Select Committee on Transport Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Manchester City Council (LR 82)

INTEGRATED TRANSPORT: THE FUTURE OF LIGHT RAIL AND MODERN TRAMS IN BRITAIN

  The Committee has received a memorandum from Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Authority and Executive. Manchester City Council is lead authority for transport within Greater Manchester and I act as Clerk to the Authority.

  I write also to endorse this submission and to add the following comments on behalf of Manchester City Council.

  There is a wide and growing body of research that places excellent transport links as one of the most influential determinants of where companies will locate in the future. Professor Michael Parkinson's recent study for the Deputy Prime Minister, for instance, showed that connectivity—along with a small number of other conditions such as a skilled workforce—is a key enabler of competitiveness and critical to success. Indeed, there are very few examples of successful regions around the world that do not have good transport links, or of successful regions that do not have well connected cities—at international, national and local levels—at their heart.

  The most productive businesses operate in the most demanding international markets and will therefore tend to cluster in areas with superior accessibility. Hence the growth of the knowledge economy and general popularity of London and the "Greater South East" as a business location. However, the UK's major regional cities are relatively poorly served in comparison and positively second-rate compared to our EU and global equivalents and this surely must be a factor in the widening UK regional prosperity gap.

  Manchester is transforming itself into a world-class regional capital city, one that is increasingly categorised as a City of Opportunity rather than a centre of decline. We are leading the way on the urban renaissance outside London—indeed the Deputy Prime Minister has dubbed the City the "UK regeneration capital". This is recognised within relevant Government initiatives that, importantly, are also increasingly highlighting transport as a key issue. For example, the Northern Way Growth Strategy, which will underpin the Government's objective to reduce the persistent North-South growth and prosperity gap, highlights Manchester's key role in driving the North of England economy and explicitly states that Metrolink Phase 3 has a critical role to play in delivering the Strategy.

  Metrolink has undoubtedly been a key factor in our recent economic revival and the Phase 3 expansion underpins Greater Manchester's entire regeneration future. Recent independent research by leading consultants tells us that without Phase 3,

    —  28% of the projected 100,000 new jobs may be lost—many new labour market participants would come from some of the UK's most deprived communities

    —  this equates to £1.8 billion GVA losses by 2020

    —  private sector confidence will be undermined and will potentially result in major lost investment

    —  brownfield land may well remain underdeveloped, affecting Government targets

  It is also important to note that Government made a very public commitment to funding the Phase 3 expansions in March 2000. A four-year procurement process then ensued, during which time Manchester worked constructively with Government at all stages of the process following, I would emphasise, DfT procurement rules/requirements right through to BAFO bids. While we accept that costs went up during this period, this was not surprising because of the time delay alone but coupled with developments elsewhere in the transport sector over this period that resulted in an increasingly risk-averse private sector, it was in fact inevitable and indeed not unique to Manchester.

  Following the Secretary of State's announcement in July 2004 that the previously agreed funding of £520 million had been withdrawn, a public "Get Back on Track" campaign was launched in Greater Manchester and the Prime Minister subsequently established a Metrolink Working Party to carry out a full review of Phase 3.

  Local officials submitted a revised case in September 2004 that we believe:

    —  Demonstrated Metrolink is the optimum solution for the specified corridors, in the context of the July 04 Transport White Paper.

    —  Set out the full economic costs and disbenefits of delaying or failing to deliver Metrolink Phase 3.

    —  Addressed cost/affordability issues, including the definition of new revenue sharing and risk arrangements.

    —  Put forward proposals for re-structuring the financing of Phase 3, following a review of procurement options.

    —  Addressed how the new measures available in the White Paper might be used to maximise patronage and therefore support the viability of Metrolink as part of Greater Manchester's integrated transport strategy.

  DfT officials actively promoted bus alternatives, and this required further evaluation of these alternatives. We undertook this diligently, and examined routes, vehicle types, possible integration strategies with heavy rail and other bus networks. We also produced patronage forecasts, costs and revenue, and benefit profiles. A very comprehensive assessment and the following key outcomes were presented to the Working Party:

    —  None of the bus alternatives could be delivered within the funding envelope of £520 million agreed for Metrolink in December 2002. Significant additional resources would be required, probably of the order of £100 million. This brought into even sharper focus the fact that re-pricing the value of the £520 million, as agreed in December 2002, into today's prices would give us £645 million . . . enough to build at least two Metrolink lines.

    —  Bus-based alternatives would deliver very significantly reduced benefits in comparison with Metrolink. Examples:

      —  Buses would remove about 2.2 million car journeys from the system, compared with 5.6 million through Metrolink.

      —  Buses would have more limited capacity to cater for demand: 12.3 million a year instead of the 18 million carried by Metrolink.

      —  User benefits would be 302 for buses, compared with 1,143 for Metrolink. Non-User benefits for buses were shown as 168, compared to 502 for Metrolink.

      —  The cost to benefit ratio for buses were about 1.5:1 compared to Metrolink's 2.6:1.

    —  There were also very significant capacity constraints within Manchester city centre that made a bus-based solution impracticable, certainly in the absence of very aggressive and immediate demand restraint measures in relation to the use of the car.

    —  We made the point that our fundamental objection to the bus option was that it did not provide the scale of capacity and benefits we were seeking. The Manchester city-region economy is reinventing itself. We had demonstrated our capacity to improve competitiveness, we had created more than 25,000 new jobs over the last few years, and we were confidently predicting more than 100,000 new jobs over the next 10 years throughout Greater Manchester. This growth profile was unsustainable without the public transport capacity for people to access job markets.

    —  Our transport strategy was fully integrated with local and national regeneration plans and programmes. Indeed, we were one of the very few areas in the country which had not only created jobs, but had also seen a change in modal share in favour of public transport.

  We positively welcome the Government's recent reinstatement of the £520 million funding package and the Prime Minister's public support for the principle of Metrolink at the Sustainable Communities Summit in Manchester earlier this month.

  In terms of next steps, a submission has now been made to the DfT for a package of essential maintenance/improvement works to Phases 1 and 2 to ensure the system continues to operate effectively and efficiently such that it remains an attractive alternative to the car. This funding bid covers capacity enhancement; stop and vehicle improvement to bring them up to the new legislative standards required under the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) and Road Vehicle Accessibility Regulations (RVAR) and track renewal works to address the question of poor ride quality, primarily on the Bury line.

  We are also currently engaged in developing an Integrated Transport Strategy for the Phase 3 corridors for submission to the DfT in the Spring. The plan will address:

    —  Delivery of the Metrolink Phase 3 network, including funding options.

    —  Better links between bus, rail and Metrolink.

    —  New measures to encourage more people to use public transport.

    —  Ideas to get the most out of the local rail network.

    —  Better ticketing and smarter travel choices; park and ride; improved transport interchanges and intelligent transport systems like "real-time" passenger information.

  In closing I would reaffirm Manchester's commitment to Metrolink. We have proved that it works. It gets people out of their cars and onto public transport and it's good for the environment. In fact, it meets all the objectives we share with Government, and that is why we are determined to deliver Phase 3 and to build upon that for the future economic and social success of Greater Manchester, the North West of England and the UK as a whole.

  I can confirm that the Passenger Transport Authority and Executive and the City Council would be happy to give oral evidence, if the Committee would find that useful.

Sir Howard Bernstein

Chief Executive

February 2005



 
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