Memorandum by the Civil Aviation Authority
(EU 15)
EUROPEAN UNION COMPETENCE AND TRANSPORT
INTRODUCTION AND
OVERVIEW
1. The Committee sought views on European
Union competence and transport, with particular reference to the
current and future powers of the Commission and the relationship
between transport matters and the single European market.
2. The CAA has identified five air transport
related areas, including EU-US negotiations on aviation agreements,
in which it believes the Committee may have a particular interest.
This memorandum has been structured to address the key points
of the Committee's terms of reference for each of the following
areas:
— negotiations on air service agreements;
— access to the groundhandling market;
— regulation of aircraft slots at co-ordinated
airports;
— the Single European Sky programme;
and
— the European Aviation Safety Agency.
3. In each of these cases, the CAA provides
specialist advice to the Department for Transport and, in many
cases, participates in international fora with the Department
to represent the interests of UK industry and consumers.
4. The increasing involvement of the European
Union in these aspects of air transport has the potential to deliver
important benefits, eg,
— further development of a single liberalised
market in aviation and related services, both within Europe and
between Europe and other major aviation markets, particularly
the United States;
— reducing flight delays and other
inefficiencies which stem from each nation regulating its own
airspace, from limited co-ordination of cross-border traffic flows,
and from differences in ATC systems and concepts;
— raising aviation safety standards
across Europe, and the creation of a more level playing-field
through the establishment and uniform application of common rules
for aviation safety.
5. The CAA welcomes these various new EU
initiatives, and will do all it can to help them succeed, as the
potential benefits are very significant. However, experience of
other EU initiatives, both in aviation and other fields, underlines
the need for considerable effort, skill and vigilance to be applied
to ensure that the potential benefits are realised and undesirable
side effects avoided. Also, it is important to be realistic about
the length of time it will take for the benefits to be realised,
given the difficulty of progressing with so many countries involved.
6. In many of these areas, the principle
of subsidiarity will be very important. Many of the objectives
in the areas discussed below can be achieved only with EU involvement.
However, given that the results obtained will also often depend
significantly on local operation/implementation, there must be
effective consultation to ensure the correct distribution of roles
and responsibilities between the Commission and Member States.
Full account should be taken of national interests. It is essential,
therefore, that the role of the EU is limited to those functions
which are best performed at EU level.
EXTENDING COMMISSION
COMPETENCE IN
BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
Actual and appropriate extent of Community competence—EU-US
7. In June 2003, the European Council granted
a mandate for the EU to carry out negotiations with the US government
on a new EU-US air services agreement to replace the current bilateral
agreements between each Member State and the US. These talks are
now in progress, with the European Commission fielding a negotiating
team that is working through a number of issues with the US negotiators,
led in their case by the State Department. The mandate to negotiate
with the US is designed to achieve a comprehensive liberalising
deal, and Member States cannot now negotiate on a bilateral basis
with the US.
8. From the CAA perspective, the Commission
taking this on represents the best chance of achieving the much
needed liberalisation of the aviation market between the two most
important markets in global aviation, and if successful, could
be the first step in achieving global liberalisation.
Actual and appropriate extent of Community competence—other
countries
9. The June mandate also extends to allowing
the Commission to open up discussions with other countries, or
blocs of countries, with a view to amending existing restrictive
bilateral agreements and replacing them with a multilateral agreement
covering all EU Member States and the relevant third country or
countries. This is known as the "horizontal mandate".
Whilst considerations about how best to handle these issues in
the future are continuing, the dividing line between Community
competence and national competence in this area is currently somewhat
unclear.
10. In brief, the system is supposed to
allow Member States in the interim to continue to conduct bilateral
negotiations, as long as they try to broker deals based on EU
airlines being given rights to fly, rather than national airlines
(the so-called "community carrier" provision) and do
not pursue policies that are contrary to EU transport policy.
The Member State would also need to formally ratify any bilateral
agreements with the Commission.
11. If the Commission is itself in negotiation
with a third country, or bloc of countries as part of its horizontal
mandate, then the scope of any bilateral with a Member State would
be much restricted.
What powers the Commission needs or wants for
the future
12. The European Court of Justice ruling
that declared it was illegal to discriminate in air services agreements
between EU airlines on the grounds of the nationality of their
ownership, points, in the long term, to a future where bilateral
agreements between Member States and third countries should be
replaced by multilateral agreements between the European Union
and those third countries.
13. For negotiations with the US, this is
already happening, as described above. The horizontal mandate
provides opportunities for this same approach to be applied in
relation to other countries on an ad hoc basis but there is a
limit to how far this can be taken forward. The sheer number of
existing bilateral agreements between Member States and other
countries makes it impractical for the Commission to take on a
greater role in actively renegotiating them at the moment. This
is why the Member States continue to operate national competence
in relation to bilaterals, but not with complete freedom of manoeuvre.
The difficulty with this "mixed competence" situation
is that in a bilateral situation, neither the Member State nor
the third country can be sure that the Commission might not overrule
any bilateral agreement reached, particularly if the third country
is unwilling to agree to the Community carrier provision and yet
still wishes to make amendments to the existing air services agreement.
The current position is unstable, and it is likely that there
will need to be some resolution in the near future—including
the possibility of the Commission seeking sole competence in air
services negotiations at some point in time.
14. Given that the European Court of Justice
ruling has confirmed that traffic rights between an EU country
and a third country should be available for any EU carrier, not
just national carriers, then the logical position for the long
term future would probably be for the Commission to take responsibility
at the EU level for negotiations with all third countries. These
negotiations would then cover all matters, including traffic rights.
But for now at least, this would simply be impractical, and lack
of resources in the Commission could lead to an unhelpful stasis
where sensible bilateral amendments would not be able to be taken
forward. Consequently, there would seem to be some merit in allowing
Member States in the interim to preserve the ability to amend
their own bilateral agreements, unless the Commission is itself
taking forward negotiations with the relevant bilateral partner,
which could be compromised by a single Member State amending its
own agreements.
Key issues from the UK perspective
15. The two key issues for the UK in this
area relate to the potential opening up of the UK-US market that
could be achieved by a broader EU-US deal, and the possible restrictive
impact that the Commission's stance on relations with third countries
could have on the UK's ability to conclude beneficial amendments
to existing bilateral agreements with those countries.
16. The UK's existing Bermuda II agreement
with the US is more restrictive than the "Open Skies"
agreements that are in place between other EU Member States and
the US. In particular, access to Heathrow is restricted to just
four airlines (two US and two UK) and a limited number of US cities.
Consequently, the introduction of an Open Aviation Area would
create new opportunities for carriers to operate services to the
US from Heathrow, and would bring benefits to UK consumers as
well. Removing US restrictions on foreign ownership as part of
such a deal would also open up new opportunities for UK carriers
who may wish to start up an airline in the US.
17. For negotiations with third countries,
it will be important that the interim arrangements are clarified
and that they are framed in terms that allow some flexibility
for Member States. The UK ought to be able to continue to pursue
sensible, liberalising, amendments to the network of air services
agreements with its trading partners, as long as this did not
reduce the likelihood of the Commission being able to conclude
a broader agreement on behalf of the EU as a whole. If the Commission
seeks to adopt too restrictive a position on this matter, then
resource constraints could lead to a long period of stasis (with
air services agreements frozen in their current form), which would
not be beneficial to airlines or the travelling public.
ACCESS TO
THE GROUNDHANDLING
MARKET AT
COMMUNITY AIRPORTS
Scope of the EC directive on groundhandling
18. The directive (Council directive 96/67/EC)
was designed to open up access to the market for the supply of
groundhandling services within the EU, with the aim of reducing
the operating costs of airlines and improving the quality of service
for airport users. It was given effect in UK law by the Airports
Groundhandling Regulations 1997 and should now be fully implemented
across the EU.
19. Under the directive, airports (above
a certain size) cannot restrict either self handling (airlines
that handle themselves) or third party handling (companies that
handle airlines or airlines that handle other airlines) without
a determination from the Member State. Details of the thresholds
and determinations possible are shown in the table below.
| Self handling |
Third party handling |
| Landside | None (any airports)
| None (any airports) |
| Airside (baggage, ramp, fuel and oil, and freight and mail handling).
| Not less than 2 handlers (airports with more than 1 mppa or 50,000 tonnes of freight).
| Not less than 2 handlers (airports with more than 2 mppa or 75,000 tonnes of freight).
|
| | |
20. Any restrictions beyond these have to be agreed by
the European Commission and are time limited.
21. Additional features:
— third party handlers (whether airport, airline
or other company) must separate the accounts of their groundhandling
activities from their other activities;
— airports need to establish an airport users' committee
comprising representatives of airport users or organisations representing
airport users;
— Member States may reserve for the managing body
of the airport or another body the management of centralised infrastructures
used for groundhandling services;
— Member States must ensure that handlers (including
self handlers) have access to installations to the extent necessary
for them to carry out their activities and that any conditions
upon access and any fees must be according to relevant, objective,
transparent and non-discriminatory criteria.
Key issues from the UK perspective
22. The effects of the directive on UK airports have
not been great, partly because the UK groundhandling market was
already quite diverse in terms of offering a choice of service
providers. Prior to the directive, at Heathrow there were eight
airlines which had rights to handle themselves and other airlines
(although the rights did not necessarily cover all four terminals),
at Gatwick the number of handlers had varied between three and
four. BAA did not handle at any of its London airports. At Manchester,
a subsidiary of the airport operator (Ringway Handling) had held
a monopoly of baggage and ramp handling. However, this had been
found to act against the public interest by the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission and by the time the directive came into force
there was a choice of five handlers. At the next tier of airports
(eg Birmingham and Glasgow), the airport operators were looking
for opportunities to rid themselves of inefficient in-house handling
units and to introduce competition. A number of them ceased their
own handling activities at this time.
23. Since the directive has come into force, the situation
has changed to some extent, so that more specialist groundhandling
agents now operate at UK airports. However, the greater effect
has been seen elsewhere in Europe where groundhandling was often
previously either a monopoly or duopoly between the airport and
the national airline. The directive has led to an increase in
competition and provided greater choice and flexibility for UK
airlines. Charter airlines were particularly strong supporters
of the directive.
Relevance to the single market
24. The directive has led to greater opportunities for
groundhandling companies to operate throughout the Community.
Actual and appropriate extent of Community competence
25. The directive allows Member States to limit the opening
up of markets to some extent but the Commission's oversight has
prevented Member States from retaining all the previous barriers
to entry. The directive has not had a great effect within the
UK, although some airports have commented that they feel it has
given them less control over service quality at their airports
and has led to more handlers operating than they would otherwise
have allowed. From a CAA perspective, the requirement for separation
of accounts seems to impose an unnecessary burden, although it
is unclear how widely this provision has been implemented across
the Community.
Whether the Commission wants or needs more power
26. Amendments to the directive are currently being considered.
We are not aware of any which would increase the Commission's
powers.
EC REGULATION OF
SLOTS AT
CO -ORDINATED
AIRPORTS
Scope of the regulation
27. The regulation on slots (Council Regulation (EEC)
No 95/93) requires that Member States have an administrative procedure
for dealing with slot allocation and that they set up a co-ordination
committee to deal with slot issues at co-ordinated (in effect,
this means congested) airports.
28. The regulation allows for grandfather rights to continue,
but sets out rules governing the allocation of new slots (broadly
seeking to favour new entrants) and the usage of slots (broadly
providing that slots that are not at least 80% used must be returned
to the pool and reallocated). Exchange of slots between airlines,
with or without monetary compensation, operates under a "grey
market".
29. Where public service obligations have been imposed
on a domestic route according to Article 4 of Council Regulation
(EEC) No 2408/92, a Member State may reserve at a co-ordinated
airport the slots required for the envisaged operations on that
route. If the reserved slots on the route concerned are not used,
these slots shall be made available to any other air carrier interested
in operating the route according to the public service obligations.
What powers the Commission wants or needs for the future
30. The Commission has shown some desire to increase
their regulatory control of slots, for example making proposals
to outlaw the limited secondary trading in slots that exists under
the so-called grey market. However, the UK and other like-minded
States have been successful in resisting this change, and there
seems to be some acceptance within the Commission that, in the
longer term, a move to a more open system of trading in slots
would be desirable. However, the current position is unclear;
the Commission has asked a consultancy to carry out a study into
the benefits of slot markets, the results of which have not yet
been released. This is likely to be an area of discussion in the
future. The CAA considers it important that the Commission takes
a deregulatory approach.
The key issues from a UK perspective
31. The slot question is a particularly important one
for the UK, as the problem of congested airports is more acute
in the south east of England than anywhere else in Europe. The
key issues from a UK perspective fall into two main areas. Firstly,
the economic value of slots and the need for flexibility of use
of what is a scarce resource, particularly for the main London
airports, suggests that a transparent secondary trading market
in slots ought to be encouraged. This is the UK policy stance,
and was the conclusion of a recent CAA study ("Implementation
of Secondary Slot Trading" published in December 2001).
32. Second, there is the question of how best to allocate
new slots at airports, and to what extent auctions could be used
to create an efficient initial slot allocation. More work is needed
in considering these issues, but as it stands, the EC regulation
could operate to constrain how the UK may wish to allocate slots
at extremely congested airports such as Heathrow.
33. On the first question, the CAA believes that there
should be greater flexibility to allow transparent secondary trading
and that the Commission could therefore helpfully reduce regulation
of this area. On the second question, there could be a need in
the future to see the Commission's regulation evolve so that it
facilitates economically efficient methods of allocating new resources
that could apply in Member States as required.
SINGLE EUROPEAN
SKY (SES)
34. Air traffic delays in Europe increased steadily during
the last decade as the European air traffic management system
struggled to cope with increases in traffic. European airspace
is still organised in much the same way as it was in the 1960s,
with each country regulating its own airspace with only limited
co-ordination, primarily to deal with cross border traffic flows.
The resulting fragmentation is unlikely to be the most effective
way to provide air traffic management services for Europe. It
was against this background that the European Commission's proposals
for a Single European Sky (SES) were formulated.
What powers the Commission has/stage reached in implementation
35. In December 2003, four regulations relating to the
implementation of the Single European Sky were finalised for adoption
into Community law. This is expected to occur in Feb 2004, following
three years of sensitive political debate. These regulations will
extend Community competence to administrative arrangements, airspace,
service provision and all aspects of interoperability. The proposals
are designed to overcome fragmentation in Europe's ATM system
by using the EU's regulatory framework to overcome the lack of
legislative or enforcement powers, inherent with Eurocontrol's
intergovernmental status. As the EU is now a Member of Eurocontrol,
the Community's regulatory framework, together with its evolving
SES initiative, will provide for a more integrated airspace solution
which enhances safety, increases efficiency and reduces delays.
The CAA supports the aims of the SES programme and is committed
to ensuring that existing high national safety standards are maintained,
whilst at the same time recognising our other international obligations.
36. The ramifications of the Single European Sky initiative
cannot be fully understood at this early stage in its development,
but it is clear that the future structure of air traffic management
services in Europe may be very different to the one that exists
today. This will have a number of consequences, including on the
economic regulation of those services and the extent to which
national competence in this area may need to be ceded to a central
European body of some kind.
What powers the Commission needs or wants for the future
37. The EC has indicated that is seeks to:
— Become a Member of ICAO;
— Extend the remit of the SES to cover the lower
airspace as well as the upper airspace;
— Tackle congestion at Europe's airports;
— Introduce differential en-route air navigation
charges to take account of the environmental impact of aircraft;
— Extend the powers of the European Aviation Safety
Agency to the ATM sector. The Government's White Paper makes clear
the importance of ensuring the separation of regulation from service
provision that the European Aviation Safety Agency will require;
— Coincident with the emergence of SES, the Commission
intends to submit legislative proposals to the European Parliament
and Council for the introduction of a common licensing scheme
for air traffic controllers.
What powers/duties should be reserved to individual countries
38. Since the organisation and use of airspace may impact
on military authorities, Member States are most likely to retain
ATM mechanisms which are proportionate to their defence and security
needs.
39. Any reconfiguration of airspace into Functional
Airspace Blocks will require specific arrangements to ensure
that national interests are not compromised, particularly with
regard to the military. Operationally based proposals must be
driven by users and service providers, although some encouragement
by States, who may be informed by EC data, may facilitate the
process.
40. Decisions relating to the provision of airport capacity
are likely to remain a national responsibility, given the sensitivity
of local communities to such developments and the differing ownership
of airports.
What are the key issues from a UK point of view
41. Ensuring full participation by military authorities
in the regulation and management of all SES activities through
national arrangements. The Transport Act 2000 and Directions to
the CAA provide for this in the UK.
42. Issues including sovereignty, certification, uniform
enforcement (cross border) of standards and air traffic services
system provision will have to be considered to ensure both a level
playing field and no reduction in safety standards across Europe.
As part of the certification process, the EC has also suggested
that all air navigation service providers should be subject to
a large number of "common requirements". Whilst most
of these requirements would not present any difficulties for NATS,
their common application to smaller service providers at all airports
(including many small airports) would be unnecessary, cumbersome,
disproportionate to the service provided and could reduce competition.
The UK has argued to the Commission that a flexible approach is
needed, and although their formal response has not yet been delivered,
they have indicated that they have sympathy with these arguments.
However, whatever emerges as "common requirements" may
include some new areas of economic oversight which the CAA would
have to implement. Going forward, it will be important to ensure
that development of the market is not hampered by excessive regulation.
43. Capitalising on the opportunities provided by the
creation of Functional Blocks of Airspace to the benefit of the
UK.
44. Ensuring that the CAA makes preparations for the
discharge of its function as a national supervisory body and,
if necessary, as a qualified entity.
How do these matters relate to the Single European Market
45. The SES initiative allows for limited liberalisation
of the ATM sector. The first set of Single European Sky regulations
includes a requirement for each air navigation service provider
to be certified by the relevant national supervisory authority
(the CAA, in the case of the UK). The objective behind this certification
process is to enhance service provider mobility across Europe
and to facilitate future cross-border service provision, objectives
which would help to complete the single market and provide for
more efficient operation of air traffic control, objectives which
the CAA supports. The CAA also supports the introduction of a
common European Air Traffic Controller Licence with full mutual
recognition attributes. Within the constraints of the licence
validation process, there will be some potential to facilitate
the free movement of air traffic control staff between EU Member
States. Following sector specific training, this would increase
the resource pool available to air traffic service providers.
46. Air traffic control has some elements of natural
monopoly, and there is likely to be a need for some economic regulation
under whatever structure for provision of air traffic control
services emerges under Single European Sky.
47. The thinking on this issue is at an embryonic stage,
and it is unlikely that radical change will occur over the next
few years. However, if future provision of air traffic management
services moves away from a system based on national boundaries
(a change which would enhance efficiency and result in a major
benefit of the Single European Sky concept), then a national system
of economic regulation, such as the CAA applies to NATS, may no
longer be fit for purpose. In such a scenario, there would be
a range of options available, but it is likely that some form
of centralised body, either within the EC or as an independent
regulatory agency set up by the EC, may be needed to carry out
economic regulation of air navigation service providers that were
operating on a multi-national basis.
The actual and appropriate extent of Community competence
48. The most important benefit of the SES initiative
is that the role of the State is reserved, largely, to the three
functions of safety, equal access to scarce resources for all
categories of user and the economic oversight of monopolistic
providers. The view of the CAA is that the EU should restrict
its activities to the high level regulation of the three functions
and encourage autonomous service providers to take responsibility
and accountability for ATM service provision rather than this
being carried out in the same body that is handling regulation.
Similarly, it would be far preferable for Eurocontrol to be restricted
to carrying out its core functions of network co-ordination (which
can only be done by a trans-national body) rather than being involved
in pure service provision or regulatory activity. In this manner,
a focused ATM sector can respond more effectively to market signals
relating to the cost effective provision of capacity.
The level of detail needed in European regulation
49. Three levels are foreseen in the SES initiative:
— Essential requirements—mandatory
— Implementation rules—mandatory
— European standards—voluntary.
50. The CAA believes that it is essential that the industry
determines the means of compliance to mandatory rules and associated
certification criteria. Therefore, all regulation should be objective
based, protect the autonomy and innovation capabilities of industry
and facilitate competition in the development of products and
services. However, the nature and extent of the common requirements
and implementation rules is not clear.
Conclusion
51. The CAA welcomes the EC's involvement in the ATM
sector, although it recognises that there are many constraints
and difficulties which lie ahead if concepts such as cross-border
service provision are to mature. If Member States or Eurocontrol
could solve Europe's ATM performance difficulties, there would
be no requirement for the Community to acquire or to exercise
competence. Consequently, the challenge for the future is to ensure
that Community Regulations focus on achieving key objectives such
as safety, efficiency and equal access to scarce resources, and
that the level of detail contained in the Regulations is appropriate
to this aim. To achieve these objectives, further institutional
changes will be necessary such that the ATM sector can operate
in a regulated commercial environment within the constraints set
by European competition law (Articles 81, 82 and 83). This is
unlikely to happen in the near future.
EUROPEAN AVIATION
SAFETY AGENCY
(EASA)
52. Air transport in the Community has been progressively
liberalised since 1988 and the market has evolved from one based
on bilateral agreements, with virtually no competition, towards
a genuine open market based on Treaty principles. Hence, air transport
is governed by common rules for licensing, market access, pricing
and competition. However, it became clear that a genuine air transport
single market also required the establishment and uniform application
of common rules for aviation safety and environmental protection.
In order to address the shortcomings in the JAA system, a European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) was formed.
53. Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 established the European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which started functioning on 28
September 2003 and which put in place the framework to replace
the existing Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) non-binding arrangements.
EASA's establishment is regarded as an important element of the
European Union's strategy to maintain and improve the level of
aviation safety in Europe. Unlike the JAA, the Agency has a firm
legal basis on which to ensure the application and enforcement
of common aviation requirements across the Member States. The
CAA is supportive of the formation of EASA and recognises the
potential benefits of common standards across Europe. The CAA
has provided ongoing specialist safety regulatory advice and support
to the DfT and the Commission during the establishment of EASA,
and is closely monitoring the Agency's development, with the aim
of seeking to ensure that:
— UK CAA is able to continue to fulfil its safety
regulatory obligations;
— the current high safety standards established
by the UK and JAA Full Member States are not eroded as EASA assumes
legal competency for aviation regulation;
— the UK civil aviation community and industry are
not adversely affected; and
— safety regulations are developed transparently
and, in future, are applied uniformly across all EU Member States.
54. The CAA continues to adapt its procedures in transition
to the EASA regulatory system, with the aim of achieving these
objectives.
What Powers the Commission has
55. Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 15 July 2002 set out common rules in the
field of civil aviation and established EASA. The Regulation applies
to the design, production, maintenance and operation of aeronautical
products, parts and appliances, to the personnel and organisations
involved in these activities and to those involved in the operation
of aircraft. The Regulation does not generally apply to very small
aircraft, those of historic relevance or when aircraft are engaged
in military, customs, police or similar services.
The stage reached in implementation
56. On 28 September 2003, EASA became responsible for
the airworthiness standards for the majority of the civil aircraft
registered in the Member States of the EU.
57. As a first step, Commission Regulations have been
established which pave the way for Community action in respect
of:
— the airworthiness and environmental certification
of aeronautical products (generally aircraft, engines and propellers)
and related parts and appliances (generally installed equipment);
and
— the approval of organisations and personnel engaged
in the maintenance of these products, parts and appliances.
58. It is still early days for the Agency and there is
currently a lack of resources and technical expertise. As a consequence,
tasks required under the EASA Regulation have initially been allocated
to Central JAA and to National Aviation Authorities (NAAs). Such
allocations are in the form of interim arrangements pending the
signing of more formal contracts.
What powers the Commission needs or wants for the future
59. The EC, assisted by EASA, will propose the necessary
legislation to extend its scope to embrace the following domains:
— operations and licensing—the date for transfer
of responsibility from JAA to EASA for these has not been decided,
but is expected to be before 2007; and
— the safety oversight of airports and air traffic
services operators (Air Navigation Facilities). The Commission
has indicated that Air Navigation Facilities will not be considered
until a later stage of EASA development, which is unlikely to
take place before the end of the decade.
What powers/duties should be reserved to individual countries
60. The principle of subsidiarity and proportionality
has been applied to the development of the airworthiness regulatory
framework and the CAA's view is that a similar pragmatic approach
should be adopted for the development of essential requirements
and Community Regulations in respect of operations and licensing.
61. One area recognised as being appropriate for EASA
to act centrally is in respect of major certification activity,
specifically the initial certification of products and the certification
of significant changes to these products when in service. However,
to provide the flexibility necessary to ensure operations are
not adversely affected, the certification of other changes by
competent NAAs should continue.
62. The work of EASA should be clearly limited to those
activities where it has full and effective access to the information
necessary for it to discharge its responsibility. A major consideration
in achieving the Commission's strategy to maintain and improve
the level of safety in Europe is the management of the continuing
airworthiness of community aircraft. This relies on significant
effort at local level, which is essential to achieve effective
oversight.
What are the key issues from a UK point of view
63. The concept of "common regulation" across
Europe is not new and, in the area of aircraft certification,
has existed since the 1970s in the form of the JAA. The new and
challenging concept is common standards of compliance.
There are significant issues related to ensuring common compliance
in the 15 EU Member States, which could not be satisfactorily
addressed by the JAA, and this problem will be exacerbated with
the arrival of the 10 Accession States.
64. The UK has one of the most rigorous aviation safety
regimes in the world, and the CAA considers that it is essential
that we avoid any degradation in the UK's achieved and measured
safety performance as a result of the introduction of common rules
and standards under EASA, particularly in the context of the enlarged
Community. We must also ensure that we continue to meet the UK's
ICAO obligations in respect of activities now to be undertaken
by EASA.
65. EASA has started with a sound basis in using the
JAA system but the Implementing Rules necessitate some changes
to the CAA's regulatory processes. With regard to compliance finding
against common standards, UK safety regulatory policy must be
consistent with that of EASA, while at the same time encouraging
use of "Best Practice" aviation regulation along the
lines of the UK model.
66. The Commission's stated objectives to maintain and
improve safety will be tested by its need to establish a common
airworthiness system that meets the demands and expectations of
all EU Member States. Significant change in the approach adopted
by some NAA's will need to be made in order to achieve common
standards across the 15 EU Member States. The CAA has been a leading
example in maintaining and where practicable, improving safety.
It will be possible for NAA's to take unilateral action in the
short-term where they consider safety standards are not being
met. However, there is a risk of potential for conflict where
such action places an aircraft on one State's register at a commercial
disadvantage compared with those operated on the registers
of other States.
67. Over the first three and a half years of transition
to EASA, the Agency will assume responsibility for certain airworthiness
certification activities and rule-making. After transition, there
will be a significant number of activities in these areas that
the CAA will continue to carry out, either as an NAA or on behalf
of EASA. During the transition period, EASA will also require
the CAA to undertake activities on its behalf under contract.
Consequently, it will be necessary to ensure that the CAA takes
the necessary steps to enable a smooth transition to the EASA
system and that there is clarity concerning the division of responsibilities
between EASA and the CAA, both during and after the transition
period.
68. The development of EASA has implications for the
staffing and funding of the CAA, especially in the area of certification
of products. Although, pending clearer definition of the role
and manpower plan of the Agency, this effect cannot be quantified
with any confidence, it is likely that the evolution of EASA will
give rise to issues concerning the funding of the CAA. The CAA
is unique in Europe in that it is funded entirely by the industry
it regulates, whereas other regulators are funded wholly or partly
by their taxpayers. Against this background, the CAA considers
important that it maintains the appropriate level of expertise
necessary to support its national safety regulatory obligations,
the DfT, and the interests of the UK civil aviation community
and industry.
How do these matters relate to the Single European Market
69. The goal of a single European market puts pressure
on EASA to achieve common and equal acceptance of national activities.
The current responsibilities are focused initially on the certification
of products, parts and appliances. The ability to carry out this
work varies significantly across EU Member States and EASA must
ensure there is consistency of compliance finding, through the
development of well defined standards for required expertise,
and effective procedures. These must be tested by means of a robust
standardisation system (audit). This will be essential if the
current high airworthiness standards presently achieved in the
UK are to be maintained.
The actual and appropriate extent of Community competence
70. At its start in September, EASA had few staff, none
of whom had any appreciable experience of the civil aviation regulatory
environment. Recruitment at Director level is now almost complete
and further recruitment of some Project Managers and Technical
Assistants is underway. There is as yet no information on how
the lower levels of the Agency will be structured, or when the
posts will be filled.
71. In respect of technical expertise, it is also unclear
how this will be accommodated within the EASA structure. In the
interim, the appointment of a Panel of Technical Experts has been
proposed, with members sought from appropriate bodies outside
the Agency. The size and terms of reference of this panel, and
the qualifications of its expert members, have yet to be defined.
72. Consequently, the CAA has been asked to continue
with the majority of airworthiness certification activities that
it currently undertakes, and in the year ahead, EASA will continue
to rely substantially on the resources of all the NAAs.
The level of detail needed in European regulation
73. The existing standard of airworthiness achieved in
Europe has benefited from a system of detailed certification procedures
and guidance material, harmonised with the FAA, through the work
of the JAA. This has provided consistent interpretation and application
of requirements. Issues have arisen during the early experience
of EASA resulting from the limited detail of the Regulations and
the minimal guidance provided directly by the Agency, primarily
due to its temporary lack of suitably experienced staff.
74. Initial experience has shown that there is an inherent
reluctance to amend regulation, even where such changes may provide
the most effective and efficient means to resolve issues and prevent
unnecessary burdens on the Agency, NAAs and industry. The CAA
supports an approach that minimises the level of detail in Regulations,
with such instruction and guidance being left to other documentation
that can be managed with greater flexibility.
75. The level of detail in European regulation should,
therefore, be such that it ensures that the major principles to
be followed are well defined and that there is proper foundation
for the generation of the support documentation required to achieve
consistency of approach within EASA, as well as by the NAAs.
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
76. The CAA welcomes the involvement of the European
Union in the aspects of aviation described above, and considers
that they have the potential to deliver very significant benefits.
Our key concerns at this time are:
(i) that the Commission should continue to make progress
on liberalisation of air services, particularly with the US, whilst
permitting Member States to take forward sensible amendments to
bilateral agreements that are consistent with overarching EU aviation
policy;
(ii) the Commission moves to allow a more open system
of trading in airport slots to operate in Member States as necessary;
(iii) ensuring that the Commission's emerging secondary
legislation for the Single European Sky remains proportionate
to the objective and that the development of the market is not
hampered by excessive regulation;
(iv) ensuring full participation by military authorities
in the regulation and management of all Single European Sky activities,
through national arrangements;
(v) ensuring common standards of compliance with common
safety rules established by EASA; and
(vi) ensuring that UK safety standards and safety performance
are maintained under the new EASA regime.
January 2004
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