Memorandum by MonoMetro (LR 63)
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT: THE FUTURE OF LIGHT
RAIL AND MODERN TRAMS IN BRITAIN
COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF
LIGHT RAIL
TRANSIT (LRT)
Suspended light rail transit (sLRT) has successfully
operated in Germany for more than 100 years with an evolved system
of rules and regulations that now have EU-wide applicability.
MonoMetro sLRT follows these rules. MonoMetro sLRT bogies sit
astride rails in the same way as ground-supported LRT. The only
difference is the vehicle body is suspended below the wheeled
bogies rather than sitting above it.
sLRT enjoys all the cost benefits of LRT but
there are further benefits:
— sLRT is 60% cheaper than LRT on a
per km basis.
— sLRT is more rapidly implemented
than LRT.
— sLRT columns are erected using with
civil works procedures restricted to a small area whereas LRT
requires road surface replacement and diversion of sub ground
services.
— sLRT are ultra lightweight vehicles
whereas LRT vehicles are heavier to withstand heavy impacts of
mixed ground traffic.
— sLRT low inertia trains can be accelerated
and decelerated on a very rapid frequency service using relatively
limited power.
Costs for London urban implementation of sLRT
were calculated by Faithful and Gould up to £15 million per
Km including double track, stations, depot, planning and professional
costs.
Ground-supported trams follow much heavier construction
methods to satisfy the high impact resistance required because
the vehicles operate in a heavy traffic environment. Rules governing
the impact resistance of trams relate to the railways where vehicle
loads are much heavier than highway vehicles. Trams are heavy
using much more energy to stop and start while MonoMetro is lightweight,
using far less power.
Suspended light rail is separated from ground
traffic, enabling unimpeded lightweight trains to move rapidly
across ground congestion. If ground-supported trams operate on
a dedicated right of way, other traffic has to be displaced shifting
congestion elsewhere.
MonoMetro offers low cost wireless automated
control of quick and frequent train movements whereas a tramway
needs a driver and is restricted to the speed of ground traffic
or in the case of DLR (where elevated) requires a heavily constructed
continual bridge structure. This is overwhelmingly obtrusive by
comparison to the elegant architecture of MonoMetro architecturally
designed masts and beams. Suspended light rail offers the greatest
benefit of mass transit passenger capacity generally associated
with heavy metro systems at 60% of the cost of implementing a
ground supported tramway.
WHAT LIGHT
RAIL SYSTEMS
NEED IN
ORDER TO
BE SUCCESSFUL
LRT cost of implementation and operation is
rarely covered by fare box revenue. The challenge is to reduce
the amount of subsidy required to an acceptable level while the
ultimate goal of operating at or near profit seems elusive.
LRT costs begin with an expensive and cumbersome
planning process. While the Transport and Works Act was intended
to speed up the process and lower the cost, it has failed to deliver.
Capital cost for urban track bed where roads have to be torn up,
sewers and other sub-ground services diverted, with sophisticated
construction providing a velvety glide to vehicles, is very expensive.
Tram vehicles constructed to resist high impacts associated with
railways together with manning day-to-day operations is a cost
paradigm we must change. Since 1997 several LRT schemes have been
discarded because the overall bill for construction, amortisation
of debt and operation was too great for the resources we have.
A paradigm shift can alter many of these costs.
Because MonoMetro sLRT is essentially the construction
of architecture, of designed columns, architectural beams and
station architecture, it is appropriate to use the architect's
two stage planning process. The Mayor of London has the power
to grant outline planning permission for MonoMetro sLRT as architecture.
It is surely not civil engineering for it looks nothing like it.
Full planning permission can then be granted on a borough-by-borough
basis, dealing with the environmental impact assessment locally.
MonoMetro tracks are laid along continuous rubber cushions on
the architectural beams and held together by standardised railway
torsion clips. Assembly is a simple and clean operation. Planting
an architectural column every 25 metres is much less costly than
tearing back the roadway. The lightweight MonoMetro sLRT trains
are built to withstand the far lower impacts found within the
environment of its segregated tracks . . . never mixing with heavy
rail. Stations are admittedly more expensive than tram stops but
the overall cost is 60% of building a tramway.
The procurement paradigm for MonoMetro sLRT,
while satisfying the requirements for competition, follows the
architect's route where suppliers become general contractors building
from full design drawings rather than tendering on specification.
This saves a vast amount of design time and costs associated with
manufacturers' bids. A manufacturer tendering on specification
has to design his product before tendering his price. Only one
can get the job so the costs of losing has to be absorbed and
these costs can run into millions. The way to change this paradigm
is to procure from licensed annotated design drawings as well
as specification, instead of purchasing proprietary technology.
Mass manufacture of the modular components of
MonoMetro columns, beams, stations, track, switches and trains,
creates a kit of standardised components and the proportional
cost of ground works in relation to overall cost is far lower.
The cost of the kit is highly predictable because it is fabricated
under controlled conditions in fabrication shops. Cost prediction
for LRT ground works is least reliable whereas this part of the
work is the greater portion of LRT cost. It is far better for
the greater portion of cost for any system to have the highest
cost predictability. You never know what difficulties are going
to arise from a tramway because every metre runs across unique
sub-ground conditions.
MonoMetro sLRT beam construction has been deliberately
over structured. This allows masts to be locally re-positioned
by up to 1,500 mm forward and backward to optimise the avoidance
of any sub-ground services.
HOW EFFECTIVELY
IS LIGHT
RAIL USED
AS PART
OF AN
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT
SYSTEM?
Discounting the change of level between the
ground and the elevated stations which can be accessed by mechanical
means MonoMetro sLRT is actually more effective in its potential
to integrate transport services across the full range of modes.
This is because the elevated tracks are able to enter difficult
locations to gain access impenetrable to ground supported LRT.
For example MonoMetro can be integrated into Paddington Station
whereas it would be impossible to integrate ground supported LRT.
MonoMetro architecture can be introduced without interfering with
the existing structure of Brunel's vaulting because the architectural
layout follows the same principles as cathedral vaults, allowing
MonoMetro to pass through the east west transepts. This is practical
as well as a spectacular example of integration. At Baker Street
an elevated MonoMetro sLRT station above the Marylebone Road can
provide sheltered cover and re organise the presently haphazard
location of bus and taxi stops as well as direct escalator/funicular
lifts into the Underground.
MonoMetro stations are planned to be located
less frequently than tram stops or the underground, similarly
to the Paris RER (Réseau Express Régional, Regional
Express Network). The implication is that the elevated stations
then become inter modal exchange points where local bus services
can be re organised to ferry passengers to and from MonoMetro
point of inter modal exchange. The greater distance between stops
can be covered very rapidly by the ultra light weight MonoMetro
trains. At key locations along the proposed MonoMetro route between
Paddington and Stratford via Liverpool Street, Commercial Road
and Isle of Dogs, stations can link directly down into Underground
stations while the lighted canopy of the station is an ideal point
for re organising the arrival and departure point of buses and
taxis. Along Oxford Street, where bus stops are chaotically located,
such a reorganisation would rationalise the movement of traffic
and perhaps even create the practical possibility of pedestrianising
Oxford Street, reducing ground vehicle traffic.
This can be achieved by locating a MonoMetro
station on the south side of Marble Arch where westerly bus services
could be practically terminated, and passengers discharged onto
MonoMetro. Strategically located MonoMetro stations along Oxford
Street can create direct access into major commercial arenas.
An integrated business plan involving all stakeholders in growing
the economy of the west end will disperse risk and engage the
latent energy and enthusiasm within the retail sector. Integration
at all levels is able to deal more effectively with the needs
of the community at large.
BARRIERS TO
THE DEVELOPMENT
OF LIGHT
RAIL:
There are real physical and economic barriers
to implementing LRT. sLRT is an appropriate development of LRT
that creates a new cost paradigm, new construction method, new
method of procurement, and a revised approach to obtaining planning
consent able to reduce the cost and time taken. Conservative resistance
to change from LRT proponents is the barrier to governmental understanding
of the advantages of sLRT.
The appropriate domain of competency for assessing
the architecture of supporting structure of sLRT columns, beams
and stations in the urban landscape lies with recognised Architect
Experts. This falls beyond the circumscribed field of expertise
of transport engineers to assess MonoMetro sLRT engineering.
Statutory assessment of candidate technologies
for any intended transport project must be seen to include all
fields of competency as part of due process.
The Deputy Prime Minister commissioned the shadow
Strategic Rail Authority in 1999 to carry out a study of London's
needs that recommended two transport projects for London.
MonoMetro is a candidate technology for a New
Regional Metro and is eligible for statutory assessment as part
of due process. Since the inception of Crossrail, Transport for
London (TfL) have refused to carry out any such assessment because
of their fear that it will alter the choice of technology for
the tunnel being planned as part of their Crossrail scheme. MonoMetro
sLRT is able to deliver 20,000 passengers an hour, equivalent
to a mass transit system at 60% of the cost of LRT and built rapidly
to connect Paddington and Stratford via Canary Wharf.
The Mayor of London and some GLA members have
made statements that TfL carried out assessment of MonoMetro.
Other GLA members have questioned the Mayor requesting a copy
of TfL's alleged assessment. TfL in response further dismiss MonoMetro
sLRT making no disclosure of any assessment material. In the national
press TfL continue to make statements that MonoMetro sLRT is "an
anorak's dream" with further statements of misinformation
to the GLA that MonoMetro sLRT is unworkable, cannot be introduced
into the urban environment and that MonoMetro Limited have no
technical expertise. These statements have had a deeply damaging
influence on the perception of MonoMetro from other regional authorities
in the United Kingdom. Glasgow City Council terminated their assessment
of MonoMetro for a city wide network because of adverse opinion
publicised by TfL. A study requested by Thames Gateway was abandoned
because of the biased opinion of TfL and while Portsmouth City
Council commissioned MonoMetro to undertake a study for an urban
network which was carried out and delivered they withdrew because
of the adverse statements by TfL taken as authority. By contrast
MonoMetro sLRT is the preferred technology for a 38 mile project
in the United States and is being assessed by the French Government
for urban implementation.
Unlocking the barrier of misinformation in the
United Kingdom can only be attained through expert assessment
and unbiased reporting to Government. TfL have disqualified themselves
as unbiased scrutineers and this now has to be carried out by
appropriate experts not linked to TfL or Crossrail Limited if
Government is to be empowered to commission MonoMetro sLRT as
an appropriate means of attaining implementation of affordable
systems.
THE EFFECT
OF DIFFERENT
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS
(PUBLIC/PRIVATE)
ON THE
OVERALL COST
OF LIGHT
RAIL SYSTEMS:
My viewpoint on this subject will no doubt be
contested. It is not a question of where the funding for a project
comes from, public or private, it is a question of how the money
is spent and on what. I believe there are two large areas of overspending,
the cost of consultancy and the cost of tendering.
A directing transport project architect with
the authority to take control of limiting the amount and range
of redundant work carried out by consultants would be a major
step in bringing costs under control. Absurdities such as cost
benefit analyses where there is no discipline on the figures inserted
are meaningless and expensive.
It is important to understand that most people
working in the area of transport are so cynical that anything
will ever be built that they are only too happy to charge the
earth for consultancy that they know will not lead to anything.
This situation has resulted in a community of consultants excited
about the prospect of a lot of government money being spent on
new transport. The money has indeed been spent but we have little
to show for it.
Current EU rules ensuring competition only serve
to guarantee the highest cost of transportation products. In the
past, the railway industry followed architectural and civil engineering
tendering procedure (which currently satisfies competition rules)
where procurement tenders are based on annotated construction
plans accompanied by specification. This ensured that competing
tendering companies acted as general contractors for the same
product.
Present tendering procedure for transport manufacturers
forces them to supply proprietary design products designed to
common specifications. If suppliers can act as general contractors
tendering to build from a common set of design drawings, it would
reduce the enormous risk associated with tendering to specification
alone. The huge disadvantage to tendering on specification alone
is that the supplier has to convert a specification document based
on words and numbers into a three-dimensional product. To do this
he has to spend several million pounds on creating the proprietary
design product with which to tender. Even then he may not get
the job so all the work is wasted. It means the same job has to
be designed several times. Because this involves such a high cost
it is often done on a tight budget; resulting trains have to be
recalled for additional costly work leading to passenger disillusionment.
The expense of this process reinforces a crippling conservatism
with respect to innovation since a tenderer will hardly dare to
introduce an innovation in case it is cynically received and he
loses the job. It is hardly surprising that Stevenson's Rocket
could run on the latest TGV tracks.
The time has come to return to where railways
started with MonoMetro. A tenderer pricing on construction drawings
is spared the enormous cost of designing a product which may never
be built. This would allow smaller companies to compete for work.
At present the big four are the only ones able to take a hit of
not succeeding in a bid. The Washwood Heath carriage works, for
example, is about to go out of business as part of one of the
transport giants. Independently, however, it could quite easily
be saved if it were to succeed in a bid to put MonoMetro cars
into production based on the design drawings of MonoMetro. As
an architect I believe the cost effectiveness of Design and Build
was never a good idea. As I said in the beginning, the best way
to control costs relates to how money is spent, not where it comes
from.
THE PRACTICALITY
OF ALTERNATIVES
TO LIGHT
RAIL, SUCH
AS INCREASED
INVESTMENT IN
BUSES
LRT is primarily a metropolitan transport proposition
that has associated effects on development. Buses do not deliver
the same observable effects on development as fixed infrastructure.
I believe we need to be talking about practically implementable
fixed infrastructure around which new business will locate. It
has been shown that it will not materialise around a bus stop.
Buses can be used in metropolitan conditions as long as we accept
that more buses add to the congestion we already have. They are
not a quick way to get around. Guided buses have been mooted as
a cheaper form of investment but a 12 meter dedicated guideway
strip of concrete through a city is a major obstacle. It may be
a wonderful idea to have more buses outside the big cities. I
have nothing against buses in an appropriate setting.
It is apparent to our American client and the
French Government that MonoMetro sLRT is a desirable alternative
to LRT. This is because it has lower costs, a better business
case, is designed for efficient procurement using licensed design,
and the greater proportion of its cost is above ground where modular
fabricated construction under controlled conditions guarantees
higher price stability than for LRT.
For every conceivable reason MonoMetro sLRT
is practical where there is the need for transit. Mass transit
at 60% of the cost of LRT is an even greater incentive. But the
Government will never know this without receiving thorough expert
evidence created by a suitably qualified team of experts with
all the necessary competencies. It is already apparent from the
misinformation delivered to the GLA and the Mayor concerning MonoMetro
sLRT that TfL rail engineers could only ever be biased. The practical
way forward is to create an agreed panel of independent assessors
where the Government and MonoMetro Limited are both able to nominate
architect/engineer experts.
The video presentation on the CD accompanying
this document visually demonstrates the implementation of MonoMetro
sLRT on the route between Paddington and Stratford via Liverpool
Street Commercial Road and Canary Wharf. There are a couple of
low bridges across Commercial Road for which there is a practical
solution but apart from these the obstacles are not physical nor
economic nor practical in terms of reliable delivery of a prestigious
project at an affordable price. MonoMetro sLRT is not new technology
and is demonstrated in over a hundred years of operation in Germany.
The obstacles that rest before MonoMetro sLRT
are conservatism, outrage, negativity, destructiveness, doubt
and fear. Someone is always going to say, "you cannot have
that running down the middle of the road". MonoMetro sLRT
prompts a very hard look at ourselves and our competency. What
do we think and how do we know we are right?
Britain invented so much of the modern world,
but are we unable to embrace the future?
Gareth Pearce
Chairman
February 2005
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