Select Committee on Transport Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 320 - 339)

MONDAY 14 MARCH 2005

SIR HOWARD BERNSTEIN, COUNCILLOR ROGER JONES, MR CHRISTOPHER J MULLIGAN, LORD SMITH OF LEIGH AND COUNCILLOR RICHARD LEESE CBE

  Q320  Mrs Ellman: On these schemes you are now looking at, the extensions you are looking at, which are more important: regeneration issues or alleviation of congestion?

  Lord Smith of Leigh: I think it is a false dichotomy, if I may say so. We think connectivity is the key to economic success, transport success and regeneration in a major conurbation and we think that is what we will get out of Metrolink. There will be an efficient means of transport which will encourage a large number of people to use it, which in turn will regenerate the conurbation.

  Q321  Chairman: Mr Mulligan, would you like to add to that?

  Mr Mulligan: No, that has been dealt with satisfactorily.

  Q322  Ian Lucas: I want to ask you about risk. Mr Smith, you particularly mentioned risk as being the reason why there had been a large increase in the cost of the project. Can you expand on that? What type of risk and how did that manifest itself in the process?

  Mr Mulligan: If I can illustrate from some of the figures which we have that when we had the arrangement with the Minister back in January 2002, the gross capital cost of the scheme was £705 million. The scheme which was rejected in October 2003 had gone up to £824 million and we think about 50% of that was due to a very cautious attitude on behalf of the private sector.

  Q323  Chairman: "Cautious", by which you mean they wanted to transfer all the risk from them to you?

  Mr Mulligan: Yes, but the most startling thing which happened in the net cost was in January 2002 we were told the private sector equity in the scheme would be £252 million; by October 2003, that had shrunk to £60 million, based largely on Standard and Poor's view that light rail was a risky investment based on private sector experiences dealing with the SRA where the revenue risk was being taken and based basically on the fact that the private sector felt that overall these schemes were extremely risky because they have got into trouble themselves and so have others. When we talk about schemes trebling and that sort of thing, the capital costs have not trebled, but the perception of risk, which is a concessional value, is the one which collapsed.

  Q324  Ian Lucas: Your analysis has led you to stay with the Design, Build, Finance and Operate structure, but put in some extra safeguards to protect the public sector. If you were to start again, do you think that is the correct approach?

  Sir Howard Bernstein: Put simply, what we have said is given the existing risk profile which you are trying to achieve on procurement, our procurement approach has been appropriate. Equally, I think it is fair to say, also—and we acknowledged this in recent meetings with the Department for Transport in working party meetings over the past few months—the existing procurement approach, which we have been pursuing in the context of private sector assumption of risk and their appetite for risk, is not as efficient as it ought to be. Therefore it would be appropriate to review procurement options, and we said as much in working party meetings with the Department just before Christmas.

  Q325  Ian Lucas: Which other options would you like to look at?

  Sir Howard Bernstein: I think there are a variety of options, as I think was indicated towards the end of last week under your cross-examination of ministers. Looking at a lack of private sector appetite for risk starts to generate the question, "Is the public sector procurement and operation an option which needs to be reconsidered?", and the answer to that is, "Yes". Equally, there is some evidence elsewhere in Europe where the appointment of an operator and the development of single line bids on an incremental basis have also demonstrated the ability to capture efficiencies. There are a range of options which we are currently evaluating and which need to be brought to bear as part of the process.

  Q326  Chairman: What was the response to this suggestion?

  Sir Howard Bernstein: There was no answer to that.

  Q327  Chairman: There was no answer in the sense that no one commented or that the discussion moved on? What was the response?

  Sir Howard Bernstein: They would go away and look at that and they came back to it and said: "We need to do a lot more work". Certainly, in the context of the substantive discussion we had around new procurement options, there was no detailed response given to us.

  Councillor Leese: The question rightly focused on risk within the procurement process. One of the other factors for increasing cost is the slowness of the procurement process. Quite often there are six to 12 month delays in getting responses from the Department for Transport. Again, another factor which is taken into account in our written evidence is that any advantages we might gain from an alternative procurement process might be lost simply because the time delays would put the costs on in a different way.

  Q328  Chairman: Did you tell us why you went to Design, Build and Operate in the first place?

  Sir Howard Bernstein: That was the Department for Transport's preferred approach. Chris and I led those negotiations over a period of some years. There were two broad options, the traditional PFI approach or, alternatively, the DBOM approach, which is the one we subsequently moved forward with.

  Mr Mulligan: It is true—I was doing those negotiations—that the Department preferred DBOM.

  Q329  Chairman: Design, Build and Finance.

  Mr Mulligan: Yes, Design, Build, Operate and Maintain. At that time the Treasury looked favourably on the Private Finance Initiative, similarly to the Nottingham Scheme. We had a happy nine months debating with the Treasury and the then DETR as to whether it should be DBOM or PFI.

  Q330  Chairman: It is not true that, in effect, the time taken in order to get this scheme off the ground was entirely due to people sitting on it, it was rather due to the fact that you could not agree in the first place what you were doing?

  Mr Mulligan: Before we went into the market and before we were allowed to put an OJEC in the European press we had to decide with the Department—

  Q331  Chairman: What is an OJEC?

  Mr Mulligan: It is a journal of the European community which would advertise a scheme to prospective tenderers. Before we were allowed to do that, we had to establish the procurement methods to the Government's satisfaction.

  Q332  Miss McIntosh: Have you quantified the work you did? One of you said you did some work on the buses for the Department for Transport, have you quantified what the cost of that work would have been?

  Sir Howard Bernstein: Page eight of our detailed submission identifies both the cost and the benefits of our Phase 3 expansion and, also, the comparable alternative options in relation to buses. What we clearly show there is that Metrolink has a superior cost to benefit ratio; total benefits are nearly three times those of the bus; Metrolink carries 25% more passengers than the bus; it takes 3.6 million more journeys off the roads and would generate an operating surplus. Indeed, the cost of bus is at £527 million compared with the cost of Metrolink of £764 million.

  Q333  Miss McIntosh: Yet earlier on one of you said that 85% of the journeys that would have been made are travelling by bus?

  Mr Mulligan: Correct. 85% of the public passenger transport trips are taken by bus within the county and about 15% are by heavy rail and light rail. Of course they are subsidised, whereas Metrolink is not. If you look at the same figures which Howard is talking about, operating costs of £16.1 million for the bus option and £15.4 million is the revenue, so there would be a real subsidy required for the bus network and that is not the case for the Metrolink network.

  Q334  Miss McIntosh: Would you agree or disagree with the National Audit Office report which found that while light rail had improved the quality and the choice of public transport, it had not brought all the benefits expected?

  Mr Mulligan: I would disagree extremely strongly. I wish to dispel an illusion that the National Audit Office was anti-light rail in its report. I read it and there were various comments which I disagreed with, but one of the exceptions they made within that report was in talking about Manchester Metrolink which they described as one of the most successful schemes in patronage terms which the country had experienced.

  Q335  Miss McIntosh: If you look at France, they have much more landmass than we have in this country and that is why, I understand, with transport, planning tends to go much quicker in countries like France. Do you have evidence that it is the consultants seeking to prolong the process for putting forward an application?

  Councillor Leese: No, I do not think we have evidence of that. We have clearly looked at other examples like cities like Lyon, which will probably have similar densities and in part of the city even greater densities than the Manchester conurbation, and they appear to be able to accelerate the procurement at every stage of the process. Compared to the United Kingdom, more of the expenditure decisions are taken at a local level and do not require this batting backwards and forwards between the local level and government.

  Q336  Miss McIntosh: Would you say the fact that Metrolink was not extended has been to the benefit or disbenefits of passengers?

  Councillor Leese: Overwhelmingly to the disbenefit.

  Q337  Miss McIntosh: Would you like to elaborate?

  Councillor Leese: In a number of areas. First, journey times along those corridors are significantly longer by public transport than they need to be, and with Metrolink they would be a lot quicker. There are lots of people now who do not really have a good choice of public transport, and Metrolink would give them a good choice. The evidence does come from phases 1 and 2 where we have had very significant modal transfer that far exceeds modal transfer that comes from bus-based alternatives. Both in terms of choice, accessibility and journey time, passengers have a disbenefit in all those ways.

  Lord Smith of Leigh: Part of the extension is on existing heavy rail routes, which are in a state of dilapidation, and there is very poor experience for the passengers that use them, so we wanted to improve that, very much as we did on the Bury/Manchester line.

  Q338  Miss McIntosh: What is the difference between modal transfer and integrated transport?

  Councillor Leese: Modal transfer is jargon shorthand for getting people out of cars and onto public transport.

  Q339  Mr Stringer: We are getting a very different impression here today than we had last Wednesday when the Minister told us that he was cracking the whip over officials to get a decision on refurbishing the current Metrolink lines. Is that your impression?

  Councillor Leese: No, it is not. It is a question that has already been asked about how often we have, and did we, do a bus comparison with Metrolink; and it would appear yet again on the refurbishment of phase 1 and phase 2 that we are having to do a benefit cost analysis from scratch, which would include those sorts of comparisons, which from our point of view does not seem to go along with "cracking the whip" not least because that is work that has already been done and has already been presented to the Department.


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2005
Prepared 10 August 2005