Select Committee on Transport Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200-219)

MR JOHN WEIGHT AND MR TERRY MORGAN

8 DECEMBER 2004

  Q200 Clive Efford: Given the performance of your company over the last year, is your bonus justified?

  Mr Morgan: That obviously is fixed by my remuneration committee. If you wanted to consider the things that we did I understand why in part there is a heavy concentration on availability but my business is not just about availability; it is about project investment, it is about ambience, it is about service points. Yes, we still have a challenge to face on availability but the other targets were achieved. My board decided on that basis that the bonus that I received was commensurate with the achievement of the business.

  Q201 Clive Efford: Did your board consider the implications for industrial relations when they made that decision?

  Mr Morgan: In the context of?

  Q202 Clive Efford: To put it bluntly, resentment amongst the staff who worked extremely hard to deliver the performance that presumably you were paid a bonus for.

  Mr Morgan: I am quite proud of the fact that we had a two-year deal in place at the time that we filed our performance. It included my remuneration. I am also very proud of the fact that we inherited a business where there were only six people under some form of incentive. Today there are 500 people under some form of incentive. This is not just about one individual. This is all about creating a culture that tries to value performance.

  Q203 Clive Efford: This is about one individual. It is about one individual gaining a pretty huge bonus.

  Mr Morgan: As I said, there were 500 people under bonus arrangements going forward.

  Q204 Miss McIntosh: Can you clarify one point which you mentioned about controls in place? In the Railtrack situation, if there was any question of the company going into administration the government acted as a backstop. Are you now saying that that responsibility has passed to TfL?

  Mr Morgan: If Jarvis were placed in some form of administration the administrator would try to find a buyer for the Jarvis interest but would in fact try to find a buyer for the Jarvis business that would include the Tube Lines interest. If a potential buyer was found for that interest, if that ever occurred then, whatever we came back to London Underground with in terms of that recommendation, they would have to approve that transaction. It is not possible suddenly to find buyers for Tube Lines' equity that are unacceptable to London Underground.

  Q205 Miss McIntosh: Mr Weight?

  Mr Weight: It is similar. As far as Metronet is concerned my understanding of that circumstance, if we look first of all at a voluntary sale, is that none of the shareholders can sell now more than 25% of their stake in the first seven and a half years. Even then there will obviously be a dialogue with London Underground and there is also a profit share element to that. There is, of course, a circumstance where the whole company could be taken over, as indeed was the case with Amey. The company owning the shareholding stays in place; it just has another prime owner so that can happen. I think they are similar. I think it is well controlled. It was anticipated during the bidding of the contract because in 30 years it would be quite surprising if it were exactly the same people sitting round the table at the end of the day.

  Q206 Miss McIntosh: Could I ask each of you why did the number of signals passed at danger relating to equipment performance go up from 161 to 208 last year?

  Mr Weight: As far as Metronet is concerned there were two particular problems. One was to do with a batch fault on some signalling lamps that were bought as part of a normal purchase contract, and you would not think that this was a terribly difficult thing to do. They are of special design but they are not complicated as such, but there was a batch fault and those lamps had to be taken out as quickly as we could do that and in the hours available to us we did it. There is also a particular problem with signalling in three distinct areas within the sub-surface lines—one at Farringdon, one at Finchley Road and one down at Southfields on the Wimbledon Line. I draw particular attention to that to demonstrate another point if I may because earlier on this year we had what started off as a rainfall issue, quite frankly. The beds become saturated, the signalling currents are carried by the running rails and so you have a whole issue there about conductivity and the like. With London Underground's co-operation we introduced a new programme. Rather crassly, it is called "Sponge"; you can see why. There were some emergency civil engineering works taken out in each of those three locations. That has improved the signalling performance at Finchley Road and at Farringdon. It has not solved the problem at Southfields. That requires a more technical solution and again we are working very closely with our partners, London Underground, to find a solution that we can introduce to improve the reliability of that section of line. It is further complicated by the fact that the line is owned by Network Rail.

  Q207 Miss McIntosh: Thank you. Mr Morgan?

  Mr Morgan: There has been an improvement. I have one particular problem area right now, which is on the Northern Line in the tunnel. Tim made reference to bobbing, which is the track moving as the train moves over it and therefore the position of the rail can sometimes not be where we would wish it to be and therefore we lose the signal or we get a signal when we should not and that is when we would get a technical spad. I think it is an example of the flexibility of PPP in that we have identified that we have a particular problem on the Northern Line in that area and we have re-prioritised our work programme for the early part of 2005 and we will be re-railing that area much earlier than we had anticipated given what we had previously understood to be the asset condition.

  Q208 Miss McIntosh: Mr Weight, in Metronet's annual review you say, "The long term replacement of key drainage systems will, however, take a number of years to complete", and you refer specifically to the example you gave of Southfields. Why should we consider these signals as safe in the interim?

  Mr Weight: They do fail/safe. I think that was a point that Mr O'Toole made. That is different from the overground railway in that if there is any element of failure within the signalling system then generally it is understood that it fails safe and a mechanical device will stop the train. I think the solution to Southfields is more technical than simply drainage. It is an element of it. We have got the same bobbing problem that Terry has just talked about and we there is also an issue, if you will forgive me, without going into the technicalities, of using third-rail systems versus fourth-rail systems, this whole interface system with Network Rail. There is possibly a solution using a piece of equipment called an isolating transformer and we are prepared at our risk to go ahead with installing a number of these to see whether it helps solve the problem. Ultimately, the signalling will have to be replaced wholesale across that whole section of line; there is no doubt about that.

  Q209 Miss McIntosh: Could I ask each of you to give us an indication of whether assaults on staff have gone down and what the scale of that is, and also what problem graffiti is on your trains?

  Mr Weight: Assaults on staff are something which I fully understand the criticality of as far as those people working for Mr O'Toole are concerned. It is not a particular issue for me running the infrastructure side of things, and the reason is, of course, that the very clear divide between the PPP and London Underground is that they look after the customer-facing operations. I provide all of the infrastructure that goes in support of that. Graffiti is an issue and I do not think I can say much more than Mr O'Toole reported. We are still getting around 800-1,000 hits a day on the trains on the sub-surface fleet. We are just about on top of it but at no small cost. I do believe that we have to show commitment. I believe we have to see this thing out over the next few years and I wholeheartedly support the initiatives that Mr O'Toole is taking in this respect.

  Q210 Mr Donohoe: What is it that you companies have that was not able to be done beforehand? What is it that you achieve that they could not?

  Mr Morgan: Can I use a few examples? In an organisation like London Underground there is enormous bureaucracy, some of which is well founded, which is intended to maintain a safe regime, but some of which it is very difficult sometimes to comprehend the value-added of. By bringing someone like Metronet or Tube Lines in it is very easy for us to come in new and start to challenge what has become the status quo. I have commented many times that we did a relatively small job on a part of the railway. I needed 60 signatures to hand it back as being assured for use. The only individual that did not sign that piece of paper was the project manager but that was what the system drove you to do. We have been able to say, "That has just got to stop". We are now down to one signature. We have worked with London Underground, and that is the sort of change we are trying to make. At Green Park we are doing an escalator refurbishment. I have heard the complaint so many times that the hoardings go up and it is silence behind the hoardings. There cannot be anything happening behind there. On average it took between 26 and 35 weeks to do escalator refurbishments on that scale. Today we are trying to do it in 10 weeks. We have gone to the guys and said, "What do you need to do this job much quicker than you ever have before?". Some of it was better planning, some of it was the tools to do the job. Those are the sorts of things that we have been trying to change in terms of what I think we bring fresh to the deal.

  Q211 Mr Donohoe: I find it very difficult to get my head round this in terms of why it is that it could not be undertaken by the existing regime. All of what you have said with good management could have been undertaken, not to bring about, as has been said before by others, the whole question of introducing profit and bonuses. What difference have you made, because I am looking at your targets and whatever else and nothing seems to have been achieved?

  Mr Weight: I hope, Mr Donohoe, that we might convince you that we are on the way to changing things and our reports indicate that there is progress. There is still much to do. I guess what I am going to say may strike at the heart of this. I have worked in both sectors, the public sector and the private sector, and I have seen transition through public and private. I believe the private sector brings a particular culture and yes, profit is an element. It brings a drive, it brings a focus, it brings an enthusiasm and a commitment. Above most things it brings the right spirit of accountability for delivery. I have to say that in my experience those elements are often missing in the public sector.

  Q212 Chairman: Mr Weight, I think we would be a bit more impressed by this if you had not had problems with performance, derailments, lost customer hours and similar rates of rolling stock failures as before the PPP.

  Mr Weight: Madam Chair, I refer back to the report that we have submitted to you and what you have asked for now, which is more detail on performance. I believe I can address each of those issues and give a good account of how we have improved.

  Q213 Mr Donohoe: Can I ask Mr Morgan something specific? Why is it that the number of rolling stock failure on lines operated by you has increased since the transfer?

  Mr Morgan: I really would need to check that because my statistics suggest that it has gone down by about 40%.

  Q214 Chairman: So you dispute the Transport for London figures?

  Mr Morgan: I can only give you the numbers that we reported. On fleet there has been a reduction—and these are incidents per month—of 38%.

  Q215 Mr Donohoe: I am looking specifically at TfL's submission to us and it is indicating something quite different from that. Is it acceptable for you to say what you have just said when we are looking at the reverse of that? In the most recent quarter, for instance, there are only two days where zero delays have occurred on the Northern Line. Why is that the situation if you are saying something different?

  Mr Morgan: We are not saying something different. I have to say with regard to the expression that you have just used about zero delay days that we did not have one single zero delay day in the first six months of inheriting the assets that we took from London Underground. It is one of our metrics when we do have a zero delay date that we celebrate it. Compared to where we were historically we are now getting at least one or two. That may not sound impressive but at the moment our figures are significantly higher than 12 months ago. If you are interested I can provide that information to you. We measure that every single day.

  Q216 Mr Donohoe: You seem to be confident in things that I cannot see on a daily basis by using the service. This is a problem that I am facing as far as your companies are concerned. You have targets that you are suggesting you are going to achieve. Thirty trains an hour is a target on lines that have got the worst results with the worst delay factors within them. I just cannot see you being able to undertake what you are promising.

  Mr Morgan: Can I quote to you from the TfL report that was issued last month, that the last quarter was the best quarter in performance terms in seven years? Can I also refer you to the TfL report which said last month that the Jubilee Line had its best performance since the JLE was commissioned? I am not suggesting in any shape or form that we have got the system where we wish it to be, but this was a very unreliable poorly-maintained set of assets that we inherited and it will take time to deliver.

  Q217 Chairman: Which is why you got more elastic targets.

  Mr Morgan: We have targets to improve and that is why they exist, quite right.

  Mr Weight: The important thing is what you say: it is the experience of the customers. We can quote the statistics, we are looking at trends. We do gather information and put it in a particular form. I think it is still there for us to do so that we can convince the travelling public that the system has improved. I think we have all indicated that that through investment is going to take some time. We are dealing with ageing assets. We are putting a lot of money in resource behind maintaining and, where we can, improving those assets. The statistics are one thing; the personal experience is another. I will grant that.

  Q218 Mr Donohoe: It says in your annual report that London Underground claim not to have received any information about the progress with the Victoria Phase One upgrade or, for that matter, for the Central Line upgrade. Can you explain this lack of reporting?

  Mr Weight: It is not my experience. In fact, each of these projects is discussed each month at a performance meeting which I attend. Only the other week we took the second visit down to the signal supplier for the Victoria Line at Chippenham and we had a full day down there to examine progress. We have made a lot of advances since the first 12 months report and that is a good thing.

  Q219 Mr Donohoe: When you look at the specifics, and you mentioned the specifics, or when you look at the Bond Street escalator overrun which caused, we are told, an estimated 570,000 customers lost by the delay on that, that is more than was caused by the Chancery Lane derailment. That was only 550,000. These are figures that are specific, that are seen by the public, and as a matter of fact have been presented to us in a way that is negative and demonstrating that you are not worth being put in to manage the system.

  Mr Weight: I understand your point. Both of those incidents are related because they happened well over a year ago. The Chancery Lane incident itself happened just before our watch but we took on the consequences of it. Bond Street was an inherited project and there were undoubtedly resources that were diverted onto the challenge of getting the Central Line trains back rather than repairing the escalator. The two things are related and both events were around 18 months ago.


 
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