
railway. This gives a rapid service at a relatively low cost,
but is only appropriate if the railway is in the right place to
serve key destinations, or the light rail can be extended off
the railway to reach them. For example, the original Bury-Altrincham
route of Manchester Metrolink converted two existing railways
and added a small amount of street track, to give good access
to the city centre but retain the rapid journey through the suburbs.
On the other hand the existing Midland Metro route suffers from
lack of proximity to key destinations—the proposed extensions
address this problem.
In several cities in mainland Europe, and at
Sunderland in the UK, light rail shares tracks with the main line
railway, giving the advantage of a fast segregated alignment in
places where it is necessary to retain the railway for longer-distance
passenger or freight trains. While track sharing is possible in
principle, it is more complicated to implement than a pure light
rail scheme. Several other UK cities are interested in this model.
Most of the French schemes have been mainly
on street, but with a very high degree of segregation from other
road traffic. Although the average speed can be low, this is compensated
by proximity of the route to key destinations. Severe traffic
restriction or management policies are also essential to make
roadspace available for the tram route.
Tramways with large sections of street running
have been less successful in the UK. The most obvious example
is the Middlewood-Malin Bridge route of South Yorkshire Supertram.
This route shares roadspace with general traffic over most of
its length, and few priority measures are possible. It has suffered
badly from bus competition, as the bus does not have to pay for
its infrastructure, runs at a similar speed on the shared roadspace
and can take a more direct route to the city centre.
In an environment where traffic congestion is
limited to a small proportion of the route, and no railway-based
or other segregated alignment is available, then a bus priority
scheme may make more sense than light rail. Sections of bus lane
or busway would be needed to avoid the congestion hotspots; guided
busway is physically incompatible with other types of vehicle
so acts as a self-enforcing bus lane. However away from these
congested sections the bus option only needs minor work, whereas
trams would require expensive street track over the entire route.
On the other hand, where congestion is present
along much of the route then a much more segregated alignment
will be necessary. Particularly if this is off-street, light rail
can use ballasted track, which ought to be cheaper and more environmentally
acceptable than building new guided or unguided busways.
Trams are more likely to be accepted in busy
pedestrian areas than are buses. The running gear is shielded
and the vehicle follows a predictable path, so it is (and is perceived
to be) much safer and more pedestrian-friendly than a bus. The
best UK example of trams in crowded pedestrian streets is George
Street in Croydon, but it can be seen in many European city centres.
Guided busway is not suitable for busy pedestrian areas because
the guideway requires steps in the road surface.
The final factor for consideration is passenger
flow. A light rail vehicle carries over twice as many passengers
as even an articulated bus. In situations where the sheer number
of buses means they are delaying each other or obstructing traffic,
or they are unacceptable on safety or environmental grounds, then
light rail may be a better choice. The larger vehicle also reduces
operating costs.
4. SUGGESTIONS
FOR SUCCESSFUL
LIGHT RAIL
IN THE
UK
— Impose regulation of bus routes,
times and fares—at least in areas served by light rail.
— Allow the public sector the freedom
to specify key interfaces according to known best practice.
— Abandon procurement methods by which
suppliers and operators have to form a single consortium.
— Adopt common European standards where
practicable.
— Revise procurement and financing
rules so that the private sector only takes on the risks it can
control.
— Improve interface management at procurement
and design stage of a light rail project.
— Adopt a common language tender specification
to reduce procurement period through ease of preparation, response
and processing.
— The following situations could make
light rail more appropriate than bus-based alternatives:
— Where a large part of the route
must be off-street to achieve reliable operation without unacceptable
impacts on other road users;
— or where a suitable segregated
alignment is available in the right place and at a reasonable
cost;
— or where the route is mainly
on-street but the predicted passenger flows are very high;
— or where it is essential to operate
through busy pedestrian areas.
Ian Ambrose
Principal Consultant
New Railways Team
February 2005
16 LibeRTiN Workshop May 2004. Back
17
Except Tyne and Wear Metro. Back
18
In this note a tram is defined as a rail vehicle capable of being
driven "on line of sight" like a bus. It may also be
capable of being driven under the control of a signalling system
like a train. Back
19
Other forms of guideway have been proposed where an electronic
system steers the vehicle to follow a painted line on the road
or a cable buried beneath it. Any application would need to demonstrate
safe operation in the case of snow, ice, or sudden failure of
the electronics. The UK safety authorities are understood to have
concerns about this type of guidance. Back
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